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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE
OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XXXVII (1999)



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Walter of Burley: His Life and Works

JENNIFER OTTMAN & REGA WOOD

Walter of Burley was born in 1274-1275, probably at the village of Burley-in-Wharfedale, Yorkshire.¹ His education was long and complete; he was an Oxford Master of Arts by 1301 and a Parisian Master of Theology by 1324. His experience of the world was wide: when studying at Paris, he held a quodlibetal disputation at Toulouse. He entered the service of Edward III in 1327 as an ambassador to the papal court at Avignon, acquiring the title of king's clerk by the time of a second mission to Avignon in 1330. In about 1333, he joined the circle of Richard de Bury, named in that year to the see of Durham, whose patronage he enjoyed for about ten years. Burley found himself imprisoned for a forestry offense in 1336. On his release, he traveled over-seas on the king's business in 1338-1339, held a quodlibetal disputation in Bologna in 1341, and presented one of his books to Clement VI at Avignon in 1343. He died at the age of about 70 in 1344 or shortly thereafter. Like so many good things, his life can be divided into three parts: nine years at Oxford (1301-1310), sixteen years at Paris (1310-1326), and seventeen years as a clerical courtier in Britain and at Avignon (1327-1344).

Not the least of the problems confronting students of Walter Burley is that he wrote a great deal; there are about fifty authentic works, a number of which exist in more than one redaction. The work which we know best, the *Physics commentary*, the twenty-fourth of the works enumerated by James A. Weisheipl, illustrates the situation. Weisheipl listed five different works by Burley on the *Physics*, Charles H. Lohr eliminated one as inauthentic, and we discarded a second because it was written in a manuscript dated before 1250.² Of the three remaining, the first could be

¹ For biographical information, see A.B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500*, 3 vols., Oxford 1957-59, s.v. "Burley, Walter de," vol. 1, 312-4; and C. Martin, *Walter Burley*, in: *Oxford Studies Presented to Daniel Callus*, Oxford 1964, 194-230 (Oxford Historical Studies, n.s. XVI).

² Rega Wood, *Walter Burley's Physics Commentaries*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 44 (1984), 275-327; James A. Weisheipl, *Repertorium Mertonense*, in: *Mediaeval Studies*, 31 (1969), 174-224, at no. 24, 197-98; Charles H. Lohr, *Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Authors G-I*, in:

plausibly attributed to Burley's Oxford period and was certainly written before 1316, the second was probably written at Paris before 1322; most of the last was written at Paris between 1324 and 1327 and completed at the suggestion of Richard de Bury between 1334 and 1337.³

Burley was not an author who ordinarily wrote from scratch; like many others he usually started with a base text. He even reused dedicatory letters.⁴ In cases where the base text is not his own, such as the *Ethics* and *Politics* commentaries where the base is St. Thomas' exposition,⁵ this practice makes it difficult to evaluate Burley's importance and independence. We do not mean to suggest that Burley was unoriginal, but rather to warn that in this, as in other cases, the medieval practice of paraphrasing and quoting without acknowledgement can mislead the unwary. In the case of the *Physics* commentary, one important base of the *Paris Questions* is the *Oxford Exposition*. Similarly, parts of both the *Oxford Exposition* and the *Paris Questions* are incorporated in the *De Bury Commentary*. As with many authors and teachers, when he began each project, in the first books, Burley made radical changes in the base. There is less difference between the base and the new work at the end. So, for example, Ockham is an important source and a central opponent in books I to V of the final commentary, but this is less the case in the later books.⁶ On the one hand, that's not surprising since Ockham's *Physics commentary* is cut short near the beginning of book VII. But perhaps it is surprising that Burley did not look elsewhere; in fact VII and VIII, the books Burley specially prepared for Richard de Bury, according to Weisheipl look most like a revision of the earliest *Oxford Exposition*.⁷

Traditio, 24 (1968), 149-245, at no. 17-20, 179-81; and idem, *Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries: Addenda et corrigenda*, in: Bulletin de philosophie médiévale, 14 (1972), 116-26, at 121.

³ See also on the final commentary Anneliese Maier, *Handschriftliches zu Wilhelm Ockham und Walter Burley*, in: Anneliese Maier, *Ausgehendes Mittelalter: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte I*, Rome 1964, 209-35, at 226-27, who states that the beginning of book VII in Vatican, Vat. lat. 2150 is different from the usual form, perhaps dating from the first period of composition.

⁴ Martin (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 225.

⁵ On the *Ethics* see Risto Saarinen, *Walter Burley on Akrasia: Second Thoughts*, elsewhere in this volume; on the *Politics* see Lowrie J. Daly, *Walter Burley and John Wyclif on Some Aspects of Kingship*, in: *Mélanges Eugène Tisserant*, vol. 4, *Archives vaticanes; Histoire ecclésiastique: Première partie*, Vatican City 1964, 163-84, at 179-84 (Studi e testi CCXXXIV); and idem, *Some Notes on Walter Burley's Commentary on the Politics*, in: T.A. Sandquist and M.R. Powicke (eds.), *Essays in Medieval History Presented to Bertie Wilkinson*, Toronto 1969, 270-81, at 279-81.

⁶ Wood (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 296.

⁷ Weisheipl, *Ockham and Some Mertonians*, in: *Mediaeval Studies*, 30 (1968), 163-213, at 182-3.

So there is some question about the significance of the works prepared for Richard de Bury and other patrons near the end of Burley's life. It is possible, for example, that a work ostensibly completed in 1337 was in fact written for the most part in 1305. To add to our uncertainties, we do not know what base (if any) Burley used when he began lecturing on the *Physics*.

Apart from difficulties about dating, there are problems with the text; there is no modern edition of Burley's *Physics*. Only the final commentary is printed at all, and collation of the surviving manuscripts suggests that the publisher was not extraordinarily fortunate in his choice of manuscripts. Working on the question of motion in a vacuum, we found plenty of homeoteleutons and other mistaken readings.⁸ As is so often the case in discussing medieval authors, working on Burley requires either some skating on thin ice (as we are doing here) or an inordinate investment of time.

The aim of this paper, however, is the less ambitious one of attempting to make sense of as many as possible of the remaining works attributed to Burley in chronological terms. We will try to distinguish what remains from the Oxford, Paris, and court years. Works about whose dating we could find nothing we have simply omitted from this account; though we cannot resist hinting at evidence of what appears to be another lost work, the *Tractatus de novem generibus accidentium* to which Burley refers on more than one occasion.⁹ Despite the limitations we put on this study, it is an endeavor in which we surely need help in the form of corrections and additions, which we will gratefully receive. In addition to the lists compiled by Weisheipl and Lohr already cited, those looking on their own should also consult the bibliography which appears in this volume and the one published in the SIEPM *Bulletin* 30 (1988), which includes a reference to Mary Shriver's St. Bonaventure master's thesis.¹⁰ That 1958 thesis includes yet another list of manuscripts, a list which includes quite a number of manuscripts not listed by Weisheipl.

⁸ See Wood, *Walter Burley on Motion in a Vacuum*, in: *Traditio*, 45 (1989-90), 191-217, at 207-17.

⁹ For example, Walter Burley, *In Physicam Aristotelis expositio et quaestiones*, Venice 1501 [facsimile reprint, Hildesheim-New York 1972], f. 8^{vb}: "Alias rationes multas feci ad hanc cognitionem in tractatu de novem generibus accidentium: sed ista causa brevitatis sufficiant ad praesens."

¹⁰ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 185-208; Lohr 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 171-87; Lohr 1972 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 121; Wood, *Studies on Walter Burley 1968-1988*, in: *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*, 30 (1988), 233-50; and Mary Ellen Shriver, *The Tractatus de universalibus of Walter Burley*, M.A. thesis, St. Bonaventure University, 1958, 7-27.

1. *Oxford*

At Oxford Burley was a fellow of Merton College. Merton fellows ordinarily completed their preliminary studies at other colleges. Since Burley came from the North, and Balliol College was intended for northern scholars, who were required to move on when they were ready for inception, C. Martin suggests that Burley may have studied first at Balliol College.¹¹ Burley's regency in Arts at Merton College was long, from 1300 to 1310 according to Weisheipl.¹²

Burley's earliest surviving works are logical; they include both independent treatises and commentaries. If it were not for the title found in a single manuscript of a commentary *In Perihermenias*¹³ and a colophon found in one manuscript of his *Obligationes*,¹⁴ Merton College records would suggest that Burley was not yet a Master of Arts in 1305.¹⁵ Fortunately, not only do we have a dated work from 1301 whose title states that its author was a Master of Arts, but it is both printed and edited. Stephen F. Brown edited Burley's 1302 *Oxford Questions on the Perihermenias* in 1974.¹⁶ It is a work in which Burley argues against the views of Avicenna, Albert the Great, Henry of Ghent, St. Thomas, and Giles of Rome. Burley prefers the position of Godfrey of Fontaines to these authors.¹⁷

With regard to the *Perihermenias*, the situation is similar to that of the *Physics*, except that there are four surviving works: an elementary summary as well as questions, followed by two others, the *Middle Commentary* probably written at Paris and the *Final Commentary* completed when Burley was a member of the circle of Richard de Bury in 1337.¹⁸ Though

¹¹ Martin (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 202.

¹² Although based on his absence from the Merton bursars' roll of Easter to August 1307, Martin considers him to have left Oxford by that point, i.e., between 1305 and Easter 1307: *ibid.*, 202. Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 175, n. 56, quotes London, Lambeth 70, f. 109^{vb}: "Explicit tractatus de puritate artis logice mag. Walteri Burley Anglici, optimi logici, famosi naturalis philosophi, et subtilis theologi, utpote qui in universitate Oxon. quammultis anni rexit in artibus et tandem Parisius in theologica facultate."

¹³ "Questiones quinque date a mag. Waltero de Burley super librum Peryarmenias a.d. 1301": Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 4a, 188; Lohr 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 7, 177.

¹⁴ "Explicit optimus tractatus de obligationibus datus a mag. Waltero de Burley anno domini Millesimo trecentesimo secundo": Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 20a, 196.

¹⁵ He is listed as a fellow but not given the title of magister: Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 175.

¹⁶ Stephen F. Brown, *Walter Burley's Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 34 (1974), 200-95, at 202-95.

¹⁷ Brown 1974 (*op.cit.*, above n. 16), 200.

¹⁸ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 4a,b,c, 188; no. 7, 189; Lohr 1968 (*op.cit.*,

it contains passages taken verbatim from the *Middle Commentary*, the *Final Commentary*, which is a part of *Super artem veterem*, also retracts views stated in the *Middle Commentary*,¹⁹ so it is an important independent work.

Even after eliminating one commentary as the work of William Milverly,²⁰ Weisheipl found six versions of the commentary on the *Liber sex principiorum*, if we include the version in the *De Bury Super artem veterem*.²¹ This is a rare case, where we have two post Parisian versions.²² The early versions rely heavily on Albertus Magnus and were written before Burley's contact with Ockham.²³ At least one probably comes from the Oxford period; its colophon refers to it as the "*expositio vetus*."²⁴

Mercifully, Weisheipl lists only three versions of the *Tractatus de obligationibus*.²⁵ No one has commented on the third, preserved only in Erfurt and attributed to Burley in the catalogue of 1412.²⁶ But debate rages about the other two: one written in 1302 and the other before that time. The authenticity of the 1302 *Obligationes* is generally accepted; more questionable is the authenticity of the much shorter treatise (three times shorter).²⁷ Martin Grabmann rejected the attribution to Burley of the short treatise;²⁸ Weisheipl accepted it.²⁹ There are four surviving manuscripts, two at Paris and one at Erfurt and Venice. One Parisian manuscript attributes the work to a "Master W." in a colophon. The other

above n. 2), no. 1-2, 173-74; no. 4, 174-76; no. 7, 177. The middle commentary has also been edited by Brown, *Walter Burley's Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Perihermeneias*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 33 (1973), 42-134, at 45-134.

¹⁹ Brown 1973 (*op.cit.*, above n. 18), 43.

²⁰ Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 178, n. 71.

²¹ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 3a,b,c,d,e, 186-7; no. 7, 189. See also *Quaestiones de arte vetere: De universalibus, de predicamentis et de sex principiis*, *ibid.*, no. 6, 188-89. Lohr 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 3-4, 174-6.

²² Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 3e, 187: "Et istam opinionem tenui Parisius et eam declaravi in primo tractatu de formis accidentalibus."

²³ Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 178.

²⁴ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 3c, 187.

²⁵ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 20a,b,c, 196.

²⁶ Wilhelm Schum, *Beschreibendes Verzeichnis der amptonianischen Handschriften-Sammlung zu Erfurt*, no. O. 76, Berlin 1887, 733; *Mittelalterliche Bibliothekskataloge Deutschlands und der Schweiz*, vol. 2, *Bistum Mainz: Erfurt*, ed. Paul Lehmann, Munich 1928, Logica no. 11, 17.

²⁷ Both are edited in Romuald Green, *An Introduction to the Logical Treatise "De obligationibus": With Critical Texts of William of Sherwood (?) and Walter Burley*, 2 vols., Ph.D. diss., Université catholique de Louvain, 1963, the 1302 treatise at 2:34-96 and the earlier treatise, ascribed to William of Sherwood, at 2:1-33.

²⁸ Martin Grabmann, *Die Introductiones in logicam des Wilhelm von Shyreswood († nach 1267): Literarhistorische Einleitung und Textausgabe*, Munich 1937, 21-3 (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Abteilung, 1937, X).

²⁹ Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 179.

Parisian manuscript and the Erfurt manuscript from which it was copied include a colophon attributing the work to Walter Burley. The Venetian manuscript includes both a title attributing the work to Burley and a colophon attributing it to William Sherwood; that colophon has been crossed out.³⁰ Romuald Green, who edited both treatises in his Louvain dissertation, rejected the attribution to Burley on account of inconsistencies between the views stated in the shorter and the longer version. He laid greatest weight on the fact that the longer 1302 *Obligationes* rejected a view stated in the earlier treatise, introducing it with the words "*quidam dicunt*."³¹

By contrast, Paul Vincent Spade and Eleonore Stump believe that the difference in opinion is the sort of change in views an author might make.³² Contrary to Weisheipl, Spade and Stump as well as Green agree that the short treatise is the early one; they also agree that the author of the longer treatise knew the shorter treatise. It is our view that the presumption is in favor of the evidence of the colophons and for the authenticity of the short early treatise. But if that is so, we have a work written before 1302: that would be as early or earlier than what was previously described as Burley's earliest work, the 1301 *Perihermenias* commentary. On the other hand, perhaps the title of earliest work should itself be reassigned to the *Quaestiones super III De anima* recently edited by Edward A. Synan and ascribed to *dominus* Walter Burley, the title of a bachelor of arts,³³ or to some version of the *De consequentiis* edited by N.J. Green-Pedersen, who identifies the copy of that treatise found with the 1302 *Obligationes* as a revised redaction.³⁴

According to L.M. de Rijk, both the 1302 *Obligationes* and the *De consequentiis* form part of a group of six treatises which made up a course

³⁰ Green 1963 (*op.cit.*, above n. 27), 1:186-7.

³¹ Green 1963 (*op.cit.*, above n. 27), 1:189-94.

³² Paul Vincent Spade and Eleonore Stump, *Walter Burley and the Obligationes Attributed to William of Sherwood*, in: *History and Philosophy of Logic*, 4 (1983), 9-26.

³³ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 32b, 200-1; Lohr 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 29, 182-83; and the text in Adam Burley and Walter Burley, *Questions on the De anima of Aristotle by Magister Adam Burley and Dominus Walter Burley*, ed. Edward A. Synan, Leiden-New York-Cologne 1997, 76-156 (*Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters* LVI). The title appears in the running head of the unique manuscript, Cambridge, Gonville & Caius 668*, f. 158^v-173^r: see Edward A. Synan, *Introduction*, in Adam Burley and Walter Burley, vii-lxiii, at x-xii.

³⁴ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 19a, 195; N.J. Green-Pedersen, *Walter Burley's "De consequentiis": An Edition*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 40 (1980), 102-66, dating at 108-10, text at 113-63.

of logic as it was taught at that time,³⁵ a connection which has encouraged most modern authors to date all six together. If we suppose that they make up a single logic course offered in 1302, then perhaps it makes sense that only the last of the treatises, the *Obligationes*, is actually dated by the scribe. The first is the *Suppositiones*, edited by Stephen Brown and dated in 1302, firstly on account of its presence in two manuscripts containing other works from that period and secondly because Burley calls it "a work of his youth."³⁶ Here a caveat is in order: not all of the works of Burley's youth belong to the Oxford period. Burley appears to have called works written in 1326 as well as works written in 1302 "works of his youth."³⁷ Edited by De Rijk, *De exceptivis* and *De exclusivis* are the second and third treatises in the group.³⁸ The fourth is *De consequentiis*, and the fifth, *De insolubilibus*, is also dated 1302 by De Rijk.³⁹

Brown described the *Suppositiones* as an early treatment of an important topic in the *De puritate*; its treatment of relative supposition was copied and accepted by Ockham in his *Summa logicae*.⁴⁰ Something similar could probably be said about the other five treatises. For purposes of simplicity we will call this group of six treatises Burley's *Logic of 1302*.

Possibly also belonging to the Oxford period is the *Posterior analytics commentary*, of which there may be as many as three redactions: exposition, summary and questions.⁴¹ The *Exposition* is based on Albertus Magnus and Grosseteste.⁴² The *Quaestiones*, perhaps to be dated before 1307 together with the *De potentiis animae*,⁴³ have been edited in a 1981

³⁵ L.M. de Rijk, *Walter Burley's Tract De exclusivis: An Edition*, in: *Vivarium*, 23 (1985), 23-54, at 23.

³⁶ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 12, 191; Brown, *Walter Burleigh's Treatise De suppositionibus and Its Influence on William of Ockham*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 32 (1972), 15-64, text at 31-64, dating at 16.

³⁷ Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 182.

³⁸ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 16-17, 195; De Rijk, *Walter Burley's De exceptivis: An Edition*, in: *Vivarium*, 24 (1986), 22-49, at 23-49; De Rijk 1985 (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 28-54.

³⁹ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 21, 196; text in M.L. Roure, *La problématique des propositions insolubles au XIII^e siècle et au début du XIV^e, suivie de l'édition des traités de W. Shyreswood, W. Burleigh et Th. Bradwardine*, in: *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du moyen âge*, 45 (1970), 205-326, at 262-84; De Rijk, *Some Notes on the Mediaeval Tract De insolubilibus, with the Edition of a Tract Dating from the End of the Twelfth Century*, in: *Vivarium*, 4 (1966), 83-115, at 87.

⁴⁰ Brown 1972 (*op.cit.*, above n. 36), 16, 25-26, 27.

⁴¹ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 9a,b,c, 190; Lohr 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 9-10, 177-78.

⁴² Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 178.

⁴³ For the date see Synan 1997 (*op.cit.*, above n. 33), *Introduction*, x-xi; and idem, *Introduction*,

Toronto dissertation;⁴⁴ the summary is described by Weisheipl as of doubtful authenticity⁴⁵ and by Robert Andrews as a mere list of conclusions.⁴⁶

The last of the logical works which may have been written at Oxford is the *Elenchi commentary*, which survives only in English manuscripts.⁴⁷ Again there are at least two versions: *Questions* and an *Exposition* or *Treatise*, also known as *Modus arguendi*. The *Questions* survive only in an early 14th century manuscript, and no one has written on it recently. By contrast both Sten Ebbesen and Clemens Kopp have written on the *De modo arguendi*.⁴⁸ Kopp has ascribed a third version to Burley which he calls the *Fallaciae breves*, along with one of four versions or adaptations of the thirteenth-century textbook *Fallaciae ad modum Oxoniae* edited in parallel in his dissertation, and a commentary to the *Logica* "*Cum sit nostra*" found in the same manuscript.⁴⁹ All four of the *Fallaciae ad modum Oxoniae* treatises are

in: Richard of Campsall, *The Works of Richard of Campsall. Vol. 1, Questiones super librum Priorum Analeticorum: MS Gonville and Caius 668**, ed. Edward A. Synan, Toronto 1968, 11-34, at 18-19 (Studies and Texts XVII). For the *De potentiis animae* see Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 33, 201-2; and the text in M. Jean Kitchel, *The "De potentiis animae" of Walter Burley*, in: *Mediaeval Studies*, 33 (1971), 85-113, at 88-113. According to S. Harrison Thomson there exists a medieval Hebrew translation of this work: S. Harrison Thomson, *The De anima of Robert Grosseteste*, in: *New Scholasticism*, 7 (1933), 201-21, at 202.

⁴⁴ Publication of Walter Burley, *Quaestiones super librum Posteriorum*, ed. Mary Catherine Sommers, is under discussion with the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, Canada.

⁴⁵ Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 178.

⁴⁶ Personal communication.

⁴⁷ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 11a,b, 191; cf. *ibid.*, no. 22 (*De sophismatibus cum sua sophisteria*), 196, although the authenticity of this work has been questioned by Jan Pinborg, *Walter Burley on Exclusives*, in: H.A.G. Braakhuis, C.H. Kneepkens, L.M. de Rijk (eds.), *English Logic and Semantics: From the End of the Twelfth Century to the Time of Ockham and Burleigh: Acts of the 4th European Symposium on Mediaeval Logic and Semantics, Leiden-Nijmegen, 23-27 April 1979*, Nijmegen 1981, 305-29, at 307 (*Artistarium, Supplementa* I). Lohr 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 13-14, 178-79.

⁴⁸ Sten Ebbesen, *OXYNAT: A Theory about the Origins of British Logic*, in: P. Osmund Lewry (ed.), *The Rise of British Logic: Acts of the Sixth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Balliol College, Oxford, 19-24 June 1983*, Toronto 1985, 1-17, at 3 (*Papers in Mediaeval Studies* VII).

⁴⁹ Clemens Kopp, *Die "Fallaciae ad modum Oxoniae": Ein Fehlschlußtraktat aus dem 13. Jahrhundert*, Ph.D. diss., Universität zu Köln, 1985, ascription to Burley at xxviii-xxxi, text at 4-153; *idem*, *Die Fallaciae breves (ad modum Oxoniae)—ein Werk Walter Burleys?*, in: *Aristotelisches Erbe im arabisch-lateinischen Mittelalter: Übersetzungen, Kommentare, Interpretationen*, Berlin-New York 1986, 119-24 (*Miscellanea mediaevalia* XVIII); and text in *idem*, *Ein kurzer Fehlschlußtraktat: Die Fallaciae breves (ad modum Oxoniae): London, British Museum, Royal MSS 12 F XIX, 104rb-105vb*, in: Albert Zimmermann, with Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem (eds.), *Studien zur mittelalterlichen Geistesgeschichte und ihren Quellen*, Berlin-New York 1982, 262-77, at 263-73 (*Miscellanea mediaevalia* XV). See also De Rijk, *Logica modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic*, 2 vols. in 3, Assen 1962-67, vol. 2, pt. 1, 445-6 (*Wijsgerige teksten en studies* VI, XVI).

very similar to each other, with lots of verbatim borrowing. So the presumption is that Kopp is right. But to say the least it complicates the situation. For it might equally be that what Kopp has found is the base text or texts Burley used in lecturing on the *Elenchi*.

As stated in the introduction, we tentatively attribute the earliest of Burley's *Physics* commentaries to the Oxford period. Apart from such derring-do in dating by modern authors, the attentive will note that there is little evidence for attributing works to the Oxford period. There is a title in one of three manuscripts of the *Oxford Questions on the Perihermenias* and a colophon in one of two manuscripts of the *1302 Obligationes*. That is a circumstance which might prompt the prudent to wonder whether these early Oxford productions even have the same author as the famous works published in 1330s. Here the work of Brown, who has published some of the earliest of these works, offers reassurance. Brown points to close parallels in the first *Questions*, the *Paris Exposition*, and the *Final Commentary* of Burley's *In Perihermenias*.⁵⁰ For the first book of the *1302 Logic*, Brown lists parallel passages in the *De puritate artis logicae*.⁵¹ So one advantage of Burley's reuse of earlier redactions is greater certainty that we are dealing with works by a single author.

2. *Paris*

Burley's clerical career began in 1309, when he was admitted as rector of Welbury, Yorkshire, a position he owed to Sir John de Lisle, a friend of the Archbishop of York, William of Greenfield. An acolyte, Burley took this position in order to finance his study of theology at Paris; throughout his pastoral career he employed substitutes.

Along with the income from his first rectory, Burley received permission to study and to take holy orders abroad. At Paris, Burley strengthened his ties with Bishop Greenfield by acting as a companion to Greenfield's nephew, Baldwin of St Albans, who received a Yorkshire rectory at the same time as Burley. Papal reservation of a benefice in the gift of the bishop of Lincoln was conferred on Burley at the petition of William Testa, cardinal of S. Ciriaco, in 1317, notwithstanding Welbury.⁵² That is, Burley received the promise of a new rectory before leaving the last, but he did not occupy two rectories simultaneously.⁵³ Burley's Lincoln

⁵⁰ Brown 1973 (*op.cit.*, above n. 18), 43; Brown 1974 (*op.cit.*, above n. 16), 201.

⁵¹ Brown 1972 (*op.cit.*, above n. 36), 26-7, n. 43.

⁵² See Emden (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 312.

⁵³ See Martin (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 214, n. 3.

rectory was Pytchley, Northhamptonshire, to which he was admitted in 1320; by 1321, Burley was a priest.

Although many of his printed works seem to have been finally completed during his years as a courtier, intellectually the most exciting period in Burley's life must have been at Paris shortly after he completed his lectures on the *Sentences*, when he first encountered and reacted against William of Ockham's logic and natural philosophy. Burley and Ockham studied theology at the same time, Burley at Paris, Ockham at Oxford. Both Burley and Ockham began their studies around 1310 and completed their *Sentences* lectures around 1320. After completing their theology degrees, both returned to a consideration of logic and natural philosophy.

The most serious loss with regard to Burley's works are his lectures on theology. His Parisian *Sentences commentary* has not survived. (Edith Dudley Sylla doubts whether an *Ordinatio* was prepared, but not presumably the existence of a *Reportatio*).⁵⁴ However, since in his *Tractatus primus* Burley adverts to the material covered in the fourth book of that work, we may assume that some of the same material which was treated originally in the fourth book is repeated in the *Tractatus primus*.⁵⁵ By contrast to the *Tractatus primus*, the fragmentary theological question discovered by S. Harrison Thomson tells us nothing about Burley's theological views—the denial that Christian salvation is possible by natural means being a view universally held.⁵⁶

At Paris, Burley was associated with Thomas Wilton, whom Burley calls his *socius* and reverend master in the *Tractatus primus*.⁵⁷ Weisheipl believed that Wilton was Burley's chief opponent in the *Tractatus primus* as well as his reverend master, but Sylla considers that an open question.⁵⁸ Like Burley, Wilton had been at Merton College, where he was a fellow from 1288 to 1301. Wilton became a Parisian master of theology in 1314 and Chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral in London in 1320,

⁵⁴ Edith Dudley Sylla, *Walter Burley's Tractatus primus: Evidence Concerning the Relations of Disputations and Written Works*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 44 (1984), 257-74, at 261.

⁵⁵ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 44, 204.

⁵⁶ Thomson, *An Unnoticed Questio theologica of Walter Burley*, in: *Medievalia et Humanistica*, 6 (1950), 84-88, text at 87-88. For a correction to Thomson's interpretation, see Martin (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 209, n. 2.

⁵⁷ Martin (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 207-8.

⁵⁸ Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 185-6; Sylla 1984 (*op.cit.*, above n. 54), 258. Weisheipl assumes that Burley's opponent is the same throughout, while Sylla considers this uncertain.

but received permission to remain abroad until 1322. Since Burley mentions his master's promotion to Chancellor in the work, the *Tractatus primus* has to be dated after 1320. Since Burley probably incepted before Wilton actually left for London, around November 1, 1322, when Wilton's permission to be absent from St. Paul's expired, it seems reasonable to suppose that Burley incepted in 1322 or not long after.⁵⁹

The *Tractatus primus* grew out of the discussion which followed Burley's inaugural lecture on the fourth book of the *Sentences*, just as Ockham's *De sacramento altaris* addresses questions raised in his fourth book. Indeed, it seems to us that Burley's *Tractatus primus* was written after his lectures on the *Sentences* and before he became a master, and should be dated between 1320 and 1322, correlating with the dates suggested for the associated *Quaestio utrum contradictio sit maxima oppositio*, the first half of the 1320s, and *Tractatus secundus*, between 1320 and 1323.⁶⁰ One problem with that suggestion is that it is generally assumed that the *Tractatus primus* was written after Burley became a master of theology, because when it was written he had already held a quodlibet at Toulouse: *De primo et ultimo instanti*.⁶¹ However, the objection holds only if we believe that Masters of Arts could not hold quodlibetal disputations; surely at Toulouse, there would be no obstacle to Burley's holding such a quodlibet on a question in logic and physics before becoming a Parisian master of theology (Sylla also appears to hold this view).⁶²

⁵⁹ Assuming, of course, that by referring to Wilton as his "reverend master" Burley meant to indicate that he incepted under him, an assumption which does make it rather difficult to explain his simultaneous use of the title "*socius*."

⁶⁰ On the *quaestio* see De Rijk, *Burley's So-Called Tractatus primus, with an Edition of the Additional Quaestio "Utrum contradictio sit maxima oppositio,"* in: *Vivarium*, 34 (1996), 161-91, at 164, with text at 176-91, and Maier, *Handschriftliches zu Wilhelm Ockham und Walter Burley. Nachtrag*, in: Maier, *Ausgehendes Mittelalter: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts I*, Rome 1964, 469-79 at 474; and the version of the text based on a different ms from the four used by De Rijk in Ryszard Palacz, *Gualterii Burlei quaestio: Utrum contradictio sit maxima oppositio (Ms. Vat. Ottob. 318 f. 141va-145vb)*, in: *Mediaevalia philosophica polonorum*, 11 (1963), 128-39. On the *tractatus*, see Maier, *Zu Walter Burleys Traktat De intensione et remissione formarum*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 25 (1965), 293-321, at 293-4.

⁶¹ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 47, 205; text in Herman Shapiro and Charlotte Shapiro, *De primo et ultimo instanti des Walter Burley*, in: *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*, 47 (1965), 157-73, at 159-73.

⁶² Sylla 1984 (*op.cit.*, above n. 54), 261, although it is Maier who makes the point explicitly: Maier 1964 (*op.cit.*, above n. 60), 475-76. Martin assumes that only a doctor can hold a quodlibet, but makes the rather more complicated argument that Burley could have written a first version of the treatise before Wilton's departure in 1322, only to revise it between 1324 and 1327, after his inception, which in Martin's view may be as late as 1324: Martin 1964 (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 208-9.

More evidence that the *Tractatus primus* was written before Burley became a master of theology, that is before 1324,⁶³ comes from its citation by William of Ockham. Ockham borrowed from it, as well as critically commenting on it, in his circa-1324 *Questions on the Physics*.⁶⁴

Interestingly, there are no insulting personal comments in Ockham's *Questions on the Physics*. Ockham's circa-1319 *Scriptum* on the *Sentences* includes the first insult traded by Ockham and Burley. Ockham says that he would not have treated a certain frivolous objection (*cavillatio*) had it not been that "some people who consider that they know logic give great weight to such childish considerations (*puerilia*) on account of which they posit many absurdities."⁶⁵ But apart from this comment, there are no more nasty remarks about Burley in Ockham's writings. Some views Ockham seeks to refute; others he adopts without attribution in the circa-1323 *Summa logicae*.⁶⁶ More importantly, before Burley's 1324 *Physics commentary*, there is no sign that he was aware of Ockham as an enemy. This peaceful interval suggests that when we find works by Burley in which there is no sign of hostility to Ockham, they may be as late as 1324, though it is more usual to suggest 1320.⁶⁷

One such work is the first redaction of Burley's famous logical treatise, the *De puritate artis logicae*.⁶⁸ The second redaction, by contrast, is

⁶³ See below.

⁶⁴ Sylla 1984 (*op.cit.*, above n. 54), 258.

⁶⁵ William of Ockham, *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum ordinatio: Distinctiones II-III*, ed. Stephen Brown, with Gedeon Gal, St. Bonaventure 1970, 146 (OTh II): "Ista cavillatio non esset hic ponenda nisi quia aliqui, reputantes se scire logicam, ponderant talia puerilia, propter quae ponunt multa absurda circa suppositionem terminorum."

⁶⁶ William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gal, and Stephen Brown, St. Bonaventure 1974, 233-6 (OPh I), where he uses either Burley's *De suppositionibus* or his *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior*; *ibid.*, 233, n. 1. If the *De puritate tractatus longior* is supposed to be written in response to Ockham's *Summa*, presumably it would be the former which Ockham would have available to him at the time of writing.

⁶⁷ Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 179, 183-84.

⁶⁸ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 13a,b, 191-2. Both versions are in Walter Burley, *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior: With a Revised Edition of the Tractatus brevior*, ed. Philotheus Boehner, St. Bonaventure-Louvain-Paderborn 1955 (Franciscan Institute Publications, Text Series IX), the shorter at 199-260 and the longer at 1-197. Weisheipl's no. 19b, *De consequentiis*, is an excerpt from the shorter version: Green-Pedersen 1980 (*op.cit.*, above n. 34), 110. See also for the longer version the German translation of the first treatise (*De proprietatibus terminorum*) in: Walter Burley, *Von der Reinheit der Kunst der Logik: Erster Traktat: Von den Eigenschaften der Termini*, trans. and ed. Peter Kunze, Hamburg 1988 (Philosophische Bibliothek CDI), and the English translation of the first part of the second treatise (*De propositionibus hypotheticis conditionalibus*) in: Ivan Boh, *Burleigh: On Conditional Hypothetical Propositions*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 23 (1963), 4-67, at 14-67, both with Boehner's Latin on facing pages.

dated by Boehner between 1324 and 1329, "or more probably between 1325-1328";⁶⁹ it is an attempt to refute Ockham's circa-1323 *Summa logicae*. Since the Swede, John Nicholas, made excerpts from the second redaction in 1329,⁷⁰ it has to have been written before that date. Probably the work can in fact be dated before 1327, when Burley left Paris for Avignon. But since the dating of Ockham's *Summa* has now been pushed back a bit, we do not have a shorter interval, just a slightly earlier one, 1324-1327.

Burley had become a master of theology by 1324, as we know from a rubric at the beginning of his *Physics commentary*.⁷¹ From Burley's point of view, there is nothing peaceful about the relationship with Ockham from 1324 onward, and disagreement is frequently signaled by insult. When Burley completed the first book of his *Physics commentary* in 1324, he scornfully refers to Ockham as one who claimed to know more logic than any other mortal.⁷² Completed by 1326 when Ockham's not advancing to master might be expected to rankle, book IV refers to Ockham as a beginner in philosophy.⁷³ In book VI, the last book completed before

⁶⁹ Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 68), *Introduction*, in: Walter Burley, *De puritate*, vi-xiv, at vii-viii.

⁷⁰ "Hanc extractionem de logica Burle ordinavit frater Johannes Nicholai, lector de custodia Lincopensi provinciae Daciae, quando studuit Parisius anno Domini M^oCCC^oXXIX^o, de cuius logicae commendatione praemisit prologum in hunc modum. Post praecedentem summam editam a fratre (Willielmo Ockham) compilavit Burle alium tractatum de logica in quo pauca continentur utilia realiter nihil vel sumpta de priori summa vel de Boethio in libro de categoricis et hypotheticis syllogismis": Erfurt, Amplon. O. 67, f. 125^v, quoted in Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 68), vii.

⁷¹ "Scriptum magistri Galteri de Burley doctoris sacrae theologiae super librum phisicorum Aristotelis editum parisiis Anno domini M^oCCC^oXXiii^o": Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F. II. 30, quoted in Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 181. The application of the date to Burley's acquisition of the degree in theology is made by Emden (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 312, and Martin 1964 (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 208, n. 5. Maier reads the date in the rubric as referring only to the date of composition, and suggests that had Burley been a master by 1324, he would have described Clement VI in the dedication to the *Politics* as a former colleague and not someone from whom he learned, concluding that he more likely received the degree only just before leaving Paris, in 1326 or 1327: Maier 1964 (*op.cit.*, above n. 60), 478-9. He is described as "*sacrae paginae professor*" in Edward III's commission of 1327: Martin 1964 (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 213-4. Maier's reading seems forced, since Burley had every incentive to flatter the pope, regardless of who incepted first.

⁷² Walter Burley, *In Physicam*, f. 8^{vb}: "Istae tamen rationes non essent hic ponendae nisi quia quidam asserentes se scire logicam super omnes mortales, respondent ad illam rationem dicentes quod sic dicendo 'permitto tibi bovem' permitto tibi unam rem singularem extra animam, sed non permitto istum bovem vel istum, quia in illa 'permitto tibi bovem' ille terminus bos stat confuse tamen et ideo non supponit disiunctive pro bovis singularibus, sed supponit disiunctum, ergo etc."

⁷³ Walter Burley, *In Physicam*, f. 98^{vb}: "Ad hanc igitur quaestionem quidam de novo

he left Paris, Burley once more calls attention to the fact that Ockham is still an inceptor or beginner; his exposition, says Burley, includes a "suggestion any idiot could make."⁷⁴

Burley's hostility did not diminish with time, so that works from the court period, as well as works written in Burley's last years at Paris, contain references to Ockham, as "a beginner in philosophy" and even as a heretic.⁷⁵ The final version of *Super artem veterem* includes rebuttals of Ockham's views on quantity found in *Quodlibet 4*, *De sacramento altaris*, and *Expositio Physicorum*.⁷⁶ From a chronological standpoint this means that though the presence of insults directed against Ockham indicates that the work must be after 1320 and probably after 1324, it is no sign that the work was not written near the end of Burley's life.

For a great many works, we really know with certainty only whether they were written before or after Burley began his controversy with Ockham. Weisheipl considers it likely that Burley's first reaction to Ockham is found in the *Tractatus de formis*,⁷⁷ which deals in its second part with

incipientes philosophari dicunt quod locus non est ultimum corporis continentis, unde de virtute sermonis debet dici quod locus est corpus continens et circundans aliud corpus undique ita quod quaelibet pars corporis continentis quae est ultima versus locatum tangit aliquam partem locati et econverso quaelibet pars locati quae est ultima versus locum tangit aliquam partem loci."

⁷⁴ Walter Burley, *In Physicam*, f. 183^{ra}: "Ex his igitur apparent duo quae sunt contra quosdam incipientes probari qui dicunt quod nihil est simpliciter indivisibile in istis generabilibus et corruptibilibus nisi anima intellectiva et accidentia eius, et quod tempus non sit aliquae res alia a rebus permanentibus." Ibid., f. 196^{va}: "Sed circa solutionem praesentis rationis est dudum quia quilibet idiota potest sic solvere dicendo quod velocissimum tandem attinget tardissimum: sed non attinget ipsum dum tardissimum praecedit."

⁷⁵ *Introductio*, in: William of Ockham, *Opera philosophica II*, St. Bonaventure 1978, 24*. Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem*, Venice 1497 (facsimile reprint, Frankfurt 1967), f. e v va: "Propter ista dicunt quidam incipientes philosophari quod res non referuntur adinvicem distinguendo res contra signa rerum sive voces, quia sola nomina et talia signa rerum referuntur adinvicem." Ibid., f. e vi ra: "Ad principalem quaestionem probo quod haec opinio ponens solam vocem vel signum per se esse relativum est haeretica, quia fides tenet quod in divinis sunt tres relationes reales seu tria relativa, ut tres personae divinae, unde in divinis sicut in creaturis pater et filius sunt relativa. Si ergo sola vox vel signum esset relativum vel relatio et non res, sequitur quod in divinis non essent tres personae relativae, sed solum tres voces vel tria signa qui significant essentiam divinam essent relativa, et sic non esset generatio nec processio in divinis, quod est haereticum."

⁷⁶ Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem*, Venice 1497 (facsimile reprint, Frankfurt 1967), f. e ii vb; William of Ockham, *Quodlibeta septem*, ed. Joseph C. Wey, St. Bonaventure 1980, 395, n. 1 (OTh IX). See also Pierre Duhem's comments on Burley's attempts to refute Ockham on indivisibles in the *Categories Commentary* of the *Super artem veterem* and in book I of the *Physics Commentary*: Pierre Duhem, *Medieval Cosmology: Theories of Infinity, Place, Time, Void, and the Plurality of Worlds*, ed. and trans. Roger Ariew, Chicago and London 1985, 24-5.

⁷⁷ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 42, 204; for dating, Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*,

the same topics considered in Ockham's *De sacramento altaris*—chiefly, quantity and the composition of the continua.⁷⁸ It was probably written at roughly the same time as Burley's other early attacks on Ockham's views, about 1324-1326.⁷⁹

Of course Ockham was not the only contemporary attacked by Burley, and we cannot assume that every mention of a "modern" author refers to Ockham. There is a recitation and refutation of the views of Franciscus de Marchia in the *Physics commentary*, according to Anneliese Maier;⁸⁰ *Super artem veterem* includes a refutation of Peter Aureol's views on *esse obiectivum*, as well as Ockham's on quantity.⁸¹ Maier even suggests a dialogue with Buridan on the subject of motion in a vacuum;⁸² looking at the same subject, however, Wood found Ockham as usual influencing Burley negatively; more unexpectedly, she found a strong positive influence from Scotus.⁸³ Clearer is the influence in the other direction: Markowski has described Buridan's polemic against Burley's theory of universals.⁸⁴

3. *At Court*

Burley's entry into life at court was as part of the political group which deposed Edward II of England.⁸⁵ His first diplomatic assignment was to

above n. 7), 183-4; text in: Frederick J. Down Scott, *Walter Burley's Treatise De formis*, Munich 1970, 7-71 (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt IV).

⁷⁸ Scott 1970 (*op.cit.*, above n. 77), 2-4.

⁷⁹ Weisheipl dates it 1320-23, on the grounds that it antedates the final *Physics* commentary, but it is unclear which books of the *Physics* he has in mind: Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 184.

⁸⁰ Maier, *Zwei Grundprobleme der scholastischen Naturphilosophie: Das Problem der intensiven Grösse; Die Impetustheorie*, 2nd ed., Rome 1951, 232-4 (Storia e letteratura XXXVII).

⁸¹ Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem*, Venice 1497 (facsimile reprint, Frankfurt 1967), f. b i ra.

⁸² Maier, *An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft: Die Struktur der materiellen Substanz; Das Problem der Gravitation; Die Mathematik der Formlatituden*, 2nd ed., Rome 1952, 244-5 (Studien zur Naturphilosophie III, Storia e letteratura XLI).

⁸³ Wood 1989-90 (*op.cit.*, above n. 8). See also Agustín Uña Juárez's arguments for Burley as an auditor of Scotus in Oxford, based on a reference in book 7 of the *Physics* commentary: Agustín Uña Juárez, *La filosofía del siglo XIV: Contexto cultural de Walter Burley*, Madrid 1978, 18-22 (Biblioteca "La ciudad de Dios," Libros XXVI).

⁸⁴ M. Markowski, *Johannes Buridans Polemik gegen Universalienlehre des Walter Burleigh*, in: *Mediaevalia philosophica polonorum*, 26 (1982), 7-17.

⁸⁵ On the following events, see in addition to Emden and Martin, N. Denholm-Young, *Richard de Bury (1287-1345)*, in: N. Denholm-Young, *Collected Papers on Mediaeval Subjects*, Oxford 1946, 1-25; Scott L. Waugh, *England in the Reign of Edward III*, Cambridge 1991, 10-14 (Cambridge Medieval Textbooks); and W.M. Ormrod, *The Reign of Edward III: Crown and Political Society in England 1327-1377*, New Haven-London 1990, 3-7.

seek the canonization of Thomas, Earl of Lancaster, Edward II's late and unlamented cousin, the leader of the baronial opposition whose refusal to support the King resulted in the loss of Scotland at Bannockburn in 1314. After seven years of complicity in Scottish raids, Thomas of Lancaster lost the battle of Boroughbridge and was condemned to a traitor's death in 1322.

Five years later the tides had turned, under the leadership of Queen Isabelle. Isabelle travelled to France in 1325 where she arranged the marriage of the future Edward III to Philippa of Hainault, and where young Edward joined her to do homage for Gascony. In September 1326, Isabelle returned to England and took London with the assistance of the count of Hainault and of her lover Roger Mortimer, who had escaped to France from the Tower where he was imprisoned after Boroughbridge. Edward II's ministers, the two Hugh Despensers, father and son, were hanged in November; Edward himself was forced to abdicate in January 1327. Edward III was crowned on February 1 at the age of fourteen. On February 28 a letter went out in his name asking the Pope to canonize Thomas of Lancaster, whose brother Henry was chief of Edward III's regency council.

Burley's associates were deeply involved in these events. The bishop to whom Burley owed permission to study abroad while holding a rectory in the diocese of Lincoln, Henry Burghersh, was a close associate of Queen Isabelle. Richard de Bury, Burley's most important intellectual patron, may have visited Isabelle at Paris while in the service of the future Edward III in 1325-1326, at which time Burley may also have met his future sponsors. One of Burley's two associates on the mission to Avignon seeking Thomas of Lancaster's canonization in February of 1327 was the knight William Trussel, who presided at the tribunal which sentenced Hugh Despenser to death in November of 1326 and who acted as procurator of the realm in the formal retraction of homage from Edward II in January of 1327. When Edward III married Philippa in January of 1328, Burley himself was appointed her almoner. So Burley began his political life as part of the successful northern baronial party of rebels, which ought to increase the interest of his *Politics commentary*.

During Burley's first mission at Avignon in 1327, William of Ockham was also in residence there. Unlike Burley, who was an enemy of Edward II, Ockham might have benefited from some of Edward II's acts, even if indirectly. In 1322, Edward at first denied John Lutterell permission to travel to Avignon, probably because Edward did not want an enemy of

Oxford University to gain the Pope's ear.⁸⁶ When Lutterell was granted permission to travel to Avignon, where he presented his criticisms of Ockham's theology, it was for two years. After that period, in May 1325, about a year after Ockham arrived to defend himself, Edward II ordered Lutterell home again. John XXII refused, claiming that Lutterell was needed to combat "certain pestiferous doctrines," presumably those of Ockham whose *Sentences commentary* Lutterell was examining. In 1330, at the time of his second mission, this time as a king's clerk, when Burley again attempted to have Thomas of Lancaster canonized, his status as one of Ockham's most prominent enemies can only have been an advantage at the papal curia.

Once he traveled to Avignon, Burley's clerical career took off. In addition to holding a rectory, Burley augmented his income by holding a position as a canon or prebendary; these positions, too, he held as an absentee. In May 1327 he became canon of Chichester and prebendary of Waltham by papal provision. These positions he exchanged in September of 1332, becoming canon of Wells and prebendary of Shalford. A former canon of Wells, now its Dean, was Burley's great patron Richard de Bury. As keeper of the privy seal, De Bury was one of the organizers of the *coup d'état* of 1330 which cost Mortimer his head and made Edward III king in fact as well as in name. After that success, the Pope provided De Bury to the see of Durham in October 1333; in December the King and Queen of Scotland attended De Bury's consecration as Bishop. In 1334-1335, he was Chancellor of England. De Bury gathered around himself a court of intellectuals, a distinguished group which included Thomas Fitzralph and Richard de Kilvington, as well as Robert Holcott, Thomas Bradwardine, and Burley. Between 1334 and 1343, Burley dedicated to De Bury his *Ethics commentary*,⁸⁷ the last version of his *Physics commentary*, his *Super artem veterem*,⁸⁸ and finally his *Politics commentary*.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ On Lutterell, see Emden 1957-59 (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 2:1181-2, and Francis E. Kelley, *Ockham: Avignon, Before and After*, in: Anne Hudson and Michael Wilks (eds.), *From Ockham to Wyclif*, Oxford 1987, 1-18, at 1-9 (Studies in Church History, Subsidia V).

⁸⁷ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 48, 205-6; Lohr 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 36, 185-6.

⁸⁸ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 7, 189: "Completa est hec expositio quinta die mensis Augusti anno domini millesimo CCC° tricesimo septimo et anno etatis exponentis sexagesima secundo." Lohr 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 4, 174-6.

⁸⁹ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 49b, 206-7; Lohr 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 37, 186-87. On the various dedications see Martin 1964 (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 219-22, 225-7. The dedicatory letters to the *Politics* are in Maier, *Zu Walter Burleys Politik-Kommentar*,

Apparently completed after the final version of Burley's *Super artem veterem*, *De universalibus* may also be one of Burley's last works.⁹⁰ It is a treatise which might repay further study. It was edited less than forty years ago by an able latinist at St. Bonaventure University,⁹¹ so some of the errors in the printed editions have been corrected. More to the point, this may be the last logical work written by Burley. Since so much work has been done on Burley's earliest period, and the *De puritate* of the middle years is much studied, perhaps it would be a good opportunity to see how much and what kind of change occurred in forty years. At least that is what we thought when we read this sentence in the *Categories* commentary from the *De Bury Ars vetus*: "All this material will be clearer in the treatise on universals, God willing: De ista tamen materia plenius apparebit in tractatu de universalibus Deo concedente."⁹²

But because we knew that Weisheipl believed that *De universalibus* was not a late work, but an early example of a treatise directed against Ockham's *fictum* theory or *esse obiectivum*,⁹³ we checked further. We knew that the argument against *esse obiectivum* found in the *Isagoge* commentary from the *De Bury Super artem veterem* was directed not against Ockham but against Peter Aureol; it replies to all of Aureol's characteristic examples of sensory illusions.⁹⁴ So we compared the two discussions and found that they were the same. Further investigation revealed that the entire *De universalibus* presents the same text as the prologue to the *Isagoge* commen-

in: Maier, *Ausgehendes Mittelalter: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geistesgeschichte des 14. Jahrhunderts I*, Rome 1964, 93-9; and Thomson, *Walter Burley's Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle*, in: *Mélanges Auguste Pelzer: Études d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale de la scolastique médiévale offertes à Monseigneur Auguste Pelzer à l'occasion de son soixante-dixième anniversaire*, Louvain 1947, 557-78 (Université de Louvain, Recueil de travaux d'histoire et de philologie, 3d ser. XXVI); and the conclusions are excerpted in L.J. Daly, *The Conclusions of Walter Burley's Commentary on the Politics, Books I to IV*, in: *Manuscripta*, 12 (1968), 79-92, at 84-89; and idem, *The Conclusions of Walter Burley's Commentary on the Politics, Books V and VI*, in: *Manuscripta*, 13 (1969), 142-9, at 145-8.

⁹⁰ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 23, 197.

⁹¹ Shriver 1958 (*op.cit.*, above n. 10), 28-71.

⁹² Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem*, Venice 1497 (facsimile reprint, Frankfurt 1967), f. d ii vb.

⁹³ Weisheipl 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 7), 180: "The noticeable absence of any detailed refutation of Ockham's arguments might suggest that it was written before Burley found an opportunity to study Ockham's *ordinatio* carefully, but such an absence could just as easily presuppose a detailed refutation already written."

⁹⁴ For the positions of Aureol and Ockham on sensory illusions, see Wood, *Adam Wodeham on Sensory Illusions with an Edition of "Lectura secunda," Prologus, Quaestio 3*, in: *Traditio*, 38 (1982), 213-52, at 220-6.

tary found in the *De Bury Logic*.⁹⁵ What does that mean? It is hard to know, a puzzle yet to be unraveled. Either it means that the sentence was copied into the *De Bury Logic* from an earlier version, or it means that the printed version included bits and pieces not part of the original *De Bury Logic*.⁹⁶ So far all we have been able to establish is that the earliest version of the *Categories commentary* from which the statement comes includes no reference to the *Tractatus de universalibus*. A manuscript of the *De Bury Logic* refers to a chapter rather than a treatise on universals.⁹⁷

Members of Richard de Bury's circle benefited from their shared society and from his wonderful library; De Bury was the foremost book collector of his age. Burley appears to have been particularly close to a canon lawyer who belonged to the circle, Richard Bentworth. In 1336, he exchanged benefices with Bentworth, moving his canonry and prebend from Wells to Durham. After Bentworth became bishop of London in May of 1338 and Chancellor of England in July, Burley began, at his request, to work again on the *Politics Commentary*. Bentworth died 8 Dec. 1339, before the work was complete, leaving Burley without a powerful friend, and free to dedicate one more work to De Bury, to whom Burley must have been very grateful—grateful among other things for a pardon. Granted two oaks in Sherwood forest, not far from his rectory in Pytchely, by Queen Philippa, Burley was arrested and imprisoned with his men when he cut them down;⁹⁸ a pardon for his forestry offenses was obtained at De Bury's request in December of 1336.

⁹⁵ Walter Burley, *Super artem veterem*, Venice 1497 (facsimile reprint, Frankfurt 1967), f. a iii vb-b i rb. Uña Juárez identifies the *De universalibus* section of Weisheipl's *Quaestiones de arte vetere* (no. 6) with the passage in the printed *Super artem veterem*, and apparently also with the separate *De universalibus* (no. 23): Uña Juárez 1978 (*op.cit.*, above n. 83), 56-7. He also notes that the *Quaestio disputata de primo et ultimo instanti* is included in book 8 of the *Physics*, citing f. 252^{va}-254^{va} of the 1482 ed.: *ibid.*, 77. In the 1501 ed. used in this paper the question is found on f. 257^{ra}-259^{va}.

⁹⁶ Lohr's listing of two redactions of the *Sex principiis* and of the *Perihermenias* under the heading of the *Super artem veterem* would seem worthy of further investigation in this regard, as would Konstantyn Michalski's statement that the printed version of the commentary on the Posterior Analytics is an abridged version of that in the mss: Lohr 1968 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 4, 174-76; and Konstantyn Michalski, *La physique nouvelle et les différents courants philosophiques au XIV^e siècle*, in: Bulletin international de l'Académie polonaise des sciences et des lettres: Classe de philologie, Classe d'histoire et de philosophie, (1927), 93-164, at 96. See also Scott's comments on the incoherence of the text of the *De formis*: Scott 1970 (*op.cit.*, above n. 77), 4-5.

⁹⁷ Vatican, Vat. lat. 3048, f. 34^r.

⁹⁸ A complication blamed in the records of the affair on "certain of his rivals," unfortunately not otherwise identifiable: Martin 1964 (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 224.

Burley's other experience of women may not have been entirely favorable either. At least one passage from his *Ethics* is conspicuously sexist. The text on which Burley is commenting is harmless enough. Aristotle remarks that women are not called incontinent or overcome by passion because of the position they assume in (missionary style) intercourse.⁹⁹ Following a rather poor translation, Aquinas takes this passage to mean that since women are led rather than leading, they do not count as incontinent. Supplying an explanation, Aquinas tells us that this is because lacking reason, women are led by their affections rather than governing their affections with reason. Consequently, we rarely find strong, wise women.¹⁰⁰

Burley goes further. He agrees that such women are rare and adds a prurient note: For the most part, he says, women are led by their concupiscent desires. If they are not to be led by their concupiscent desires, then since they lack reason, they must be led by the reason of men. Consequently, Burley concludes that, strictly speaking, women do not count either as continent or incontinent—that is, if their appetite is uncontrolled, women lack the concomitant grasp of universal practical right reason which characterizes the merely weak; if their appetite is controlled, it is by a man's reason, not by their own.¹⁰¹

Burley's last works were a 1341 disputation at Bologna¹⁰² and his *Politics commentary*, which he dedicated in November of 1343 to Pope Clement VI,

⁹⁹ Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. W.D. Ross, rev. J.O. Urmson, in: Aristotle, *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Bollingen Series LXXI, Princeton 1984, 2:1729-1867, at lib. 7, cap. 5, no. 1148b, 1815.

¹⁰⁰ Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. C.I. Litzinger, 2 vols., Chicago 1964, lib. 7, lect. 5, no. 1376, 642 (Library of Living Catholic Thought).

¹⁰¹ Walter Burley, *Expositio super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis*, Venice 1500, f. 112^b: "Deinde ponit probationem exemplarem maioris dicens quod quemadmodum mulieres supple non dicuntur incontinentes propter defectum rationis in eis: unde non ducunt se per rationem propriam: sed magis ducuntur per rationem viri: vel a concupiscentiis suis, ita nec illi qui habent rationem debilem quae non est nata repellere concupiscentias non debent dici incontinentes aut continentes simpliciter. Intelligendum est hoc primo quod tam continentes quam incontinentes habent fortes concupiscentias quae repelli non potunt nisi per rationem fortem, et quia talis ratio non est in his qui delectabiliter operant contra naturam, ideo continentia non est nata esse in talibus: cum ratio in eis sit quasi totaliter oppressa ex malitia complexionis aut ex egritudine vel consuetudine: et in quibus non est nata esse continentia in eisdem non est nata esse incontinentia: cum contraria habeant fieri circa idem. 2^o est intelligendum quod in idiomate graecorum non dicuntur mulieres incontinentes, quia ut in pluribus ducuntur a concupiscentiis et non a ratione propria, unde raro inveniuntur mulieres sapientes aut fortes propter imperfectionem naturae."

¹⁰² Maier, *Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert: Studien zur Naturphilosophie der Spätscholastik*, Rome 1949, 257-8 (Storia e letteratura, XXII).

whom he remembers from the time they were both students of theology at Paris (Peter Roger incepted in 1323).¹⁰³ Burley may have particularly remembered the two panegyrics on St. Thomas Aquinas (canonized in 1321) delivered by the future pope, on the fiftieth anniversary of Thomas' death, March 7, 1324, and again in 1326. Perhaps their "sonorous eloquence" directed Burley's attention to Thomas' work. In any case, like the *Ethics commentary*, the *Politics commentary* depends on Aquinas, and at least in mundane terms, Burley must have considered the *Politics* a success. In January 1344 he was confident enough of his standing to ask papal favors for his clerk, two servants, and a nephew, Nicholas de Borbache of Coventry.

4. *Last Years and Conclusion*

Possibly his brief imprisonment in the winter of 1336 led to Burley's disenchantment with Pytchely; in any case after twenty-one years there, Burley moved to more southern rectories: first to Suffolk in 1341; to Surrey in 1342; to Wiltshire in May 1344; and finally to Kent, where he was admitted in June of the same year. Oddly enough, Burley benefited from no papal provisions in 1344, the year in which Clement VI declared that all ecclesiastical offices were subject to such provisions. However, he also continued to shift his other benefices, perhaps indicating continued residence in Avignon: he received papal provision to a canonry in York, with expectation of a prebend, in 1342, and then to a canonry at Salisbury and prebend of Netheravon in 1343.

Whether Burley actually resided in Kent, his last rectory, is not certain. It has been presumed that Burley died at the age of 70 shortly after he ceased getting new benefices. But this may be mistaken. It is possible that Burley lived many contented years in retirement at his rectory in the south of England, Great Chart in Kent.

Similarly, the absence of a fourteenth-century witness has been the basis for concluding that far and away the most popular work associated with Walter Burley, *De vitis et moribus philosophorum*, is not authentic.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰³ *Chartularium universitatis Parisiensis*, vol. 2, ed. Henricus Denifle, with Aemilius Chatelain, Paris 1891, 271-72; Martin 1964 (*op.cit.*, above n. 1), 211.

¹⁰⁴ Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), no. 50, 207. For an updated list of manuscripts, numbering over 270, see Jan Prelog, «*De Pythagora phylosopho: Die Biographie des Pythagoras in dem Walter Burley zugeschriebenen «Liber de vita et moribus philosophorum»*», in: *Medioevo*, 16 (1990), 191-251; idem, *Die Handschriften und Drucke von Walter Burleys Liber de vita et moribus philosophorum*, in: *Codices manuscripti*, 9 (1983), 1-18; and idem, *Zur Bewertung der Textzeugen*

Mario Grignaschi has concluded that it is rather the work of an anonymous Italian author.¹⁰⁵ Certainly, it was written before 1326, when excerpts were made from it, and it is now generally accepted that the modern philologists who have taken from Burley his most popular work are correct.

Still, as in the case of his supposed death in 1344, the evidence for this conclusion is not yet wholly compelling. And there is some slight evidence in favor of the attribution in Burley's turn of mind. Having examined Burley's *Ethics commentary* and its relation to its base in Thomas's exposition, we can assure you that Burley omits not one detail which could form the basis of a good story. While Aristotle's text itself provides the example of the laggard who drags his clothes through the mud because it's too much work to lift them,¹⁰⁶ along with (by way of a garbled translation) the symbolism of Venus's sandalstrap,¹⁰⁷ and the animal exemplars of the various vices, in which the filth of pigs is contrasted with the comparative cleanliness of sheep, are taken over from Thomas,¹⁰⁸ it is on his

von Walter Burleys "*Liber de vita et moribus philosophorum*," in: *Mittelateinisches Jahrbuch*, 20 (1985), 164-83; and for the text see John O.H. Stigall, *The De vita et moribus philosophorum of Walter Burley: An Edition with Introduction*, Ph.D. diss., University of Colorado, 1956, 1-266; and Walter Burley, *Liber de vita et moribus philosophorum: Mit einer altspanischen Übersetzung der Eskorialbibliothek*, ed. Hermann Knust, Tübingen 1886 (Bibliothek des Litterarischen Vereins in Stuttgart CLXXVII). The two editions offer different texts—Stigall's based on six manuscripts chosen for their age, Knust's on early printed editions—but neither is a critical edition in the full sense. There do exist fourteenth-century manuscripts, but none of them include the ascription to Burley in a contemporary hand: Prelog, "*De Pictagora philosopho*," 194.

¹⁰⁵ Mario Grignaschi, *Lo Pseudo Walter Burley e il «Liber de vita et moribus philosophorum»*, in: *Medioevo*, 16 (1990), 131-90; and idem, "*Corrigenda et addenda*" sulla questione dello *Ps. Burleo*, in: *Medioevo*, 16 (1990), 325-54.

¹⁰⁶ Walter Burley, *Expositio super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis*, Venice 1500, f. 115^{ra}: "Sunt etiam multi qui magis fugiunt tristitias quam persequuntur delectationes, ut pigri qui permittunt vestes suas fluere deorsum in terra et in luto, ut vident laborem vel tristitiam laboris quae perveniret allevando vestes sursum a terra, qui tamen non persequuntur superabundanter delectationes corporales." Cf. Aristotle, lib. 7, cap. 7, no. 1150b, 1817; Thomas Aquinas, lib. 7, lect. 7, no. 1414, 656.

¹⁰⁷ Walter Burley, *Expositio*, f. 113^{va}: "Sed non est sic de concupiscentia: delectabile enim est per se natum movere appetitum et nisi ratio sit diligens ad perhibendum: delectabile statim cum apprehensum fuerit trahit ad se appetitum. Unde quidam loquentes de Venere comparaverunt eam dolosae cyprigenae: dicitur enim quod Venus fuit regina Cypri: unde dicitur cyprigena quasi Cypri regina vel quasi in Cypro genita: et eius corrigiam dicunt esse variam per quam intellexerunt concupiscentiam quae mentes ligat: et dicitur esse varia quia intendit in aliquid quod apparet esse bonum scilicet in delectabile tactui: quod tamen simpliciter est malum." Cf. Aristotle, lib. 7, cap. 6, no. 1149b, 1816; Thomas Aquinas, lib. 7, lect. 6, no. 1394, 648.

¹⁰⁸ Walter Burley, *Expositio super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis*, Venice 1500, f. 113^{vb}-114^{ra}: "Et circa primas concupiscentias scilicet humanas et naturales solum dicimus esse temperantiam et intemperantiam, et propter hoc nec bestias dicimus temperatas nec intem-

own account that Burley expands and generalizes Aristotle's treatment of the regal weakness of delicately nurtured princes.¹⁰⁹ Quite original is his proof that people are willing to undertake great risks for the sake of excessive enjoyment—namely, the many dangers encountered by solitary walkers on long winter nights in frigid weather for the sake of voluptuous enjoyment.¹¹⁰ Clearly Burley was an engaging as well as a useful author.

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peratas proprie, sed solum secundum metaphoram hoc est metaphorice et secundum similitudinem comparando unum genus ad aliud genus animalium. Differt enim unum genus animalium ab alio in contumelia id est in hoc quod unum est magis contumeliosum quam aliud: aut in hoc quod unum est magis immundam vitam habens sicut porcus quam ovis: et sinamoria scilicet stultitia ut in hoc quod unum animal est stultius alio, ut asinus equo: et omnivorax scilicet in hoc quod unum est vorax ut lupus et aliud non, unde per comparisonem horum animalium quae superfluent in talibus, aliqua genera animalium dicuntur temperata et intemperata ut porcus respectu ovis dicitur intemperatus et ovis respectu porci dicitur temperata." Cf. Aristotle, lib. 7, cap. 6, no. 1149b, 1816; Thomas Aquinas, lib. 7, lect. 6, no. 1399-1400, 649-50.

¹⁰⁹ Walter Burley, *Expositio super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis*, Venice 1500, f. 115^{vb}: "Sed si hoc accidat eis ex natura generis scilicet ex natura progenitorum quod non possint sustinere tristitias nec labores nec resistere delectationibus: accidit eis ex natura progenitorum sicut accidit regibus et filiis regum scilicet quia multum delicate sunt nutriti: non debent dici molles vel incontinentes simpliciter: sed debent dici molles mollitiae regis vel molles genere. Talis enim mollities invenitur in regibus Scytharum propter delicate nutrir quod non possunt sustinere tristitias nec labores." Cf. Aristotle, lib. 7, cap. 7, no. 1150b, 1817; Thomas Aquinas, lib. 7, lect. 7, no. 1416, 657.

¹¹⁰ Walter Burley, *Expositio super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis*, Venice 1500, f. 115^{ra}: "2° est notandum quod multi superabundanter quaerunt delectationes qui tamen non fugiunt tristitias superabundanter. Multi enim multas tribulationes labores et pericula sustinent propter delectationes consequendas: ut patet de multis incontinentibus, qui propter delectationes corporales consequendas patiuntur frigora et calores et multa pericula ambulantes solitarii per noctes hyemales in tempore frigidissimo ad consequendum delectationes corporales et voluptates, et tales magis negociantur circa delectationes quam circa tristitias." Cf. Aristotle, lib. 7, cap. 7, no. 1150a, 1817; Thomas Aquinas, lib. 7, lect. 7, no. 1406-7, 655.

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In 1962, H. Shapiro published an edition of a short tract on universals, attributed to Walter Burley, calling the tract *De materia et forma*.² A couple years earlier, he had published an article on Burley's realism, based on that tract.³ There he argued that, although there is plentiful textual evidence that Burley had subscribed to the so-called "exaggerated realism" which had become associated with his name, there is some textual evidence that he had also subscribed to an extremely moderate form of realism, one which would have placed him squarely within the conceptualist camp. According to Shapiro, the textual evidence supporting Burley's conceptualism is provided by one solitary tract: *De materia et forma*.

The tract *De materia et forma* provides no such evidence, however. For though the tract does contain a theory of universals, it is a fully realist theory, not a conceptualist one. Unfortunately, Shapiro simply misunderstood the text.

The theory contained in *De materia et forma* ("M&F" for short) and the theory of universals associated with Burley's name are, nonetheless, incompatible theories. Burley could have subscribed to both only by having, at some point in his career, performed what Shapiro has called a "sharp turnabout". But when might Burley have taken such a turn? Where universals are discussed, his later works contain the theory of universals commonly associated with his name and referred to as "exaggerated realism".⁴ So we must look earlier. In a work of his mid-career, however, his *Expositio*

¹ I wish to thank Professor Rega Wood both for general inspiration and for numerous comments and suggestions which were of a great help when I was writing the final draft of this paper.

² This edition is contained in: H. Shapiro, *More on the "Exaggeration" of Burley's Realism*, in: *Manuscripta*, 6-2 (1962), 94-8.

³ H. Shapiro, *A Note on Walter Burley's Exaggerated Realism*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 21 (1960), 205-14.

⁴ Those works are: Burley's Commentaries on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and on Aristotle's *Categories*, contained in his *Expositio super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, his *Tractatus de universalibus* and his *Expositio et quaestiones in Physicam Aristotelis*.

in *libros de anima*,⁵ the theory developed in later works is already present. Could he have taken that turn early on in his career? That too seems ruled out, for in one of his earliest works, his *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*,⁶ the same theory is already found. Moreover, in none of these works, have I been able to discover a passage where Burley so much as mentions the theory of universals contained in M&F.

In view of these facts, I am inclined to seriously doubt that Burley is the author of that tract.⁷ Nor can I agree with Shapiro that a practically incontrovertible proof of Burley's authorship is provided by the fact that the sole printed version of the tract,⁸ as well as the codex which contains the two known manuscript versions of it,⁹ both ascribe the tract to him.¹⁰

This is not a point I wish to press, however. For whether Burley is the author of this tract or not, the fact is that the theory of extra-mental universals which it contains is one of the major medieval alternatives to the theory commonly associated with Burley's name and found in so many of his works. As such, these two theories are well worth a comparative

⁵ A. Maier has argued (in: A. Maier, *Ein unbeachteter "Averroist" des 14. Jahrhunderts: Walter Burley*, in: *Medioevo e Rinascimento* (Festschrift B. Nardi), Florence 1955, 477-99, reprinted in: A. Maier, *Ausgehendes Mittelalter I*, Rome 1964, 101-121, at 119-20) that this work was written after Thomas of Wylton's *Quaestio de anima intellectiva* and therefore after 1312 and Z. Kuksewicz (in: Z. Kuksewicz, *The problem of Walter Burley's Averroism*, in: A. Maier & A. Paravicini Bagliani (eds.), *Studi sul XIV secolo in memoria di Anneliese Maier*, Roma 1981, 341-77 at 377) that it was probably written in 1316. Since Conti (in: A. Conti, *Ontology in Walter Burley's Last Commentary on the Ars vetus*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 50 (1990), 121-76, at 138) provides no argument in support of his claim that book I, the book which contains the views on universals I discuss here, was "probably composed between 1301 and 1307", I have disregarded it.

⁶ Written in 1301, see S.F. Brown, *Walter Burley's Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 34 (1974), 200-95, at 200.

⁷ H.-U. Wöhler, *Das "realistische" Individualitätskonzept Walter Burleys im geschichtlichen Kontext*, in: J.A. Aertsen & A. Speer (eds.), *Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter*, Berlin-New York 1996, 313-326, at 318 (*Miscellanea Mediaevalia*, 24), cites M&F without questioning its ascription to Burley. Nor does he seem to have realized how profoundly different the theory of universals contained in this tract is from the theory contained in other works by Burley.

⁸ In the printed edition of Oxford 1518, the tract is entitled: "*Tractatus perbrevis de materia et forma Magistri Burlei doctoris planissimi.*"

⁹ The codex is Assisi 2146. It is described by Maier in: A. Maier, *Codices Vaticani Latini, codices 2118-2193*, Bibliotheca Vaticana 1961, 59-66. It contains two versions of our tract, which is ascribed to Burley in a note written by the owner, dated 1397.

¹⁰ Nor would this be the only instance where a work not by Burley has been ascribed to him, even at a relatively early date. Rega Wood has informed me that all of Richard Rufus' philosophical works have been ascribed to Burley since about 1400, although the manuscripts themselves date from before 1250.

study, a study which, it is hoped, will contribute to our knowledge of the various forms taken by medieval realism.

In order to leave open the issue whether or not Burley is the author of M&F, I shall refer to the theory of extra-mental universals commonly associated with his name as to "Burley's characteristic theory of extra-mental universals".¹¹ That theory, which may have originated with Burley, is found in the works cited above. In this paper, I shall compare it with the one contained in M&F, a theory which was already circulating in the 1230s.¹²

The first part of the present paper is devoted to the theory of extra-mental universals stated in M&F and the second part to Burley's characteristic theory of those universals. The differences between the two theories, as well as their few common features, are spelled out in the conclusion.

*Part I: The theory of extra-mental universals stated in De materia et forma*¹³

Though the subject is mentioned in its first lines, M&F does not deal chiefly with matter and form as the two "principles" of individuals. Rather it is about extra-mental universals, its purpose being to explain what they are and what their mode of being is. One of the two manuscript versions of the tract provides two titles for it: *De duobus principiis primis* and *De modo essendi universalium*.¹⁴ As A. Maier realized, the second title is the more appropriate one.¹⁵

The extra-mental universals with which the tract chiefly¹⁶ deals are exclusively universals in the category of substance. As such those universals are common to individual substances. Accordingly, the text opens with a metaphysical account of individual substances.

The account presented is simplified: only the essential components of an individual substance are mentioned, excluding accidents. On that

¹¹ I shall not call it "exaggerated realism" because I think this is a misnomer. There is nothing "exaggerated" in the realist theory to which Burley subscribed in so many of his works. A theory positing an infinite hierarchy of universals might be called "exaggerated realism", but, of course, Burley subscribed to no such theory.

¹² The theory, or a close variant of it, is present in some of the philosophical works of Richard Rufus of Cornwall, written before 1238. See the appendix to this paper. It is assumed by William of Sherwood, probably writing slightly later, as background theory to some of his semantical theses. See, below, footnote 29.

¹³ All references to this tract will be to Shapiro's edition, contained in Shapiro 1962 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2).

¹⁴ The tract is called *De materia et forma* in the printed edition. See footnote 8.

¹⁵ See Maier 1961 (*op.cit.*, above n. 9).

¹⁶ Mental universals are also mentioned in this tract.

account, individual substances are composed of matter and form,¹⁷ where by "form", a substantial form is meant, not an accidental one. The substantial form is said to provide the individual as a whole with an essence¹⁸ or quiddity.¹⁹ In other words, it provides the individual as a whole with a nature of a certain kind. A human being, for example, is regarded, on this account, as essentially composed of matter and of a substantial form in virtue of which he or she is a human being.

Assuming this to be a correct account of individual substances, the author proceeds to identify extra-mental universals with substantial forms. This identification is not, however, a straightforward one. It requires that a distinction first be drawn between actual and habitual being. It will then turn out, as we shall see, that extra-mental universals—identified with substantial forms—exist as universals only insofar as they have habitual being, whereas, insofar as they have actual being, they exist as singulars.

Obviously, this is a doctrine which cannot be understood unless the distinction between actual and habitual being is clear. The actual being of a thing is its present existence. But what is its habitual being?

Roger Bacon, surely one of the fiercest opponents of the notion, at least tells us what its content is. Habitual being, he reports, is characterized as a being common to things past, present and future.²⁰ But the only being which is precisely common to past, present and future things is past, present or future being. *Habitual being, therefore, is past, present or future being.*

If this is what actual and habitual being are, relationships between them will follow from truths of tense logic. Thus, it is a truth of tense logic that whatever has present being has past, present or future being, though not conversely. Consequently, anything which has actual being has habitual being as well, though some things have habitual being which do not have actual being. Properties of actual and of habitual being will also follow from truths of tense logic. Thus, it is another truth of tense logic that whatever has past, present or future existence will always have

¹⁷ "Notandum quod tantum sunt duo principia substantie secundum rem, scilicet materia et forma." (96).

¹⁸ "Forma autem est tota essentia compositi. . . ." (96).

¹⁹ "Secundum autem quod forma est in materia . . . est perfectio totius compositi, et secundum hoc esse dicitur 'quidditas'." (97).

²⁰ *Compendium Studii Theologiae*, ed. T.S. Maloney, Leiden-New York-København-Köln 1988, 92: ". . . fingunt unum esse . . . et dicunt illud esse habituale. Et hoc dicunt esse commune praesenti, praeterito, et futuro . . ."

it. Accordingly, we find the author making the claim that, insofar as it has habitual existence, a thing is, as he puts it, "incorruptible".²¹ By contrast, if a thing has present existence now, it does not follow that it will always have it in the future. Accordingly, we find the author making the further claim that, insofar as it has actual existence, a thing is "corruptible".²²

Such is the distinction between actual and habitual being which the author uses to articulate a theory of extra-mental universals. On that theory, an extra-mental universal, identified with a substantial form, has habitual being of itself.²³ Its actual being, however, supposing it does actually exist, it owes to the fact that there is an actual individual in which it exists as one of the individual's two essential component parts, matter being the other.²⁴ But each of the component parts of an actual individual is singular.²⁵ It follows that a given universal, insofar as it actually exists, exists as a singular. Moreover, in all but exceptional cases, a universal, if it exists in one individual, exists in many others. In each individual, it exists as a distinct singular. It follows that a universal, insofar as it actually exists, normally exists not just as one, but as many singulars. Insofar as it habitually exists, however, whether or not it also actually exists, a universal exists, not as a singular nor as many singulars, but as a universal.

Let us take as an example the universal in which being human consists. That universal actually exists insofar as it exists in actually existing human beings. In each individual, it exists as a singular. Since it exists in many human beings, it follows that, insofar as it actually exists, it exists as many singulars, and not as a universal. Insofar as it has habitual being, however, a being which it has of itself, it exists as a universal.

Using the author's own terminology, we could say that a universal (or substantial form), insofar as it actually exists, is "actually multiplied". Insofar as it habitually exists, by contrast, it is not actually multiplied, though it is "multipliable".²⁶

²¹ Talking of forms or universals, the author says (97): "Secundum tamen esse habituale, incorruptibilia sunt. . . ."

²² Talking again of a form or universal, the author says (98): "sub tali esse [esse actuale] est corruptibile. . . ."

²³ ". . . licet universale habeat esse habituale in se preter hoc quod est in singulari . . ." (98).

²⁴ ". . . [universale] secundum actum solum reperitur in singularibus, cum forma sine materia actualiter subsistere non potuit." (98).

²⁵ ". . . principia rerum individuarum singularia sunt, et non universalia, quia forma singularis et materia singularis . . ." (97).

²⁶ ". . . prius enim secundum naturam est forma multiplicabilis per materiam quam actu multiplicetur . . ." (97).

To leave matters at this, however, might give the impression that a universal has, as such, no relation to individuals. For it has been said that a universal exists as a universal only insofar as it has habitual being and not insofar as it exists in actual individuals. Yet a universal as such is essentially related to individuals. For nothing is a universal unless it is common to individuals. As the author says, a universal, by its very notion, is "one in many"—i.e. one in many individuals.²⁷ The author is thus faced with the challenge of showing that a universal, insofar as it has habitual being and exists as a universal, though it does not, as such, actually exist in actual individuals, nevertheless does in some way exist in individuals.

The author meets this challenge by drawing once again on the distinction between actual and habitual being. He now admits that a universal can exist in two ways in an individual: either actually, or habitually.²⁸ To say that a universal actually exists in an individual is to say that it now exists in it. To say that a universal habitually exists in an individual is to say that it has, does or will exist in it.

It follows by tense logic that every universal which actually exists in a given individual also habitually exists in it. For example, the universal in which being human consists, which actually exists in Henry, also habitually exists in him. On the verbal level, this means that we can assert both that Henry is human and that he is, was or will be human.²⁹

Now, insofar as a universal actually exists in an individual, it exists in it as a singular. Insofar as it habitually exists in an individual, however, it exists in it as a universal.

But in which individuals does a universal habitually exist? Surely not just in individuals which actually exist. Rather, it habitually exists in all

²⁷ "Et si aliquis obiciat adhuc quod hec est definicio universalis, quod sit unum in multis et non preter multa . . ." (98).

Note that this form of realism, where universals are always common to individuals, excludes higher order universals. The same holds for all forms of medieval realism I know.

²⁸ "Unde secundum hoc esse [esse habituale] universale habitualiter est in multis . . ." (98).

²⁹ Alternatively, one could consider that the affirmative copula "is" can be taken in two senses, either to express the actual existence or to express the habitual existence of a universal in an individual or in individuals, and that the sentence "Henry is human" is true in both senses. This is the view taken by William of Sherwood in his *Syncategoremata*, where, discussing the copula "est", he writes (*The Syncategoremata of William of Sherwood*, ed. J.R. O'Donnell, in: *Mediaeval Studies*, 3 (1941), 71): "Sciendum autem quod hoc verbum 'est' quandoque accipitur aequivoce; dicit enim quandoque esse actuale quod debetur actualiter existenti; quandoque esse habituale quod debetur ei quod in se est natura aliqua et natum est habitualiter esse in aliquo singulari. . . ."

the individuals, past, present and future, to which, on its habitual mode of being, it is common or which, on that mode of being, it "includes", as the author says.³⁰ Thus, the universal in which being human consists habitually exists not only in Henry, who is now alive, but in Caesar, who is now dead, as well as in the Antichrist, not yet born. It habitually exists in all of them, just as, on the verbal level, it is true to say of each that he was, is or will be human.³¹

The impression that universals are, as such, unrelated to individuals is thus corrected. It is recognized that a universal is, as such, related to individuals, indeed to the past, present and future ones in which it habitually exists.

To summarize: on the theory contained in M&F, every extra-mental thing which actually exists is singular.³² Consequently, extra-mental universals, insofar as they actually exist, exist as singulars.³³ Only insofar as they have habitual being do they exist as universals.³⁴ It is a far cry from this doctrine to the conceptualist doctrine that every extra-mental thing is singular and that, therefore, universals can only be mental.

Part II: Burley's characteristic theory of extra-mental universals

I now turn to the theory of extra-mental universals found in indisputably authentic works by Burley, a theory I shall be calling "Burley's characteristic theory of extra-mental universals".³⁵

³⁰ "et [universale] sub hoc esse [esse habituale] non includit aliqua individua determinata, sed omnia presencia, preterita et futura indifferenter . . ." (98).

³¹ The text by William of Sherwood quoted in footnote 29 continues as follows: "Primo modo, haec est falsa 'omnis homo est animal', nullo homine existente; secundo modo vera . . ."

³² "... secundum actum existendi nihil est extra animam nisi singulare . . ." (97).

³³ "... secundum actum existendi, solum reperitur forma in materia . . ." (97).

³⁴ "... secundum tamen habitum, universale est extra animam." (97).

³⁵ In this section, I shall be referring to the following works by Burley, using abbreviated titles: *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*, ed. Brown, in: Brown 1974 (*op.cit.*, above n. 6), abbreviated as "QPH"; *Expositio in libros de anima*, I, q. 3, Vat. lat. 2151 (quotations are from a provisional edition of this question by Professor A. Conti who kindly made it available to me), abbreviated as "De anima" I, q. 3; *De formis*, ed. Scott, in: F.J. Scott, *Walter Burley's Treatise De Formis*, München 1970 (Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für die Herausgabe ungedruckter Texte aus der mittelalterlichen Geisteswelt, 4) pars prior, pp. 7-48, abbreviated as "DFpp"; Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Commentary on Aristotle's *Categories*, both contained in *Expositio super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, Venice 1497 [reprint Minerva 1967], abbreviated as "*Isagoge*" and as "*Categories*" respectively; *Tractatus de universalibus*, ed. M.E. Shriver, in: M.E. Shriver,

On this theory, as on the preceding one, there are extra-mental universals, the most conspicuous of which are universals in the category of substance. As such, those universals are common to individual substances. Accordingly, as on the preceding theory, an account of those universals requires a metaphysical account of individual substances.

Burley's treatise *De formis* contains such an account. On that account, an individual substance is essentially composed of two singular parts: its matter and its substantial form. This substantial form is said to "perfect" the entire matter of the individual. In every individual substance, there necessarily exists exactly one such form. For it is that substantial form which gives the individual its identity, both specific and numerical, making it an individual of a certain sort.³⁶ It is, for example, by her intellectual soul—which is the substantial form which perfects her entire matter—that Susan is an individual human being.³⁷ By contrast, Susan's corpse, because it has no substantial form perfecting its entire matter, is not an individual of any sort, it is a mere aggregate.³⁸

Though an individual substance always has just one substantial form perfecting its entire matter, it generally has other forms which also perfect its matter. Some are substantial forms each of which perfects only a part of the individual's matter, called "partial" forms. For example, different parts of Susan's matter are perfected by substantial forms in virtue of which one part is bony matter, another is flesh, another is nerves.³⁹ Other forms are accidental forms. They perfect the matter of the individual insofar as that matter is already perfected by a substantial form, providing

The Tractatus de universalibus of Walter Burley, typescript, dissertation, St. Bonaventure University 1958, abbreviated as "*De universalibus*"; *Expositio et quaestiones in Physicam Aristotelis I*, Venice 1501 [reprint Olms 1972], abbreviated as "*Physica*".

³⁶ DFpp (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 10: "... forma substantialis dat esse simpliciter composito cuius est forma . . . Verbi gratia: forma substantialis hominis dat homini esse simpliciter et quod sit homo. Unde nihil est homo, nisi ex hoc quod forma substantialis sua, scilicet anima intellectiva, perficit suam materiam . . ."

³⁷ DFpp (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 35: "... in homine est una forma substantialis perficiens totam materiam hominis, scilicet, anima intellectiva . . ."

³⁸ DFpp (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 37: "... dicendum quod corpus animalis mortuum non est unum per aliquam unam formam substantialem nec inducitur nova forma substantialis in materia quando animal corrumpitur . . . Dico ergo quod corpus animalis mortuum non est unum nisi unitate aggregationis . . ."

³⁹ DFpp (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 35: "Preter animam intellectivam sunt plures forme substantiales partiales perficientes diversas partes materie, que forme distinguuntur specie, cuius sunt forma carnis, forma ossis, forma nervi et sic de aliis. Et ita est in quolibet alio etheromogenio . . ."

the individual with size, shape, color, etc.⁴⁰ Neither its partial forms nor its accidental forms are essential to the individual as a whole: only the substantial form which perfects its entire matter is.

All those forms, substantial, partial and accidental, are things which are thoroughly singular.⁴¹ There is no conceivable mode of being on which any of them could be general. The intellectual soul of Susan, for example, can no more be a general thing than Susan herself.

The forms which perfect its matter are not, however, the only forms which exist in an individual substance. In any individual substance, there necessarily exist in addition other forms and, in particular, other substantial forms. These are forms which "declare quiddity", as Burley says.⁴² They are essential to the individual as a whole, from which they cannot be separated.⁴³ These forms are not, however, singular forms, as are the forms which perfect matter; instead, they are general. As such, they are shared (or shareable) by other individuals. They can be called specific or generic "natures". Thus, in addition to her intellectual soul, which is her proper substantial form, Susan has one general substantial form or nature in which being human consists, another in which being an animal consists, a third in which being a substance consists, a fourth in which being rational consists.⁴⁴ All these general substantial forms or natures exist in her actually, as does her proper substantial form, though they actually

⁴⁰ DFpp (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 10-1: "... est sciendum quod quedam forma perficiens materiam est substantialis et quedam est accidentalis ... forma substantialis perficit immediate materiam primam sed forma accidentalis perficit immediate materiam compositam ... materia prima simul tempore recipit formam substantialem et quantitatem et qualitatem; prius tamen natura recipit formam substantialem quam qualitatem vel quantitatem."

⁴¹ Its matter, the substantial form and the accidental forms perfecting its matter, are all singular things proper to the individual. Consequently, each of these things is different from one individual to the next in the same species. As Burley writes (DFpp (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 9-10): "Distinctio vero individuorum sub eadem specie est tam per materiam quam per formam quam etiam per accidentia. Verbi gratia: Sortes distinguitur materialiter per materiam suam a Platone distinctione individuali et formaliter per formam suam et accidentaliter per accidentia sua."

⁴² DFpp (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 45: "Omnia ista que dicta sunt de unitate forme substantialis, dicta sunt de formis perficientibus materiam et non de formis declarantibus quidditatem, quia tales forme que declarant quidditatem possunt esse simul in eodem, ut species, genus subalternum, genus generalissimum et differentie ...". Also *Categories* (*op.cit.*, above n. 4), f. d3^{rb}: "... forma est duplex, scilicet forma declarans quidditatem et forma perficiens materiam ..."

⁴³ *Categories* (*op.cit.*, above n. 4), f. d3^{rb}: "... forma declarans quidditatem ... est essentialiter concomitans essentiam eius."

⁴⁴ DFpp (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 45: "... tales forme que declarant quidditatem possunt esse simul in eodem, ut species, genus subalternum, genus generalissimum et differentie."

exist in other individuals as well. They, and others like them, which do not exist in Susan but exist in individuals of other kinds, are the extra-mental universals in the category of substance which the theory recognizes.⁴⁵

On this theory, then, it would seem that an individual substance includes as its essential component parts not only singular matter and a singular substantial form, but also general natures or universals. This is indeed the view taken by Burley in his *Expositio in libros de anima*, a work he wrote in his mid-career.⁴⁶ He took the opposite view, however, not only in his later works,⁴⁷ but also in his early *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*,⁴⁸ considering that only a singular thing can be a component part of an individual and that, consequently, the universals which exist in it are not among its component parts. This is not an attractive view, however, for, as Burley himself realized, it entails that, if the universals which exist in

⁴⁵ It is in virtue of having a certain proper substantial form that an individual has certain shared substantial forms. Thus, it is by her proper substantial form, which is her intellectual soul, that Susan is a human being, that she is an animal, that she is an animated body, that she is rational and that she has, consequently, the shared substantial forms in which those quiddities consist. As Burley writes (DFpp (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 38): "... homo ... per animam intellectivam est homo et animal et corpus animatum". The priority of the individual over the general, manifested here, is one of the most remarkable features of the realist theory of universals characteristic of Burley. Thirteenth century realists had commonly assumed a priority of the general over the individual, thus creating a need for a theory of individuation, for which Burley, on this theory of universals, has no need whatsoever.

⁴⁶ *De anima*, I, q. 3: "... dicendum quod universale est pars substantiae determinatae, nec componitur Sortes sufficienter ex hac materia et ex hac forma: immo ex hac materia, et ex hac forma et ex universalibus praedicatis in quid de eo." The whole passage is quoted by Conti 1990 (*op.cit.*, above n. 5), 138-9. On the dating of this work, see footnote 5.

⁴⁷ *Physica* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), f. 9^{rb}: "... dico quod quamvis universale sit res extra animam, tamen non est pars individui, quia effectus particularis sunt causae particulares, et sic dico quod ... species non est pars individui quia individuum sufficienter constituitur ex causis particularibus ..."

Burley makes similar claims in *Isagoge* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), f. a5^{va}, in *De universalibus* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 51 and in *Categories* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), f. d3^{ra}.

⁴⁸ Each of the universals which exist in it can be called a "quidditative part" ("*pars quidditativa*") of the individual. But that just means that between the universal and the individual there is a relation of a "*per se superius*" to its "*inferius*", a relation in virtue of which it is equally legitimate to say that the universal is a "universal whole" ("*totum universale*") of which the individual is a "subjective part" ("*pars subjectiva*"). That relation has, obviously, nothing to do with the relation between a whole and each of its component parts. Accordingly, Burley can concede of each of the universals existing in it that it is a quidditative part of the individual and deny that it is one if its component parts. This is exactly what he does in QPH, q. 1, §1.821, ed. Brown 1974 (*op.cit.*, above n. 6), 213, where it reads: "... dicendum quod res significata per 'homo' est pars quidditativa et totum universale Sortis. Et ... non est concedendum quod Sortes componatur ex natura speciei et toto residuo a natura speciei nisi concederetur quod Sortes componatur ex se ipso et alio."

an individual are imagined substracted from it, the remainder is still the whole individual.⁴⁹

Whether or not the universals which exist in it are regarded as component parts of the individual, they are as essential to it as its singular substantial form is.⁵⁰ On this theory, then, instead of there being in an individual just one substantial form essential to it, a form which, on one mode of being, is singular and, on another, general, as was the case on the preceding theory, there are several substantial forms in an individual, each essential to it, only one of which is singular, whereas the others are general. All have the same mode of being, namely actual being.

The feature which is most distinctive of this theory of extra-mental universals, however, setting it apart from the preceding one, is that a universal actually exists in an individual, not as a singular, but as a universal. Since, in all but exceptional cases, a universal which exists in one actual individual exists in others as well, it follows that it exists wholly in each individual as a universal. It retains, therefore, its unity and is in no way multiplied by existing in many actual individuals. In each individual in which it exists, it exists as one and the same actually existing universal.⁵¹

At first sight, such a theory might be thought to be unsustainable. For distinct actual individuals have distinct locations. It follows that, if a universal exists as one and the same universal in different actual individuals at the same time, it exists as one and the same universal in different places at the same time. But is it not impossible that a thing should exist as one and the same in different places at the same time?⁵²

⁴⁹ QPH, q. 1, §1.121, ed. Brown 1974 (*op.cit.*, above n. 6), 203: "Tunc arguo: omne compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima est Sortes; residuum a natura speciei est compositum ex hoc corpore et hac anima; igitur residuum a natura speciei est Sortes, et per consequens in residuo a natura speciei habetur complete tota natura Sortis" and, a few pages later QPH, q. 1, §1.821, ed. Brown 1974 (*op.cit.*, above n. 6), 213: "dico quod . . . in illo residuo est completa natura Sortis."

⁵⁰ If his intellectual soul were destroyed, Tom would no longer exist. Nor would he, or any other human being, exist if the specific nature in which being human consists were destroyed.

⁵¹ *Isagoge* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), f. a4^{rb} and *De universalibus*, ed. Shriver 1958 (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 36: "Alia est opinio quae ponit universale habere esse subjectivum in suis singularibus et quod universale secundum se totum est in quolibet suo singulari."

This "opinion" is the one Burley defends.

⁵² *Isagoge* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), f. a4^{vb} and *De universalibus*, ed. Shriver 1958 (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 43: "Contra istam opinionem sunt rationes apparentes. Primo secundum istam opinionem sequitur quod idem omnino sit in caelo et in inferno, quia homo qui est species est in quolibet suo individuo ergo est in illo individuo quod est in inferno et in illo quod est in caelo."

Burley believed that this is not impossible at all, at least not for all "things". For individuals, it is indeed, he granted, impossible that they should exist as one and the same in different places at the same time. But universals are not individuals, and the property of not possibly existing as one and the same in different places at the same time, which holds of individuals, does not hold of universals.

Why not? Because universals have a type of identity which individuals do not have. There is, of course, a type of identity common to all things, whether they are individuals or universals. Burley calls this type of identity "numerical identity in the common or wide sense". But, more basic than this general type of identity, are two other types of identity, one characteristic of individuals, the other of universals. Burley calls the former "numerical identity in the strict sense" and the latter "specific or generic identity."⁵³ The property of having numerical identity in the wide sense is thus derivative: it is common to whatever has numerical identity in the strict sense and to whatever has specific or generic identity.⁵⁴

Because they have different types of identity, individuals and universals support opposite properties of a very fundamental nature. In particular, individuals have the property of not possibly existing as one and the same thing in different places at the same time,⁵⁵ whereas universals

⁵³ It is essential to realize that the expression "specific or generic identity" is not taken here in its usual sense (the sense in which, in *Topica* I,7, Aristotle uses it), where it denotes a certain sort of similarity relation, the relation, namely, which individuals of the same species or of the same genus bear to each other. Instead it is taken in a sense in which it denotes a genuine identity relation, the relation, namely, which a universal bears to itself.

The view that individuals have numerical identity (in the strict sense), whereas universals have specific or generic identity is expressed over and over again by Burley, both in early and in later writings. Thus, in QPH, q. 1, §1.82, ed. Brown 1974 (*op.cit.*, above n. 6), 213: "... hoc nomen 'homo' significat rem extra animam sed illa res non est una numero sed una secundum speciem, nec est omnis res extra animam una res numero."; in *De anima*, I, q. 3: "Quod autem universale... habeat esse praeter animam, ita quod est aliqua natura extra animam, quae non est una natura numero, patet."; in *Isagoge* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), f. a5^{rb} and in *De universalibus*, ed. Shriver 1958 (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 47: "Sed accipiendo unum numero stricte secundum quod distinguitur contra unum specie et unum genere, sic unum numero distinguitur contra quodcumque commune et sic idem et unum numero idem est quod individuum... et ideo nullum universale est unum numero..." and in *Physica* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), f. 9^{rb}: "Sic dico quod universale non est unum numero sed est unum specie vel unum genere".

⁵⁴ *Isagoge* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), f. a5^{ra} and *De universalibus*, ed. Shriver 1958 (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 46: "... idem numero accipitur dupliciter, scilicet communiter et stricte. Idem numero communiter acceptum est... superius ad idem numero stricte assumptum et ad unum specie et ad unum genere et etiam est commune cuilibet enti..."

⁵⁵ *Isagoge* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), a5^{rb} and *De universalibus*, ed. Shriver 1958 (*op.cit.*, above

have the opposite property. It is not, of course, as numerically one and the same thing in the strict sense that a universal can exist in several places at the same time, but as numerically one and the same thing in the wide or common sense.⁵⁶

By establishing that a universal can exist as one and the same thing in different places at the same time, thereby proving that the contrary assumption was wrong, Burley disposed of a major objection against the theory of extra-mental universals which he favors. It now appears that, far from being "unsustainable," the theory that a universal actually exists as one and the same universal in every individual in which it exists is quite attractive.

The theory of extra-mental universals characteristic of Burley is thus based on a theory of identity. Because universals are assigned a type of identity different from that of individuals, a universal can be recognized as actually existing as one and the same universal in each of many individuals. It follows that, on this theory by contrast with the preceding one, no mode of being other than actual being is required to ensure that universals have extra-mental being as universals. In particular, the theory need not posit habitual being for that purpose.

It does not follow that the theory must deny habitual being, however. I know of no indisputably authentic text by Burley in which he so much as mentions habitual being. Yet there is a text, contained in his early *Quaestiones in librum Perihermeneias*, where he subscribes to a semantical thesis which probably commits him to denying that universals have habitual being.

The semantical thesis in question is the thesis that a general substantive term cannot be univocally or, as Burley also says, uniformly predicated of past, present and future individuals. The term "human being" for example cannot be uniformly predicated of Caesar, who is now dead, of Henry who is now alive, and of the Antichrist who is not yet born.⁵⁷

n. 35), 47: "Sed accipiendo unum numero stricte secundum quod distinguitur contra unum genere et unum specie . . . impossibile est quod idem numero sit in caelo et in terra . . ."

⁵⁶ *Isagoge* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), f. a5^{ra} and *De universalibus*, ed. Shriver 1958 (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), 46: "Dico ergo quod accipiendo idem numero communiter . . . sic non est inconueniens quod unus vel idem numero sit simul in caelo et in inferno . . ."

⁵⁷ Burley rejects the following thesis (QPH, q. 4 §4.51, ed. Brown 1974 (*op.cit.*, above n. 6), 274): "... a quibus aliquid indifferenter abstrahitur de illis indifferenter dicitur; igitur sicut haec est vera 'Gualterus est homo' sic et ista 'Caesar est homo'." Instead he subscribes to this thesis (QPH, q. 5 §5.31, ed. Brown 1974 (*op.cit.*, above n. 6), 290): "... terminus communis significans rem per se in genere non praedicatur univoce de suppositis praesentibus,

It follows that the corresponding universal—signified by the general term—cannot uniformly exist in those individuals. Nor does it, therefore, habitually exist in each. When writing this work, then, Burley would have surely opposed the notion that a universal habitually exists in past, present and future individuals. It is likely that he would also have opposed the notion that universals have habitual being.

Conclusion

These two theories of extra-mental universals are very different from each other. They are, indeed, incompatible theories.

On the theory stated in M&F, a universal actually exists in actual individuals only as “multiplied”—i.e. as many singulars, not as a universal. It is only insofar as it habitually exists in past, present and future individuals that it exists as a universal. On Burley’s characteristic theory, by contrast, an extra-mental universal actually exists in actual individuals as a universal, or as one might say, it exists in them as “unmultiplied.”⁵⁸ Moreover, on this theory, universals are not recognized as habitually existing in past, present and future individuals.

Nevertheless, these theories have some features in common: they both avoid what may well have been regarded by medievals as two major pitfalls for a theory of extra-mental universals. The first pitfall could be called “inconsistent realism,” meaning a theory of universals which acknowledges extra-mental universals while denying them any mode of being other than one whereby they exist as singulars.⁵⁹ Both theories clearly avoid that pitfall, the theory stated in M&F by admitting that extra-mental

praeteritis et futuris, sed analogice, quoniam si iste terminus ‘homo’ esset univocus ad Joannem et Caesarem, essentia hominis salvaretur in Joanne et etiam in Caesare. Sed hoc est falsum, quia . . . Caesare corrupto non habet Caesar aliquam essentiam . . .”

⁵⁸ Apparently characterizing the “opinion” subscribed to by Burley in so many of his works, Ockham writes in *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 4, ed. St. Brown and G. Gál, St. Bonaventure 1970, 101,6-11 (OTH II): “Et ita secundum istam opinionem quot sunt universalis praedicabilia in quid et per se primo modo de aliquo singulari per se in genere tot sunt in eo res realiter distinctae quarum quaelibet realiter distinguitur ab alia et ab illo singulari, et omnes illae res in se nullo modo multiplicatae, quantumcumque singularia multiplicentur, sunt in quolibet individuo eiusdem speciei.”

⁵⁹ In *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, q. 5, ed. Brown and Gál (*op.cit.*, above n. 58), 153, Ockham refers to a theory according to which: “. . . universale et univocum [est] vera res extra animam realiter distincta ab individuo, in eo tamen realiter exsistens, realiter multiplicata et variata” (153, 3-5). As he is quick to point out, this theory is inconsistent, for it entails that every universal is a singular thing and, therefore, not a universal. “. . . igitur omnis talis res est vere singularis et per consequens non est universalis.” (153, 20-1).

universals habitually exist as universals, and Burley's characteristic theory by admitting that extra-mental universals actually exist as universals.

The other pitfall is the form of realism about universals which medievals seem to have been unanimous in condemning, namely the doctrine which Aristotle had already denounced, ascribing it to Plato. On that doctrine, extra-mental universals actually exist as universals separately from any actual individual. Now this is incompatible both with the theory stated in M&F and with Burley's characteristic theory. On the former theory, extra-mental universals have being as universals separately from any actual individual, but it is habitual being, not actual being.⁶⁰ On the latter theory, extra-mental universals have actual being as universals, but only by existing in actual individuals.⁶¹

These two theories are clearly amongst the most important forms taken by scholastic realism. One of these theories—namely Burley's characteristic theory—still has partisans today;⁶² the other theory, as far as I know, does not.

An APPENDIX on parallel passages in *De materia et forma*, attributed to Walter Burley, and in philosophical works by Richard Rufus of Cornwall.

There are parallel passages in the tract *De materia et forma* and in works by Richard Rufus of Cornwall written before 1238, when the author was

⁶⁰ The author of M&F is glad to point this out. He writes (ed. Shapiro 1962 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 97-8): "Et si aliquis obiciat quod hec opinio ponit universale secundum rem esse aliquid preter intellectum et extra singularia, et ita ponit ydeas separatas sicut posuit Plato; dicendum quod Plato posuit formas universales separatas extra singularia habere actum existendi, et esse hoc aliquid et encia actu, sicut entitas aliorum. Sed licet universale habeat esse habituale in se preter hoc quod est in singulari, tamen secundum actum solum reperitur in singularibus, cum forma sine materia actualiter subsistere non potuit."

⁶¹ In *Isagoge* (*op.cit.*, above n. 35), f. a4^{rb} and f. a5^{va}) and in *De universalibus*, ed. Shriver 1958, 36 and 52, Burley contrasts his own opinion, namely: "opinio quae ponit universale habere esse subjectivum in suis singularibus et quod universale secundum se totum est in quolibet suo singulari" with another which he rejects: "alia est adhuc opinio quae ponit quod universalia sunt extra animam separata secundum esse a singularibus; et haec fuit opinio Platonis secundum quod Aristoteles sibi imponit."

⁶² Here is how David Lewis (*On the Plurality of Worlds*, Oxford 1986, ch. I, 64) characterizes a "sparse theory of immanent universals" which he considers attractive: "To each perfectly natural property, there corresponds a universal... Wherever the property is instantiated, there is the corresponding universal... One and the same universal recurs; it is multiply located; it is wholly present in both particles, a shared common part whereby the two particles overlap. Being alike by sharing a universal is 'having something in common' in an absolutely literal sense." Though less favorable to such a theory, Armstrong

a master of Arts in Paris. They suggest that those works by Richard might have served as a direct or indirect source of the theory contained in that tract. The text of two pairs of such passages is given here.⁶³

1. *On forms as "actually multiplied" and as "multipliable"*

1a. *De materia et forma* (96-7)

Hec forma que solum in materia reperitur duplex habet esse. . . . aliquod esse habet prius naturaliter in se preter esse quod sibi derelinquitur in quantum est actus materie et perfectio compositi. Prout ergo est aliquod in se duplex esse habet; unum in quantum est una essentia in se alia ab essentia materie, sine omni comparacione ad materiam . . . aliud habet in comparacione ad materiam in quantum est multiplicabilis per materiam; prius enim secundum naturam est forma multiplicabilis per materiam quam actu multiplicetur, et hoc esse vocatur "esse habituale," quod debetur nature in quantum natura est multiplicabilis per multa. Secundum autem quod forma est in materia, alia duo habet esse . . . et utrumque istorum duorum esse vocatur "esse actuale" sive "actus essendi," et secundum hoc esse est forma substantia in actu et principium individui; et sic patet quod principia rerum individuarum singularia sunt, et non universalia, quia forma singularis et materia singularis . . .

1b. *Richard Rufus*

Sententia cum quaestionibus super Physicam Aristotelis, ed. R. Wood, liber II, tr. II, pars 5, Erfurt Quarto 312, fol. 4^{vb}:

Forma enim duplex habet esse: unum esse scilicet secundum quod est multiplicabilis, et aliud esse secundum quod actu multiplicata est. Si primo modo consideretur forma, ei debetur communitas; de se enim est forma multiplicabilis. Si secundo modo consideretur forma, sic est principium et causa eius quod est hoc-aliquid . . . formae individuatæ et multiplicatæ [sunt] per materiam.

recognizes that it "comes close" to what he takes to be "the truth of the matter" (D.M. Armstrong, *Universals and Scientific Realism*, 2 vols., Cambridge 1978, vol. 1, 68).

⁶³ When quoting texts by Richard Rufus, I shall be quoting from a provisional edition by Professor Rega Wood of the works they are contained in. Professor Wood, who is the general editor of Rufus' works, has, with boundless generosity, provided me with transcriptions of those works as well as of a number of others by this fascinating author.

2. *On universals as incorruptible and as corruptible*

2a. *De materia et forma* (97-8)

... Unde Philosophus ... et Commentator ..., cum dicit quod [nullum] universale habet esse extra animam, intelligunt de esse quod est actus existendi, et [non] de esse habituale. ... secundum ... esse habituale, [universalia] incorruptibilia sunt; ... secundum autem quod est actualiter multiplicatum, [universale] ... est corruptibile ...

2b. *Richard Rufus*

Sententia super libro Posteriorum, ed. R. Wood, Erfurt, Quarto 290, fol. 32^{va}:

... dicendum quod universale dupliciter potest considerari: aut secundum esse quod habet in individuis; aut secundum esse quod debetur ei non inquantum est in individuis, sed quod debetur ei in sua essentia ... Et propterea per corruptionem individuorum non corrumpitur quoad esse quod habet in sua essentia, sed tantum quoad esse quod actualiter habet in individuis corrumpitur ad eorum corruptionem.

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Walter Burley on The Kinds of Simple Supposition¹

PAUL VINCENT SPADE

1. Background

By the early-fourteenth century at the latest, the mediaeval theory of supposition could be divided in most authors into two main branches, which in recent literature have come to be called the theory of "supposition proper" and the theory of "modes of personal supposition," respectively.² While the relation between these two branches remains obscure, we can say to a first approximation that the theory of supposition proper was a theory of "reference," designed to answer the question what entity or entities a term refers to or "supposits" for in a given occurrence in a given proposition, whereas the theory of modes of personal supposition, whatever its ultimate purpose, was the part of the theory that included the much-discussed accounts of "descent to singulars" and "ascent from singulars."³

Walter Burley and his somewhat younger contemporary, William of Ockham, for the most part agreed about the modes of personal supposition,⁴

¹ I am grateful to Rega Wood and Elizabeth Karger for their comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.

² See Paul Vincent Spade, *The Semantics of Terms*, in: Norman Kretzmann et al. (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, New York 1982, Ch. 9 (188-96). This terminology was first used by T.K. Scott in the "Introduction" to his translation of John Buridan's *Sophismata*, and is not mediaeval. See T.K. Scott (trans.), *John Buridan: Sophisms on Meaning and Truth*, New York 1966, 29-42.

³ For an account of this second part of the theory, and a discussion of some of the difficulties surrounding it, see Paul Vincent Spade, *The Logic of the Categorical: The Medieval Theory of Descent and Ascent*, in: Norman Kretzmann (ed.), *Meaning and Inference in Medieval Philosophy: Studies in Memory of Jan Pinborg*, Dordrecht 1988, 187-224. For a critique of my interpretation of the theory there (although not of my account of its mechanics), see Gareth B. Matthews, *Two Theories of Supposition*, in: *Topoi*, 16 (1997), 35-40. See also Terence Parsons, *Supposition as Quantification versus Supposition as Global Quantificational Effect*, in: *Topoi*, 16 (1997), 41-63, especially p. 61, n. 2.

⁴ That is, although their definitions of the modes of personal supposition differ, those definitions appear to agree in assigning the various modes to particular cases—at least in the contexts the theory seems to have been primarily designed to handle. (John Buridan's definitions behave the same way.) On this odd fact and its significance, see Spade 1988 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3).

but they disagreed fundamentally about supposition proper, particularly about the kinds of supposition known as "personal" and "simple."⁵ Even there, however, they agreed on the main paradigm cases. In "Every man is mortal", for example, they both held that "man" is in personal supposition and supposits for individual human beings; in "Man is a species", they both held that "man" is in simple supposition and supposits for the universal *man*.⁶ Their disagreement was over what is going on in these and other cases, both metaphysically and semantically.

Metaphysically, Ockham was a nominalist. For him, talk about universals—which had been an important part of logical discourse ever since Aristotle's *Categories* and Porphyry's *Isagoge* came to be included in the logical corpus—only makes sense as talk about universal *concepts* in the mind.⁷ Of course, like everything else in Ockham's ontology, concepts are metaphysically individual. Some of them, nevertheless, can be regarded as universal "by representation," so to speak; they are *general* concepts (mental representations) of many individuals at once. Burley, by contrast, was a metaphysical realist of some kind or other.⁸ For him, talk about species and genera is talk about the *world*.

Semantically, the main basis for the disagreement between Burley and Ockham was over signification, and hence over the proper way to define personal and simple supposition. For Ockham, a term in personal supposition always supposits for what it signifies (that is, for *everything* it signifies), which is always one or more individuals (there are nothing *but* individuals in Ockham's ontology), whereas in simple supposition it supposits non-personally for a mental concept. For Burley, on the other hand, a term in personal supposition does not always supposit for what it signifies, and indeed only rarely does so;⁹ it is typically only in *simple* sup-

⁵ For a general overview of the theory of "supposition proper," see Spade 1982 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 192-3. For a discussion of some aspects of this disagreement between Burley and Ockham, see Paul Vincent Spade, *Some Epistemological Implications of the Burley-Ockham Dispute*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 35 (1975), 212-22. For corrections to both papers, see Paul Vincent Spade, *Walter Burley on the Simple Supposition of Singular Terms*, in: *Topoi*, 16 (1997), 7-13.

⁶ For Ockham, of course, that universal is the concept "man." See the following paragraph.

⁷ And, derivatively, about universal spoken or written words subordinated to such concepts in conventional languages.

⁸ The exact form Burley's realism took is a matter still under discussion. For some recent treatments of the question, see Alessandro D. Conti, *Ontology in Walter Burley's Last Commentary on the Ars Vetus*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 50 (1990), 121-76; and Elizabeth Karger, *Mental Sentences according to Burley and to the Early Ockham*, in: *Vivarium*, 34 (1996), 192-230.

⁹ In fact, this occurs only in cases of what Burley calls "simple discrete terms," for exam-

position that a term supposits for what it signifies, and what it signifies may turn out to be a metaphysical universal or to contain such a universal as a part.¹⁰

But Burley's theory differs from Ockham's in ways that go beyond these basics. Perhaps because so much of the modern secondary literature has focused primarily on Ockham's theory, these differences have not been investigated to the extent they deserve. Burley, for example, divided and subdivided simple supposition into various kinds, and furthermore changed his mind about at least some aspects of this structure over the course of his intellectual career. This part of Burley's theory has received practically no attention at all in the modern secondary literature.¹¹

In the present paper, therefore, I shall explore in at least a preliminary way Burley's account of the divisions and subdivisions of simple supposition, investigate how that account changed over time, and inquire into the motivation behind this part of his doctrine. The main texts I shall be concerned with are Burley's early treatise *De suppositionibus* (dated 1302)¹² and his later *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior* (before 1327).¹³ I shall occasionally mention Burley's late *Expositio super artem veterem* (1337), although the theory of simple supposition in that work remains to be studied more fully.¹⁴

2. Absolute and Compared Simple Supposition

In his *De suppositionibus*, Burley divides simple supposition first into "absolute" and "compared."¹⁵ The basis for this division is the two traditional features

ple proper names. For a discussion of this aspect of Burley's theory, see Spade 1997 (*op.cit.*, above n. 5).

¹⁰ The last clause is included to accommodate such cases as "White Socrates is a being by accident". See Spade 1997 (*op.cit.*, above n. 5) for a discussion of this proposition.

¹¹ A brief and partial exception may be found in Allan Bäck, *Who Is the Worthiest of Them All?*, in: Stephen Read (ed.), *Sophisms in Medieval Logic and Grammar: Acts of the Ninth European Symposium for Medieval Logic and Semantics, Held at St Andrews, June 1990*, Dordrecht 1993, 277-87, at 284-5.

¹² Edited in Stephen F. Brown, *Walter Burleigh's Treatise De suppositionibus and Its Influence on William of Ockham*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 32 (1972), 15-64. On the date, see *ibid.*, 16.

¹³ Edited in Walter Burley (= Burleigh), *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior*, *With a Revised Edition of the Tractatus brevior*, ed. Philotheus Boehner, St. Bonaventure, NY 1955. In the introduction to his edition (p. viii), Boehner dates this work 1325-1328. But Rega Wood, in an unpublished paper *Walter Burley: Life and Works*, suggests a slightly earlier date.

¹⁴ Walter Burley, *Burlei super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis*, Venice: Otinus [de Luna] Papiensis, 11 May 1497 (Copy in the Lilly Library at Indiana University). On the date, see the explicit quoted in James A. Weisheipl, *Repertorium Mertonense*, in: *Mediaeval Studies*, 31 (1969), 174-224, at p. 189.

¹⁵ *De suppositionibus*, 35-6, (§ 2.3): "Suppositio formalis est quando terminus supponit pro

of a universal, namely that, although it is one thing, it is both "in many" and "said of many."¹⁶ Absolute simple supposition corresponds to the former feature and compared simple supposition to the latter. For example, in "Man is the most worthy creature among creatures"¹⁷ the term "man"

significato suo vel pro supposito, et dividitur suppositio formalis quia quaedam est simplex et quaedam personalis. Et dividitur suppositio simplex, quia aliquando terminus supponit pro significato absoluto et aliquando pro significato comparato ad supposita. Et sic suppositio simplex est duplex: quaedam est absoluta et quaedam comparata: suppositio absoluta ut hic 'Homo est dignissima creaturarum creatura,' et suppositio comparata ut hic 'Homo est species.' Quoniam universale habet duas condiciones: una eius condicio est esse in multis, et alia dici de multis. Secundum quod universale habet esse in multis debetur sibi suppositio absoluta, et secundum quod dicitur de multis debetur sibi suppositio simplex et comparata. Unde secundum aliam suppositionem est haec vera: 'Homo est species,' et secundum aliam est haec vera: 'Homo est dignissima creaturarum creatura,' alioquin foret haec vera: 'Dignissima creaturarum creatura est species.'" ("Supposition is formal when a term supposits for its significate or for a suppositum. Formal supposition is divided, because one kind is simple and another kind personal. Simple supposition is divided, because sometimes a term supposits for its absolute significate, and sometimes for its significate [as] compared with [its] supposita. And so simple supposition is of two kinds. One kind is absolute, and the other kind is compared. Absolute supposition, as here: 'Man is the most worthy creature among creatures', and compared supposition, as here: 'Man is a species'. For a universal has two conditions. One condition of it is 'being in many', and the other is 'being said of many'. According as a universal has 'being in many', absolute supposition belongs to it. And according as it is 'said of many', simple and compared supposition belongs to it. Thus, according to the one supposition 'Man is a species' is true, and according to the other 'Man is the most worthy creature among creatures' is true. Otherwise 'The most worthy creature among creatures is a species' would be true.") Translations from *De suppositionibus* in this paper are parts of a larger translation I have prepared of a portion of the text, available on the World Wide Web at "<http://pvspade.com/Logic>." (Follow the links to the "Download" page.)

¹⁶ This characterization of a universal is a slogan commonly attributed to Aristotle. Nevertheless, although it reflects his views, Aristotle does not say all of it in any one place. See *Metaphysics* XII.13 1038^b11 (for "in many") and *De interpretatione* 7 17^b39-40 (for "said of many").

¹⁷ The locution "the most worthy creature among creatures" (*dignissima creaturarum creatura*) is apparently just an elaborate way of saying "the most worthy creature of all." Ockham discusses the same proposition (with a trivial inversion of word order) in William of Ockham, *Summa logicae*, ed. Ph. Boehner, G. Gál and St. Brown, St. Bonaventure, NY 1974, I.66, lines 3-9, 26-50 (OPH, I). Indeed, the proposition was a paradigm of at least one kind of simple supposition well back into the twelfth century. See the entries under "creatura" in the index to L.M. De Rijk, *Logica Modernorum: A Contribution to the History of Early Terminist Logic*, 2 vols., Assen 1962-1967, at vol. 2.2, 863. The odd expression "creature among creatures" sounds to me suspiciously like a literal translation of a fairly common Arabic syntactical construction. This in turn suggests that perhaps the proposition itself is taken from an Islamic source. Ockham's editors (*ibid.*, p. 199 n. 1) suggest it is the *incipit* of the pseudo-Aristotelian *De pomo* (= "The Apple, or Aristotle's Death"). But the Latin version of that work instead begins "Cum homo creaturarum dignissima *similitudo* sit . . .," which (1) does not contain the characteristic construction in question and (2) is the *incipit* of Manfred of Sicily's own Latin prologue, not of the original Arabic work. See the editions

has absolute simple supposition and supposits for the universal species *man* insofar as it is “in many” individual human beings. By contrast, in “Man is a species” the term “man” has compared simple supposition and supposits for the universal species *man* insofar as it is “said of many.”

Burley does not say enough in this passage to make the basis for this distinction completely clear, and the examples do not on the face of it offer much help. Some motivation for the second example may perhaps be derived from Porphyry’s dictum, “Species is what is *predicated*, with respect to what the thing is, of *several things* differing in number.”¹⁸ But, initially, it is hard to see why the first example could not just as well have been counted as *compared* simple supposition instead.

To be sure, it is possible to supply ways to motivate the distinction, but they are not ways Burley himself gives in this passage. For example, it might be construed as the distinction between a universal essence or nature as something “absolute” inhering in singulars (corresponding to absolute simple supposition) and that same essence or nature as that whereby each singular is related (“compared”) to all others of the same kind, and indeed to the essence or nature itself (corresponding to compared simple supposition).¹⁹ This suggestion does take account of the fact that when one hears “Man is a species”, it is natural to ask “A species of *what*?” The answer is that it is a species of singulars, of individual men, thus relating or “comparing” the universal to the several individuals that partake of it, in a way that isn’t obviously done with “Man is the most worthy creature among creatures”.

in Marianus Plezia (ed.), *Aristotelis qui ferebatur liber De pomo: Versio latina vetusta interprete Manfredo duce*, in: Eos: Commentarii societatis philologiae Polonorum 47.1 (1954), 191-217; and Bruno Nardi and Paolo Mazzatini, *Il canto di Manfredi e il Liber de pomo sive de morte Aristotelis*, Torino 1964. See also the translation and discussion in Mary F. Rousseau, (trans.), *The Apple or Aristotle’s Death (De Pomo sive De Morte Aristotelis)*, Milwaukee 1968; and the information in Charles B. Schmitt and Dilwyn Knox, *Pseudo-Aristoteles Latinus: A Guide to Latin Works Falsely Attributed to Aristotle Before 1500*, London 1985, 51. See the further discussion of the Arabic source of this work in Jörg Kraemer, *Das arabische Original des pseudo-aristotelischen “Liber de pomo,”* in: *Studi orientalistici in onore di Giorgio Levi della Vida*, 2 vols., Rome 1956, at vol. 1, 484-506. I would welcome further information on the background to the mediaeval discussions of this proposition.

¹⁸ Porphyry, *Isagoge*, Paul Vincent Spade (trans.), *Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals*, Indianapolis 1994, p. 4, para. (19). The Greek is εἶδος ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ πλείονων καὶ διαφερόντων τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἐν τῷ τί ἐστι κατηγορούμενον. I take it that for, for purposes of merely motivating the example, “predicated of” (κατηγορούμενον) may be regarded here as an approximate equivalent of “said of” (λεγόμενον). See L.M. de Rijk, “Categorization” as a Key Notion in Ancient and Medieval Semantics, in: *Vivarium*, 26 (1988), 1-18.

¹⁹ This reading was suggested to me by Rega Wood.

But however one is to understand the distinction as drawn in *De suppositionibus*, in his later *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior* Burley attributes that account to the “older logicians,”²⁰ and then goes on to present a new and alternative basis for the distinction.²¹ On this alternative account,

²⁰ *De puritate*, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 13), 11.2-21 (references in this form are to page and line numbers in the Boehner edition): “Viso quando terminus habet suppositionem simplicem, videndum est, quomodo suppositio simplex dividitur. Et dividitur suppositio simplex secundum antiquos logicos in suppositionem absolutam et in suppositionem simplicem comparatam. Suppositio simplex absoluta est, quando terminus communis supponit absolute pro suo significato, ut est in suppositis. Suppositio simplex comparata est, quando terminus communis supponit pro suo significato, secundum quod praedicatur de suppositis. Universale enim seu terminus communis habet duas condiciones secundum Philosophum, quia est in multis et dicitur de multis. Secundum quod universale habet esse in multis, debetur sibi suppositio simplex absoluta, et secundum quod dicitur de multis, debetur sibi comparata suppositio simplex sive respectiva. Unde secundum unam suppositionem verificatur ista: ‘Homo est species’, et secundum aliam suppositionem verificatur ista: ‘Homo est dignissima creatura creaturarum’. Secundum enim quod ille terminus ‘homo’ habet suppositionem simplicem absolutam verificatur ista: ‘Homo est dignissima creatura creaturarum’; sed secundum quod homo habet suppositionem simplicem comparatam, verificatur ista: ‘Homo est species’.” (See Walter Burley, *On the Purity of the Art of Logic: The Shorter and the Longer Treatises*, trans. Paul Vincent Spade, New Haven (forthcoming), § 45: “Now that we have seen when a term has simple supposition, we must see how simple supposition is divided. According to the old logicians, simple supposition is divided into *absolute* supposition and *compared* simple supposition. Simple supposition is *absolute* when a common term supposits absolutely for its significate insofar as it is in its supposita. Simple supposition is *compared* when a common term supposits for its significate insofar as it is *predicated* of its supposita. For a universal or a common term has two conditions, according to the Philosopher, because it is in many and is said of many. Absolute simple supposition belongs to the universal insofar as it has *being in* many, and compared or respective simple supposition belongs to it insofar as it is *said of* many. Thus, ‘Man is a species’ is made true according to the one supposition, and ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’ is made true according to the other supposition. For ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’ is made true insofar as the term ‘man’ has absolute simple supposition. But ‘Man is a species’ is made true insofar as ‘man’ has compared simple supposition.”)

It is not clear who these “older logicians” are. Both Rega Wood and Elizabeth Karger have suggested to me that Richard Rufus of Cornwall may be one of them. The matter deserves further investigation. Of course, it is also possible that Burley is merely referring here to his own former view. (All references to *De puritate* will be to the *Tractatus longior*, first to Boehner’s edition, and then to the paragraph number in my forthcoming translation.)

²¹ *De puritate*, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 13), 11.21-8: “Posset tamen dici, quod suppositio simplex absoluta est, quando terminus supponit pro suo significato absolute non in comparatione ad supposita nec quantum ad esse in, nec quantum ad dici de. Sed suppositio simplex comparata est, quando terminus communis supponit pro suo significato in comparatione ad supposita vel pro aliquibus inferioribus suis habentibus supposita. Primo modo est haec vera: ‘Homo est dignissima creatura creaturarum’, secundo modo est haec vera: ‘Homo est species.’” (trans. Spade (*op.cit.*, above n. 20) § 45: “Nevertheless, one could also say that simple supposition is *absolute* when a term supposits for its significate absolutely, not in comparison to its supposita, either as far as *being in* is concerned or as far as *being*

the distinction between absolute and compared²² simple supposition has nothing to do with “being in” or “being said of.” Instead, he now says, a term in absolute simple supposition supposits for its significate *not* in comparison to its supposita,²³ either with respect to “being in” or with respect to “being said of.” Again the example is “Man is the most worthy creature among creatures”. On the other hand, a common term in compared simple supposition supposits for its significate in comparison to its supposita, or for some of its inferiors that have supposita. (We shall examine the two parts of this definition in section 3 of this paper, below.) As in *De suppositionibus*, the example is “Man is a species”.²⁴

said of is concerned, but simple supposition is *compared* when a common term supposits for its significate in comparison to its supposita, or for some of its inferiors having supposita. In the first way, ‘Man is the worthiest creature among creatures’ is true; in the second way, ‘Man is a species’ is true.”)

Note that Burley gives no reason for rejecting the view of the “older logicians.”

²² At *De puritate*, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 13), 11.14 (see n. 20 above), he also calls this “respective” simple supposition.

²³ The noun “suppositum” commonly has both a logical and a metaphysical sense. In the logical sense, it means whatever a term supposits for. (That reading would be obviously awkward here.) In the metaphysical sense, a “suppositum” is, roughly speaking an entity in which other entities inhere but that does not itself inhere in anything else. See the discussion in my “Introduction” to *John Wyclif: De universalibus: (Tractatus de Universalibus)*, trans. Anthony Kenny, Oxford 1985, vii-l, at pp. xxviii-xxix. (The discussion there is not applicable only to Wyclif.) Although for theological reasons not all individuals are supposita, nevertheless all supposita are individuals. Until recently I thought that in contexts such as the present one, Burley was using the term “suppositum” in the metaphysical, not the logical sense. (See, for example, Spade 1997 (*op.cit.*, above n. 5), n. 10.) But I now wish to suggest that Burley is using the term in yet a third sense in these contexts. In this third sense, the supposita of a term are, roughly speaking, the “lowest” things of which the term can be predicated on the Porphyrean tree. Thus, if we allow the notion of the “inferiors” of a term (a notion Burley frequently uses), then its supposita in this third sense are its “*infima*.” In this third sense, Socrates and Plato are supposita of the term “man” and the species *man* is a suppositum of the term “species”. But only the former two are supposita in the metaphysical sense.

Although one might disagree about which sense of “suppositum” Burley is using in a given case, clearly some sense like the one just described is needed to accommodate certain things Burley says. For example, in *De suppositionibus* (2.3), he says “Supposition is formal when a term supposits for its significate or for a suppositum.” (See n. 15 above. Compare *De puritate*, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 13), 3.1-3, trans. Spade (*op.cit.*, above n. 20) § 11.) The former is simple supposition and the latter personal. Obviously “suppositum” in the second disjunct here cannot be taken in the logical sense, because a term *always* supposits for its suppositum in that sense, so that *all* supposition would then have to be personal. But if “suppositum” here is taken in the metaphysical sense, then terms like “species”, “accident” and “universal” could never be in personal supposition. Plainly, some third sense is needed.

²⁴ In his Prologue to the commentary on Porphyry’s *Isagoge* in his *Expositio super artem veterem*, Burley remarks that a (common) nature is a thing of first intention insofar as it is

Despite the use of the same examples, Burley's new account in fact represents a subtle change of doctrine. Recall first of all that in both *De suppositionibus* and *De puritate*, Burley explicitly allows some discrete terms to be such that simple and personal supposition *coincide* for them.²⁵ In

considered "absolutely," whereas it is a thing of second intention insofar as it is considered in relation to the individuals it is common to (fol. a2^{rb-va}): "Et conceptus rei est duplex, scilicet primus et secundus. Verbi gratia: Possum enim de homine habere unum conceptum quo concipio humanam naturam absolute, scilicet intellegendo vel concipiendo ipsum esse substantiam animatam sensibilem rationalem. Et sic habeo unum conceptum solum primum. Et possum conceptum de homine habere quo concipio naturam humanam in ordine ad illa quae participant eandem naturam, scilicet ad Sortem et Platonem. Et sic habeo alium conceptum, scilicet conceptum comparatum qui dicitur secundarius conceptus. Et iste abstrahitur a conceptu primo. Conceptus primus dicitur prima intentio; conceptus secundus dicitur secunda intentio. Unde prima intentio est conceptus immediate abstractus a rebus. Sed secunda intentio est conceptus abstractus a conceptu primo vel a conceptibus primis. Nomina enim rerum existentium extra animam sunt primae intentionis, ut 'homo' 'animal' 'albedo' 'nigredo'. Sed conceptus abstracti ab istis significantur per nomina secundae intentionis, ut 'genus' 'species' 'subjectum' 'praedicatum' et hujusmodi. Unde breviter prima intentio est primus conceptus rei, secunda intentio est secundarius conceptus rei. Nomen primae intentionis est nomen significans rem ut cadit sub primario conceptu intellectus. Nomen secundae intentionis est nomen significans rem ut cadit sub secundario conceptu. (fol. 2^h/2^a) Et ex his patet eandem rem esse primae intentionis et secundae intentionis, quia eadem res potest apprehendi sub primario conceptu intellectus et secundario, cum tamen prima et secunda intentio non sunt eadem." ("There are two kinds of concept of a thing, first and second. For example, I can have a concept of man whereby I conceive human nature absolutely—that is, by understanding or conceiving him to be rational, sensible, animate substance. In that case I have only a first concept. I can also have a concept of man whereby I conceive human nature as ordered to the things that participate that same nature—namely to Socrates and Plato. In that case I have another concept, a compared concept that is called a 'secondary concept'. This is abstracted from a first concept. The first concept is called a 'first intention'; the second concept is called a 'second intention'. Thus a first intention is a concept immediately abstracted from things, but a second intention is a concept abstracted from a first concept or concepts. For names of existing things outside the soul, like 'man', 'animal', 'whiteness', 'blackness', are of first intention. But concepts abstracted from these are signified by names of second intention, like 'genus', 'species', 'subject', 'predicate', and the like. Thus, in brief, a first intention is a first concept of a thing; a second intention is a secondary concept of a thing. A name of first intention is a name that signifies a thing insofar as it falls under a primary concept of the understanding; a name of second intention is a name that signifies a thing insofar as it falls under a secondary concept. From these [observations], it is plain that the same thing is of first intention and of second intention, because the same thing can be apprehended under a primary and a secondary concept of the understanding—although nevertheless the first and the second intention [themselves] are not the same."

Although the distinction between absolute and compared simple supposition does not seem to be present in the *Expositio super artem veterem* (on the significance of this fact, see section 5 below), this passage suggests that the distinction as drawn in *De puritate* implies that compared simple supposition will occur only in *second-intention* contexts. I am grateful to Elizabeth Karger for calling this passage to my attention.

²⁵ For the details, see Spade 1997 (*op.cit.*, above n. 5).

such cases, the term has simple supposition for an individual, not for a universal. When therefore, in *De suppositionibus*, Burley divides simple supposition into absolute and compared supposition on the basis of the two traditional features of a universal, the division cannot be exhaustive of simple supposition. That is to say, in *De suppositionibus*, some simple supposition is absolute, some is compared—and some is neither. Certain discrete terms in simple supposition supposit for their significates (individuals), but cannot be said to do so either insofar as the significates are “in many” or insofar as they are “said of many” (since individuals are neither in many nor said of many) and so such terms have neither absolute nor compared simple supposition.

In *De puritate*, however, the division between absolute and compared simple supposition is not drawn on the basis of the features of universals. Notice in fact that there the stipulation “common term” occurs in the description of compared simple supposition, but not in the description of absolute simple supposition. Furthermore, it is in absolute simple supposition that a term is there said to supposit for its significate without regard to any supposita it may or may not have, and without regard to “being in many” or “being said of many.” In *De puritate*, therefore, the distinction between the absolute and compared kinds is exhaustive of simple supposition. That is, every case of simple supposition is either simple or compared. The simple supposition of all singular terms will be absolute; some occurrences of common terms will be in compared simple supposition. But, as the example “Man is the most worthy creature among creatures” shows, common terms (here “man”) can have absolute simple supposition too.

Thus, although Burley is silent about his reason for offering a new and alternative formulation of the distinction between absolute and compared simple supposition, it is not hard to supply one for him: it is to “close the gap” in his earlier formulation, and to make the distinction an exhaustive one.

3. *General and Special Compared Simple Supposition*

In both *De suppositionibus* and *De puritate*, Burley distinguishes certain cases of compared simple supposition²⁶ into “general” and “special.”²⁷ In *De*

²⁶ In neither text is the division meant to be exhaustive of compared simple supposition.

²⁷ *De suppositionibus*, ed. Brown 1972 (*op.cit.*, above n. 12), § 2.32: “Sciendum quod terminus generalis habens sub se species et individua potest habere suppositionem simplicem comparatam duplicem, quia potest habere suppositionem generalem vel specialem. Quando habet generalem, tunc supponit pro significato absolute, ita quod non pro aliquo supposito. Et secundum hanc suppositionem est haec vera: ‘Substantia est genus generalissimum.’”

suppositionibus, this distinction is said to apply only to a "general" term that has species and individuals falling under it. Since the term has to have *species* under it, the expression "general term" here implies not just a "common or universal" term but a "genus term" in particular. In *De puri-*

Sed quando habet suppositionem simplicem specialem tunc supponit pro speciebus ita quod non pro individuīs, et sic est haec vera: 'Substantia est substantia secunda.' Unde haec est vera: 'Prima [*on this word, see n. 37 below*] substantia est substantia secunda' secundum quod subiectum habet suppositionem simplicem specialem." ("You should know that a general term having species and individuals under it can have two kinds of simple compared supposition. For it can have general or special supposition. When it has general [supposition], then it supposits for [its] significate absolutely so as not for any suppositum. And according to this supposition, 'Substance is a most general genus' is true. But when it has special simple supposition, then it supposits for species so as not for individuals. And in that case 'Substance is second substance' is true. Thus 'Substance is second substance' is true according as the subject has special simple supposition.")

De puritate, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 13), 11.29-12.23: "Suppositio simplex comparata dividitur in suppositionem generalem et specialem. Et haec distinctio specialiter habet locum in termino generali habente sub se species et individua, scilicet in generibus generalissimis. Quando talis terminus generalis habet suppositionem simplicem generalem, tunc supponit pro suo significato absolute, ita quod non pro aliquo eius inferiori; et isto modo est vera: 'Substantia est genus generalissimum'. Sed quando habet suppositionem simplicem specialem, tunc supponit pro speciebus, ita quod non pro individuīs. Et isto modo sunt tales propositiones verae: 'Substantia est secunda substantia', 'Substantia est species de genere substantiae', 'Substantia proprie definitur'. Si enim 'substantia' acciperetur pro suo significato primo et adequato, sic est haec falsa: 'Substantia proprie definitur', sive substantia significet rem extra singularem sive rem communem omnibus substantiis sive significet conceptum in anima, quia nec res singularis proprie definitur nec conceptus in anima, cum sit accidens, nec res communis omnibus substantiis sive genus generalissimum, cum non habeat genus et differentiam, et omnis definitio datur per genus et differentiam. Ideo, si haec sit vera: 'Substantia definitur', cum nec individuum nec substantia in communi definiatur, oportet quod substantia supponat pro speciebus contentis sub substantia. Et illud oportet dicere tam ponentes quod species et genera sunt res extra animam quam etiam ponentes quod species et genera sunt conceptus vel intentiones in anima. Si enim genus generalissimum de genere substantiae sit res, sive sit communis sive singularis, manifestum est, quod non definitur. Et ideo, si ista aliquo modo sit vera: 'Substantia definitur', vel etiam ista: 'Substantia est species substantiae', oportet quod iste terminus 'substantia' nec supponat pro genere generalissimo, quodcumque sit illud, nec etiam pro individuīs; et ideo oportet quod supponat pro speciebus substantiae, sive illae species sint res extra sive conceptus in anima." (trans. Spade (*op.cit.*, above n. 20) §§ 46-48: "Compared simple supposition is divided into *general* and *special* supposition. This distinction applies in a special case of a general term having species and individuals under it, namely, in the case of the most general genera. When such a general term has *general* simple supposition, it supposits for its significate absolutely, and not for any of its inferiors. In this sense, 'Substance is a most general genus' is true. But when it has *special* simple supposition, it supposits for the species and not for individuals. In this latter sense propositions like the following are true: 'Substance is second substance', 'Substance is a species of the genus substance', 'Substance is properly defined'. For if 'substance' were taken for its first and adequate significate, then 'Substance is properly defined' would be false, whether 'substance' signifies a singular external thing, or a thing common to all sub-

tate, the same restriction is stipulated *verbatim*, but then Burley adds the unexpected words “namely, in the case of the most general genera”—that is, the Aristotelian categories.

Two things are surprising about this addition. First, terms having species and individuals under them are certainly *not* confined to category-terms; any genus-term at all will count. And second, although all Burley’s examples in both texts do involve the category-term “substance”, the problem this distinction is designed to address seems to be one that will arise for any genus-term whatever, not just the most general ones.

Furthermore, in the commentary on the *Categories* found in his *Expositio super artem veterem*, Burley reaffirms the doctrine of *De suppositionibus*, that the distinction between general and special simple supposition applies to all and only general terms that have both species and individuals falling under them.²⁸ This suggests that the added words in *De puritate* are simply in error, and that Burley does not intend any real change in or further restriction of the distinction between general and special supposition. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that the “most general” (= *generalissimis*) in the added phrase “namely, in the case of the most general genera” is an erroneous gloss or a corruption of the text and should simply be omitted. In that case, the addition, now reduced to “namely, in the case of genera”, would be nothing more than an acknowledgment of the point already made in connection with *De suppositionibus*, that the restriction of

stances, or whether it signifies a concept in the soul. For a singular thing is not properly defined. Neither is a concept in the soul, since it is an accident. Nor is the thing common to all substances—that is, the most general genus—since it does not have a genus and difference, and every definition is given by genus and difference. Therefore, if ‘Substance is defined’ is true, then since neither an individual nor substance in general is defined, ‘substance’ must supposit for the species contained under substance. Those who maintain that species and genera are things outside the soul have to say this, as well as those too who maintain that species and genera are concepts or intentions in the soul. For if the most general genus in the genus substance is a real thing, then clearly it is not defined, whether it is common or singular. And therefore, if ‘Substance is defined’ is true in any sense, and also ‘Substance is a species of substance’, the term ‘substance’ must supposit neither for the most general genus, whatever that may be, nor for individuals either. Therefore, it must supposit for the species of substance, whether those species are external things or concepts in the soul.”)

²⁸ *Burley super artem veterem*, fol. d2^{va}: “Et sciendum quod haec divisio de suppositione simplici generali et speciali habet locum [correction by a mediaeval hand in the margin of the Indiana University copy from uocem] in terminis generalibus qui habent sub se species et individua, et non in aliis terminis.” (“You have know that this division between general and special simple supposition concerns general terms that have species and individuals under them, and not to other terms.”)

I am grateful to Elizabeth Karger for calling this passage to my attention.

the distinction to "general" terms implies not just "common or universal" terms, but "genus terms" in particular.

Apart perhaps from that one dubious point, the division of compared simple supposition into general and special is exactly the same in the two treatises. A genus-term term has general compared simple supposition when "it supposits for its significate absolutely"²⁹ so as not for any suppositum."³⁰ It has special compared simple supposition when "it supposits for the species so as not for individuals."³¹

Note that while at this point in the texts the wording is virtually identical in the two treatises, their general notions of simple supposition appear to be different. When simple supposition is first introduced in *De suppositionibus*,³² it seems to be intended as always supposition for the term's *significate*. At the beginning of the passage, the preliminary notion of "formal" supposition is introduced as supposition either for the term's *significate* or for the term's suppositum. Formal supposition is then immediately divided into simple supposition and personal supposition. The text does not say explicitly that the latter division exactly matches the former, so that simple supposition will always be supposition for the term's *significate*, but that is the most natural way to read it. This impression is strengthened when the passage goes on at once to divide simple supposition into absolute and compared, both of which are said to be versions of supposition for the term's *significate*. The case is perhaps not air-tight, to be sure, since we have seen in section 2 above that in *De suppositionibus* the division of simple supposition into absolute and compared is itself not an exhaustive one. But the exceptional cases involved discrete terms for which simple and personal supposition coincide, and there simple supposition continues to be supposition for the term's *significate* (in this instance, an individual).

In *De puritate*, however, Burley has a more complicated notion of simple supposition³³: "Supposition is simple when a common term supposits

²⁹ "Absolutely" here is not being used technically. That is, general compared simple supposition is a type of *compared* simple supposition, not a type of *absolute* simple supposition.

³⁰ *De suppositionibus*, 2.32, ed. Brown 1972 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 12). In *De puritate*, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 13), 11.33-34, trans. Spade (*op.cit.*, above n. 20) § 46, "not for any suppositum" is replaced by "not for any of its inferiors". For both texts, see n. 27 above.

³¹ *De suppositionibus*, 2.32, ed. Brown 1972 (*op.cit.*, above n. 12); *De puritate*, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 13), 11.36-12.1, trans. Spade (*op.cit.*, above n. 20) § 46. See n. 27 above.

³² *De suppositionibus*, 2.3, ed. Brown 1972 (*op.cit.*, above n. 12). See n. 15 above.

³³ *De puritate*, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 13), 7.1-5, trans. Spade (*op.cit.*, above

for its first significate *or for everything contained under its first significate*, or else when a singular concrete term or a singular compound term supposit for its whole significate.”³⁴ The words just italicized appear to be an attempt to accommodate special compared simple supposition, as we shall see.

This apparent difference in the general notion of simple supposition perhaps leads to a problem for *De suppositionibus*: a term in special compared simple supposition does *not* supposit for its significate but rather for a species contained under that significate. Thus it violates what seems to be the view in *De suppositionibus* that simple supposition is always supposition for the term’s significate. The problem is conjectural, since Burley gives no explicit general definition of simple supposition in *De suppositionibus*. But if it is real, then once again we see a way in which *De puritate* attempts to “clean up” the theory of simple supposition in *De suppositionibus*.

At any event, the point of the distinction between general and special compared simple supposition is the following. Consider the proposition “Substance is properly defined”.³⁵ (Since Latin has no indefinite article, “A substance is properly defined” would look exactly the same.) If the term “substance” in that proposition supposits for individual men, the proposition is false since individuals cannot be properly defined. On the other hand, if “substance” supposits for what it signifies—namely, for the category—the proposition is false once again, since proper definitions proceed in terms of genus and difference, whereas a category, being a most general genus, belongs to no higher genus in terms of which it can be defined. But if “substance” supposits for *specific* substances such as *man*, *ox* and *dog*—in short, for intermediate entities on the Porphyrean tree, between individuals at one end and the category at the other—then the proposition is true. For *man* can be properly defined as *rational animal*.³⁶ Similar considerations apply to “substance” in propositions like “Substance is second substance” and “Substance is a species of the genus substance”.³⁷ In such

n. 20) § 28: “[S]uppositio simplex est, quando terminus communis supponit pro suo significato primo vel pro omnibus contentis sub suo significato primo vel quando terminus singularis concretus vel terminus singularis compositus supponit pro suo significato totali . . .”

³⁴ For the part about singular terms, see Spade 1997 (*op.cit.*, above n. 5). The notion of a “first significate” is derived from the Aristotelian “first subject” of an attribute or “commensurately universal” attribute, in *Posterior Analytics* 1.4 73b25–74a3.

³⁵ *De puritate*, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 13), 12.3–23, trans. Spade (*op.cit.*, above n. 20) § 47. See n. 27 above. This example is not used in *De suppositionibus*.

³⁶ Although Burley does not make the point, the specific substances do not have to be *infima species*. Subalternate genera will do. Thus, *animal* can be properly defined as *sensible organism*.

³⁷ *De puritate*, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 13), 12.2–3, trans. Spade (*op.cit.*, above

cases, Burley says, "substance" has special compared simple supposition.

By contrast, in a proposition like "Substance is a most general genus", the term "substance" can only supposit for the category, if the proposition is true. In such cases, Burley says, the term has general compared simple supposition.

We saw in section 2 above that in *De puritate* Burley describes compared simple supposition as occurring when (a) a common term supposits

n. 20) § 47. See n. 27 above. In *De suppositionibus*, 2.32, ed. Brown 1972 (*op.cit.*, above n. 12), 37, n. 37, the sentence "Substance is secondary substance" appears as a variant. As it stands in the edition there, the example reads "First substance is second substance". The correct reading is uncertain, although I conjecture that the variant reading is to be preferred. In either case, no *individual* substances ("first" substances) are second substances. On either reading, it appears that the proposition can be read as true when the subject term is taken either in general or in special simple supposition. Nevertheless, the point stands that the proposition says quite different things with those two kinds of supposition.

In favor of my textual conjecture above, consider the following discussion from the commentary on the *Categories* in *Expositio super artem veterem*, fol. d2^{va} (the context is Aristotle's discussion of second substance): "Sed dubium est utrum substantia secunda sit substantia vel non. Et videtur quod non, quia sequitur: 'Nulla substantia est substantia secunda; ergo nulla substantia secunda est substantia. Consequentia patet per conversionem simplicem. Antecedens probatur, quia nullus homo est substantia secunda, et sic de aliis; ergo, sequitur quod nulla substantia est substantia secunda'. Patet consequentia per auctoritatem Philosophi 2 *Topicorum* circa finem, ubi dicit quod illud quod negatur a qualibet specie universaliter sumpta negatur a genere universaliter sumpto, sicut patet. Sequitur enim: 'Nullus homo currit, nullus asinus currit, et sic de singulis speciebus animalis; ergo nullum animal currit'. Et eodem modo potest probari quod nulla substantia est genus generalissimum, quia nullus homo est genus generalissimum, nec aliquis bos, et sic de singulis speciebus substantiae; ergo, nulla substantia est genus generalissimum. Dicendum quod haec est vera 'Nulla substantia est substantia secunda' et tamen haec est vera 'Substantia est substantia secunda' secundum quod subjectum habet suppositionem simplicem, sicut haec est vera 'Homo est species' et haec similiter 'Nullus homo est species' secundum quod subjectum in prima habet suppositionem simplicem, in secunda suppositionem personalem." ("But there is a doubt whether second substance is a substance or not. And it seems not, because it follows: 'No substance is a second substance; therefore, no second substance is a substance'. The inference is plain, by simple conversion. The antecedent is proved, because no man is a second substance, and so on for the other [species of substance]; therefore, it follows that no substance is a second substance. The inference is plain on the authority of the Philosopher, *Topics* II, near the end, where he says that what is denied of every species taken universally is denied of the genus taken universally. This is plain. For it follows: 'No man runs, no ass runs, and so on for each species of animal; therefore, no animal runs'. In the same way it can be proved that no substance is a most general genus. For no man is a most general genus, and neither is any ox, and so on for each species of substance; therefore, no substance is a most general genus. It must be said [in reply] that 'No substance is a second substance' is true, and yet 'Substance is a second substance' is true according as the subject has simple supposition, just as 'Man is a species' is true and 'No man is a species' likewise, according as the subject in the first [proposition] has simple supposition [and] in the second one personal supposition.")

for its significate in comparison to its supposita, or (b) for some of its inferiors that have supposita. Alternative (a) describes general compared simple supposition, while (b) describes special compared simple supposition. Thus, in "Substance is a most general genus", "substance" has general compared simple supposition since it supposits for its significate (the category), and its significate is called a "most general genus" only in comparison to what comes under it, and ultimately to its supposita. Again, in "Substance is properly defined", "substance" has special compared simple supposition since it supposits for species in the category *substance* (its "inferiors") and those species have supposita (individual substances).³⁸

4. *The Motivation for These Distinctions*

What is the purpose of all these divisions? Burley does not tell us what is motivating him, but his purpose appears to be to block certain types of fallacious inferences.

Let us first consider the distinction between absolute and compared simple supposition. Consider the following. In *De suppositionibus*, immediately after introducing the examples "Man is the most worthy creature among creatures" and "Man is a species" in explaining that distinction, Burley remarks, "Otherwise 'The most worthy creature among creatures is a species' would be true."³⁹ Although he does not fill in the reasoning, presumably the point is that the last proposition is *not* true, since an individual has all the perfection of its species plus an additional perfection besides (the individual difference?), so that an individual is more "worthy" than its species.⁴⁰

In order to prevent the false conclusion, therefore, we need to block the inference "Man is the most worthy creature among creatures; man is a species; therefore, the most worthy creature among creatures is a species." Burley's analysis does this by making the syllogism rest on an ambiguity in the middle term. The first premise is true according to

³⁸ I do not understand the occurrence of "some" in the phrase "some of its inferiors that have supposita" in clause (b). (See n. 21 above.) In none of Burley's examples—"Substance is properly defined", "Substance is secondary substance" and "Substance is a species in the genus substance"—is there any apparent reason why "substance" should supposit for only some "of its inferiors that have supposita" (that is, for some secondary substances) and not for all of them. I suspect no special weight should be given to the word here.

³⁹ *De suppositionibus*, 2.3, ed. Brown 1972 (*op.cit.*, above n. 12); see n. 15 above.

⁴⁰ But compare the rejected inference in the passage quoted in n. 41 below.

absolute simple supposition, but the second premise is true according to compared simple supposition. The conclusion, therefore, need not follow after all.

Curiously, Burley seems to reject this solution in *De puritate*. There he apparently just *grants* the conclusion "The most worthy creature among creatures is a species". This time he does explicitly consider the objection that the individual Socrates is more worthy than the species *man* in general, and counters it by saying in effect that since Socrates exists only contingently, whatever perfection he has he has only contingently, and he is therefore *less* worthy than the species, which has its perfection necessarily.⁴¹

But the overall point does not rest on the example. If the previous syllogism is sound according to *De puritate*, we still have to deal with syllogisms like: "Substance is a most general genus; substance is properly defined; therefore, a most general genus is properly defined." And the conclusion of *that* syllogism, as we have seen, is most definitely false. Burley can block it just as he did the earlier one in *De suppositionibus*: it rests on an ambiguity in the middle term, which has different kinds of simple supposition in the two premises.

⁴¹ *De puritate*, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 13), 14.1-10, trans. Spade (*op.cit.*, above n. 20) § 56: "Et quando dicitur, quod Sortes est dignior creatura quam homo in comuni, solet dici quod illud non est verum, quia quamvis Sortes includat perfectionem hominis, tamen non necessario includit eam, sed contingenter, quia Sorte corrupto Sortes non est homo. Et ita patet, quod ista consequentia non valet: 'Sortes includit totam perfectionem hominis, et etiam aliquam perfectionem superadditam, ergo Sortes est perfectior natura humana', sed oportet addere, quod Sortes necessario includeret perfectionem speciei humanae vel quod includeret perfectionem speciei humanae tamquam partem sui; et neutrum illorum est verum." ("When it is stated that Socrates is a worthier creature than man in general, it is usually said that this is not true. For although Socrates includes the perfection of man, yet he does not include it necessarily but rather contingently, because when Socrates is dead, Socrates is not a man. So it is plain that the inference 'Socrates includes the whole perfection of man, and also some superadded perfection; therefore, Socrates is more perfect than human nature' is not valid. Rather, one has to add that Socrates would *necessarily* include the perfection of the human species, or that he would include the perfection of the human species as a part of himself. And neither of these is true.") Note that Burley's point here is oddly muted. He does not commit himself outright to the truth of "The most worthy creature among creatures is a species", but only describes how a certain argument against its truth is "usually" avoided. (I do not know who he has in mind here.)

Note also that the device adopted by *De suppositionibus* to avoid the truth of the proposition is nowhere mentioned in this passage. Elizabeth Karger has suggested to me that Burley is perhaps not really concerned here with what was said in *De suppositionibus* but rather with countering an objection raised by William of Ockham in *Summa logicae*, 1.66, that "man" in "Man is the most worthy creature among creatures" cannot have simple supposition.

There is more to the story, however. Notice an important difference between our two examples. In the second (the syllogism concluding "A most general genus is properly defined"), the ambiguity in the middle term is that it has general compared simple supposition in one premise and special compared simple supposition in the other. And in those two kinds of simple supposition the term supposits for *different things*, for the category in the one case and for species under that category in the other. But in the first example (concluding "The most worthy creature among creatures is a species"), this is not so. There the middle term has absolute simple supposition in the one premise and compared simple supposition in the other. But in absolute and compared simple supposition, a given term supposits for *the same thing*—its significate.⁴² It merely supposits for that thing in different ways, absolutely in the one case and "in comparison to its supposita" in the other.

But if that is so, then it appears that Burley in *De suppositionibus* really has no way of blocking the conclusion after all. If the same universal *man* is both the most worthy creature among creatures and also a species, then, inevitably, the most worthy creature among creatures is a species. The fact that the middle term has different *kinds* of simple supposition in the premises does not prevent this result, any more than the fact that in "Every man is an animal" the subject has confused and distributive personal supposition, whereas in "Some man is a Greek" it has determinate personal supposition,⁴³ prevents the conclusion "Some animal is a Greek". It is no wonder, then, that in *De puritate* Burley avoids his earlier solution in *De suppositionibus*. Once more we see that Burley's theory of simple supposition in *De puritate* neatly sidesteps problems with the theory in the earlier *De suppositionibus*.

But if that earlier solution is abandoned, it appears that the distinction between absolute and compared simple supposition in *De puritate* is left with no real theoretical role to play. It seems to be kept merely as matter of classification for classification's sake. One can, to be sure, say as Burley does in *De puritate* that there is a difference between a term's suppositing for its significate with and without a comparison to its supposita. But that distinction does not allow one to solve any sophisms, to prevent any fallacies, or as far as I can see to avoid any other problems whatever. The

⁴² That is not quite correct. In special compared simple supposition a term does not supposit for its significate but for a species contained under its significate. But special compared simple supposition is not involved in the example.

⁴³ For the modes of personal supposition, see Spade 1988 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3).

theory of simple supposition would have been just as adequate without it. It is perhaps significant, therefore, that in the commentary on the *Categories* in his late *Expositio super artem veterem*, Burley discusses the distinction between general and special simple supposition but entirely omits the distinction between absolute and compared simple supposition.⁴⁴

On the other hand, the situation with the distinction between general and special compared simple supposition is more complicated. There is, after all, a difference between talking about a category and talking about the species under that category; one is talking about *different things* in the two cases. We must therefore find some kind of supposition for each case, or else there will be instances in which terms have none of the recognized forms of supposition and the theory will be incomplete. Ockham does this by defining simple supposition in such a way that his definition applies univocally to both these cases; he does not bother to draw any further distinctions.⁴⁵ Burley, by contrast, at least in *De puritate*,⁴⁶ builds these two cases into his definition of simple supposition at the outset as separate clauses of a disjunction,⁴⁷ and then separates them again in a later distinction.

5. Conclusion

In several respects, therefore, Burley's theory of the kinds of simple supposition in *De puritate* appears to be an improvement on the theory in *De suppositionibus*. The description of special compared simple supposition in *De suppositionibus* seems to conflict with the implied view there that in simple supposition a term always supposits for its significate. Burley meets

⁴⁴ *Expositio super artem veterem*, fol. d2^{va}. I am grateful to Elizabeth Karger for calling my attention to this fact.

⁴⁵ Ockham, *Summa logicae*, 1.64, lines 26-7, ed. Boehner, Gál and Brown 1974: "Suppositio simplex est quando terminus supponit pro intentione animae, sed non tenetur significative." ("Supposition is simple when a term supposits for an intention of the soul but is not taken significatively.") See also *ibid.*, 1.68. In effect, this definition means that for Ockham a term has simple supposition when it supposits for a concept and is *not* in personal supposition. Note that he does not say it must supposit for the concept *to which it is subordinated*. (That would correspond to Burley's "suppositing for its significate.") For Ockham, of course, the categories as well as the species that fall under them are concepts, so that his definition includes in one fell swoop all the cases covered by Burley's general and special compared simple supposition.

⁴⁶ Recall that his procedure in *De suppositionibus* is different—and problematic. See section 3 above.

⁴⁷ *De puritate*, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op.cit.*, above n. 13), 7.1-5, trans. Spade (*op.cit.*, above n. 20) § 28. See n. 33 above.

this problem by adopting a nuanced and much more carefully defined notion of simple supposition in *De puritate*, a notion that explicitly allows that in some cases a term in simple supposition does *not* supposit for its significate, but rather for the non-individual “inferiors” of that significate.

Again, the division of simple supposition into absolute and compared is drawn in *De suppositionibus* in such a way that it fails to be exhaustive; some instances of simple supposition are neither the one nor the other. This apparently unintentional result is fixed in *De puritate*, which carefully redefines absolute and compared simple supposition in a way that avoids it.

Yet again, the division of simple supposition into absolute and compared, and of some cases of simple compared supposition into general and special, seems to have been originally motivated by a concern to block certain kinds of fallacious inferences. But while the latter division can successfully be used to this end by diagnosing the inferences as relying on an ambiguous term that supposits for quite different things in its various occurrences in the inference, the former division seems much harder to use for this purpose. Significantly, therefore, *De puritate* does *not* use it in this way, and indeed abandons one attempt in *De suppositionibus* to do so. As a result, however, the division of simple supposition into absolute and compared is left without any real motivation in *De puritate* and has in fact disappeared by the time of his late *Expositio in artem veterem*.

These developments suggest that Burley’s theory of the kinds of simple supposition is a topic he thought about carefully, revising and improving the theory in subtle but noticeable ways. Perhaps it will repay us to think about it carefully too.

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1. *Burley and Aquinas: Gomes' Results*

Walter Burley's *Expositio super libros Ethicorum Aristotelis*¹ has been neglected by most scholars of medieval moral philosophy. In addition to the extensive unpublished dissertation by G.J. Gomes,² one can find some analyses of Burley's treatment of *Nicomachean Ethics* (*EN*) in my own study of weakness of will³ and in a very helpful article by Rega Wood.⁴ All these studies find Burley's contribution to medieval ethics highly significant, but they evaluate his evident debt to Aquinas to some extent differently. I will therefore begin (1.) by clarifying once more the relationship between Burley and Aquinas with the help of Gomes' study. In keeping with this clarification, I will then (2.) reconsider my earlier findings concerning Walter Burley's view of Aristotle's *akrasia* (*incontinentia*, weakness of will) and (3.) address the problems which Wood and Jeffrey Hause⁵ have seen in my interpretation of Burley. After that (4.) I will have a closer look at Burley's preferred "fourth solution" of *akrasia*. In the last part of this article (5.) I will summarize my reading of Burley as the "insufficient reasoning" explanation of *akrasia*.

Throughout his exposition of Aristotle's ethics, Burley borrows heavily from the *Sententia libri Ethicorum* of Aquinas. Although Aquinas is hardly ever mentioned by name, this debt is so evident that nobody can fail to see it: often Burley is simply paraphrasing the text of Aquinas. In addition to the exposition, however, Burley's commentary contains some questions and above all a great number of *dubia*, *notanda* and *intelligenda*. As Gomes points out, the longer *dubia* have a full *questio* form: opposing view-

¹ In the following I will use the Venice 1521 edition.

² G.J. Gomes, *Foundations of Ethics in Walter Burleigh's Commentary on Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics*, Diss. Columbia University 1973.

³ R. Saarinen, *Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan*, Leiden 1994, 131-45.

⁴ In the present issue of *Vivarium*.

⁵ J. Hause, Review of Saarinen 1994, in: *Speculum* 1996, 759-60.

points and their reasons are set out, a resolution is given, and the opposing views are answered. Thus Burley's commentary employs a method which adds a lot of new material and new perspectives to Thomas' literal exposition. Gomes calls this methodological feature the "double orientation" of Burley's commentary.⁶ After extensively comparing Burley with Aquinas, Gomes comes to the conclusion that it is the *dubia*, *notanda* and *intelligenda* that mark the widest departure from Aquinas' commentary.⁷ Gomes stresses that this departure pertains not only to the structure and methodology of Burley's commentary but also to its content. Burley departs from Aquinas on some crucial points of doctrine.⁸

The two commentators are, however, in agreement on a number of important issues. Both affirm that natural law is the norm for the moral justification of action and, consequently, they accept ethical naturalism, rationalism and cognitivism. Here Ockham according to Gomes clearly parts company with Burley, Aquinas and also with Buridan. Moreover, these three authors generally agree on the concepts of the supreme good and the ultimate end and on their identification with happiness. Gomes further notes an agreement between Burley and Aquinas on the doctrine of justice and on the place of desire, will, the voluntary and choice in moral action.⁹

In addition to a number of differences in detail, Gomes observes a major doctrinal difference between Aquinas and Burley in their view of the speculative intellect. Whereas for Aquinas the practical reason in the habit of *synderesis* contains the first principles of action, Burley holds that the speculative intellect knows and establishes the universal precepts of the natural law. In a Scotistic manner Burley denies any real distinction between the speculative and the practical intellect: they are formally distinct but denotatively the same on the level of natural reason. Burley thus emphasizes the unity of the intellect and consequently restores the function of the speculative intellect in ethical theory. According to Gomes, Burley's view anticipates the later conception that the two intellects are not different faculties but different functions of the same mind.¹⁰

⁶ Gomes 1973 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 98-9.

⁷ Gomes 1973 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 103.

⁸ Gomes 1973 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 119-20.

⁹ Gomes 1973 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 503-4, 517, 508.

¹⁰ Gomes 1973 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 512-4.

2. Burley's "Model 2"

Although Gomes does not deal with Burley's account of *akrasia*, his results are instructive for the understanding of Burley's exposition of *EN* VII. Here Burley normally follows Aquinas, but whenever a *notandum* occurs the reader must be careful. Some of the *notanda* are taken from Thomas or at least reflect his views, but others depart from Aquinas and are critical of his understanding of the text. Moreover, some of the *notanda* contain views which seem to depart from all earlier medieval interpretations of Aristotle's *akrasia*.

Burley's contribution to medieval discussion on *akrasia* can be briefly formulated as follows¹¹: Medieval interpreters approach Aristotle's *akrasia* described in *EN* VII—i.e., the problem how one can act against one's own better judgment—with the help of three different conceptual models. According to the first model, the akratic person ignores something in his reasoning and therefore the good action does not materialize. Most often this model is outlined in terms of "particular ignorance" explanation which holds that the akratic person does not grasp properly the minor premise of the practical syllogism. The particular ignorance explanation can be classified as model 1a., whereas a slightly different explanation 1b. holds that the akratic person knows both major and minor premise but fails to combine them properly: *akrasia* would thus rather resemble a logical error than ignorance.

According to what I call "model 2" the ignorance in question does not pertain to the premises of practical syllogism but to its conclusion. This explanation has received some support in modern scholarship which has paid special attention to Aristotle's words that the *akrates* somehow possesses the right choice before acting akratically.¹² Moreover, when Aristotle says that the "last *protasis*" is ignored in akratic action (*EN* 1147b9), a supporter of model 2 may claim that the last *protasis* is not the minor premise but the propositional conclusion of the syllogism.¹³ In sum, model 2 claims that since the right choice is reached, the conclusion

¹¹ Cf. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3).

¹² *EN* 1111b13-15; 1151a5-7; 1152a15-17. See further D. Charles, *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action*, London 1984 and N.O. Dahl, *Practical Reason, Aristotle and Weakness of the Will*, Minneapolis 1984.

¹³ Charles 1984 (*op.cit.*, above n. 12), 117-21. Charles here claims that Aristotle sometimes discusses one type of *akrates* who fails to reach the good conclusion of the practical syllogism (model 1), sometimes another type who reaches the good conclusion but fails to act in accordance with it (model 2).

must also to some extent be present but in a manner which is insufficient to produce the corresponding action.

“Model 3” comprises all voluntarist explanations which claim that the will as a self-determining principle is not necessitated by what reason dictates. Wickedness is therefore not simply a form of ignorance, but we can will wickedness knowingly and deliberately.

Late medieval views of *akrasia* for the most part oscillate between models 1 and 3. Interestingly enough, I find Walter Burley to be the only commentator who clearly identifies model 2 as a plausible option. This finding is based on the following evidence:

– a) After the exposition of *EN* 1147b9-18 in a rather Thomistic manner, Burley adds a *notandum* which claims that

the proposition with regard to which the akratic person is deceived and of which he is ignorant, is not the minor premise of the practical syllogism, but the conclusion of the practical syllogism. Let us consider for instance the following practical syllogism: nothing sweet ought to be tasted, this is sweet, therefore this should not be tasted. Now, the akratic person is not deceived in regard to the minor premise, since he knows well enough that this is sweet. But he is deceived with regard to the conclusion which he does not actually know because of vehement concupiscence.¹⁴

I have found no parallels to this claim in medieval commentaries. Normally the commentators hold that Aristotle’s “*ultima propositio*” (*EN* 1147b9) which is to some extent ignored refers to the minor premise and thus they explain the passage in terms of the particular ignorance explanation.

– b) In what he calls the “fourth solution” Burley departs from Aquinas in that he does not explain *akrasia* in terms of ignorance but in terms of the person’s knowledge being “bound” and “released”:

... the knowledge which he [the *akrates*] possesses on the universal level is so bound by concupiscence that, when vehement concupiscence takes over, the formal knowledge of the universal cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence. ... One can act and does act against the bound knowledge and the opinion of the particular; for the incontinent acts in this way.¹⁵

¹⁴ *In Eth.* VII c.3. p.2 (f. 121^{ra}): “Scienda sunt haec duo: Primum, quod propositio circa quam decipitur incontinens et cuius ignorantiam habet, non est minor syllogismi practici, sed est conclusio in syllogismo practico. Verbi gratia, sit iste syllogismus practicus: nullum dulce gustare oportet, hoc est dulce, ergo hoc non est gustandum. Circa minorem huius syllogismi non decipitur incontinens, quia bene novit quod hoc est dulce. Sed circa conclusionem decipitur et eam ignorat actu propter concupiscentiam vehementem.”

¹⁵ *In Eth.* VII c.3. p.2 (f. 121^{ra-rb}): “... scientia quam habet in universali est ligata per concupiscentiam ita quod ratio universalis, insurgente concupiscentia vehementi, non potest prohibere motum concupiscentiae. ... Contra scientiam in universali ligatam et opinionem particularem potest quis agere et agit, scilicet incontinens.”

Unlike Thomas, Burley considers that this bondage in the reasoning of the *akrates* pertains to the major premise whereas the minor is perfectly accessible. We will return below to the precise content of this claim.

– c) Burley takes very seriously Aristotle's claim that the *akrates* has the capacity for a good choice. He explains this by holding that the akratic person is prevented from "executing" this choice in a manner which is similar to the sickness in which the paralysed limbs do not obey reason's commands.¹⁶

Burley's views in b) and c) clearly cannot be reduced into claiming that concupiscence only affects the body but he does emphasize the bodily effects in *akrates* more strongly than other expositors. Moreover, Burley – d) develops a logic of the will in which the logical consequens need not be willed although the logical antecedent is willed. A person can thus know and will the premises but he does not necessarily will the conclusion.¹⁷

These views occur for the most part in the *notanda* and are not found in Aquinas' text. In many cases Burley's note includes a criticism of Thomas' view. All this evidence is in keeping with model 2; in many ways one can even claim that Burley's view matches well with some modern interpreters of Aristotle who argue in favor of this model.¹⁸ One can further note that the evidence is also in keeping with the important observation of Gomes that Burley stresses the unity of intellect and restores the function of speculative intellect in ethical theory.¹⁹ The syllogistic structure of action theory interests him more than most other expositors.

3. *Reconsidering the Textual Problems*

After stating that the last proposition which is ignored is the conclusion, Burley adds another *notandum* which says that the akratic person who knows both premises

can be ignorant of the conclusion and be deceived with regard to it. This occurs when he does not actually put the premises together in order to reach the conclusion. But when he does actually put the premises together, aiming at the conclusion, it is not possible to know the premises and ignore the conclusion.²⁰

¹⁶ Cf. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3), 140-6.

¹⁷ Cf. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3), 142-3.

¹⁸ I.e. Charles 1984 (*op.cit.*, above n. 12); Dahl 1984 (*op.cit.*, above n. 12).

¹⁹ Gomes 1973 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 512-4.

²⁰ *In Eth.* VII c.3. p.2 (f. 121^{va}): "Secundo est intelligendum quod habens scientiam universalem maioris in syllogismo practico, et opinionem particularem in actu de minori propositione, potest ignorare conclusionem et decipi circa eam, quando scilicet non applicat actu premissas ad invicem respectu conclusionis inducendae."

In this connection Burley also quotes Aristotle's *Analytica posteriora* (71a21), thus clearly indicating that the akratic person commits a logical error which resembles our model 1b.

This *notandum* doesn't seem to fit well into its context. For if this logical error explains the ignorance of the conclusion, why does Burley develop the rather elaborate idea of bound and released knowledge? And why would he claim in the previous note that the ignorance of which Aristotle speaks pertains to the conclusion? For Aristotle in *EN* 1147a10-b15 concentrates on cases in which the akratic person claims to know the "last protasis". If ignorance here only means a logical error, no such quasi-knowledge of the conclusion would emerge in the *akrates* which would need explanation in the first place.

In my book I resolve these discrepancies by defending model 2 as Burley's preferred view and interpret this problematic *notandum* as being compatible with it. One reviewer has already remarked that this doesn't work, since 1b and 2 are simply incompatible.²¹ Rega Wood suggests that Burley is in fact offering three alternative models of explaining *akrasia*. In addition to the above-mentioned models 2. and 1b., Wood quotes passages in which Burley adheres to the Thomistic "particular ignorance" explanation 1a.²² These passages are in fact paraphrases of Aquinas' exposition.

How should we deal with all these findings which seem to raise serious doubts concerning the inner coherence of Burley's commentary? As to Burley's methodology, I still think that Gomes' view of "double orientation" is useful: whereas Burley's exposition of the text follows Aquinas, the *notanda* very clearly mark out another kind of opinion which often is not in keeping with Thomas. I agree with Wood that all three models of explaining *akrasia* can be found in Burley's commentary. Perhaps one should not reduce them to any one view but say simply that *akrasia* is explained in three different ways. The view 1a is present in Aquinas and is clearly taken from there; the view 1b is suggested by Averroes who at this point speaks of syllogistic failures in the reasoning of the *akrates*.²³ Perhaps view 1b in Burley's second *notandum* refers to that specific Aristotelian case in which the last *protasis* is not known, whereas his model 2 pertains to cases in which it is known imperfectly.²⁴

²¹ Hause 1996 (*op.cit.*, above n. 5), 760.

²² Wood (in this issue).

²³ Averroes, *In Eth.* VII c.3 (f. 98^{va-vb}), in: *Aristotelis Opera omnia cum Averrois commentariis*, Venice 1562, vol. III [reprint Frankfurt 1962].

²⁴ Cf. *EN* 1147b9-12, Latin text: "ultima propositio . . . vel non habet in passione ens [= 1b] vel sic habet ut non erat in habere scire [= 2]".

With these reconsiderations, I can agree with Rega Wood in that the view which Burley calls "the fourth solution"—and what we have been outlining in terms of "model 2."—is an explanation of *akrasia* which marks a departure from Thomas' view. But the fourth solution which Burley here, quoting the Greek commentary, calls the solution which Aristotle preferred, nevertheless co-exists with the other two more traditional models of explanation.

One may here note that not only Burley but also other medieval commentators offer several competing explanations of *akrasia*. Geraldus Odonis in a somewhat inconsistent manner offers both models 1a and 3 as his explanations of *akrasia*.²⁵ In a very useful article Bonnie Kent claims that Thomas Aquinas' philosophical explanation of *akrasia* differs from his theological explanation of it.²⁶ Although these two views probably can be reconciled with each other within the so-called two-step explanation,²⁷ the textual fact observed by Bonnie Kent nevertheless remains. Thus it is not unusual to say that different approaches can also be found in Burley's explanations.

4. *Practical Syllogism in the "Fourth Solution"*

In order to understand Burley's fourth solution we have to outline his view of Aristotle's practical syllogism somewhat more closely. "Model 2" which we have put forward as Burley's own contribution to the explanation of *akrasia* presupposes that a distinction can be made between a) the propositional expression of the conclusion and b) the conclusion as action, or, respectively, between a) the internal good choice and b) the external realization of the conclusion. Since Aristotle seems to hold that the conclusion of the practical syllogism is the action itself (*EN* 1147a25-30), many commentators deny the possibility of making such distinctions. But others do think that they can nevertheless be applied.²⁸

²⁵ See Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3), 146-60.

²⁶ B. Kent, *Transitory Vice: Thomas Aquinas on Incontinence*, in: *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 27 (1989), 199-223.

²⁷ As outlined in Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3), 125-9, this explanation holds that as a result of concupiscence the right major premise becomes abandoned without deliberation (first step). After that the particular facts are deliberated under a false major premise (e.g. "pleasure should be pursued", second step). Thus the sin of *akrates* is to some extent, but not altogether, deliberate. Whereas Jeffrey Hause (1996 (*op.cit.*, above n. 5), 760) finds this explanation only an "educated guess", Rega Wood (in this issue) adheres to it and shows in which way the second step is at the focus of Burley's criticism of Aquinas.

²⁸ Charles 1984 (*op.cit.*, above n. 12), 113, 146, 156; Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3), 13.

In the fourth solution Burley is explaining in what sense the conclusion of the practical syllogism follows from its premises. There, as I will show next, he applies a distinction between the propositional and the causal consequences resulting from the premises and thus follows the interpretative patterns of model 2.²⁹ Gomes offers additional support to this interpretation, since he shows that Burley, while commenting on *EN* III, considers the conclusion of the practical syllogism to be not an action but a normative or prescriptive statement indicating what is to be done in a particular situation. The choice follows this statement as a conclusion drawn from it.³⁰

In the fourth solution Burley holds that, unlike in theoretical syllogism, in practical syllogism the action does *not* follow

in the way the conclusion from premises, but in the way the posterior follows from the prior, like the downpour from the raincloud. In this way does the action follow, if the agent having these opinions is not prohibited from acting. For example: if someone has the actual opinion that everything sweet ought to be tasted, and he also has the actual opinion that this is sweet, then it is necessary that the person having these opinions tastes this if nothing prevents him from tasting. Thus, from the premises: "everything sweet ought to be tasted" and "this is sweet", it necessarily follows that "this ought to be tasted". But the action does not necessarily follow from the actual opinion concerning the universal "everything sweet ought to be tasted" and from the actual opinion concerning the singular "this is sweet". For it is possible that a person who has these opinions can be prevented from acting. But if he is not prevented, he necessarily acts and tastes the thing which he actually considers sweet.³¹

²⁹ Cf. also Saارين 1994 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3), 133-4.

³⁰ Gomes 1973 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 330. He quotes Burley, *In Eth.* III c.3 p.3 (f. 51^{ra}): "Electio est quasi conclusio que sequitur ad sententiam factam de operabili que proprie est conclusio syllogismi practici. Ut si arguitur sic: legibus est obediendum. Sed honorare patrem et matrem est preceptum in lege. Igitur pater est honorandus. Et ad hanc sententiam que est de honorando patrem sequitur electio eius quod est honorare patrem."

³¹ *In Eth.* VII c.3. p.2 (f. 121^{ra}): "[Sicut igitur in speculativis ex propositione universali et propositione singulari necessario sequitur conclusio, . . . ita in practicis et factivis ex opinione universali in actu et opinione singulari in actu necessario sequitur opus.] Non sicut conclusio ex premissis, sed tamen sequitur sicut posterius sequitur ad prius, ut pluvia sequitur ad nubem. Sic igitur sequitur opus, nisi opinans prohibeatur ab operando. Verbi gratia: si aliquis actu opinetur quod omne dulce est gustandum, et etiam actu opinetur quod hoc est dulce, necesse est quod sic opinans gustet hoc nisi impediatur a gustando. Unde ex istis premissis, omne dulce est gustandum, hoc est dulce, de necessitate sequitur: ergo hoc est gustandum. Sed ex opinione in actu de ista universali, omne dulce est gustandum, et ex opinione in actu de illa singulari, hoc est dulce, non de necessitate sequitur opus. Habens enim istas opiniones in actu potest impediari ab operando, sed si non impediatur de necessitate operabitur et gustabit hoc quod in actu opinatur esse dulce."

We distinguish here two levels: at the propositional level the premises strictly imply the conclusion, whereas at the level of actual opinions these opinions prompt action with another type of necessity which is subjected to external causal impediments. The impediment or prevention introduced here enables Burley to claim that the action cannot be identified with the conclusion of the practical syllogism, since they operate at different levels of necessity. The action follows not like a conclusion from premises, but rather like a physical effect of some preceding cause. One can thus hold the conclusion of practical syllogism but not act according to it e.g. in cases in which the appetitive power, concupiscence, succeeds in causally "binding" the knowledge in such a way that the conclusion does not materialize as action.

Rega Wood not only shares this interpretation but also shows in a helpful way how this feature in Burley's analysis of deliberation relates him to Ockham and distinguishes him from Aquinas. She further emphasizes the weakness of the link between understanding and execution in Burley's view of human intellect.³² Gomes thinks that the above-quoted text supports Burley's view that the conclusion of practical syllogism is not an action but a normative statement. Gomes further considers that this kind of "gap between judgment and choice" links Burley with Scotus and voluntarism.³³

The links with Scotus and Ockham do not mean, however, voluntarism in the sense of deliberate wrong-doing. On the contrary, Burley attempts to explain *akrasia* without postulating evil deliberation. His criticism of Aquinas' view in this context shows that. Whereas Aquinas holds that concupiscence offers its own major premise which the *akrates* to some extent deliberately follows, Burley claims that concupiscence affects the particulars and thus does not introduce syllogistic structures.³⁴ At the same

³² Wood (in this issue).

³³ Gomes 1973 (*op.cit.*, above n. 2), 330-1; 339-40.

³⁴ In *Eth.* VII c.3. p.2 (f. 121^{rb}): "Sciendum est hic secundum aliquos quod quedam propositio universalis est ipsius rationis et quedam ipsius concupiscentiae. Propositio universalis rationis est ista: nullum dulce est gustandum extra horam. Propositio universalis concupiscentiae est talis: omne dulce est gustabile, et per consequens delectabile, et incontinens syllogizando practice sumit minorem sub maiori concupiscentiae sic: omne dulce oportet gustare, hoc est dulce, et sequitur conclusio operationis, quia gustabit hoc dulce si non sit prohibitus. Mihi tamen videtur quod concupiscentia, cum sit passio existens in parte sensitiva, non habet aliquam universalem in quam inclinetur, sed solum inclinatur in particularia. Ipse tamen incontinens habet duas propositiones universales et sub una sumit minorem in practice syllogizando. Sed concupiscentia non inclinat in illam universalem,

time Burley also explains *akrasia* without postulating any ignorance of the premises. Thus he avoids both the intellectualistic (model 1a) and the voluntaristic (model 3) view of *akrasia*.

But what does the perverse appetite precisely effect in the mind in order that akratic actions can take place? One must note here that the bad effect is not called ignorance or forgetfulness, but it resembles a causal obstacle which prevents the action. Ignorance of the premises need not be postulated as such but only in the form of *scientia ligata—soluta*, i.e. bound and released, or “inaccessible” and “accessible” knowledge. The impediment which the *scientia ligata* causes relates to the major premise: as a result of this inaccessibility the person’s deliberation does not proceed as it should, although the minor premises are as such fully known. Consequently, the right conclusion remains in some sense ignored and the akratic person voluntarily, though not deliberately, follows an option presented by some minor premise and desired by concupiscence.

Interestingly enough, Burley does not even mention ignorance in his discussion concerning the fourth solution. Ignorance is first introduced after that in the exposition of *EN* 1147b6-8 which is taken from the Greek commentary.³⁵ And then Burley claims, as we have seen, that the “ignorance of the particulars” relates to the conclusion of the practical syllogism, not to the minor premise. Ignorance is thus not the *cause* of *akrasia*, but rather its *effect*. Perhaps one cannot claim that Burley adopts a “clear-eyed” view of *akrasia*, since the conclusion of the syllogism is not actual at the moment of akratic action. But it is certainly safe to say that whereas for Aquinas *akrasia* basically results from the ignorance of the particulars, Burley in his fourth and fifth solution aims at showing that, even when the major and minor premises are known, *akrasia* can nevertheless arise as a result of insufficient reasoning.

5. Burley’s “Insufficient Reasoning” Explanation

According to Burley’s “fourth solution” akratic action is not deliberate nor does it presuppose ignorance of the premises. Concupiscence here causes *akrasia* by hindering the syllogistic deliberation process so that its conclusion does not materialize as action. This can happen as a result of

sed in particularia contenta sub illa universali.” Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3), 125-9 and 136-7.

³⁵ See Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3), 137.

the bondage of the major premise (fourth solution) or, even in a case in which no such bondage is operative, as a failure to put the premises together ("fifth solution").

Let us call this view the "insufficient reasoning" explanation of *akrasia*. This explanation once more brings models 1b and 2 (or the fifth and fourth solution) into close connection, although one cannot simply be reduced to the other. What is distinctive in Burley's view of *akrasia* is his tendency to explain it as a problem of syllogistic reasoning, thus emphasizing Aristotle's view that the cause of *akrasia* can be explained from a "natural" syllogistic viewpoint (*EN* 1147a24-25). The "particular ignorance" explanation is a commonplace in all medieval literature on *akrasia*. In addition to this, Thomas Aquinas and especially the Franciscans are interested in clarifying in what sense *akrasia* is not only voluntary but also deliberate. Still another important explanatory strategy is employed by Albert the Great and John Buridan who emphasize the uncertainty and *prima facie* character of the ethical premises in the akratic mind.³⁶ Though dependent on many sources, Burley's view cannot be identified with any of these other major strategies.³⁷

Why does Burley emphasize so much the insufficient reasoning as a major cause of *akrasia*? Further research is necessary in order to give a really good answer, but perhaps three factors here play a role.

1. Since Burley in the first place clearly distinguishes between judgment and choice (Gomes) and considers the link between understanding and execution to be a weak one (Wood), he has no need to postulate additional ignorance or deliberate bad choice in order to explain *akrasia*: insufficient reasoning already explains this phenomenon.

2. If Gomes is right in claiming that the speculative intellect plays a strong role in Burley's ethics, its capacity for reasoning is decisive for action theory. Whereas concupiscence cannot overcome true scientific knowledge, it may temporarily succeed in binding this capacity of reasoning so that it cannot bring about self-controlled actions.

3. In addition to historical and conceptual issues, the insufficient reasoning explanation has a kind of psychological plausibility: we know well enough many general truths concerning certain harmful activities, e.g. eating sweets, cigarette smoking or environmental pollution. We can also

³⁶ For these, see Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above n. 3).

³⁷ In Book III Burley does make, however, some remarks concerning uncertainty which resemble Buridan's discussions. Cf. *In Eth.* III c.2. p.2, especially f. 47^{va-vb}. I intend to return to these on another occasion.

easily identify the respective particular actions as belonging under the general truth. But in the everyday decision-making processes *either* we do not care to put these particulars under the well-known general rule *or* we consider ourselves as exceptions, thus “binding” the force of general rule without forgetting it. In the latter case we not only know the facts but also in some sense both reach and ignore the conclusion.

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*Willing Wickedly:
Ockham and Burley Compared*

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Contrary to St. Thomas Aquinas and the rest of the scholastic tradition of Aristotelian ethics, William of Ockham argued that wickedness as wickedness could be willed. Specifically, he argued that Thomas was wrong to think that we can explain willed wickedness by positing ignorance of the particular propositions which form the minor premises in practical syllogisms.

Against Bl. John Duns Scotus, Ockham argued that willing wickedness is just as bad as doing something wicked. In support of his claim, Ockham distinguished between conditional and executive acts of will. What lends plausibility to the view that external acts are worse than internal volitions is our suspicion that willing wickedness without external action is somehow blameless because ineffectual. According to Ockham, that's a confusion that results from our failure to distinguish conditional volitions from executive acts of will. Conditional volitions do not result in external action because actual external actions were never intended; executive, formally imperative acts of will inevitably result in action unless impeded by an entirely extraneous external circumstance—such as, the failure of the firing mechanism of the weapon of a murderer.

Walter of Burley, like his predecessors in the classical and scholastic traditions denied that wickedness as wickedness could be willed. But he agreed with Ockham that sometimes ignorance of particulars cannot explain willed wickedness. When we depart from diets which dictate that 'all sweets should be eliminated from the diet' and eat chocolate truffles, we are not ignorant of their sweetness. Moreover, like Ockham's, Burley's account of practical reason involves executive acts.

So as is often the case, the views of these contemporaries are related in an interesting fashion, which brings us to a perennial problem: which of them wrote on ethics first? Burley was born about 1275;¹ Ockham,

¹ J. Weisheipl, *Repertorium Mertonense*, in: *Mediaeval Studies*, 31 (1969), 175.

more than ten years later in about 1287.² But Ockham's teaching career was much shorter than Burley's; beginning about 1318, it effectively ended about 1328, when like Burley he entered the political arena. By contrast Burley's philosophical works date from 1301 until almost the end of his life in 1344. Specifically the work with which we shall be most concerned here, Burley's *Ethics* commentary is dated about 1333-1334,³ more than ten years after Ockham's *De connexione virtutum*; so we will be considering a well-known older master's response to a younger man's work. Burley did not take kindly to Ockham. Even when he borrowed Aristotelian exposition from Ockham, Burley pointedly called him a beginner in logic.⁴ Though Ockham was not named in the *Ethics*, presumably Burley was tacitly replying to him. And since Burley was partly convinced, though still very critical, it ought to be an interesting reply; and it is.

In this article, Ockham and Burley will be compared and contrasted on three topics:

- 1) how to explain cases where we do what we know is wrong
- 2) how to distinguish weakness of will from vice, or in medieval terms incontinence from intemperance, and
- 3) how to describe the link between knowledge and volition in moral acts.

In conclusion, I will consider what effect medieval speculations on vice may have had on the concept of intellect.

Much of this article will concern the difference between incontinence and intemperance, or between moral weakness and moral vice. It is a topic where examples are useful. For purposes of clarity, instead of simply alternating sexes in the examples, I have adopted a convention which presents weak women and wicked men. Unfortunately, experience suggests that there are also plenty of weak men and wicked women. The convention I adopted does not reflect my beliefs about the distribution of moral flaws among the sexes; rather it is a sign of sloth. There are more examples of weakness, and only male scholastic authors, so this convention makes ambiguity in pronoun reference easier to avoid.

² R. Wood, *Ockham on the Virtues*, West Lafayette, Indiana 1997, 1.

³ J. Weisheipl 1969 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 1), 187.

⁴ Burley, *Expositio s. totum Phys. Aristot.* I t.c.4-5 tr.1, f.8^{vb}; I t.c.15 tr.2 c.1, f.13^{rb}; III t.c.11 tr.1 c.1, f.64^{rb}; IV t.c.42 tr.1 c.5, f.98^{vb}; VI t.c.24 tr.1 c.4, f. 183^{ra}; VI t.c.79 tr.3 c.1, f.196^{va} (ed. Venice 1501). In *Artem Veterem, Praedic.* 3, Venice 1541, f.33^{vb}, 34^{rb}. Cf. G. Gál, *Opera Philosophica Guillelmi de Ockham*, II, 24*.

1. *Must Wickedness be based on Ignorance?*

1.1 *Ockham*

Ockham's position on willing wickedness is well-known; it was, for example, ably discussed by Marilyn M. Adams at the 1994 Eastern Division APA Meeting in Boston.⁵ Nonetheless, a brief summary based on Ockham's *De connexione virtutum* will be useful.

In that work, Ockham defends, among other things, the thesis that prudence without moral virtue is possible. That is, we can know perfectly well what it is we should do and yet fail to do it. We know the conclusion of the practical syllogism, and yet we do not choose to obey its dictate. Unlike his predecessors, who claim that we choose wickedness only because we somehow fail to understand our duty, Ockham claims that sometimes we cannot fail to understand. He holds that the intellect is necessitated or determined; by contrast, the will is free and undetermined. And since both Christian theologians⁶ and pagan philosophers⁷ agree that we are praised or blamed only for what is voluntary, Ockham concludes that the will is the primary moral faculty.⁸

Ockham's is a very Christian thesis, and not surprisingly, he defends it in part by adducing the authority of all the theologians who agree that there is malicious sin.⁹ But malice does not differ from ignorance, if the malicious like the ignorant do not know the minor premise of the practical moral syllogism: 'everything worthy should be done, this is worthy, therefore this should be done'. The case based on malice is confirmed by an argument based on incontinence or weakness of will,¹⁰ a case in which malefactors display awareness of what it is they should or should not do.

In the process of arguing for his conclusion Ockham rejects the various theories which had explained that what is really involved in wickedness is a form of ignorance. The first such thesis is the view that the minor

⁵ A revised version is forthcoming as *Ockham on Will, Nature, and Morality*, in: P. Spade (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Ockham*.

⁶ Cf. August., *De vera religione*, c.14, n. 27 (PL 34, 133): 'Nunc vero usque adeo peccatum voluntarium est malum, ut nullo modo sit peccatum, si non sit voluntarium.'; Anselmus, *De conceptu virginali*, c.4, ed. Schmitt (Rome 1950), vol. II, p. 145: 'Quid quid igitur faciunt, totum imputandum est voluntati.'

⁷ Cf. Aristot., *Nicomachean Ethics*, III.1. 1109b30-31; 3.5. 1114a22-30; Martinus Bracarenensis, *Liber de moribus*, cited as Seneca, in: *Les Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, Louvain-Paris 1974, p. 280 (I): 'Omnis peccati actio voluntaria est.'

⁸ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. J.C. Wey, 364 (OTH VIII).

⁹ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 365 (OTH VIII).

¹⁰ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367 (OTH VIII).

premise is unknown,¹¹ which I shall call the particular ignorance explanation (PIE). In the form presented by Ockham, PIE suggests that since the rectitude and certitude of scientific knowledge make it incompatible with moral error, it must be that the wicked are ignorant of the minor proposition. Ockham replies first that there is as much rectitude in the major premise as in the minor. So if we can know the major, and yet act wickedly, we can know the minor and act wickedly.

Ockham next rejects a variant of PIE, which distinguishes the ignorant from the malicious in terms of the intensity of their knowledge of the universal. Those who do wicked things maliciously have a well-developed understanding of the universal principles of moral science,¹² as opposed to the ignorant who understand such universals only dimly. To this Ockham replies that the degree of knowledge is not relevant; both know, or could know, the universal, since even the ignorant know that 'everything worthy should be done'. Yet on his opponents' account, neither the malicious nor the ignorant know the particular. There is no difference between what is known by the ignorant as opposed to the malicious unless one admits that the malicious know the particular in Ockham's view.¹³

The last of these suggestions is in some ways the most interesting—that the behavior of the incontinent is governed by two major premises:¹⁴ 'nothing unworthy should be done' and 'everything enjoyable should be done'. And since she knows only 'this is enjoyable' and not 'this is unworthy', she acts unworthily. Here Ockham replies that we cannot *know* two such universal maxims, since they are incompatible. Assent to one militates against assent to the other. If this argument is rejected, he appeals to experience. Supposing such simultaneous assent is really possible, it is still true that people sometimes act unworthily even though they know the conclusion as well as the major and the minor premises of the practical syllogisms which dictate the avoidance of the unworthy.

The freedom of the will is the basis of the last of Ockham's proofs that we can will wickedness knowingly. In the sensitive appetite, perception is sometimes immediately followed by the inclination to grasp or to

¹¹ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 365 (OTh VIII).

¹² Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 365-6 (OTh VIII).

¹³ Another rejected suggestion is that those who act wickedly have merely speculative knowledge, not practical knowledge, of moral propositions (*De connexione virtutum*, ed. Wey, 366 (OTh VIII)).

¹⁴ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367 (OTh VIII).

avoid an object. But if the will is free, this cannot be its relation to the dictates of the intellect, according to Ockham.¹⁵

The classic reply to this argument is that the will can avert the intellect from considering any object. It is free because it determines what subjects the intellect considers, not because it can act contrary to the intellect's dictate.¹⁶ Ockham counters by asking about the act of will which determined what subject the intellect considers: was it dictated by our understanding or not? If so, then the will is not free. If not, then since the will is not following an intellectual dictate, the will, not the intellect, is the primary moral faculty—contrary to the proponents of the original reply. Ockham concludes this series of arguments by explaining that in any series of acts of will and intellect, there is an original act of will which depends not on a demonstrated conclusion but on a bare act of intellect which manifests the object to the will.¹⁷ So, basically, Ockham holds that the first act is an intellectual act, but denies that it is an act of reasoning; rather it is a bare manifestation, a merely apprehensive act.

In confirmation of his views, Ockham adds that sensitive appetite is just as capable as the will of averting the intellect,¹⁸ and yet we do not call the sensitive act free on that account. He strengthens his claim that the intellect, unlike the will, is necessitated and not free, by reminding us that evidence compels the intellect.¹⁹

1.2 *Burley on Willing Wickedness*

A discussion of Burley's views on *Weakness of the Will* constitutes a chapter in a recent book by Risto Saarinen.²⁰ It is a valuable study of an important

¹⁵ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367-70 (OTH VIII).

¹⁶ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 368 (OTH VIII).

¹⁷ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 368-9 (OTH VIII).

¹⁸ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 369-70 (OTH VIII).

¹⁹ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 370 (OTH VIII).

Another objection to Ockham's account of the freedom of the will suggests that the will is free in respect to external actions, not in respect to understanding. Ockham's reply to this objection is based on the claim that the relation between volition and external actions is not free. External acts follow from executive volitions not freely but inevitably, provided there is no impediment. His proof of this claim is based on authority. From St. Gregory he takes the claim that where there is volition there is action, see *XL Homiliarum in Evang.*, II h. 30 (PL 76, 1220 C). 'What an animal desires decisively, it will do' is a text drawn from Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (9.4. 1048a8). Presumably, Ockham is here tacitly appealing to our experience as agents, as reflected in the works of theological and philosophical authorities.

²⁰ R. Saarinen, *Weakness of the Will in Medieval Thought: From Augustine to Buridan*, Leiden 1994. My thanks to Saarinen whose book played an important role in the development

topic in medieval philosophy, which has been insufficiently studied. Some hints of the difficulty in studying Burley on Aristotle's *Ethics* are provided—one of which is the extent to which Burley borrows from his predecessors, most of all St. Thomas Aquinas, from whom a great deal of the literal exposition of the text is taken, as Saarinen indicates.²¹ Moreover there is the problem with unnamed sources. There are a couple places which seem to indicate contact with Ockham as we shall see; similarly, it is chronologically quite possible that there is a debt to Geraldus Odonis whose pre-1329 *Commentary* antedates Burley's (1333-1334) by about five years; indeed it is quite likely that some of the interesting views about what goes wrong in incontinence described below come from Gerald.²²

So much is taken from Aquinas, that it is not always easy to discern Burley's own views. Sometimes the quotation is so extensive that it is 'almost impossible to see [Burley's] own contribution.'²³ Facing this difficulty, and seeing that Burley advocates alternatives to PIE, Saarinen assumed that Burley had rejected PIE, Aquinas' principal solution to the problem of *akrasia*. But this strategy is too sweeping. We cannot simply disassociate from Burley the views he owes to Aquinas.

Saarinen contrasts Aquinas with Burley in terms of two models of *akrasia*. Thomas, he says, accounts for weakness in terms of ignorance of moral science; Burley, in terms of disregard for practical knowledge. According to Thomas, an incontinent person does not know the minor premise in the practical syllogism; according to Saarinen, Burley claims that incontinent people are 'clear-eyed'. Saarinen completes his exposition of Burley by suggesting that concupiscence acts only on the body; that would certainly explain why incontinent people can retain their knowledge while acting badly.²⁴

I believe both that Burley's disagreement with Thomas is less basic and on a different point, having to do not with the absence of knowledge, but the absence of deliberation among the incontinent. I will show first that Burley and Aquinas do not disagree in the manner suggested by Saarinen. Over and over again, Burley says that moral science in the

of my own views. Saarinen has continued his research, as the reader will see in his *Walter Burley on akrasia: Second Thoughts*, which appears in this issue of *Vivarium*.

²¹ R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 131-3.

²² Cf. R.A. Gauthier & J.Y. Jolif, *L'éthique à Nicomaque: Introduction, traduction et commentaire*, 2nd ed., Louvain-Paris 1970, 136.

²³ R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 132.

²⁴ R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 135-41.

incontinent is not actual (*non potest exire in actu, ignorat actu*, etc.),²⁵ but what is not actual is not 'clear-eyed' knowledge. As to the suggestion that knowledge is intact because concupiscence affects only the body not the intellect, it is the result of a misinterpretation of a text which Saarinen himself correctly translates: 'concupiscence not only moves the soul, but even . . . the body'.²⁶

Saarinen's exposition is also based on a correct reading of a brief text from book VII ch. 3 of the *Ethics* which renders the whole puzzling. Burley says in one sentence that incontinence does not result from ignorance of the particular, minor premise in the practical syllogism, thus seemingly rejecting PIE,²⁷ the particular ignorance explanation of incontinence. But elsewhere Burley repeatedly approves the identification of incontinence with ignorance of the particular. For the purposes of establishing that Burley does not really want to hold that incontinence cannot involve ignorance of the particular, let me quote a couple of later passages in which he summarizes what has been established in the third chapter: There is a sentence at chapter 8 which reads: 'We should note that the incontinent [person] truly evaluates the universal but not the particular (*Notandum est quod incontinens . . . habet veram existimationem . . . in universali . . . sed habet falsam existimationem de eis in particulari*).'²⁸ A little later in the same chapter, we read: 'An incontinent [person] acts against a dictate of reason on account of passion, but passion passes rapidly, and when it ceases, she evaluates the particular correctly (*propter passionem operetur contra dictamen rationis, cessante tamen passione quae cito transit habet rectam existimationem in particulari*).'²⁹ At chapter 10, Burley says that 'the incontinent's reason is not corrupt; she has right reason in the universal. When passion [first] arises she [also] has right reason in the particular; she has it actually [again], when passion ceases'.³⁰

So Burley's apparent rejection of PIE is puzzling. To get to the bottom of the puzzle, let me explain the structure of book VII, chapter 3 of the *Ethics* as Burley expounds it. Chapter three concerns a problem set by Aristotle: what happens when someone does something wicked and

²⁵ *Expositio Gualteri Burlei super decem libros Ethiconum Aristotelis*, 7.1.3, Venetiis: Arte Simonis de Luere, impensis Andree Torresani de Asula, 1500 [Hain, 4144], f.109^{vb} E-F, 110^{rb} P. Xerox copy; reproduced from UCLA's copy of the Bibliothèque Nationale original.

²⁶ R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 134-5.

²⁷ R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 138.

²⁸ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.8, f.116^{va} B.

²⁹ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.8, f.116^{vb} D.

³⁰ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.10, f.118^{va} F.

knows it? Are her acts unconsidered? Is she using her knowledge or not? In medieval terms: is she speculating as she acts (*agere speculante*)? Burley believes that Aristotle presents four solutions to this problem, and he quotes Eustratius as saying that Aristotle accepted the fourth more fully than the rest. Saarinen seems to have seen these four as mutually exclusive solutions. Since Burley had copied most of the first three from Aquinas, including the second, which is PIE, he may have considered it safe to ignore the first three, which is not the case.

In fact as Burley states at the outset, the first three solutions present the basic distinctions in terms of which the problem of incontinence is to be solved. The first solution is the most basic, the distinction between habitual knowledge and actual knowledge.³¹ The second solves the problem by distinguishing between the different propositions in the practical syllogism and by suggesting PIE.³² In response to the hardest case, in which the incontinent person says things which indicate that she knows that what she is doing, Aristotle distinguishes between knowledge which can and cannot be acted on. The habitual knowledge of healthy people who are awake is at their disposal in a way in which it is not accessible to sleepers, drunks, or the insane. For Burley, following Aquinas, inaccessible knowledge is described as 'bound', '*ligatus*'. Burley contrasts bound knowledge with released knowledge, or *habitus solutus*;³³ he distinguishes between accessible and inaccessible knowledge. Bound knowledge cannot actually be brought to bear on moral problems; or rather, premises known in this way are not actually available for the construction of syllogisms.

In the fourth solution,³⁴ Burley applies the three distinctions in a somewhat different way; the first is always operative. Coming to the second distinction, he considers what other parts of the practical syllogism besides the particular might not be known. The third distinction provides Burley with his basic picture of sins of passion: concupiscence wars against knowledge and succeeds in binding it, so that it cannot dictate action;³⁵ it affects both the body and the soul. Building on those distinctions, Burley then constructs what he describes as Aristotle's preferred, fourth solution. According to the fourth solution, concupiscence binds knowledge, as

³¹ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist. 7.1.3, f.109^{rb} C.*

³² *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist. 7.1.3, f.109^{ra-rb} A.*

³³ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist. 7.1.3, f.109^{va} E.*

³⁴ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist. 7.1.3, f.110^{ra} J-K.*

³⁵ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist. 7.1.3, f.109^{va}-110^{ra} G.*

described in the third distinction, and as the second distinction suggests, only one premise is bound, but what is bound is the universal not the particular premise.

Finally in what is in effect a fifth solution,³⁶ Burley considers the possibility that an incontinent person actually knows both the major and the minor premise, but does not know the conclusion. He notes that if the major and minor are actually known in combination, the conclusion is unavoidable. But he suggests that they may not be combined (*applicatio actu praemissas ad invicem*).

Now what I think is going on here is Burley exploring different ways in which to introduce indeterminacy into the intellect. In addition to the PIE model, in the fourth solution, Burley describes a second model where the major premise is inaccessible;³⁷ in the fifth solution, a third model, featuring known, but uncombined premises accounts for an incontinent person's ignorance of the conclusion.³⁸ Not only Burley's continued acceptance of PIE, but his use of language like 'someone can' suggests that this is the case.

What do we make of Burley's assertion, in the course of describing the third model, that the minor is not unknown? He may be referring to the simple premise 'this is sweet', rather than to the qualified premise 'this is a sweet I should not eat'. Earlier he has noted that 'this is sweet' is only accidentally opposed to 'all sweets are to be eliminated from the diet'.³⁹ Only in the presence of an passion for sweets is knowledge of the simple minor likely to lead to actions incompatible with the course of action suggested by the major.

Suppose that the three models presented in solutions two, four and five are alternative, but not mutually exclusive, solutions. What purpose might be served by introducing them? Perhaps Burley recognized that incontinence might have more than one explanation. Sometimes we do not recognize an action as unworthy (PIE, model 1), but also sometimes we do not stop to think or combine the relevant premises (model 3). As Aristotle pointed out, it even sometimes happens, that we say things we do not understand. In Burley's terms we may say that we have to maintain a reasonable weight, but not really understand the risk that a fatty diet

³⁶ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist. 7.1.3, f.110^{rb} O.*

³⁷ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist. 7.1.3, f.110^{ra} J-K.*

³⁸ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist. 7.1.3, f.110^{rb} O.*

³⁹ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist. 7.1.3, f.110^{ra} G.*

presents; model two describes a case in which we won't really understand until our first heart attack.⁴⁰

I see this is as an interesting variation on Thomas, whom Burley endorses as 'the common expositor'.⁴¹ Moreover, at least one modern student of Aristotle, David Charles,⁴² suggests that Aristotle presents a similar account. Describing what I have called Burley's model two, he says that 'there is one type of *akratês* who actually reaches the good conclusion (in an off-colour way) but does not act on it.' 'If,' as Charles says, 'this account of the chapter's structure is correct,' then where Burley modifies Aquinas' account by providing alternate models of incontinence, it is in the direction of greater fidelity to Aristotle.⁴³

Where Burley does disagree with Thomas is on the subject of deliberation.⁴⁴ Here again a glance at Saarinen is instructive. Saarinen (quite correctly I believe) sees Thomas as a proponent of the view that incontinence, though voluntary, is not deliberately chosen.⁴⁵ By contrast to Bonnie Kent,⁴⁶ who emphasizes the Augustinian aspects of Thomas' theological works which suggest that incontinence is deliberately undertaken, Saarinen holds that Thomas follows Aristotle on the key point—namely, that incontinence results from ignorance. Concupiscence averts the intellect, so that the practical syllogism required for continence is not completed. Saarinen accounts for the passages in the theological works which indicate that incontinence is deliberate by what he calls the 'two step explanation' of incontinence.⁴⁷ The first step is some sort of failure of actual knowledge regarding the syllogism which would prohibit the act. The second step is the completion of a misleading syllogism, which begins 'everything sweet is delectable' and licenses incontinence. Incontinence is deliberate in the sense that it results from a permissive practical syllogism; it is not deliberate in the sense that the failure to complete the

⁴⁰ Models two and three both describe cases in which the ignorance involved is not ignorance of the particular, but ignorance of the conclusion (ICE).

⁴¹ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist. 7.1.4*, f.114^{vb} C.

⁴² *Aristotle's Philosophy of Action*, Ithaca, NY 1984, 128; cf. 156; 168.

⁴³ Cf. also Norman Dahl, *Practical Reason, Aristotle, and Weakness of the Will*, Minneapolis 1984, 200. By contrast to conclusions known in an 'off-colour way' or 'not fully possessed', real knowledge is 'integrated' according to Charles and Dahl.

⁴⁴ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist. 7.1.3*, f.110^{ra} K. The view Burley is opposing is stated in Aquinas' *Summa theol.* I-II q. 77 a. 2 ad 4; cf. also *De malo* q. 3 a. 9 ad 7.

⁴⁵ R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 126.

⁴⁶ *Transitory Vice: Thomas Aquinas on Incontinence*, in: *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 27 (1989), 199-223.

⁴⁷ R. Saarinen 1994 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 20), 127-9.

prohibitive syllogism is the result of ignorance, and not something chosen.

As we saw above, Ockham challenges such accounts of incontinence. He denies that the intellect can simultaneously assent to two universal premises with contrary implications. Here Burley agrees with Ockham in rejecting Thomas' account of incontinence as the result of a permissive syllogism, though on different grounds. Burley holds that concupiscence inclines directly to particulars, rather than achieving its effects by means of a practical syllogism. He does not believe that it is proper to depict concupiscence as providing an alternate major premise—such as, 'everything sweet should eaten'. 'Since concupiscence is a passion of the sensitive soul,' Burley says: 'it seems to me that it does not incline by means of some universal, but only [directly] to particulars.'⁴⁸ He appears to be suggesting an account of incontinence which permits acts dictated only in particular, not as the result of syllogistic deliberation, an account in which concupiscence results in unconsidered acts. Thus where Burley departs from Thomas, it is to undermine the view that incontinence is deliberate in one sense. It takes him not farther from, but closer to the Aristotelian account of *akrasia* as voluntary but not deliberate.

2. *Incontinence and Intemperance*

2.1 *Ockham*

For Aristotle incontinence is not a vice, because it is the result of passion, not a deliberate choice (*NE* 7.8. 1151a5-7; 7.9. 1152a4-7); by contrast, intemperance and more generally vice 'expresses decision' (*NE* 7.8. 1151a7). Following Cicero,⁴⁹ the medieval virtue/vice literature takes another line. It distinguishes continence as sexual virtue from temperance as virtue in eating and drinking—e.g. Phillip the Chancellor, *Summa de Bono*.⁵⁰ Accordingly, medieval interpreters of Aristotle's ethics describe incontinence as a vice. Ockham, for example, quite correctly observes that, according to Aristotle, the temperate, unlike the continent, are not troubled by inordinate passion (*NE* 3.11. 1119a11-20).⁵¹ But Ockham does not, and probably could not, say that intemperance is a vice but incontinence is not.

⁴⁸ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.* 7.1.3, f.110^{ra} K.

⁴⁹ Cicero, *Oratio in Catilinam*, 2. 25. Cited, for example, by Albert, *De bono* 3.2.223, ed. H. Kühle et al., Münster in Westph. 1951, 135 (OO 28).

⁵⁰ Philippi Cancellarii Parisiensis, *Summa de bono*, ed. N. Wicki, Bernae 1985, 900.

⁵¹ Ockham, *Circa virtutes et vitia*, edd. G. Etzkorn & F. Kelley, 273 (OTH VIII).

Ordinarily Ockham uses the two terms in the usual medieval fashion, so that 'temperance' means restraint in eating and drinking,⁵² as contrasted with restraint in sexual matters, or 'continence'. Ockham realizes that Aristotle related both temperance and continence to bodily pleasures generally. He describes Aristotelian temperance as a superior degree of continence—superior, either because inclinations for depraved pleasures are absent, or because the person involved has taken steps to avoid temptation.⁵³ This presents no major interpretive problems; the difficulty is rather with incontinence, which Ockham, like other medievals, sees as a vice distinguished from intemperance only by its subject matter.

What this means for the larger question is that to some degree Ockham lacks an account of wicked acts which are the result of weakness rather than vice. According to Ockham, there are three causes of vice: ignorance, malice, or passion.⁵⁴ He has no difficulty in accounting for chosen wickedness or malice. But concerning passion, Ockham appears poorly positioned. How would he account for wickedness produced by passion, but without malice—vices of weakness rather than deliberation? How can he distinguish passion from malice?

He might claim to deal with the distinction in one of two ways. He can account for weakness of will as a form of conditional willing—being moved by passion not to will the worthy unconditionally. To take a dietary example, I might wish to abstain from sweets only if that need not result in any loss of pleasure. To take a charitable example, I might wish to give a million dollars to UNICEF if I had it. My not having a million dollars, Ockham contends, is a partial object of that volition. Willing to give a million dollars you have is an entirely different act from willing to give away what you do not have, according to Ockham. So this model of weakness of will suggests simply that my desire for pleasure exceeds my desire to live virtuously. What has gone wrong is that the desire for virtue rather than the desire for pleasure is conditional, not absolute.

Ockham might also account for weakness of will in terms of the degrees of virtue he posits. Virtue in the first degree is defined as follows: . . . someone wills the performance of just works in conformity with right reason, as it dictates that such acts should be performed, according to the

⁵² Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3 & a. 4, ed. Wey, 361 & 393 (OTh VIII).

⁵³ Ockham, *Circa virtutes et vitia*, 273-5 (OTh VIII).

⁵⁴ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 354 (OTh VIII). This is a traditional account, cf. Bonaventura's 'ignorantia, infirmitas, malitia,' *Sent.*, II d. 43 a. 3 q. 2, *Opera omnia* II:994s.

proper circumstances respecting precisely this work, on account of the worthiness of this work itself, as an end.⁵⁵ Second degree virtue adds to this definition the determination to persevere. Supposing vice were defined in parallel fashion, the incontinent might be said to be guilty of only first degree vice, since they do not intend to persist. Their act is contrary to right reason and hence vicious, and their goal is unworthy, but they do not plan to continue.

What is suggested here as a solution Ockham might have advanced—namely, that incontinence is vice in a minor degree—is not far from St. Thomas Aquinas' view. Aquinas following Aristotle (*NE* 7.8. 1151a5-6) holds that incontinence is vice (or rather *depravity*) only in a qualified, not an unqualified sense of the term, because it is not continuous.⁵⁶ But where Aquinas and Burley appear to have a fundamental problem, because they deny that we can knowingly choose wickedness, Ockham does not; there is no reason he need deny that passion motivates knowingly wicked choices. Rather what Ockham may have difficulty accounting for are cases of self-deception, or vices which result from partial ignorance. He cites Aristotle in behalf of the claim that when we know the major and minor premises of a practical syllogism, we cannot fail to know the conclusion.⁵⁷ By contrast, as we saw above, Burley's account of weakness of will consists of a description of various models of incomplete knowledge or self-deception.

2.2 *Burley*

If the commonest cases of incontinence result from ignorance of particulars, according to Burley, the problem with intemperance is that knowledge of the universal is corrupted. Both are voluntary, but intemperance, unlike incontinence, is deliberate. Like Ockham, Burley correctly understands Aristotle's distinction at least in part, indicating that neither the temperate nor the intemperate is much troubled by passion—or rather inordinate appetite.⁵⁸ He even recites a passages from Eustratius in which the statement is made that incontinence is not a vice.⁵⁹ But like other medieval theologians, he cannot deny that incontinence is a vice.

⁵⁵ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 2, ed. Wey, 335 (OTh VIII).

⁵⁶ Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, 7.8, Rome 1969, OO 47, 415.

⁵⁷ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367 (OTh VIII).

⁵⁸ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7, f.111^{rb}, 115^{rb}.

⁵⁹ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.1, f.105^{vb} K.

Ultimately, Burley claims that incontinence is *partly* a vice—only partly, because although appetite is corrupt, reason is not.⁶⁰ The incontinent properly understand the universal proposition which indicates what our proper ends should be, at least most of the time. Their problem is that their reason is overwhelmed by their passion.

Concerning intemperance, Burley like a number of other medieval commentators had no difficulty understanding that Aristotle was not using the term as the medievals did, to refer only to vices of eating and drinking. Aristotelian intemperance, according to Burley, is habitual lack of right reason concerning all bodily pleasures, making them the ends of life.⁶¹ For Burley, as for Ockham, temperance is a superior degree of continence: right reason concerning bodily pleasures undisturbed by strong inclinations.

Burley does do things a modern Aristotle commentator would not do—such as, claiming that continence is a mean,⁶² and holding that continence differs from other virtues mainly in that it is not a firm habit, but rather a habitual disposition.⁶³ Like Ockham and other medievals,⁶⁴ Burley includes bestiality among the vices [rather than excluding it as the result of nature]. Burley makes Aristotle a worse sexist than he really is, suggesting that in the Aristotelian scheme of things women do not count either as continent or incontinent.⁶⁵ But his grasp of the basic Aristotelian concept of weakness of will appears unexceptionable: knowing what is right, but being led by appetite to act wickedly. The contrasting state of intemperance prompted not by strong appetite but deliberately chosen false principles corresponds to Aristotle's statement that the intemperate person thinks he is right (*NE* 7.9. 1152a6-7).

Let us return now to Ockham's more Christian scheme for dividing vice according to its causes: ignorance, passion, and malice. Incontinence is the Aristotelian description which most closely resembles vices of passion,⁶⁶ while intemperance resembles malice in some respects. Moreover, Ockham argues that orthodox Aristotelians cannot distinguish passion and malice from each other and from vice. Aquinas distinguishes malice from passion, or rather intemperance from incontinence. Intemperance results

⁶⁰ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.4, f.111^{ra} B.

⁶¹ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.8, f.116^{ra} A-B.

⁶² *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.9, f.117^{ra-vb}.

⁶³ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.8, f.116^{vb} E.

⁶⁴ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 343 (OTH VIII).

⁶⁵ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.5, f.112^{rb} A.

⁶⁶ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.8, f.116^{ra} B.

from deliberately chosen vicious acts; its ultimate origin is the failure to grasp the first principles of moral philosophy—the major premises of practical syllogisms. If intemperance is produced by ignorance of the major premise, incontinence results from ignorance of the minor premises in such syllogisms. Ockham rejects this account, holding that no one can fail to know such major premises as ‘everything unworthy should be avoided’. Thus if there is ignorance, it must be ignorance of the minor in the case of the malicious as well as the incontinent.

On this topic, Burley does not seem to have taken Ockham’s criticism very seriously. He simply adopts Thomas’ account. Like Aquinas, Burley distinguishes between incontinence which is a temporary disturbance and intemperance which is habitual.

Neither Ockham nor Burley treats vices which result from ignorance separately. As we saw above, Ockham attacks the Thomistic position for failing to distinguish between vice which result from ignorance and those which result from malice or passion (incontinence). Again this is an attack which Burley did not take seriously. Perhaps, there are perfectly good reasons for this. Ockham agrees with Burley that there are some circumstances in which ignorance is exculpatory. Ockham’s distinction between culpable and non-culpable ignorance regarding vice is straight-forward. Inculpable ignorance is insurmountable; culpable ignorance arises when we can and should know what we do not know.⁶⁷ Burley’s account is similar; ignorance excuses only when we ourselves (or our credulity) is not responsible for our ignorance.⁶⁸

Non-culpable ignorance can be disregarded, since it does not count as vicious at all. Culpable ignorance would be treated as the result either of passion or of malice. Indeed Burley treats incontinence as a form of

⁶⁷ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 354 (OTh VIII).

⁶⁸ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.2, f.108^{ra} C: ‘Ad rationem hic factam dicendum quando dicitur quod ille qui operatur malum sciens illud esse malum est peior illo qui operatur malum ignorans illud esse malum, dico quod ista maior non est universaliter vera nisi cum duabus condicionibus superaddendis—scilicet (1) quod ipse operans non sit causa suae ignorantiae seu falsae credulitatis. Ignorantia enim vel error cuius homo est causa non excusat ipsum, ut patet ex III huius; sed intemperatus est causa suae ignorantiae et erroris; nam nos sumus causae vitiorum et virtutum; virtutes enim et vitia sunt in nostra potestate ut patet ex III huius. Alia condicio (2) est quod cetera ab ignorantia unius et scientia alterius sint paria quod non accidit in proposito. Nam incontinens habet concupiscentias vehementes delectationum, et intemperatus aut non habet huiusmodi concupiscentias, aut habet eas debiles et remissas; et minus malus est qui fortiter concupiscens operatur malum quam qui non concupiscens vel debiliter concupiscens operatur simile malum.’

ignorance resulting from passion, while intemperance might be regarded as maliciously induced ignorance.⁶⁹ Thus Burley might claim that a separate treatment of the vices of ignorance would be superfluous.

3. *How is What We Do Related to What We Know and Will?*

3.1 *Ockham*

If the suggestion made at the end of the last section is correct, most medieval ethical philosophers are chiefly concerned to account for vices produced by passion and malice. In terms of the issues which divide Ockham and Burley, as followers of Scotus and Aquinas, respectively, the focus is on volitional and intellectual vices. Ockham and Scotus treat all vice as volitional and the will as the true rational agent; by contrast, Burley and Aquinas describe both intemperance and incontinence, or vices of passion and malice, in terms of defective knowledge. A consideration of the issues that divide the partisans of the primacy of will from those of the primacy of intellect would take us far afield. What will concern me here, instead, is an issue on which Ockham and Burley depart from their respective schools: the execution of virtuous and vicious acts.

Having rejected the intellect as an important moral faculty on the ground that it is not a free, but a natural faculty compelled by evidence, Scotus was willing to hold that the actual execution of volition had a distinct moral significance. His was a model of fittingness which likens virtue to dancing; what has moral value is not just what you will, but what you actually do in particular circumstances. Actually to do something is better than merely to will it.⁷⁰ Ockham disagrees and deploys a variety of arguments in the dispute. One claims that extrinsic actions can have no independent moral significance because the same physical act is virtuous when performed for one reason, and vicious when performed for another. Such acts are only accidentally, not intrinsically good. A second suggests that we may be misled by the fact that people who are actually vicious sometimes have their behavior reinforced by the results of that behavior—as when eating one pistachio produces a craving that results in our consuming the entire contents of the container. Another indicates that Scotus' view has confused what is more severely punished on earth in order to

⁶⁹ As quoted in the previous note.

⁷⁰ M. McCord Adams, *Is to Will It as Bad As To Do It?*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, 41 (1981), 5-60.

maintain public order with what is more vicious. Finally, we may be confusing volition which does not result in action with weak volition.⁷¹

In fact, it is logically possible for equally intense, and hence equally reprehensible, acts of willing wickedness to have vastly different consequences. Suppose two commanders, Henry and Roger, both order the execution of an innocent soldier in identical circumstances. Henry's order is immediately carried out, while Roger's is accidentally delayed, and the soldier escapes. Henry may be tempted by the success of this method of eliminating annoyance to issue similar commands, so his vice may be strengthened; certainly, if the sovereign, King Stephen, wants to encourage enlistment, he will have to punish Henry more severely than Roger. But from the point of view of an omniscient God, at the time the order is issued there is nothing in the situation which would justify excusing Roger but not Henry, according to Ockham. Both commanders have elicited a formally imperative, executive act of will,⁷² and hence both are equally blameworthy.

When the widow of Henry's victim objects that the actions of the two commanders are not comparable, she's right if she means that Stephen should punish Henry more severely, but wrong if she thinks that God will not punish Roger just as harshly as Henry was punished. The widow is wrong, according to Ockham, provided both Henry and Roger unconditionally willed the execution—that is, provided their acts of volition were both formally imperative. Neither had any more reason to believe that the soldier would survive than I have that my hand will not grasp, or my stomach digest, the sweet I decide to eat. It is certainly possible that the volition will be impeded, but not because of anything of which I am aware or in control. And since morality pertains to what is voluntary, as Augustine and Aristotle agree, circumstances like a sudden paralysis of my hand are not relevant to evaluating me as a moral agent.

Ockham distinguishes between conditional and formally imperative executive acts of will to take account of the sort of considerations which Scotus and his defender, Ockham's enemy Walter Chatton, offered in justification of the view that doing good is better than willing it. Ockham admits that actually committing murder is worse than conditionally willing murder—that is, where the act is only equivalently imperative. He denies that there is a difference in the moral significance of formally imperative, executive acts of willing murder, which depend on whether

⁷¹ Ockham, *Sent.*, 3 q.11, edd. F.E. Kelley & G.I. Etzkorn, 375-9 (OTH VI).

⁷² Ockham, *De connexionione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 372 (OTH VIII).

they are or are not unaccompanied by the corresponding external acts.

This does not mean that Ockham was unaware of the moral significance of impediments to action. He distinguishes between relevant impediments of which we are aware in making moral choices and those which, however much they affect the outcome, do not affect those choices. Impediments which restrict action are partial objects of a conditional volition. If we are aware of impediments, formally imperative acts of will are impossible. Moreover, conditionally willing murder is less culpable than willing its actual execution.

Formally imperative volition is possible only where there are, or appear to be, no impediments. In some sense Ockham has built the executive function into his description of imperative volition. His description is intended to eliminate as irrelevant situations in which if the outcome differs in any respect from the willed exterior act, that difference is accidental—resulting from factors we neither know nor control.

3.2 *Burley*

Now Burley also describes executive acts, and he does so in describing prudence.⁷³ It is from the *Nicomachean Ethics* (6.9. 1143a7) that the concept of executive acts arises.⁷⁴ Albert, and Thomas following him, explain Aristotelian prudence in terms of a three-fold distinction;⁷⁵ for Thomas the third member is *praecipere* or command.⁷⁶ Albert and Thomas use this distinction to explain the difference between mere comprehension, *synesis*, and prudence. Thomas tells us that though in the speculative sciences, there are only two steps: inquiry and judgment; in the practical sciences inquiry and consideration must be followed by action or command.

Ockham is implicitly citing the same passage when he tells us that understanding only involves two steps, after which the conclusion necessarily follows.⁷⁷ That conclusion was drawn by Thomas at *Ethics*, 7.3.

⁷³ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.10, f.118^b C.

⁷⁴ The earliest medieval use with which I am familiar comes from Albert the Great, who uses the concept in explaining the difference between prudence and judgment (*Super Eth.* 6.15, ed. W. Kübel, Münster in Westph. 1987, 485-7 (OO 14).

⁷⁵ This distinction comes ultimately from a more complicated passage in Damascene's *De fide orthodoxa* which mentions *inquisitio*, *consiliatio* and *electio*, cf. the '*Versio Burgundio*' c.36, ed. E.M. Buytaert, Louvain-Paderborn 1955, 137. Gauthier maintains Thomas' identifies judgment and command, but distinguishes between command as an intellectual dictate and as an act of will.

⁷⁶ Aquinas, *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, 6.9, Rome 1969, OO 47, 366.

⁷⁷ Ockham, *De connexionione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367 (OTh VIII).

1147a24, but Ockham cites instead the opening passages of the *Posterior Analytics* (1.1. 71a20).⁷⁸ Presumably Ockham's choice of references is dictated at least in part by the wish to avoid passages in which Aristotle says that prudence is not prudence unless it is acted upon.

Ockham uses this dictum about two step speculative reasoning to prove that there can be prudence without virtuous action. Once we know the major and minor premises of a practical syllogism, the conclusion is evident at once. And since Ockham identifies prudence as knowledge of the conclusion of the practical syllogism, in his view, once the dictate is formulated, there is prudence. But not everyone who knows the premises of a practical syllogism acts virtuously. Therefore, there can be prudence in the absence of virtue.⁷⁹

Burley has this argument in mind when he explains incontinence, citing the passage used by Ockham from the *Posterior Analytics*.⁸⁰ But Burley argues instead that as long as concupiscence prevents us from applying the minor to the major, prudence can be absent. His aim is to safeguard the claim that there is no prudence without virtue.

Burley has another defense, with much more far reaching implications, against Ockham's *Posterior Analytics* argument. It is based on the *Ethics* VII passage. Again it is an explanation for how the premises of a practical syllogism can be known without producing prudence. Burley starts with Aquinas' account of the distinction between the relation of premises to conclusion in the practical as versus the demonstrative syllogism. Instead of a propositional conclusion, a practical syllogism leads to action. Whereas positing the premises of a demonstrative syllogism simultaneously leads necessarily to the concluding proposition, positing the premises of a practical syllogism does not necessarily lead to action. The agent can be impeded by external circumstances so that she cannot execute the act dictated by practical reason. Burley says that action follows judgment not as a conclusion follows from premises with logical necessity, but as rain follows from clouds.⁸¹ To me it seems that this is the difference between complete and partial causes, from which we could conclude that understanding does not by itself determine execution.

⁷⁸ In expounding this passage from the *Posterior Analytics* Thomas says (*Lect.* 2) that in some syllogisms, once the major and minor are known, the conclusion follows immediately. Ockham states unqualifiedly that the conclusion follows immediately once the premises are known, an interpretation of this passage for which he could have cited Giles of Rome.

⁷⁹ Ockham, *De connexione virtutum*, a. 3, ed. Wey, 367 (OTh VIII).

⁸⁰ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.3, f.110^{rb} P.

⁸¹ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.3, f.109^{vb}-110^{ra} G.

When expounding book VI c.9, Burley uses Aquinas' terminology for the three acts of prudence: inquiry, judgement and command. But at book VII,⁸² he describes the third part of prudence as 'executive' (*executiva vel praeceptiva executionis*). So what has happened is that Burley has contrasted impendable practical reasoning with speculative reasoning that is inevitably successful once the premises are combined. He has pointed to the weakness of the link between intellectual judgment and practical execution.

If Ockham's picture of the soul links will and execution, Burley's exposition of Aristotle unlinks intellect and execution. They are complementary philosophical strategies, both of which call our attention to possible problems in the link between understanding and action. Burley emphasizes that the intellect cannot be a total cause in the practical sphere; Ockham stresses the connection of moral practice and will. Burley, like Ockham, maintains that understanding does not determine action. And though he does not maintain that volition determines execution, Ockham seeks to show that interruptions of that linkage, unlike the link between understanding and volition, are morally irrelevant.

It is odd to find Burley lining up with an advocate of the primacy of the will. Certainly, Ockham and the Franciscans, with their caricature of Thomism, would be surprised. And doubtless there are Thomists—perhaps Giles of Rome is an example—who would be horrified. But Thomas himself might not be. Gauthier has argued persuasively that for Thomas, prudence is a habit of will as well as intellect.⁸³ Specifically, he suggests a role for will in the execution of the command which is logically though not temporally distinct from the judgment of the intellect. For Aquinas, as for Burley, an adequate account of incontinence requires that we posit something other than understanding, or the lack of it, to link judgment and action, something which functions properly in some cases and not in others.

4. Conclusion

Since Burley's work is considerably less well-known than Ockham's, I will conclude by considering Burley's contribution to medieval ethics. Burley aimed at completeness rather than originality in his *Ethics Commentary*. Most of Grosseteste's notes are included, as are substantial excerpts from Eustratius'

⁸² *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.10, f.118^{rb} C.

⁸³ R.A. Gauthier, in a review of *Psychologie et morale* by O. Lottin, in: *Bulletin Thomiste*, 8 (1947-1953), 65-9.

commentary. What Burley sought to provide, and what his readers were looking for, was a competent summary of common opinion, revised in accordance with modern views. Burley's commentary is very well structured; it would be worth having if only for the outline at its beginning: he lists of all the questions and doubts raised by each book of the *Ethics*, together with common propositions and the conclusions. The conclusions in the text and the margin are numbered to correspond to the list at the beginning.

Burley modernized the treatment by adding short notes to the exposition; that is where any original contributions will be found, introduced by words such as '*notandum*', '*intelligendum*', or '*dubium est*'. Often these sections in which he treats problems raised by his contemporaries reflect Burley's logical interests. There is, for example, a sustained discussion of the question in what sense the statement 'the incontinent man abandons any and every choice' is a self-evident proposition,⁸⁴ with reference to the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*. These discussions are scattered and brief, so it is hard to evaluate their importance. In one regard, at least, we may see Burley's treatment as significant in the history of philosophy.

Sarah Broadie holds that viewing knowledge as a state rather than an activity is a consequence of the 'modern dialogue with scepticism.'⁸⁵ Because the exercise of knowledge does not add to its justification or secure it from skeptical attack, our concept of knowledge no longer includes its exercise, she thinks. Viewing knowledge narrowly as a state, if they value its exercise, she argues that moderns have to decide which of our non-rational faculties its exercise should be attributed to—'will or sensibility.'

What we have seen in the medieval dialogue with Aristotle suggests another history, in which stress on the will is not a product of preoccupation with skeptical concerns; nor is the will separated from our rational nature. Indeed, both Ockham and Scotus claim that the will is the primary rational faculty. The problem is not placing value on the exercise of our rational faculty, it is rather how to explain the interplay of intellect and will in that exercise. Certainly it was not an attempt to reply to skeptical arguments (with which Ockham, for example, was notoriously unconcerned), which led medievals to focus on the will. Rather, it was an attempt to account for disorders in the exercise of our rational faculty

⁸⁴ *Expositio G. Burlei s. X lib. Eth. Arist.*, 7.1.9, f.117^b C-D.

⁸⁵ S. Broadie, *Ethics with Aristotle*, Oxford-New York 1991, 291.

which led to the description of the intellect as a state, distinct from its exercise. In this development, Burley plays an important role, influencing orthodox Aristotelianism in the manner suggested by Scotus and Ockham—by stressing the weakness of the link between understanding and execution and by expanding on Aquinas' account of indeterminacy in the intellect.

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This bibliography is a continuation of the bibliography from 1988 which was published by Rega Wood in the *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale* and which listed the studies on Walter Burley for the period from 1968 to 1988. The categorisation of this bibliography follows that of the bibliography from 1988; only "*De vitis et moribus philosophorum*" (50) has been placed under the category of "Doubtful and spurious works" due to the recent discussion about it. For a better orientation this categorisation precedes the bibliography.

Like the bibliography from 1988 the following bibliography is based upon information by the members of the Burley Society and various data bases like the *Religion Index*, the *Philosopher's Index*, the *Dissertation Abstracts* and the relevant issues of *Bulletin de philosophie médiévale*. A special word of thanks goes to Dr Olga Weyers, 's-Gravenhage (Netherland), who has supplied us with a bibliography, which she has compiled for her own dissertation.

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In memoriam Prof. Dr. Joseph IJsewijn

Prof. Dr. IJsewijn, member of the Editorial Board of *Vivarium* since 1974, passed away on November 27, 1998, after an illness of which the first signs appeared already in 1997.

Born in Zwijndrecht (Belgium) on December 30, 1932, he studied Classical Philology and Ancient History at the Catholic University of Louvain, where he was appointed full professor in Latin Language and Literature in 1967.

Until 1973 the scope of *Vivarium* had been limited to the Middle Ages. After an evaluation held on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of our journal in 1973 the Editorial Board judged it important to broaden the scope to the Renaissance and to increase the number of Board members to include scholars specializing in this field. When asked to join the Board, Professor IJsewijn, much to our pleasure, accepted without hesitation, and thus became not only the first Renaissance scholar in our midst, but also the first Board member from abroad. His internationally recognized expertise in the field of Renaissance Latin and Neo-Latin enabled the Board to take responsibility for the new domain. As a member of the Board Professor IJsewijn contributed substantially to the scholarly quality of *Vivarium* for almost twenty five years, always impressing his colleagues with his penetrating insight and sound judgement.

Professor IJsewijn's scholarly merits will be discussed more comprehensively elsewhere, *inter alia* in his journal *Humanistica Lovaniensia*, which was supervised by him for a long time in an admirable way. May it suffice here to mention his *Companion to Neo-Latin Studies*, which ever since its appearance in 1977 has been an unfailing best-seller (it saw a second and revised edition); it is the reference book *par excellence* for Neo-Latin studies all over the world.

An honorary doctorate bestowed on him by the University of Valencia and a number of fellowships awarded him by several learned academies and societies constitute further proof of his academic excellence.

The members of the Editorial Board of *Vivarium* mourn Joseph IJsewijn's passing and will miss his presence.

SIMON TUGWELL, OP

In his article, *Petrus Hispanus O.P., Auctor Summularum* (Vivarium, 35 (1997), 21-71), Angel D'Ors revives the claim that the author of the *Summulae Logicales* was a Dominican, and he makes several suggestions about his identity. However, with regard to two of his candidates, Pedro Ferrando and Petrus Hispanus conversus, we are on much firmer ground than he seems to realise, and it is doubtful whether what we know about them is compatible with the hints which Dr D'Ors has uncovered about the author of the *Summulae*. With regard to two others, there is no evidence that they were either Spanish or Dominican.

1. *Pedro Ferrando*

On Pedro Ferrando, we have a more or less contemporary statement from someone who knew him well. The obituary contained in the *Vitas fratrum* is one of several contributed by the former Dominican provincial of Spain, Giles of Portugal, and it is already there in the edition prepared by Gerald de Frachet in 1258, which survives in Toulouse, Bibl. mun., cod. 487. Giles was himself present when Pedro died in Zamora, as his narrative makes clear:

Cum frater Petrus Ferrandi, qui a puero in ordine sanctissime nutritus et doctus fuerat, qui et uitam beati Dominici patris nostri descripsit, doctor in multis locis, tandem apud Zamoram infirmaretur, quidam deuotus frater uidit ipsum supra montem altissimum stantem et faciem eius resplendentem ut sol, et a dextris et a sinistris duos iuuenes stantes splendidos nimis. Cum autem sequenti die frater michi uisionem hanc dixisset quam uiderat, intellexi fratrem Petrum in proximo moriturum. Et cum uenissem ad eum et sederem in lecto in quo ipse iacebat, . . . narrauit . . . michi quod uiderat sibi assistere beatam uirginem et sanctum euangelistam Iohannem singulas coronas in caput illius ponentes. Hanc inquit uisionem uestre dilectioni committo. Rogo autem ut dicatis michi quid significet. Ego igitur, qui uitam et conscientiam eius plene cognoueram, dixi, Una illarum uirginitati tue debetur, altera predicationi atque doctrine, et quia uirgo et doctor es eas beate uirginis et Christi discipuli adiutorio acquisisti. Tunc rogauit me ut fratres omnes ante eum uocarem. Quibus

¹ In this article, I use the following abbreviations: AFP = Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum; MOPH = Monumenta Ordinis Praedicatorum Historica.

astantibus ait, Fratres non est ordo quem dominus tantum diligit... Finitis hiis uerbis coram cunctis fratribus obdormiuit in domino.

The vulgate text of the *Vitas fratrum* was prepared by Humbert of Romans, and he modifies Giles's text slightly to make it clear that Pedro *doctor in multis locis Hispanie multis annis extiterat*. Humbert was as well placed as anyone to know whether Pedro had ever been a lector outside his own province, so his clarification can probably be accepted as reliable.²

From the early fourteenth century we have Bernard Gui's account of the people who have written about St Dominic, including Pedro Ferrando:

Secundo scripsit frater Petrus Ferrandi, Hispanus natione de Galexia.

Gui had clearly not seen a text of his legenda, but on its author, as on several other points, he had evidently received information from some Spanish confrère. His statement about Petrus Ferrandi is already present in the first edition of his compilation of *Dominicana*, presented to the Master of the Order in 1304.³

Gui tells us that Pedro's life of Dominic was approved by some general chapter, and this is confirmed by the legenda in the Regensburg lectionary (Oxford, Keble College, 49), which bears the headings, for the two feasts of St Dominic (ff. 78 and 129^v):

Frater Petrus Hispanus, qui composuit legendam beati Dominici approbatam a capitulo generali. In translatione beati Dominici.

In festo s. Dominici, frater Petrus Hispanus cum approbatione capituli generalis.⁴

The actual text fully validates the identification of Pedro Ferrando as the author of the legenda edited by F. van Ortroy.⁵ The Regensburg legenda, apart from a few extra posthumous miracles which are explicitly identified as having come to light '*post compositionem legende beati Dominici*' (f. 80^r), is simply an abridgement of that edited by van Ortroy.

As is generally recognised, the Regensburg manuscript contains the first edition of Humbert of Romans's lectionary, prepared while he was

² The text was edited by B.M. Reichert, in a less than scholarly fashion, in MOPH, I, Louvain 1896, 263-4. I have examined 26 manuscripts, and shall explain the evolution of the text, and the rôle of Humbert in particular, in a book, *The Shaping of the Vitas Fratrum*, which I hope to publish before too long in the *Dissertationes Historicae* of the Dominican Historical Institute.

³ I have edited the text in *Scripta Bernardi Guidonis de Sancto Dominico*, in: MOPH, XXVII, Rome 1995, 105-6, with comments, *ibid.* 36-35.

⁴ The text was edited by the late Hilarius Barth OP in *Die Dominikuslegende im ersten Lektionar Humberts von Romans (1246)*, in: AFP, 54 (1984), 83-112.

⁵ F. Van Ortroy, *Pierre Ferrand O.P. et les premiers biographes de S. Dominique, fondateur de l'ordre des Frères Prêcheurs*, in: *Analecta Bollandiana*, 30 (1911), 27-87.

provincial of France, on the instructions of the general chapter of 1246 (MOPH, III, 36). It thus antedates the publication of the third legenda, by Constantine of Orvieto. There is no warrant either to dispute Humbert's statement about the authorship of the legenda and its approval by a general chapter or to deny that this is the second legenda listed by Bernard Gui (it is clearly dependent on, and therefore posterior to, the *Libellus* of Jordan of Saxony).⁶

Finally, it is only this same legenda which contains the text which the general chapter of 1242 ordered to be deleted:⁷

MOPH, III 24

Monemus et volumus quod abradatur de legenda beati Dominici ubi semetipsum asserit, licet in carnis integritate divina gracia conservatum, nondum illam imperfectionem evadere posse, quin magis afficeretur iuencularum colloquiis quam affatibus vetularum.

Ferr.

Semetipsum etiam, licet ex matris utero in carnis integritate diuina gratia conseruatum, asseruit nondum illam imperfectionem euadere potuisse quin magis afficeretur iuencularum colloquiis quam affatibus uetularum.

There is thus absolutely no room for doubt that the legenda which Van Otroy claimed for Pedro Ferrando was officially in use in the order between Jordan's *Libellus* and the new legenda composed by Constantine of Orvieto, and that is the one which Humbert ascribed to Petrus Hispanus. It would be perverse to deny that it is also the life of St Dominic with which Giles of Portugal credits the Petrus Ferrandi whose death in Zamora he witnessed and reported no later than 1258, or that this Petrus Ferrandi is the one who was, judging by the information which reached Bernard Gui no later than 1304, remembered as being "from Galicia".

Contrary to the assertions of H.C. Scheeben⁸ and Barth,⁹ there are no grounds for believing that Pedro Ferrando was commissioned to produce his legenda. Such a belief is, if anything, excluded by the prologue (Göttingen, Univ. Bibl. 109, f. 2):

⁶ Dr D'Ors's suggestion that the *Libellus* may have been ghostwritten (D'Ors 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, p. XX), 50) is untenable, as the author clearly identifies himself, and indeed a fair amount of the work is autobiographical. What is more, as I have tried to show (S. Tugwell OP, *Notes on the Life of St Dominic*, in: AFP, 68 (1998), 5-116, esp. 5-33), the bulk of the *Libellus* was written in 1218/1219-1221, much of it even before Jordan joined the Order; it was only superficially revised for publication in 1233, when Jordan was Master of the Order.

⁷ The offending words were removed quite effectively from circulation, so they are not found in any of the manuscripts used by Van Ortroy, or by H.M. Laurent in his edition in MOPH, XVI; but I have discovered them in one manuscript: Lisbon, Bibl. Nac., Alcob. CXXXIII/24.

⁸ H.Chr. Scheeben, *Petrus Ferrandi*, in: AFP, 2 (1932), 329-47, at 334-5.

⁹ Barth 1984 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 4), 98.

Huius ordinis primus institutor et pater inclitus extitit beatus Dominicus, cuius uitam uirtutibus plenam deoque gratissimam, obitum quoque et ex parte miracula et ordinis ipsius in occiduis mundi partibus et occasu temporis orientis exordium rudi quidem sed ueraci stilo perstringere opere precium est opitulante gratia Iesu Christi.

Etiquette required the author of a saint's life to present some excuse for his presumption; the best possible excuse was the orders of one's superiors, so, if Ferrando had been commissioned, he would undoubtedly have said so. Failing that excuse, the author has to fall back, as Ferrando does, on apologising for his incompetence and saying that the attempt is nevertheless worth making.

The main source of Ferrando's *legenda* is, naturally, Jordan's *Libellus*, but he had information, which Jordan did not, both about Dominic's years in the Midi and about his visit to Spain. In the Midi, Dominic was part of a predominantly Spanish mission, whose members, once the order was established, mainly returned to Spain; so it was precisely with Spanish material that Ferrando was able to enrich the story. Apart from this, he has a much fuller account of Reginald of Orléans, derived expressly, from what Reginald himself said, probably on his deathbed, and from what Dominic said about him after his death, i.e. information from Paris and from the general chapter of 1220, which could easily have reached Ferrando in Spain, though I should not wish to exclude the possibility that he had himself studied in Paris soon after Reginald's death.¹⁰ The only other historical material added by Ferrando is the list of miracles involved in the canonization of Dominic in 1234.¹¹ This must have come

¹⁰ Jordan's story is based exclusively on what he heard Dominic say in Paris in 1219, before Reginald's arrival there. This is an important part of the evidence for the dating of the *Libellus*. Cf. Tugwell (*op. cit.*, above, n. 6), 24-6.

¹¹ Ferrando is also the first writer to claim that, before he died, Dominic formally 'bequeathed' to his friars the three virtues of charity, humility and voluntary poverty, and that he pronounced a curse on anyone who introduced possessions into the order. It is most unlikely that either the testament or the curse is historical, and R. Creytens OP argued that they should be regarded as a literary device (R. Creytens O.P., *Le «Testament de S. Dominique» dans la littérature dominicaine ancienne et moderne*, in: AFP, 43 (1973), 29-72, esp. 52-71). It is possible that at least the story of the testament was inspired by the 8th matins antiphon for the feast of St Dominic: "Migrans pater filiis uite firmamentum paupertatis humilis condit testamentum". The claim that Ferrando himself composed the office is not supported by any early evidence, and it is rendered improbable by the fact that the third Lauds antiphon ("Scala celo prominens fratri reuelatur, per quam pater transiens sursum ferebatur") alludes to the version of Guala's vision found only in the original version of Jordan's *Libellus*; when the *Libellus* was revised by some general chapter, the single ladder was replaced by two ladders, and it is the two-ladder account which is reproduced by Ferrando.

from the papal curia, and we may conjecture that it was brought back to Spain by Raymund of Penyafort who, even before he received permission to leave the papal curia, was in the peninsula on the pope's business in 1236-1237.¹²

A legenda officially approved for use throughout the order must obviously have been in Latin; but Getino thought he had found evidence of an earlier version of Ferrando's legenda in Spanish, in a compilation on St Dominic contained in a manuscript belonging to the Dominican nuns of Santo Domingo el Real, Madrid.¹³ This is the 'earlier Castilian version' to which Dr D'Ors alludes.¹⁴ However, Getino's theory was refuted long ago by Manning.¹⁵

Manning was unable to obtain photographs of the Madrid manuscript, so he had to rely on Getino for his knowledge of its contents;¹⁶ he was also dependent on rather inadequate editions of the Latin legendas. Though his analysis of the Madrid compilation is substantially correct, some points need further clarification.

It is far from clear exactly what sort of text we are dealing with in the Madrid codex; the material is disorganised, and on occasion we are offered two different translations of the same Latin original. The first ingredient is the official legenda—that of Humbert,¹⁷ as we shall see—going up to Humb. 51, thus including some items which are first found in Const. or in Humb. We then backtrack to a much earlier part of the

¹² Cf. the documents edited in José Ruis Serra, *San Raimundo de Penyafort. Diplomatario*, Barcelona 1954, 38-51.

¹³ Luis G. Alonso Getino, *Origen del Rosario y Leyendas castellanas*, Vergara 1925, XII-XV; much of the text is published, *ibid.* 99-225, though Getino omits some sections and to some extent re-arranges those which he includes.

¹⁴ D'Ors 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, p. XXX), 51.

¹⁵ Warren F. Manning, *An Old Spanish life of Saint Dominic: Sources and Date*, in: U.T. Holmes Jr and A.J. Denomy (edd.), *Medieval Studies in Honor of Jeremiah Denis Matthias Ford*, Cambridge Mass. 1948, 139-58.

¹⁶ Having had their generosity abused earlier in the century, the nuns became very possessive of their manuscript and would not allow it to be taken out of the monastery to be professionally microfilmed. When I went there nearly twenty years ago, I unfortunately picked a bad time for the nuns, so was only able to spend a very short time with the manuscript; but the prioress kindly allowed me to send in a photographer. In the outcome, though, he turned out to have curious notions of how to photograph a manuscript, and even after two attempts I remained without any reproduction of a few pages; having secured those that I particularly wanted, I let the matter rest.

¹⁷ References to Jordan's *Libellus* (*Lib.*) and to the legendas of Ferrando (Ferr.), Constantine (Const.) and Humbert (Humb.) are given according to the paragraph numbers in the editions contained in MOPH, XVI, but I use my own provisional edition of the texts, based on a wider range of manuscripts and testimonia.

story, with a rather untidy selection of pieces from the life of Dominic in the *Legenda Aurea*, combined with two stories for which no Latin source is known; owing to the loss of a couple of folios, the second of these is incomplete, and there is no way of knowing what followed it.¹⁸ After the missing folios there is a new beginning, with a complete translation of the *miracula sancti Dominici* of Cecilia, the canonization process of St Dominic, and the ways of prayer of St Dominic. As I have shown elsewhere, the translation was made on the basis of the Latin text added by Bernard Gui to the final edition of his compilation of *Dominicana*, presented to the Master of the Order in 1314.¹⁹ This is followed by a translation of the posthumous miracles involved in Dominic's canonization, together with a paragraph *de moribus* ultimately derived from *Lib.* 102-105. The first miracle is omitted, since James of Varagine's version of it has already been included; the second is presented in two different translations, one at the beginning where it belongs (f. 88^r), the other interpolated after Getino's chapter LXXXVIII (f. 89^r). Then, after a blank page, a new series of miracles begins (which Getino prints before the canonization miracles), corresponding to Humb. 52-9 (thus completing the translation of Humbert's *legenda* up to his version of the *de sancti uiri moribus*). After this, the Spanish codex turns to St Peter Martyr.

Getino claimed that "*del texto castellano, que publicamos, pertenecen a Ferrand los treinta y tantos capítulos primeros y los milagres últimos, en los que son paralelos nuestro texto castellano y el ya conocido latino del escritor gallego*". We shall turn to the miracles in a moment; but Manning was quite right to say that the first part of the compilation corresponds to the *legenda* of Humbert, not that of Ferrando.

Since Ferr. was Humbert's favoured source, it is not surprising that a great deal of their two texts is identical; nevertheless, there are differences, and the Spanish text invariably follows Humb., not Ferr. For example, Humbert takes over what Ferrando says about the young Dominic's habit of sleeping on the ground, but he adds a phrase at the beginning and omits the reference to *Prov.* 22:6 at the end:

¹⁸ Getino's chapters XLIII-XLV correspond to *Leg. Aur.* 68-100, 127-32 in the new critical edition by G.P. Maggioni, Florence 1998. XLVI has no known source, XLVII-LIX correspond to *Leg. Aur.* 235-43, 248-305, 313-27, 338-84. After this, there is another translation of *Leg. Aur.* 69-100, which Getino omits. LX-LXI correspond to *Leg. Aur.* 121-6. Then there is the beginning of another tale with no known source, which Getino also omits. There is an 18th-century transcript of the Madrid manuscript in the Dominican archives in Rome (AGOP, X, 982), but unfortunately the original had already lost the missing pages, as is remarked in the copy ("aqui faltandos ojos").

¹⁹ S. Tugwell, *The Nine Ways of Prayer of St. Dominic: A Textual Study and Critical Edition*, in: *Mediaeval Studies*, 47 (1985), 1-124, at 7-8; I edited the Spanish text of the ways of

Ferr. 5

Cum enim esset adhuc puerulus nondum a nutricis diligentia segregatus, deprehensus est sepe lectum dimittere, quasi carnis iam delicias abhorreret, et eligebat potius super terram accumbere quam in lecto corporali quodam modo quiete resolutus iacere. Et ex tunc duxit in consuetudinem declinata stratus mollicie frequentissime super terram dormire. Videbatur iam illud quod non dum legerat intellexisse prouerbium, Adolescens iuxta uiam suam etiam cum senuerit non recedet ab ea.

Humb. 3

Diuina igitur gratia iam in eo mirabiliter operante, cum esset adhuc puerulus nondum a nutricis diligentia segregatus, deprehensus est sepe lectulum dimittere, quasi carnis iam delicias abhorreret, et eligebat potius super terram accumbere quam in lecto corporali quodammodo quiete resolutus iacere. Extunc autem duxit in consuetudinem declinata stratus mollicie frequentissime super terram dormire.

The Spanish text clearly follows Humb. (f. 2^r):

E por la gratia de dios que obraua en el, enpero que era tan pequenno que avn non le partiesien del ama, dexaua munchas vezes el lecho et echauasse en la tierra assi como si aborreçiesse ya los plaseres de la carne e deseaua mas yaser en tierra que en el lecho et mas folgado se fallaua ende. Et de si ouo en costunbre de yaser en tierra et dormir y a menudo.

Shortly after this, where Ferrando introduces the section on Dominic's studies in Palencia with a curt "*post hec*", the Spanish text follows Humbert's more ample "*puerilibus autem annis innocenter excursis*" (Ferr. 7, Humb. 5): "*Despues que passo la hedat de pequennes sin danno*" (f. 2^r).

There are thus no grounds for claiming that the opening section of the Spanish compilation derives from Ferrando, with supplementary items inserted from later *legendas*. The whole section is translated from Humbert.²⁰

In the case of the canonization miracles, however, Manning is wrong to say that they are translated from Humb. The decision of the editors of MOPH, XVI not to repeat posthumous miracles from one *legenda* to

prayer, *ibid.* 92-103. Cf. also MOPH, XXVII, 125-7. Since no manuscript of Gui's Latin text has survived, this part of the Madrid codex is particularly important.

²⁰ Dr D'Ors's suggestion about ghostwriting applies more plausibly to Humb. than to Jordan; but the *legenda* was always regarded as Humbert's own work—it is ascribed to him by Dietrich of Apolda (edited by G. Cuperus in *Acta Sanctorum*, Aug. I, Antwerp 1733, 563) and, independently, by Bernard Gui (MOPH, XXVII, 106-7, already in the text before Gui became aware of Dietrich)—and, granted his longstanding involvement in the revision of the lectionary and his fluency as a writer, there is no real reason to dispute the ascription. What is more, as I hope to show in *The Shaping of the Vitas Fratrum*, there is good evidence that he personally revised, indeed rewrote, much of the *Vitas fratrum*. In any case, even if Humb. was actually compiled by someone else, none of its innovations suggests any connection with Spain, so it would be entirely gratuitous to suppose that Pedro Ferrando had anything to do with it. In *The Shaping of the Vitas Fratrum* I shall also show that the ascription of the *cronica ordinis* to Ferrando is impossible, as well as being very poorly attested.

another prevented him from realising that the different *legendas* have significantly different texts, so that it is perfectly possible to identify which of them is the source of any translation. In the case of the Madrid codex, the source is undoubtedly Ferr. However, Ferr. exists in two editions,²¹ and it is probable that the second was produced at the general chapter which approved the *legenda* for use in the order; on occasion, the revisers misunderstood either the point or the Latin of Ferrando's original text, which suggests that he himself had nothing to do with the revision. And it is the revised edition which underlies the Spanish version in the Madrid codex. Two examples will suffice to show that we are dealing, not with a Castilian original produced by Ferrando before the Latin *legenda*, but with a translation of the official Latin text of Ferr.

One of the miracles was worked for someone called Marsilius de Suauitis (Ferr. 55).²² Constantine could make nothing of the name, so he substituted *Marsilius de sua uita desperans*, and this was followed by Humbert. The Spanish translator, whose original clearly contained the name, can thus only have been following Ferr., and his rendering of it is delightful: '*Marsilio de Villa Besos*'.

Another miracle was worked for the two sons of a certain Albert (Ferr. 60):

Duo namque pueri cuiusdam Alberti de Tusignato filii muti a natiuitate permanserant, etatis quidem alter supra quintum dimidium, alter supra tercium dimidium agens annum.

In the Lisbon manuscript of Ferr. and in some manuscripts of Const., *Alberti* is corrupted into *abbatis*, and this is found also in the Spanish version. And the revisers of Ferr. failed to understand the way in which the boys' ages are indicated ("*dimidium annum agens supra quintum/tercium*", i.e. half way through the year after the fifth/third year) and so inserted *et* each time before *dimidium*; this too is reproduced in the Spanish:

Dos moços de vn abbad de vn logar que le dezian Tusigrato mudos de su nasçimiento eran de hedad vno de çinco annos e medio, otro sobre tres annos e medio.

The canonization miracles are rounded off with a general comment, followed by a section *de sancti uiri moribus* (chapter CIX in Getino). As

²¹ Cf. Barth 1984 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 4), 97-100.

²² The name is guaranteed by the original deposition, preserved in Cuperus's edition of the lost Osma manuscript of the *Libellus* (*Acta Sanctorum Aug. I* 559), but the text in the only surviving manuscript of the first edition of Ferr. (Göttingen 109) is defective at this point.

Manning pointed out, this corresponds to *Lib.* 102-5; but it did not necessarily come directly from the *Libellus*. None of it was included in the original version of Ferrando's legenda, but it was added by the revisers. In all manuscripts of the revised edition of Ferr., *Lib.* 102 is added, rather ineptly, at the end of the whole legenda, after Ferrando's own formal conclusion, complete with its 'Amen'. That this is the source of the Spanish text is suggested by the fact that the latter evidently felt the embarrassment of the double conclusion to the legenda, and added a second 'Amen':

Ferr.

Multa quidem et alia . . . innotuere miracula, que non sunt stili officio designata. Hec autem breuiter adnotata sunt ad sanctitatis eius astruccionem . . . ad laudem quoque et gloriam eius qui . . . uiuit et regnat per infinita secula seculorum. Amen. De curationibus etiam infirmitatum plura nobis innotuerunt, que ad presens scripto mandata non sunt sanctitatis eius insignia.

Madrid

Muchas otras maravillas se demostraron . . . mas estas cosas son escriptas a notification de la su sanctidad . . . e a alabança e gloria de aquel que . . . biue e regna para sienpre en todos los siglos. Amen. De los cuydados de las enfermedades muchas cosas nos fueron manifestas que acerca de lo presente non en escripto puestas magera que son sennales de la su sanctidad e nobleza. Amen.

In almost all manuscripts of the revised Ferr., the section *de sancti uiri moribus* is inserted just before the account of Dominic's death (it replaces the first-edition text edited in MOPH, XVI as Ferr. 45), without Jordan's opening words, which are inappropriate in the new context. However, these words are retained in the Madrid codex:

Lib. 103

Ceterum, quod ipsis fulgentius est magnificentiusque miraculis, tanta morum honestate pollebat . . .

Madrid

Entre todas las otras cosas que padre sancto Domingo fue mas resplandeçiente e mas magnifico de miraculos fue que tanto resplandeçia este bien aventurado varon en honestidad . . .

Here too, though, the Spanish does not necessarily derive directly from the *Libellus*, since *ceterum . . . miraculis* is also found at this point in the Lisbon manuscript of the revised Ferr., with which we have already found the Madrid translation agreeing in error.

On balance, it seems likely that the whole of Getino's LXXXIII-CIX derives from some manuscript of Ferr.; but it is the revised text of Ferr. which underlies the Spanish version, not some pre-existing Castilian legenda. We may safely conclude that Pedro Ferrando had nothing whatsoever to do with the Spanish compilation, except that the revised, official edition of his legenda was one of its sources.

Thus the 'Dominican traditions' which Dr D'Ors feels free to reject²³ seem to be historically watertight. The Petrus Ferrandi known to us from early sources is the author of the second approved Latin life of St Dominic, who was probably Galician, and who died in Zamora no later than 1258.

2. *Petrus Hispanus conuersus*

Another candidate proposed by Dr D'Ors is the *frater Petrus Hispanus conuersus* mentioned in T.M. Mamachi, ed., *Annales Ordinis Praedicatorum* I, Rome 1756, 466, as one of the first friars sent to Bologna. This suggestion relies on the possibility of taking *conuersus* as meaning 'convert' (from Judaism or Islam) rather than 'laybrother'.

Our earliest information about this friar comes from Jordan of Saxony, who lists the people whom Dominic sent to Bologna at the beginning of 1218 (*Lib.* 55): "*frater Iohannes de Nauarra et quidam frater Bertrandus, postmodum uero frater Christianus cum fratre conuerso*". The *conuersus* is not named, and if *conuersus* is to be taken as 'convert' rather than 'laybrother', Jordan has singularly failed to make his meaning clear.

The identification of the *conuersus* as 'frater Petrus Hispanus' comes in a fragment of the lost chronicle by Galvano della Fiamma quoted in Taegio's *chronicae ampliores*.²⁴ The only reason for taking the identification seriously is that Galvano might well have been drawing on the tradition of his own priory in Milan, on the assumption that the Peter in question is the same as the '*frater Petrus Hispanus conuersus*' who had been St Dominic's socius at some time and was subsequently one of the first friars in Milan. Galvano clearly intends us to understand *conuersus* as meaning laybrother: after listing the priests in the community, he adds, "*Tres etiam conversi ibi fuerunt, uidelicet frater Petrus Hispanus, qui fuerat beati Dominici socius, frater Gulielmus de Benexio et frater Delphinus de Modoetia*".²⁵

Far from being a convert who became a Dominican teacher of logic and died in Spain, this Pedro was clearly a laybrother who, probably

²³ D'Ors 1997 (*op. cit.*, above, p. XXX), 52.

²⁴ The text is edited by G. Odetto, *La cronaca maggiore dell'ordine domenicano di Galvano Fiamma. Frammenti editi*, in: AFP, 10 (1940), 297-373, at 344, from one of the two surviving manuscripts (Rome, AGOP, XIV 51, f. 122^r); the other manuscript (Bologna, Bibl. Univ., 1594) has the same reading.

²⁵ This is quoted in Taegio's excerpts from various documents, here specifically Galvano's chronicle (Rome, AGOP, XIV 53, f. 122^r); it is edited by Odetto 1940 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 24), 321. An identical statement is quoted in Taegio's *chronicae ampliores* (Odetto 1940, 345). I have briefly discussed the matter in *Notes on the Life of St Dominic I*, in: AFP, 65 (1995), 5-169, at 57.

having accompanied St Dominic to Rome, was sent from there to Bologna and then to Milan, where, so far as we know, he remained.

3. *Two 'magistri Petri'*

Two more Peters cited by Dr D'Ors are equally unhelpful. First, there is the 'magister Petrus' who witnessed a deed in which the abbess of S. Maria in Tempulo leased some property belonging to the monastery (MOPH, XXV, 135). There is nothing to indicate that he was Spanish, or that *magister* here denotes an academic title. Nor is there any reason to believe that he was a Dominican; indeed, it is highly unlikely. Quite apart from the fact that he does not sign as '*frater*', the deed indicates that, on 25 Nov. 1220, the nuns of S. Maria in Tempulo had abandoned their intention to move to the pope's intended new monastery in S. Sisto, for which, since late 1219, St Dominic had been responsible.²⁶ In the circumstances, they are unlikely to have invited any Dominican to witness what they were doing. Only when Dominic returned to Rome at the beginning of 1221 did they return to the path which led to their becoming Dominican nuns.²⁷

Secondly, there is the 'magister Petrus' cited in the *Vitas fratrum* as being miraculously relieved of tooth-ache at the tomb of the recently deceased former Dominican provincial of Provence, William de Sissac.²⁸ He is described by Gerald de Frachet as '*rector scholarum Burdegalsium*', which is not a Dominican title; and there is nothing whatsoever in the text to suggest that he was a Dominican.

I wish Dr D'Ors every success in his search for a Dominican author of *the Summulae*; but these four Peters can be eliminated from his enquiry.

Rome

Istituto Storico Domenicano

²⁶ This was pointed out by V.J. Koudelka OP, *Le «Monasterium Tempuli» et la fondation dominicaine de San Sisto*, in: AFP, 31 (1961), 5-81, at 56. It gives credence to Cecilia's story that, during Dominic's absence from Rome, the nuns yielded to pressure from their families and friends and went back on their promise to join S. Sisto (*Miracula* 14, ed. A. Walz in: *Die «Miracula beati Dominici» der Schwester Cäcilia*, in: AFP, 37 (1967), 5-45, at 42).

²⁷ Cf. Tugwell, *Notes on the Life of St Dominic II*, in: AFP, 66 (1996), 5-200, at 117-8.

²⁸ William is said to have died on 23 May 1238, but it is not clear on whose authority. Though the rest of the date comes from Bernard Gui's history of the provincials of Provence, and Gui reports it only on hearsay, he does not seem to be responsible for the year, which, so far as I know, is not an original part of the text in any manuscript. It is added, in a later hand, in Bordeaux, Bibl. mun., 780, but this does not seem to be one of Gui's own corrections. The *Vitas fratrum* text is edited in MOPH I, 298-9, that of Gui in E. Martène & U. Durand, *Veterum scriptorum . . . amplissima collectio*, VI, Paris 1724, 419-20.

*Peter Olivi in the Shadow of Montségur*¹

ANNE DAVENPORT

car nos no em del mon nil mon es de nos

One of the difficulties with interpreting Franciscan science as a mission to “defend Catholic Europe,”² is that a number of creative friars remained far more focused on radically transforming Catholic Europe than on defending it. No sooner had the Franciscan Order obtained a prestigious Paris chair through Alexander of Hales than zealous friars published an introduction to Joachim da Fiore’s *Eternal Gospel*, heralding the imminent demise of ecclesiastical institutions and the advent of a new spiritual age.³ Franciscan “spirituals” who felt they had special insight into the *poverello*’s teaching placed it on a par with papal authority and found themselves in chronic conflict with existing Church practices and with Rome.⁴

The line between obedience and defiance remained particularly problematic in the South of what is now France. Franciscan friars like Hugh of Digne at the convent of Hyères and Raimondo Barravi at the con-

¹ I thank R. James Long for inviting me to read a summary of this paper at the International Medieval Congress in Leeds on July 13, 1998; David Burr and Robert Pasnau for fruitful discussions and for making key Olivi material available to me; Leon Golub for multiform help; and John Murdoch for his meticulous review.

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² Roger French and Andrew Cunningham, *Before Science: The Invention of the Friars’ Natural Philosophy*, Aldershot 1996, 2; see also p. 204, where Franciscans are characterized as “the spiritual consciences of their age in the service of the Roman Church.”

³ A summary of the “Eternal Gospel” scandal is found in Morton Bloomfield, *Joachim of Fiore: A Critical Survey*, in: *Traditio*, XIII (1957), 249–311. See also John Moorman, *History of the Franciscan Order*, Oxford 1968.

⁴ A good example is Peter Olivi’s disciple Ubertino da Casale. See his *Arbor vitae crucifixe Jesu*, Venice 1485 (reprinted with an introduction by C.T. Davis, Turin 1961); see also M.D. Lambert, *Franciscan Poverty: The Doctrine of the Absolute Poverty of Christ and the Apostles in the Franciscan Order 1210–1323*, London 1961; for a theological analysis of Franciscan poverty, see K. Esser, *Mysterium paupertatis: Die Armutsauffassung des Hl. Franziskus von Assisi*, in: *Wissenschaft und Weisheit*, XIV (1951), 177–89.

vent of Béziers pursued an ascetic ideal of personal holiness rooted in the same esoteric theology of the Holy Spirit as the late Cathar *parfaits*.⁵ Hugh's saintly sister Douceline, founder of the Franciscan *béguinage* of Marseille, had to physically stop people from revering her in the old Cathar manner.⁶ Rather than the splendor of Gothic light, these bare-foot servants of God loved extreme frugality (*altissima paupertas*) and the wilderness (*ermitage*). They drew their inspiration from the example of Francis on Mount Verna,⁷ but also from the legend of the Hindu Prince Gautama-Buddha retold by local troubadours,⁸ and from the legend of Mary Magdalene, whose thirty-year penance in the wilderness of *la Sainte-Baume* between Toulon and Aix exemplified the soul's return to God through liberation from carnal snares.⁹

Perhaps the most famous Franciscan spiritual to make his way from Béziers to Paris and to contribute to scholastic philosophy is Peter John Olivi.¹⁰ Born in Sérignan in 1248,¹¹ four years after the holocaust of

⁵ For the esoteric meaning of personal asceticism among Bogomils and Cathars, see Henri-Charles Puech, *Le Traité contre les Bogomiles de Cosmas le Prêtre*, Paris 1945, 260-79. See also the many studies by René Nelli, Déodat Roché and Christine Thouzellier. According to Salimbene's *Chronica*, Bari 1966, 339, Hugh was holding his Joachite study-groups at Hyères in 1248, the year of Olivi's birth. In his 1285 Apology, Olivi describes Hugh as a "most famous and most holy man".

⁶ See *la vie de Sainte Douceline, fondatrice des béguines de Marseilles* (written in Provençal in the early XIVth century) published in a bilingual Provençal-French edition by J.-H. Albanès, Marseille 1879.

⁷ As Bonaventure explains in *Itinerarium mentis in Deum*, the wilderness symbolizes the viator's exile. The soul in this lifetime is like a "poor man in the desert", starved for spiritual food, far from his true celestial home. For the gnostic character of this attitude, see Serge Huntin, *Les Gnostiques*, Paris 1963, 24-5.

⁸ See *Le Roman spirituel de Barlaam et Josaphat*, trad. R. Lavaud et R. Nelli, in: *Les Troubadours*, Paris/Bruges 1960; especially pp. 1210-17: "Ar nos podem ben dir de Jozaphas que motas temptacions ha suffert e batalhas de malignes esperitz, e motz d'autres trebalhs e sofrachas que avia de las erbas que manjava; car per la sequeza de l'ermitage non y trovava gayre."

⁹ Mary Magdalene's complex gnostic roots as Helen-Epinoia are discussed by Déodat Roché in *Le Catharisme*, Narbonne 1957, 42-3. Peter Olivi invokes Mary Magdalene as proof that contemplative love liberates the soul from sin better than good works; see *Quaestio I* of his *Quaestiones De perfectione evangelica*, ed. Emmen and Simoncioli, in: *Studi Francescani*, 61 (1964), 438-9.

¹⁰ A now classic introduction to Olivi's trials and tribulations is David Burr's *The Persecution of Peter Olivi*, in: *Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, New Series*, 66/5 (1976). For an early study of Olivi's philosophical doctrines, see Efrem Bettoni, *Le dottrine filosofiche di Pier di Giovanni Olivi*, Milano 1959.

¹¹ We know this date and place with precision because Olivi's followers revered him as a saint. See the *Booklet on the Passing of Brother Peter John Olivi, Which Beguin Men and Women Revere and Repeatedly Read or Hear Read in their Meetings (Transitus sancti Patris)*, cited by the Dominican inquisitor Bernard Gui in *Practica inquisitionis heretice pravitatis*, given in

Montségur, Olivi entered the Franciscan convent of Béziers circa 1260 and was sent for his higher studies to Paris, where he heard Bonaventure's *Collations on the Seven Gifts of the Holy Spirit* in 1268.¹² Back in Narbonne and Montpellier, Olivi soon drew fire for his Joachite faith in a new spiritual age, his advocacy of extreme poverty, his reservations about the sacrament of marriage, his disdain for burial fees, his dualistic view of the soul, and his theory of the Trinity, judged to be dangerously tri-theistic.¹³ Although Olivi himself vigorously defended the orthodoxy of his theses and convincingly pointed to a diffamation campaign against him, there may still be an important sense in which Olivi's orthodox theses differ from the more mainstream orthodox theses being elaborated in Paris and Oxford by his contemporaries. For one thing, Olivi interpreted the Franciscan movement itself as the apocalyptic result of the infamous 1209 Béziers massacre.¹⁴ The special prism of *Occitan* history shaped his idea of what is most novel and distinctive about Franciscan spirituality.

Among Olivi's many censored articles is the doctrine that the substance of the human soul increases through grace. As Giles of Rome will recognize, this article is tied philosophically to Olivi's more general claim that substances are inherently capable of increase and decrease: *substantiae magis et minus suscipiunt*.¹⁵ By examining a number of texts jointly, we will

English translation by Wakefield and Evans in *Heresies of the High Middle Ages*, New York/London 1969, 438-9.

¹² Cited from Burr 1976 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 10), 6. Burr's sources for Olivi's Paris dates are *Letter to R.*, f. 51 (63^v); *De perfectione evangelica*, q. 16, f. 71^{rb}; *Quoniam contra paupertatem*, f. 56^r; *Apocalypsim*, f. 69^{ra}.

¹³ See *Littera septem sigillorum*, in Geroldus Fussenegger, 'Littera septem sigillorum' contra doctrinam Petri Ioannis Olivi edita, in: *Archivum Franciscanum historicum*, 47 (1954), 45-53; also, *Responsio fratris Petri Ioannis Olivi ad aliqua dicta per quosdam magistros Parisienses de suis quaestionibus excerpta*, in: *Archivum Franciscanum historicum*, 28 (1935), 115-55 and 374-407; 29 (1936), 98-141 and 365-95. For a recent study of Olivi on the soul, see Robert Pasnau, *Olivi's Metaphysics of Soul*, in: *Medieval Philosophy and Theology*, 6 (1997), 109-32.

¹⁴ This is reported by Burr 1976 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 10), 33, based on Olivi's commentary on the Apocalypse. Perhaps coincidentally, the massacre was ordered on the day of the feast of Mary Magdalene, as reported by Roché 1957 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), II, 109-11; see also E. Martin-Chabot, *La chanson de la croisade albigeoise*, 3 vol., Paris 1931-61.

¹⁵ Jansen in *Fr. Petrus Iohannis Olivi O.F.M., Quaestiones in Secundum Librum Sententiarum*, Quaracchi 1926, III, 595, lists the doctrine that substance admits degrees among Olivi's theses that contradict modern Aristotelianism, rather than under "theses that are proper to Olivi," since Olivi explicitly says that this idea originates with "others." Note that Pierre Duhem in *Système du Monde*, vol. VI, Paris 1917, 426, writing before Jansen's publication of Olivi, reports that the Scotist Franciscan Antonio D'Andrès writing c. 1340 "professe une doctrine pour peu répandue. Une forme accidentelle, une qualité telle que la blancheur est susceptible de divers degrés, car un corps peut être plus ou moins blanc; mais, de l'avis de la plupart des Péripatéticiens, il n'en est pas de même d'une forme substantielle;

see that Olivi's idiosyncratic analysis of substance and related theory of grace bear a startling affinity with Catharism.¹⁶ What this suggests is that Olivi, whether consciously or not, and perhaps in strategic reaction to new Aristotelian elements, sought to formalize a relatively more gnostic version of Christian theology by expressing its axioms within the philosophical idiom of scholastic culture.

To place Olivi in his proper *Occitan* context, we first turn briefly to his vernacular Provençal treatises,¹⁷ in particular to a *preghiera* (prayer) composed to convert his compatriots away from the vanity of "*aquest mon messongier*."¹⁸ Through metaphor, allusion and *double-entendre*, Olivi draws abundantly on regional culture—on troubadour poetry, resentment against the Inquisition, shared grief over the French devastation of Languedoc,¹⁹ and on a diffuse repertoire of Cathar expressions that had seeped into local religious life.²⁰ From troubadour culture, Olivi assimilates the ethos of *fin' amor* according to which a lover must bear privation as a method of spiritual purification: God's servant, Olivi says, must choose to hunger

un élément, en effet, n'est pas plus ou moins feu; il l'est tout à fait ou pas du tout: sa forme substantielle, donc, n'admet pas de degrés. Antonio d'Andrès est d'avis contraire. Il veut qu'une forme substantielle puisse, tout comme une forme accidentelle, être plus ou moins intense et présenter des degrés." Duhem then shows that John the Canon (from Catalonia) adopts this unusual view from Antonio d'Andrès.

¹⁶ Olivi scholars have abundantly defended Olivi's orthodoxy while tacitly assuming that Catharism is a "counter-religion opposed to Christianity" (as one critic has put it to me). If instead we accept, as we should, that Catharism is a genuinely Christian teaching, then exploring areas of intersection between Olivi's theses and Cathar views does not necessarily challenge Olivi's legitimacy as a Catholic theologian.

¹⁷ See Diego Zorzi, *Testi inediti francescani in lingua provençale*, in *Miscellanea del centro di studi medievali*, ser. I, Milan 1956, 269-72; also *Trattato provençale di penitenza*, edited by C. De Lollis, in: *Studi di Filologia romanza*, V (1890), 293-8. For a sense of how Olivi's vernacular treatises were revered and used by his *beguini* followers in their communal "poor houses", see the account given by the Dominican inquisitor Bernard Gui in *Practica inquisitionis heretice pravilitatis* finished in 1323-1324, given in English translation by Wakefield and Evans (*op. cit.*, above, n. 11), 411-39.

¹⁸ "This deceitful/lying world". See *preghiera*, edited by Zorzi (*op. cit.*, above, n. 17), 270 (Latin version in Raoul Manselli, *Spirituali e beguini in Provenza*, Roma 1959, 274-8. To the Cathars, the evil principle—*le dieu estrahn*—is responsible for the lies, deceit and illusions of this world. See e.g. the following passage from *Le roman spirituel de Barlaam et Josaphat*, ed. René Nelli, 1076: "E cant a la begnintat de nostre senhor Jhesu Crist que-m volc desliurar del poder del dyable, el mi fes mesprezar la vanetat d'aquest mont, et adonx yeu mi consirrey que aquest mont non era mays cant nient et vanetatz."

¹⁹ For the regional and political sources of Olivi's apocalyptic mentality, see Annie Cazanave, *Hérésie et Société*, in: *Heresis*, 13-14 (1989), 7-61.

²⁰ Jean Duvernoy, in: *La religion des cathares*, Toulouse 1976, 272-4, documents for example the continued use of the Cathar terms "*adombret*" and "*endura*" by Occitan Catholics after 1245. See also the troubadour poet Peire Cardenal, writing c. 1245: "A rain has fallen over this region—of cupidity, pride and evil. [...] God's friend (*"l'amic de Dèu"*),

and thirst and yearn at all times for God as though for an inaccessible love: *sia tot temps fameiant e sedeiant e desiran la mia anima*.²¹ Cathar-like elements are intermingled throughout, not only in the ubiquitous appeal to *los huels espiritals* (spiritual eyes) and *los amics de dieu* (God's friends),²² but more distinctively in the idea that evil manifests itself in man as a sort of moral amnesia or *oblidament*; in the idea that God has no harm to oppose to harm; and in the idea that Christian wisdom (*entendensa del Be*) grows from recognizing the pleasures of this world as false and bitter: *O Senhor Ihesu Crist, fay que las falsas sabors d'aquest mon messongier sian a mi amaras e sas amors dolors*.²³

One of the more subtle Cathar elements to surface in Olivi's prayer appears when the converted soul asks to be strenghtened by God:

Confirm this, God, that you work in me, and increase.²⁴

Reminiscent of St. Paul and of St. Augustine, this appeal to be "increased" might seem innocuous enough, but, as René Nelli and Déodat Roché both point out, the idea that the legitimate God (*Dieu dreyturier de bons speritz*) works in his spiritual creatures by "augmenting" their spiritual substance against nothingness is distinctly Cathar.²⁵ Indeed the XIIIth-century Cathar theorist Jean de Lugio explains in the "Book of the Two Principles" that

wherever he is, realizes that men err, having lost their sense of God ("lo sen de Dèu an perdut"). See R. Lavaud, *Poésies complètes du troubadour Peire Cardenal*, Toulouse 1957, 530; and Lucie Varga, *Peire Cardinale était-il hérétique?*, in: *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, CXVII (1938), 205-31.

²¹ "May my soul at all times be hungry, thirsty and in a state of desire." Troubadour "service" and Pauline "service" are thus superimposed. Note that Cathar theorists argue that if "good Christians" are called to "serve" God, this proves that God needs their help to fight the evil *dieu estranh*. See e.g. Jean de Lugio's *Liber de duobus principiis*, c. 13, ed. Chr. Touzelier, Paris 1973, 194-9.

²² See e.g. Olivi's *preghiera*, ed. Zorzi 1956 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 17), 271: "Senhor, que tant honras los servidors e-ls tieus amics"; for the importance of this label, see Duvernoy 1976 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 20), 298.

²³ "Lord Jesus Christ, make the false sweetness of this world taste bitter to me, and turn its loves into pain." On this gnostic principle, see Roché 1957 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9) II, 15: "Le rôle du mal est positif, mais il est intégré dans la création, et les souffrances servent à notre libération et à notre avancement vers la perfection spirituelle."

²⁴ "Confirma hoc, Deus, quod operatus es in me et adauge." This is the Latin text, published by Raoul Manselli in *Spirituali e Beghini in Provenza*, Appendix 1, 278. The Provençal text edited by Zorzi ends abruptly at line 33 of the Latin text, maybe because the ending was lost, maybe because it was censored: the last page and a half of Olivi prayer states that "those who preside today are mercenaries rather than sheperds (*qui hodie presunt magis videntur mercennarii quam pastores*) and calls for new evangelical men to teach Christ's true doctrine.

²⁵ See René Nelli, *Les Cathares*, Paris 1972, 132-3: "Le Dieu du bien . . . est capable,

God himself adds something to the essences of those who had become evil and disposes them to good works.²⁶

Whether or not this is what Olivi means in this prayer, his Franciscan superiors rejected a kindred idea expressed in one of Olivi's formal scholastic texts. In 1283, an assembly of Franciscan theologians censored Olivi for teaching that grace "augments the soul's essence." Specifically, Olivi was charged with wrongly asserting that

the soul is substantially increased through increase of grace, and glory is an increase of the soul in the sense that the soul's essence is increased.²⁷

In a response presented in Avignon in 1283, Olivi denied that he ever taught this.²⁸ He also denied the charge in a letter addressed to friends:

étant tout-puissant dans le Bien, d'ajouter un surcroît d'être à ceux que le Mal a à demi 'anéantis'. [...] Le dieu suprême de l'être a, répétons-le, la puissance d'accroître autant qu'il veut l'être de ses créatures, et de les rendre immuables et incorruptibles comme lui"; Roché 1957 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), II, 15: "La description de l'action divine pour la création des bons, pour la transformation des mauvais qu'il change en bons *en ajoutant plus d'être à leur essence même* (my emphasis), nous montre que le Christ restitue toutes choses en lui."

²⁶ *Liber de duobus principiis*, c. 23, ed. Thouzellier (*op. cit.*, above, n. 21), 240: "Per ipsum (verum) deum aliquid additur super essentias illorum qui mali effecti erant, ipsos in bonis operibus ordinando." The same expression is repeated on p. 248: "creare et facere est aliquid addere super essentias"; and on p. 252. Notice that "addere" is constructed with "super" rather than with "ad": the meaning therefore is not that something foreign is combined with/added to something different than itself, but that the essence is increased, i.e. "God adds some" over and above what amount of essence is already there. Thus to explain what he means, Jean de Lugio (254) invokes Isaiah 45, 6-7: "Non est alius dominus formans lucem nisi ego" (254) together with Paul, *Ephes.* 5, 8: "Eratis enim aliquando tenebre, nunc autem lux." Once again, René Nelli (1972, 80-1; *op. cit.*, above, n. 25) interprets: "Dieu est tout-puissant dans le Bien, et—c'est ici la conception la plus profonde de Jean de Lugio—il peut accroître comme il veut l'être de certaines de ses créatures si elles sont sur le chemin de la libération."

²⁷ See *Littera septem sigillorum*, art. 22, ed. Fussenegger 1954 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 13), 53: "Item dicere quod in augmento gratie anima substantialiter augmentetur et quod gloria est augmentum anime essentialiter, erroneum est."

²⁸ "Semper credidi quod in augmento gratiae anima substantialiter non augmentetur, et quod gloria non est augmentum animae essentialiter." See "Responsio quam fecit Petrus Ioannis ad Litteram magistrorum, praesentatam sibi in Avinione", edited by Damasus Laberge in *Fr. Petri Ioannis Olivi, O.F.M. Tria Scripta Sui Ipsius Apologetica*, in: *Archivum Franciscanum historicum*, 28 (1935), 130. Olivi lumps together articles 16-22 as listed in the *Letter of the Seven Seals*: "De aliis articulis, sextus decimus, septimus decimus, duodevigesimus, undevigesimus, vigesimus primus et vigesimus secundus articuli non me tangunt, quia semper contrarium docui, sequens communes opiniones. Et semper credidi quod gratia ponat in anima aliquid absolutum, et quod ideae in Deo realiter non differunt, et quod in augmento gratiae anima substantialiter non augmentetur, et quod gloria non est augmentum animae essentialiter." In the longer response presented to Paris masters in 1285, Olivi neglects this particular charge altogether.

I neither said this nor wrote it; rather, I believe the opposite, since indeed grace indicates an accidental habit in the soul, as I have tried with all my strength to prove in my questions on grace.²⁹

But in 1311, on the eve of the Council of Vienne and at the request of Pope Clement V, Giles of Rome will once again examine this doctrine as one of Olivi's errors, and give a fairly detailed critique and answer.³⁰ Did Olivi teach this doctrine?

In his own defense to Brother R.,³¹ Olivi argues, as we just saw, that the condemned article is actually incompatible with his true teaching on grace. Since he has always maintained that grace indicates an accidental habit in the soul, he cannot also maintain that it indicates a substantial increase. Furthermore, since the censored article implies that sinful acts would decrease the very substance of the soul, it contradicts Olivi's teaching that no creature's act is capable of corrupting the substance of the rational soul. Olivi is therefore "not so insane as to say or think this."³² With regard to glory, however, Olivi concedes that in a question examining whether the will is an active power³³ he "recited the position of some who say that the very substance of our mind will be raised to sublimity (*sublimatur*) when the habit of glory is given."³⁴ But this position,

²⁹ See *Letter to R.* published with the *Quodlibeta* (Venice: Soardum 1509) under the title *Impugnatio aliorum articulorum*, f. 52^v: "Hec non dixi; nec scripsi: immo contrarium credo, cum enim gratia dicat habitum anime accidentalem, sicut in questionibus meis de gratia totis viribus nixus sum probare." I warmly thank David Burr for making this letter available to me in microfilm.

³⁰ *Aegidii Romani Impugnatio Doctrinae P. I. Olivi*, edited by Leo Amorós, in: *Archivum Franciscanum historicum*, 24 (1934), 399-451, at p. 448.

³¹ David Burr (1976, 37; *op. cit.*, above, n. 10) cites two candidates for Brother R, namely R. de Camliaco as stated in the 1509 Venice edition, and Raymondo Gaufredi, as perhaps suggested by a manuscript copy. Burr himself refrains from speculation. Raymondo Gaufredi fits nicely with Olivi's greeting of "truly beloved brother" since he was a fellow *Occitan* sympathetic to the Spirituals—which caused him eventually to be replaced as Minister General by Boniface VIII, in favor of John of Murrho—one of Olivi's censors in 1283 and eventual leader of the persecution against Olivi's disciples.

³² See *Letter to R.*, in: *Quodlibeta*, ed. Venice 1509 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 29), f. 52^v: "Cum etiam per aliquem actum creature non credam aliquid de substantia anime rationalis corrumpi posse: quod secundum illius articuli fieret per actum peccati, non sum ita insanus ut hoc dicerem vel sentirem."

³³ See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 394-517: "Quaeritur an liberum arbitrium seu voluntas libera sit potentia activa vel passiva."

³⁴ *Letter to R.*, in: *Quodlibeta*, ed. Venice 1509 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 29), f. 51^v: "In responsionem tamen cuiusdam argumenti facti in questione: an voluntas sit potentia activa; recitavi positionem quorundam dicentium, quod quando datur habitus glorie, simul cum hoc sublimatur substantialiter substantia mentis nostre."

Olivi protests to Brother R., is neither heretical nor false: rather, it is a “probable” theory—and he could, if he cared to, support it with many good arguments.³⁵

The controversial theory in question is “recited” by Olivi as a possible solution to a delicate problem. In *Question LVII* of his *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, Olivi defends the thesis that the will is by its very essence active—in the precise philosophical sense that the will is the immediate and exclusive efficient cause of its acts. The objection is made that acts of grace and of glory possess more perfection than the mere willing of them: therefore the will cannot strictly of itself produce these acts.³⁶ Olivi concedes that this is a formidable objection.³⁷ He agrees that we must avoid saying that acts of grace and glory stem from the human will naturally without divine help, but we must also avoid presenting the will as a passive medium for God’s grace, stripping it of its freedom and dignity.³⁸ After reviewing and discarding several standard solutions, Olivi ventures a theory proposed by mysterious “others.” These anonymous theorists argue that, just as the will, generally speaking, must focus on some object in order to actually be willing (*ad hoc quod velit*), for the will to *freely* will (*ad hoc quod libere velit*), it must, in addition to this, focus on a “high” and “lordly” object to which it submits: *altus et dominativus super se ipsam*.³⁹ The reason is not that this exalted focus is per se the efficient

³⁵ *Letter to R.*, in: *Quodlibeta*, ed. Venice 1509 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 29), f. 51^r: “Et quamvis hoc ibi non asseram, non video quod sit falsum aut hereticum: immo satis probabile videtur mihi. Et possem ad hoc plures rationes verisimilitudines asserere: sed non est mihi cure.”

³⁶ See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 396: “Item, nullus effectus trahens totam suam essentiam a sua causa et hoc immediate potest esse perfectior huiusmodi causa; . . . sed [. . .] beatitudo nostra formaliter et principaliter est in actibus, [. . .] actus etiam gratiae meliores sunt potentiae nostris . . . [. . .]; ergo impossibile est actus voluntatis . . . fieri ab ipsis.”

³⁷ See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 422: “Quod autem de actibus gloriae et gratiae adiungitur, nimium est difficile.”

³⁸ See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 422, also 424, where Olivi summarizes the problem as follows: “Summopere enim debet caveri ne aut unus modus veritatem libertatis tollat aut alius gratiae necessitatem et utilitatem et nobilitatem evacuet.” To situate Olivi’s philosophy of will in context, see Calvin Normore, *Picking and Choosing: Anselm and Ockham on Choice*, in: *Vivarium*, 36 (1998), 23–39.

³⁹ See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 423: “Quidam vero alii nitentes praedictae difficultati respondere visi sunt aliquando dicere quod sicut ad hoc quod voluntas aliqua actualiter velit requiritur conversio et aspectus debitus super suum obiectum, ad hoc autem quod libere velit requiritur ultra hoc aspectus altus et dominativus super se ipsam.”

cause of the will's acts, but that the active strength of the will (*virtus activa ipsius voluntatis*) is not powerful to operate (*non est potens operari*) unless attached to such a focus.⁴⁰ Thus these anonymous theorists argue that the will is incapable of acts of grace unless its strength and active power "unite with, absorb, and quasi-incorporate the divine object"⁴¹—the way iron, for example, must absorb and quasi-incorporate the heat of a fire in order for its substantial core to liquefy.⁴² They do not however intend to say that this transformation is substantial: the will is changed only *per accidens*—just as the heat of a fire is not changed *per se* when it is absorbed by iron, and just as the substance of wax is not changed by taking on the imprints of various seals.⁴³

⁴⁰ See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 423: "Non propter hoc quod huiusmodi aspectus sint per se causa effectiva actuum eius, sed quia virtus activa ipsius voluntatis non est potens operari nisi sub tali et cum tali aspectu." Compare with Olivi's discussion of the impairment of free will in sleep and in infancy (*Quaestio LIX*, ed. Jansen, II, 518-68: "An infantes, dormientes et furiosi possint exercere opera liberi arbitrii") and with *Quaestio III* of *Quaestiones De Deo cognoscendo*, ed. B. Jansen, in: *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, III, *Appendix*, Quaracchi 1926, 453-554, at p. 545, where Olivi proves God's existence by appealing to the dramatic contrast between the acts of persons who are focused on God and of those who are not.

⁴¹ See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 423: "Sic, ut dicebant, in actus gratiae non potest voluntas, nisi eius virtus et potestas activa sit spiritualiter imbibita et unita et quasi incorporata obiecto divino et obiectum divinum ei."

⁴² See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 423: "Sicut, si daremus in corporalibus quod ignis haberet calefacere aut liquefacere centalem substantiam unius massae aureae vel ferreae, non posset quidem hoc facere, nisi virtus caloris imbibetur et profundaretur in ipso metallo, et nisi metallum in medio ipsius ignis seu fornacis igneae profundaretur." Note that a very similar metaphor is found in Olivi's vernacular *pregniera*, ed. Zorzi 1956 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 17), 271: "Tant gran e tant abominabla la duricia e la tebesessa del mieu cor e la ingratitut, que per tant gran fornas d'amor ne foc no se pot escalsar ni fondre ni amolesir"; the Latin text, ed. Manselli 1959 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 277, gives: "Tanta et tam abominabilis est duricia et tepiditas et ingratitudo cordis mei quod pro tali fornace amoris ignita non potest calefieri nec molliri nec scindi." Compare also with the single surviving poem of the *catharisant* troubadour Guilhem de Durfort, one of the lords of Fangeux: "Quom aurs en fuec o cum aciers en farga."

⁴³ See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 423: "Non intendebant autem per hoc quod ipsa forma vel virtus activa voluntatis per se moveretur, sed solum per accidens, sicut nec calor ignis per se movetur, quando ad congregationem suae materiae congregatur. [. . .] Non etiam intendebant quod ista transmutatio esset substantialis, sicut nec forma substantialis ceræ substantialiter transmutatur, quando secundum diversas imagines sigillorum tam ipsa quam sua materia varie figuratur."

The will, say these *quidam alii*, absorbs and “quasi-incorporates” the divine object through virtuous habits, especially through charity.⁴⁴ But since these habits transform the will only *per accidens*, not *substantialiter*, these habits are not, technically, the efficient cause of the will’s acts of grace: rather, the efficient cause of these acts is the active power of the will itself, which has become disposed (*disposita*) and adjusted (*coaptata*) to act under and through such virtuous habits.⁴⁵ In short, the accidental habits acquired through grace allow the will itself to become newly *potens in operari*. This anonymous solution thus saves the essentially active character of the will without denying that God’s grace is indispensable for the will to act over and above its crippled natural state.⁴⁶ The will itself originates acts of grace because its active power has been strengthened and made relatively more deiform than before. When, however, it comes to glory, these theorists say that more is required over and above *per accidens* virtuous habits: glory requires *sublimatio* of the soul’s very substance, increase (*augmentatio*) of the intellect and will, indeed of the whole form of the mind—so that it exceeds our natural and meritorious states.

The underlying idea, clearly, is that since glory is the consummation of grace, the process of quasi-incorporation of God becomes both complete and irreversible in glory—i.e. substantial. The soul and God are permanently merged. The fire and the iron, the wax and the seal, are indivisibly one: *tanta est enim illa sublimatio quod . . . non potest dari sine quodam modo habendi Deum gloriose et finali*. In retrospect, it seems that the *per accidens/substantialiter* distinction on which Olivi relies for exoneration in the case of grace, hides a *secundum quid/simpliciter* distinction that presents glory as the limit of a coherent transformation: through grace, the will’s

⁴⁴ See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 423: “Quae incorporatio fit per habitus virtutum et specialiter per habitum caritatis.”

⁴⁵ See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 424: “Dicebant ergo quod ipsi habitus non sunt per se causa effectiva huiusmodi actuum, sed potius ipsa virtus activa voluntatis ut sub talibus habitibus et per tales habitus ad agendum disposita et coaptata.”

⁴⁶ Olivi rejects in particular the solution that presents the will as a passive “medium” illuminated by grace. See *Quaestio LVIII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), II, 422: “Si autem e contra dicatur quod in productione istorum (i.e. actus gratiae) voluntas libera non plus facit nisi quantum substantia lunae aut aeris facit in illuminatione quae exit a lumine in ea suscepto a sole: tunc huiusmodi actus nullo modo erunt liberi, quia virtus libertatis omnino per accidens se habebit ad productionem ipsorum, sicut et forma substantialis ipsius aeris per accidens se habet ad producendum actum illuminationis.”

active power (its very essence) is strengthened because the will, being related to God as its focus, begins to possess the divine object in a relative sense. In glory, the will is permanently and absolutely strengthened (*sublimatur*) since God is now "possessed in a final and glorious way." Without "converting" to a "high" and "lordly" focus, the will is not *potens in operari* over and beyond natural, worldly acts.⁴⁷ When "converted" to Christ, i.e. when related to Christ's grace,⁴⁸ the will absorbs and quasi-incorporates divine form, which allows it to become sufficiently *potens in operari* to effect acts of grace. Glory, in turn, consists in the absolute, or substantial culmination of this process—symbolized by the idea that two distinct terms related *per accidens* become substantially indistinguishable. In short, grace allows the soul to have relatively "more" of its essential power and freedom—and glory consummates this increase *simpliciter*.⁴⁹ Much as Olivi denies it, it seems that his superiors grasped the gist of the theory, and Olivi's favorable opinion of it, fairly accurately.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Compare with Olivi's discussion of the impairment of free will in sleep and in infancy (*Quaestio LIX* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1924 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), 518-68) and with *Quaestio III* of *Quaestiones De Deo cognoscendo*, ed. Jansen 1926 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 40), 545. God's existence is proved, as it were, pragmatically, based on the difference in by appealing to the dramatic contrast in the actions of those who focus their will on God and those who do not.

⁴⁸ Note that Olivi was also charged with wrongly teaching that "grace posits nothing absolute in the soul but instead a relationship to Christ's grace, in the sense of a certain right to partake in Christ's merits, the way that a monk has a right to the goods of his monastery". See *Littera septem sigillorum*, ed. Fussenegger 1954 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 13), 52: "Dicimus, credimus, et tenemus quod dicere quod gratia nihil ponit in anima absolutum sed relationem ad gratiam Christi seu ius quoddam in meritis Christi, sicut monachus habet ius in bonis monasterii non per aliquid absolutum, est erroneum."

⁴⁹ Note that in defending the primacy of the will over the intellect in *Quaestio II* of his *Quaestiones de Perfectione Evangelica*, ed. Emmen and Simoncioli 1964 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), 120, Olivi argues that the will is the "principal" form of the soul: "Videmus enim in omnibus universaliter quod forma seu differentia, quanto est posterius adveniens, tanto est perfectior, et actualior, et tanto inter ceteras formas principalior; in tantum quod omnes aliae sunt quodammodo instrumentales. [...] Sed voluntas secundum suam rationem est ordine posterior intellectui: ergo et perfectior et actualior, in tantum quod se habebit ad ipsam sicut instrumentum." Olivi also writes, p. 121: "Cum etiam certum sit quod libertas potissime sit in voluntate nostra et actu eius, et quod nihil est ita nobile vel altum in nobis sicut in quo sumus liberi et omnium actuum nostrorum domini, patentissimum est quod in voluntate est summa nobilitas et ultima perfectio nostra potissimum in voluntate erit." We must also keep in mind that in infancy and sleep, according to Olivi, the will's essential freedom is impaired by contamination from carnal things. This is presumably analogous, on a lower plane, to the will not being *potens in operari* with regard to acts of grace unless it is related to Christ as its focus. There is thus a deep conceptual continuity in the will's progressive exercise of its own freedom from slumber, to ordinary acts, to acts of grace—and finally to glory.

⁵⁰ I thank David Burr for calling my attention to a similar "coherent transformation"

But since Olivi “recites” this theory without asserting it, is he really implicated? To answer this question, we must follow a clue provided by Giles of Rome, and turn to Olivi’s earlier *Question XXII*, which examines in a general philosophical way whether “substance admits a more and a less”: *an substantia suscipiat magis et minus*. Olivi here is much less careful about what he says. We will see that, taken together, *Questions LVIII* and *XXII* reveal the true character of Olivi’s position, and, more importantly, shed light on the reasons for censure.

Does substance admit a more and a less? Olivi attacks the question in standard scholastic manner by first offering eight reasons *quod non*, beginning with Aristotle’s statement in *Metaphysics* VIII that species are like numbers and therefore change their nature if increased.⁵¹ The list ends with Aristotle’s explicit assertion in the *Categories* that it is a characteristic property of substance not to admit a more or a less.⁵² Aristotle’s authority thus weighs heavily on the side of denying that substance admits degrees.

Olivi, however, defends a positive answer. He starts by distinguishing between what substances are *logice* as linguistic features of rational discourse and what substances are extramentally in themselves, *secundum rem*. With regard to rational discourse, Olivi endorses Aristotle’s position: since the function of rational definitions is to unambiguously classify phenomena for discursive purposes, substances taken in this rational sense as labels for extramental things cannot admit of a more or a less. The special flavor of Olivi’s proto-nominalist analysis is worth noting: Olivi emphasizes that our rational descriptions serve to (falsely) idealize things that in themselves

scheme in Olivi’s discussion of *intellectus spiritualis* in the third age, found in his Apocalypse commentary (cf. W. Lewis, *Peter John Olivi: Prophet of the Year 2000*, Inaugural-Dissertation zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde dem Fachbereich I “Evangelische Theologie” an der Eberhard-Karls-Universität zu Tübingen, 1972, 979). “After making a remarkable claim about the way in which we will be tuned into truth without need of books, Olivi assures us that this prediction ‘is being fulfilled and will be fulfilled *secundum quid* in the church militant, but *simpliciter* in the church triumphant’.”

⁵¹ See *Met.* VIII, 1043b 32-1044a14. Olivi summarizes Aristotle’s argument as follows: “Definitiones substantiarum aequaliter participantur a suis inferioribus, non enim possent inaequaliter participari, quin definitio in uno haberet plus quam in alio; secundum autem Aristotelem, VIII *Metaphysicae*, species et definitiones rerum sunt sicut numeri in quibus additio vel diminutio variat speciem; si ergo inaequaliter participarentur, non essent eiusdem speciei, sed diversae.”

⁵² *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 390: “Item, Aristoteles dicit in *Praedicamentis* quod hoc est proprium substantiae, scilicet non recipere magis et minus.” See *Cat.*, 3b33-4a7. Olivi’s objections 2, 4 and 6 are based on this passage, e.g. 2: “Item, unus homo non dicitur magis homo quam alter.”

are impermanent, messy and vague. Our rational definitions in no way imply that such ideal "punctual" natures exist extramentally.⁵³

Turning now to what is true about substances *secundum rem*, Olivi tells us that

others, however, with whom I find more reason to agree, say that a more and a less must be granted in substances *secundum rem*, even if this is not true *secundum viam logicalem*.⁵⁴

Aristotle himself, Olivi insists, asserts in *Metaphysics* VIII that "substances taken abstractly do not vary according to more and less, whereas substances received in matter do."⁵⁵ What Aristotle means, Olivi creatively argues,⁵⁶ is that universals considered as rational names do not vary by degree, whereas real extramental substances do. Since Olivi endorses hylemorphism for all creatures, from his point of view, all created substances are composed of form and matter.⁵⁷ God alone is absolutely immaterial. The divine essence alone is therefore absolutely "punctual" *secundum rem*.⁵⁸ As for those, Olivi says, who interpret Aristotle differently, and argue that

⁵³ This is also a key feature in Olivi's rejection of Augustinian illumination: mathematical rules and general concepts, he says, are merely abstractions, not divine Ideas. See *Quaestiones de Deo cognoscendo*, ed. Jansen (*op. cit.*, above, n. 40), III, 455-99. On Olivi's proto-nominalism, see E. Bettoni 1959 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 10), 514-5: "Mi pare che Occam riproponga con altre parole la soluzione oliviana del problema degli universali. Quando l'Olivi afferma che i concetti sono oggettivi, perché le cose "aptae natae sunt sic intelligi" e non sente il bisogno di indicare le ragioni che fondano l'affermata attitudine delle cose a diventare soggetto di predicati universali, anticipa di qualche decennio la posizione occamistica."

⁵⁴ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 391: "Alii autem quibus in parte ista magis assentiendum iudico dicunt quod in substantiis est dare magis et minus secundum rem, etsi non secundum viam logicalem."

⁵⁵ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 392: "Quia autem secundum rem aliter se habet, metaphysici autem est naturas realiter considerare: ideo, VIII *Metaphysicae*, dicit quod sicut numerus non habet magis et minus, sic nec substantia quae est secundum speciem, sed si quidem, quae cum materia, illa habet."

⁵⁶ Few or no Aristotelian exegetes would agree with Olivi's interpretation. As we will see later, Olivi himself knows that his interpretation is not likely to be widely endorsed.

⁵⁷ Like Thomas, Duhem 1917 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), V, 361 argues that Avicbron (Ibn Gabirol) is at the source of Franciscan hylemorphism, also that Scotus formally "Augustinizes" Avicbron's theory of spiritual matter. For Avicbron's place in Jewish gnosticism and the Kabbalah active in Montpellier at Olivi's time, see G.G. Scholem, *ha-Kabalah-Provans: hug ha-Rabi Avraham ben David u-veno Rabi Yitshak Sagi Nahor*, Jerusalem 1963.

⁵⁸ See *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 392-3: "Quia autem secundum rem aliter se habet, metaphysici autem est naturas realiter considerare: ideo, VIII *Metaphysicae*, dicit quod sicut numerus non habet magis et minus, sic nec substantia quae est secundum speciem, sed si quidem,

forms *per se* do not vary by more or less, but that material conditions vary, their position is "ridiculous" since it implies that a really existing thing is *accidentally* the distinctive individual that it is.⁵⁹

In support of the anonymous "others" who teach that substances *per se* admit degrees *secundum rem*, Olivi invokes multiple arguments. He invokes the experience of two things of the same kind manifesting different intensities in their formal properties.⁶⁰ He invokes mixtures, in which the substantial forms of the elements are less intense than they are in isolation.⁶¹ On a more theoretical level, Olivi argues that, the nobler the matter, the nobler the form it is disposed to receive.⁶² This implies that form

quae cum materia, illa habet. Per substantiam enim secundum speciem videtur intelligere species substantiarum universaliter acceptas, qui modus accipiendi logicalis est potius quam realis; per substantiam vero quae est cum materia videtur accipere formam, prout est particulariter in materia signata. Forma enim quae omnino est abstracta a materia, sicut est solus Deus, non potest recipere magis et minus; unde etsi universalis seu species rerum universales essent separata a materia, sicut Plato voluit aut sicut iuxta modum intelligendi logicus dicit, non possent recipere magis et minus."

⁵⁹ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 393: "Quod autem quidam exponunt quod substantia quae est cum materia habet magis et minus, id est, quod secundum materiales dispositiones et non secundum formam quae dat speciem est dare in substantia magis et minus: ridiculosus sensus videtur, quia hoc non est aliud dicere quam quod substantia recipit magis et minus secundum sua accidentia materialia et non secundum se; dispositiones enim eius materiales secundum quas dicitur habere magis et minus, si non sunt ei substantiales, oportet quod sint accidentales." Olivi's vehement rejection of matter as the principle of individuation, a key article of Thomas' synthesis, should alert us to the possible anti-Cathar force of Thomas' position. A discussion of Olivi's philosophical views on individuation is found in Bettoni 1959 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 10), 214-35.

⁶⁰ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 393: "Constat enim quod in propriis passionibus substantiarum consequentibus earum formas, sive generales sive specificas, est dare magis et minus; unde una substantia excedit alteram in eadem proprietate, et hoc tam in substantiis corporalibus quam in intellectualibus. Sed maioritas seu excessus huiusmodi proprietatum non potest causari nisi ab eo a quo causatur ipsa proprietas, cum ille excessus sit quaedam pars essentialis ipsius proprietatis." A possible source is Avicenna, *Fons Vitae*, ed. J. Schlanger, Paris 1970, III, c. 15, p. 110: speaking of simple substances, Avicenna says "quanto fuerint subtiliores et fortiores et meliores, tanto magis aptae ad agendum et conferendum se et sua." Compare also with the much later Antonio d'Andrés: "caliditas intenditur et remittitur; ergo et ignis" (since "omnis causa naturalis agit quantum potest et secundum ultimum potentiae") and John the Canon: "Calidum intenditur et remittitur; ergo et ignis" (for the same reason). Cited by Duhem 1917 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), VI, 427-8.

⁶¹ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 394: "Item, formae substantiales elementorum inveniuntur in mixtis minus intensae quam sint in ipsis elementis a mixto separatis." A brief discussion of Olivi's theory of mixtures is found in Anneliese Maier, *An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschaft*, Roma 1952, 40-1.

⁶² *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*,

must also admit of a more and less, since *capacitati materiae correspondet actualitas formae*: variation in the capacity of matter to receive form implies a corresponding latitude of degrees in formal act.⁶³ In particular, Olivi explains, successive forms gradually improve matter, making it better and better disposed to receive a higher and higher form. But since we observe that matter varies in its degree of amelioration, this implies that the prior forms were received in varying degree.⁶⁴

A second theoretical argument is based on analysing the notion of form. To claim that forms are *per se* indivisible, Olivi says, is to attribute to creatures absolute properties that belong exclusively to God.⁶⁵ Indeed a form that cannot be increased or decreased cannot consist of a plurality of parts, since otherwise it would be possible to augment or reduce it by adding or taking away some part.⁶⁶ But then the act of such a form would either be so absolute that it would be impossible to imagine it as less (this is clearly God's case)—which is absurd, especially in the case of angels; or we would have to suppose in this form "an intelligible magnitude compatible with every manner of simplicity," so that in this magnitude, for example, "any intelligible part would be identical to any other."⁶⁷ But

above, n. 15), I, 399: "Nobiliori enim materiae et ad recipiendum melius dispositae nobilior debet dari forma."

⁶³ *Quaestio XXII of Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 400: "Oportet igitur dicere quod respectu formae substantialis non sit in ea capacitas punctalis, sed potius habens latitudinem et gradus cuiusdam ambitus virtualis; et sic per consequens oportet quod forma substantialis in ea recepta hoc habeat; in omni autem forma in qua est dare gradum et gradum potest dari magis et minus per graduum appositionem seu subtractionem; ergo in omni forma substantiali erit hoc dare."

⁶⁴ *Quaestio XXII of Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 400-1: "Una materia per formas priores est magis disposita ad recipiendum sequentes, quam sit alia habens totidem priores: ergo videtur quod hoc sit principaliter propter melioritatem priorum formarum substantialium."

⁶⁵ As Bettoni 1959 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15) points out, this central Olivian topos derives from Bonaventure: see in particular Bettoni's discussion of Olivi's angelology at pp. 152-3.

⁶⁶ *Quaestio XXII of Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 401: "Tertio patet hoc ex parte ipsius actus formalis. Omnis enim forma quae nullo modo potest recipere magis et minus nullam habet in se pluritudinem partium nec habere potest, quia ubicunque est pars et pars, per subtractionem unius partis potest dari minus et per eiusdem restitutionem potest dari magis vel maius."

⁶⁷ *Quaestio XXII of Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 401: "Hoc autem modo sumendo in formis omnimodam partium carentiam, oportet quod habeant actualitatem et essentiam punctalem seu ita modicam quod non possit dari aut excogitari minor, quod est valde absurdum, et maxime in formis angelicis; aut est dare in ea quandam magnitudinem intelligibilem cum omnimoda simplicitate, ita quod in ea non differat totum et totaliter et ita quod quaelibet pars intellectualis illius magnitudinis sit idem omnino et id ipsum cum alia parte eius intelligibili."

this sort of simplicity and magnitude belong only to God.⁶⁸ Indeed a magnitude of this kind would be infinite.⁶⁹ Moreover a substance endowed with such a magnitude would have to be supremely absolute and self-contained (*absolutissimum et in se ipso manens*) and have infinite power *ad extra*.⁷⁰ But all of this belongs only to God:

I believe therefore that it accords better with Faith to say that every substantial form has in itself a plurality of parts, according to which it is possible to imagine in it a more and a less.⁷¹

Only God is absolute—every other substance is vulnerable to decline and also susceptible to being improved. Olivi's next theological argument pursues this "inductive" character of created substances further. Olivi argues that God's power would be restricted if he could not make the form of one individual be "better and more actual" than the form of some other individual of the same species.⁷² Olivi thus explicitly argues that God's omnipotence allows him to increase (*augere*) the very substance of one individual relative to another individual of the same formal description. That this is Olivi's claim is clear from an earlier argument in which he points out that we commonly experience individuals of the same species to vary in nobility. For example, we recognize that some precious gems are

⁶⁸ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 401: "Talis autem simplicitas et talis magnitudo solius Dei videtur esse propria."

⁶⁹ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 401: "Qua ratione idem simplicissimum potest habere tantam magnitudinem, eadem ratione poterit habere et infinitam." Olivi recognizes that a magnitude of such absolute simplicity no longer conforms to Euclide's part/whole axiom, and has therefore no "reason" to be finite.

⁷⁰ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 402: "Praeterea, omnis virtus vel operatio manans ab huiusmodi forma est tota et totaliter a qualibet parte intelligibili magnitudinis ipsius formae, id est, ipsa forma secundum se totam et secundum suam totalitatem et secundum quodlibet intelligibile suae essentiae producet totam virtutem et operationem a se fluentem et quamlibet partem earum: iste autem modus agendi est solius Dei proprius, et sicut deducenti faciliter patere potest, omne tale agens potest in infinita et est agens absolutissimum et in agendo illimitatum: (iste autem modus agendi est solius Dei proprius, et sicut deducenti faciliter patere potest, omne tale agens potest in infinita et est agens absolutissimum et in agendo illimitatum)."

⁷¹ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 402: "Credo igitur quod sanius est secundum fidem dicere quod omnis forma substantialis habeat in se pluralitatem partium secundum quam possit in ea cogitari magis et minus."

⁷² *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 405: "Sexto patet hoc ex parte divinae potentiae et divinarum idearum. Dicere enim quod Deus non possit augere et diminuire formam cuiuscunque entis creati

superior to others, or that a spirited young stallion participates more fully in the form of its species than a castrated workhorse.⁷³ Moreover, Olivi argues next, intellectual substances have

more of the truth of being (*plus habent de veritate entis*), and their forms have more formal act, and their individual supposita more per se existence, and their matter more of essential purity (*plus de puritate essentiali*) than corporeal substances.⁷⁴

Olivi now argues that *veritas entis*—"truth of being"—belongs to substances in varying degree. In particular, substances received in spiritual matter have "more" of it than substances received in perishable matter. Moreover, since spiritual matter has "more" essential purity than perishable matter, this in turn implies that perishable matter is a degraded, impure sort of matter, with relatively little capacity to receive a high degree of form. In fact, Olivi's analysis implies that the visible, tangible phenomena of *aquest mon messongier* have very little ontological "truth" at all.⁷⁵ Olivi's philosophical doctrine of perishable phenomena resembles nothing more than it does Josaphat's spiritual doctrine: *yeu mi constriey que aquest mont non era mays cant nient et vanetatz*.⁷⁶

This brings us finally to Olivi's censored doctrine. Man's various metaphysical states—created, fallen, redeemed—prove, Olivi argues, that substances admit of a more and less:

For who, indeed, would deny that our glorious body will have more of the act of its species than our mortal body?⁷⁷

aut dicere quod ipse non possit facere formam unius individui meliorem et actualiorem quam sit in alio eiusdem speciei non videtur multum securum."

⁷³ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 404: "Videmus enim in eadem specie unum individuum nobilius participare speciem et eius proprietates quam aliud. Unde inter lapides eiusdem speciei tam pretiosos quam non pretiosos magna est differentia; et idem est in auro et ceteris metallis. Idem etiam patet evidenter in animalibus: equi enim magni et generosi a roncinis in participatione suae speciei multum differre videntur; et idem est in canibus."

⁷⁴ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 404-5: "Substantiae enim intellectuales plus habent de veritate entis et formae earum plus de actualitate formali et supposita earum plus de per se existentia et materiae earum plus de puritate essentiali quam substantiae corporales."

⁷⁵ To appreciate the character of this, compare with *Quaestiones de perfectione evangelica*, VIII: "The lover of poverty . . . cannot be deceived by the elements of the world, for he counts all temporal things as nothing." Cited by David Burr in: *The Apocalyptic Elements in Olivi's Critique of Aristotle*, in: *Church History*, 40 (1971), 26.

⁷⁶ "I then considered this world to be little more than nothingness and vanity," in: *Le Roman spirituel*, ed. Nelli 1960 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 8), 1076. Compare with the citation from Olivi's treatise on evangelical poverty cited in the previous footnote.

⁷⁷ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 405: "Septimo patet hoc ex diversitate status nostrorum corporum et

Remember that we are considering what is true *secundum rem*. Regardless of what is true definition-wise, human substance in reality admits a wide spectrum of ordered values. Depending on whether we are considering Adam in paradise, or fallen man corrupted by evil, or spiritual man redeemed in glory, human substance varies dramatically by "more and less." Olivi's analysis implies, in particular, that the human form that is received in perishable matter is a minimal degree of humanity, *quasi-nihil* compared to the human form that is found in heaven clothed in celestial light.⁷⁸ Indeed as Olivi explained earlier, material capacity and degree of formal act go together: *capacitati materiae correspondet actualitas formae*. Since the capacity of carnal matter to receive the human form is disproportionately less than the capacity of spiritual matter, it follows that the degree of humanity that is received in carnal matter (and provides the basis of Aristotle's anthropology) is a sort of infinitesimal residue of what "man" really is.⁷⁹

There is of course a very important exception. Who, Olivi argues next, would deny that the human body in its state of innocence has more capacity than our own perishable bodies, or

that Christ's soul has a better and higher nature (*meliozem et altiozem naturam*) than other souls?⁸⁰

Thus according to Olivi, when "*Ihesu Crist ver amic nostre*" dressed himself in our nature,⁸¹ he did not take on our *degree* of humanity, anymore than he took on our own corrupt flesh.⁸² To articulate all of this philosophically, Olivi uses a number of equivalent expressions interchangeably: for

animarum. Quis enim dicet quod corpus nostrum, quando est gloriosum, non habeat plus de actualitate suae speciei quam corpus mortale?"

⁷⁸ On the gnostic root of this concept, see Henry Corbin, *Terre céleste et corps de résurrection*, Paris 1960.

⁷⁹ For the importance of this as Duns Scotus' point of departure, and in particular for Scotus' critique of Aristotle's epistemology in the Prologue of his *Sentences* commentary, see Paul Vignaux, *Lire Duns Scot aujourd'hui*, reprinted in: *La philosophie au moyen-âge*, Albeuve 1987, 243-65.

⁸⁰ *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 406: "Quis etiam dicet quod anima Christi non habeat meliorem et alteriorem naturam quam aliae animae?"

⁸¹ See Olivi's *pregliera*, ed. Zorzi 1956 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 17), 271: "Senhor Ihesu Crist e ver amic nostre, pueys que nostra natura has vestida."

⁸² *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 405: "Quis enim dicet . . . quod corpus in statu innocentiae non plus haberet quam corpora nostra corrupta?" In both the Jewish Zohar and in Catharism, Christ is "robbed in his ethereal garment" beneath the appearance of ordinary flesh. For the gnostic character of this *problématique*, see Huntin 1963 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 7), 53-5,

a being to "have more of the act of its species" is for it to "have more form," or, equivalently, "more parts of form," which give this individual a "better" nature, or a "higher" nature. If therefore Christ's soul has a *meliozem et alteriozem naturam* than other souls, this means that Christ's soul has "more form" than ours. But if Christ's soul has "more" substance than ours, this in turn implies that Christ's soul is formally increased relative to our own—just as the glorious degree of humanity that is received in celestial matter is formally increased relative to the low degree of humanity that is received in our own muddy vestures of decay. At one level, Olivi's analysis is standard Christian fare. But at another level, the very attempt to express these Christian mysteries philosophically brings out the deep congruity between Olivi's doctrine and the more mythically-stated Cathar doctrine, as captured for example by Déodat Roché in the following summary:

According to the Cathars, human souls left their pure, ethereal bodies in the spiritual realm when they entered into these "tunics of skin," which are, in St. Paul's words, the bodies of sin. In contrast, Jesus descended and incarnated himself in a pure, ethereal human body: hence the designation of "celestial" or "spiritual" body. This body however was made dense by the physical elements that fed it, and to which it gave the shape and reality of a terrestrial human organism. Consequently, this body became mortal. However, gradually purified by Christ manifesting himself in it after the Baptism of the Holy Spirit (by John the Baptist), it was resurrected as a glorious body after the crucifixion.⁸³

If we now combine this mythical account of Christ's bodily metamorphoses with the Cathar teaching that God, to rescue his flock from *nihilitas*, increases their spiritual substance, what we obtain is nothing less than the esoteric blueprint of Olivi's philosophical doctrine: the purer the material vessel, the "more" human form it receives, the higher the degree of human substance in act. Olivi's axiom that *capacitati materiae correspondet actualitas formae* provides the philosophical framework needed to express in scholastic language the Cathar doctrine that the very substance of the

who also cites a Cathar, Raymonde Bézerza, interrogated c. 1270: "Jesus was not made of our flesh . . . Never did God put on our mortal flesh."

⁸³ Roché 1957 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), II, 82. Roché bases this summary partly on the depositions received by the inquisitor Jacques Fournier in the beginning of the XIVth century, stating the teachings of Bélibaste. Note that Olivi, as reported by David Burr in *Eucharistic Presence and Conversion in Late Thirteenth-Century Franciscan Thought*, in: Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, 74/3 (1984), 55, explicitly distances himself from the docetic heresy. But as students of gnostic traditions well know, gnosticism admits of "a more and a less." The Cathar view summarized here by Déodat Roché is, like the view implied by Olivi's analysis, a very mitigated and subtle, as opposed to a frankly "docetic," view.

human soul is increased by God in those who embark on the path of purification. As *los amix de dieu* gradually wean themselves from *aquest mon messongier* through fasts and service to the *Dieu dreyturier de bons sperits*, they gradually become capable of receiving a “better and higher nature” than other souls, i.e. they receive “more and more of the act of their species”—culminating in the recovery of their Christ-nature. But is this not *also* the esoteric teaching of St. Francis, in whom “Christ was manifested” on Mount Verna?

Olivi thus assumes as his starting point a distinctive *entendesa del Be* that views human substance mythically and dynamically, rather than naturalistically and statically.⁸⁴ Who, Olivi naively asks, would deny that Christ’s soul has “more” of man’s true substance than our own? Gradual purification from carnal corruption allows the soul to recover “more and more” of its transcendent nature through grace, until it reaches the status of *alter Christus*. In the process of analysing substance in his *Question XXII*, Olivi translates this esoteric teaching into formal philosophical language, then invokes it as *proof* that substances generally are susceptible of “a more and a less.”⁸⁵

The answer to our question is therefore that yes: there is a very real sense, namely a *secundum rem* sense, in which Olivi held (1) that increase in grace substantially increases the soul, and (2) that glory increases the soul *essentialiter*. But Olivi’s focus lay wholly on articulating the formal implications of Christic metamorphosis for natural philosophy—not on defending Christic metamorphosis *per se*. Olivi’s goal was to convince his brethren that denying the increase or decrease of substances philosophically would force them to deny that Christ’s soul is formally of a higher nature than ours, or that glory consists in the full and irreversible recovery of our celestial form. And what sort of Christian would deny this? (Only those carnal men who reject *usus pauper*, persecute God’s servants, seek burial fees, build cathedrals and slavishly follow Aristotle, the “god of this world.”)

⁸⁴ To appreciate how different the Cathar view is from Aristotle’s eternal steady-state universe anthropology, see the following summary by Roché 1957 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), II, 25: “Il est essentiel de connaître ces phases de l’évolution du monde, de la Terre et de l’humanité si l’on veut comprendre comment le Christ, descendu de sphère en sphère et manifesté dans le corps physique de l’homme-Jésus, est remonté dans le monde éthérique, comment il pénètre la Terre de sa lumière et nous donne la vie, pourquoi il est là, agissant par amour pour la transmutation de nos corps et de la terre elle-même, pourquoi il ne descendra plus vers nous en corps physique et pourquoi il attend que nous nous élevions vers Lui librement.” (On croirait lire Teilhard.)

⁸⁵ I thank John Murdoch for pointing out that Olivi’s procedure is hardly a good one

Thus by examining the wider philosophical context of Olivi's multifaceted discussion, we come to appreciate why his Franciscan superiors reacted so negatively to the anonymous position he innocently "recites" in *Question LVII*. Hypersensitive to the thin line that divides Catholic doctrine from a more gnostic and even frankly heterodox *entendensa del Be*, they judged their *Occitan* confrère's analysis of the substantial increase of the human soul to be overall more heretical than Catholic—just as they sensed hot Cathar cinders beneath Olivi's view of marriage, baptism, burial fees and the rational soul.⁸⁶

The theologians who censored Olivi's article were perhaps familiar with Jean de Lugio's treatise,⁸⁷ in which the Cathar doctrine about the soul's essential increase is explicitly expressed, or perhaps with Durand of Huesca's *Liber Contra Manicheos*, written in Languedoc c. 1222.⁸⁸ This last treatise specifically alerts Catholic theologians to the metaphysical *problématique* raised by Olivi. In Chapter XIII, Durand responds to the Cathar claim that the perishable phenomena of this world are *nihil*—and were therefore not created by God. Although basically unschooled, Durand tries his best, by means of the Latin word *semel*, to argue philosophically that substance does not admit of a more and a less, but is an either/or affair. Thus he says that

No substance small or large, corporeal or incorporeal, is made without God, nor can it properly be called "nothing." What indeed is once (*semel*) something, cannot be nothing. Non-being cannot be attributed to that to which being is once (*semel*) given, even though it might change appearance and renew its being. Do not, Cathar, call nothing what can be touched.⁸⁹

philosophically. But this is, in a sense, precisely what this case-study illustrates: Olivi's deep identity is to be a friar and amic de Dieu—his assimilation of philosophy remains somewhat *extrahn*.

⁸⁶ It is interesting to note, in this regard, that Nelli 1972 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 25), 113, reports a sort of "diffuse" patriotic Catharism spreading in Languedoc in the last quarter of the XIIIth century: "On voit se répandre vers la fin du XIII^e siècle, et surtout à Toulouse dans les milieux cultivés, une sorte de catharisme diffus, orienté surtout vers la morale, qui gagne à sa cause aussi bien des réformistes catholiques que des anticléricaux."

⁸⁷ Note that key ideas from Jean de Lugio's *Liber de duobus principiis* were also transmitted by the Dominican Rainerius Sacconi, who wrote "the most widely circulated tract on the Cathars of the thirteenth century". Wakefield and Evans 1969 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 11), 329 and 746, n. 1, report that more than fifty manuscripts of the tract survive.

⁸⁸ Published with a commentary by Christine Thouzellier under the title *Une Somme Anti-Cathare: le Liber Contra Manicheos de Durand de Huesca*, Louvain 1964.

⁸⁹ *Liber contra Manicheos*, ed. Thouzellier 1964 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 88), 221: "Nulla ergo substantia parva nec magna, corporea vel incorporea, facta est sine Deo nec proprie potest esse nichil. Quod enim semel est aliquid, non nichil esse potest. Cui semel esse datur nunquam non esse licebit, sed mutat faciem et novat esse suum. Quodque valet tangi, non dicas, kathare, nichil."

Durand correctly appreciates that the Cathars interpret mutability, change and corruption as hallmarks of the evil principle, as evidence of the relative *nihilitas* of visible phenomena.⁹⁰ Durand's argument is that even perishable and corruptible entities are not "nothing," since a thing either is a substance or is not. Whatever has being—whatever, in particular, can be touched—is not "more or less" something, but is something, and cannot therefore be properly described as "nothing." In short, what Durand denies, is that substance admits degrees. Durand moreover seems to understand that denying a "more or less" to substance strikes at the heart of Cathar teaching, since the Cathar claim is precisely that perishable phenomena are a mixture of being and non-being—the result of a cosmic fall, after God's celestial creation was invaded by *nihilitas*, fragmented and corrupted by alteration, time and death.

Durand's Cathar opponents would thus presumably have answered him that perishable phenomena *inquantum tales* have so little substance, and are so bereft of ontological truth, so degraded compared to God's original creation, that they may as well be *nihil*. And since God is all-powerful in making what is good but has no evil to oppose to evil, all that he can do to rescue his fallen creatures is to increase their spiritual substance so that they have "enough" spiritual substance to suffer evil without doing evil in return, and thus be restored to eternal life. The notion that spiritual *melhorament* requires God to increase the soul's essence is fundamental to Catharism, since only through an addition of spiritual substance is man's soul "made new" and awakened from amnesia and lifted from the darkness of evil. The soul's degree of substantial dignity is inversely related to its admixture of *nihilitas*: the "greater" or "higher" the soul, the freer it is from negation and despair, and the better disposed to effect acts of grace. As Jean de Lugio explains, moral freedom, for the Cathars, consists in the power *not* to sin, rather than in the power *to* sin.⁹¹ The person in

⁹⁰ See, for example, the anonymous compilation entitled *Brevis summula contra hereses notatos hereticorum* assigned to a Franciscan friar circa 1250-60, in Wakefield and Evans 1969 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 11), 354-5: "They say . . . that things mutable are not from God; that not he but the devil created these bodies. They say that the good God did not and does not make anything of a perishable nature. They say that the good God does not give life to and kill bodies; he only gives life, He does not kill. The evil one, however, kills."

⁹¹ Which is no "power" at all but a false illusion of power, a mimicry, a snare. See Jean de Lugio, *Liber de duobus principiis*, ed. Thouzellier 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 26), 181-203; also the prayer recited by simple *croyants* under Bélibaste's guidance, cited by Roché 1957 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), II, 96-7 from Jean Duvernoy, *Registre d'Inquisition de Jacques Fournier, évêque de Pamiers (1318-1325)*, Toulouse 1965, II, 461-2: "e per tal quar li diapble era mot fals que les prometia mal e be."

whom "Christ manifests himself" is free to act with true charity: to love his enemies and pray for those who persecute him.⁹² Good Christians on their way to perfection thus ask their heavenly father to increase their souls daily with charity, which is their and God's very substance.⁹³ Or, as Olivi succinctly renders this idea in his *preghiera*:

Confirma hoc, Deus, quod operatus es in me et adauge.

We will now see that Giles of Rome, examining Olivi's errors anew in 1311, indirectly confirms the Cathar character of Olivi's view on substantial increase by refuting it along the same lines as Durand.⁹⁴ Moreover, Giles quite inadvertently reminds us of the affinity that exists between Olivi's censored doctrine and a certain Augustinianism.

After citing the censored article as it appears in the *Letter of the Seven Seals*, Giles writes:

We can only marvel at those who speak this way. For according to the Philosopher in the *Metaphysics*, the essence of a thing consists in being once what it is (*essentia cuiuslibet rei consistit in esse semel*);⁹⁵ and he gives the example of six, saying that the essence or substance of six is not three plus three, but six taken once. From this, we have it that the essence or substance of a thing consists in being indivisibly and punctually (*in esse indivisibili et punctuali*).⁹⁶

Giles correctly connects Olivi's censored article to Olivi's wider philosophical claim that substances generally admit degrees—a philosophical

⁹² Rainerius Sacconi, writing c. 1250, reports that the Cathars rejected capital punishment (see Wakefield and Evans 1969 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 11), 330; as does the anonymous (presumed to be Franciscan) *Brevis summula contra errores notatos hereticorum* (see Wakefield and Evans 1969 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 11), 361). Note also that in *Quaestio I* of his *Quaestiones de Perfectione Evangelica*, ed. Emmen and Simoncioli 1964 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), 419, Olivi adopts a similar position about freedom, viewed in his case as a progressive recovery of auto-determination. Speaking of the will, Olivi writes: "Si etiam cum summa agilitate et vivacitate omnia in Deum non ordinaret, non esset perfecte liber."

⁹³ See *A Gloss on the Lord's prayer* translated by Wakefield and Evans 1969 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 11), 607-30, especially 618-9 for the Cathar interpretation of "Give us today our daily bread."

⁹⁴ See Amorós 1934 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 30).

⁹⁵ Adopting John Murdoch's suggestion to emend Amorós' text, which reads "consistit in semel." Amorós gives *Met.* Book VII, text 20 as reference, but in reality this passage is found in *Met.* Book V, c. 14, 1020b6-8; but in *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis*, Frankfurt am Main 1964 [reprint of the 1562-1574 Venice edition], vol. VIII, 169-72, I have not found this statement.

⁹⁶ See *Aegidii Romani Impugnatio Doctrinae P. I. Olivi*, ed. Amorós 1934 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 30), 448: "Dicendum quod miramur de sic loquentibus. Nam, secundum Philosophum, in *Metaphysica* sua, essentia cuiuslibet rei consistit in (esse) semel; et ponit exemplum de sex, dicens quod essentia vel substantia ipsius sex non est tres et tres, sed semel sex. Ex quibus verbis haberi potest quod essentia vel substantia cuiuslibet rei consistit in esse indivisibili et punctuali."

claim that he, Giles, thoroughly rejects on Aristotelian grounds: *dicimus ergo non competere substantiae suscipere magis et minus*. Like Aristotle and Durand, Giles insists that being a substance is an either/or affair. And like Thomas, Giles upholds the position that forms per se do not vary by more and less: only material conditions vary. Even in the special case of qualitative forms, where degrees can be admitted with regard to existence (*quantum ad esse*), no degree must be admitted in the essence (*quantum ad essentiam*).⁹⁷ A fortiori, degrees will not be admitted in the case of substantial forms—with regard either to essence or to existence. To say therefore that the substance of the human soul increases through grace is a philosophical absurdity:

Therefore when it is said that the soul increases essentially through the increase of grace or in glory: since the rational soul, of which we speak, is a certain specific substance through which man belongs to his species, to say that this soul increases essentially or that its natural or substantial being increases, is not intelligible.⁹⁸

To bolster this conclusion, Giles invokes the same passage from *Metaphysics* VIII that Olivi cites against himself:⁹⁹ species are like numbers, they change their nature if increased:

We can indeed adduce the Philosopher's statement that forms are like numbers. Therefore just as a number cannot be increased without varying its numeric species, so the essence of any given form cannot be increased without changing its form. Therefore if the soul is augmented in its essence through increase of grace or in glory, it will no longer be of the same species as itself, which is a ridiculous thing to say.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁷ See *Aegidii Romani Impugnatio Doctrinae P. I. Olivi*, ed, Amorós 1934 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 30), 448: "Potest enim contingere quod forme accidentales suspiciant magis et minus quantum ad esse, non autem quantum ad essentiam, ut id quod est calor vel essentia caloris habet intensius esse in materia sicca, que est magis disposita, quam in materia humida, que non est materia ita disposita ad calorem. Propter quod calor igneus qui est in materia sicca, que est materia magis disposita quam materia humida, que non est materia ita disposita ad calorem, est intensior quam calor aereus qui est in materia humida. Non dabimus ergo etiam in formis accidentalibus quantum ad intensionem vel remissionem, vel quantum ad huiusmodi augmentum vel diminutionem, gradus in essentia forme, sed in esse." Giles adds that in those cases where "essence" indicates not one, but many forms, it is possible to speak of increase and decrease: "nisi forte esset talis essentia quod non diceret unam formam, sed plures formas; nam non solum unum animal est sanius alio, sed etiam una sanitas animalis est maior sanitate alia."

⁹⁸ See *Aegidii Romani Impugnatio Doctrinae P. I. Olivi*, ed, Amorós 1934 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 30), 448: "Cum ergo dicitur quod in augmento gratie et in augmento glorie anima essentialiter augmentatur, cum anima rationalis, de qua loquimur, sit quedam substantia specifica per quam homo reponitur in specie, quod ipsa augmentetur in essentia vel quod augmentetur in suo esse naturali sive substantiali non est intelligibile."

⁹⁹ *Met.* VIII, 1043b32-1044a14: see footnote 51, above.

¹⁰⁰ See *Aegidii Romani Impugnatio Doctrinae P. I. Olivi*, ed, Amorós 1934 (*op. cit.*, above,

As we saw, Olivi argues that Aristotle in this passage speaks about substances *secundum viam logicam* rather than *secundum rem*.¹⁰¹ But suppose this is not Aristotle's meaning? Olivi's response reveals just how carnal he thinks denying God's power to increase the soul's substance really is:

Aristotle in the *Categories* thus speaks logically (*via logica*); but supposing that this is his meaning, Aristotle is not the God of our intellect whom we are obliged to believe like some infallible rule—as do those who are of the seed of Antichrist.¹⁰²

We note that Olivi's approach to the philosophical analysis of substances exemplifies his own guidelines with regard to selective appropriation of pagan philosophy: Aristotle's rules for rational discourse must be rigorously observed, but the philosophical content of his work must not be uncritically adopted, since, as Olivi passionately puts it, "the principles of truth are supremely spiritual and abstract, and the carnal man cannot grasp them, because discernment or experience of them is spiritual rather than sensual."¹⁰³ The duty of spiritual man is to formally articulate these higher principles, thus giving rise to a more abstract and veridical science. Presumably, Olivi's doctrine that *substantiae magis et minus suscipiunt* is a sample of this more abstract and more veridical science, since it makes philosophical room for man's varying metaphysical fortunes—what Olivi calls "*diversitas status nostrorum corporum et animarum*."

n. 30), 448: "Possumus etiam ad hoc idem adducere illud verbum Philosophi, quod forme sunt sicut numeri. Sicut ergo non potest fieri augmentum in numero nisi varietur species numeri, sic non potest fieri augmentum in essentia cuiuscumque forme nisi varietur species forme. Si ergo anima essentialiter augeretur per augmentum gratie vel glorie, sic augmentum non esset in eadem specie cum se ipsa, quod est ridiculum dicere."

¹⁰¹ Thus in his *solutio obiectorum* in *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 409, Olivi answers the first objection, which cites *Met.* VIII, 1043b32-1044a14, as follows: "Ad primum igitur in contrarium dicendum quod definitiones logicaliter acceptae aequaliter participantur, quia tunc non attenditur in eis intensio vel remissio earundem differentiarum, sed solum absoluta veritas earum."

¹⁰² *Quaestio XXII* of *Quaestiones super secundum librum Sententiarum*, ed. Jansen 1922 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 15), I, 410: "Loquitur enim Aristoteles in *Praedicamentis* via logicali; et posito quod ipse hoc sensisset, non est ipse Deus intellectus nostri cui credere tanquam regulae inerrabili teneamur, sicut faciunt illi qui sunt de semine Antichristi." See further Burr 1971 *op. cit.*, above, n. 75), 15-29. In this study, p. 26, Burr cites the following from Olivi's *Quaestiones de perfectione evangelica*: "Aristotle took his principles from the experience of the senses or from the sensible elements of this world and thus considered simply impossible whatever seemed contrary to sense experience . . . But the lover of poverty . . . cannot be deceived by the elements of this world, for he counts all temporal things to be nothing." Jean de Lugio and Béliaste would hardly have said it any differently.

¹⁰³ See P. Ferdinandus Delorme, *Fr. Petri Joannis Olivi tractatus 'De perlegendis Philosophorum libris'*, in: Antonianum, 16 (1941), 32-44, especially p. 38: "principia enim veritatis spiritualissima sunt et abstractissima, quae animalis homo non potuit percipere, quia eorum examinatio seu experientia non est sensualis, sed potius spiritualis."

Olivi's commitment to this doctrine, with or without Aristotle, is intimately connected to one of his best acknowledged contributions, which is to restore self-sufficiency to human knowledge.¹⁰⁴ Since, according to Olivi's analysis, the supreme form of the soul, namely the will, really acquires new power through being related to Christ's grace, it follows that spiritual man not only acts autonomously in framing scientific doctrines, but indeed *more* autonomously than carnal man, who is relatively "asleep" compared to spiritual man. The new epistemological autonomy and dignity that Olivi attributes to man stem directly from his Cathar-like doctrine that the human will really acquires through grace new "parts" of its essential power and freedom. If Olivi rejects the need for passive illumination, it is precisely because he substitutes for this the more *Occitan* theory that the will itself is actually "increased."¹⁰⁵

If Olivi has a vested interest in complying with Aristotle in logical matters, Giles in turn has a vested interest in complying with Augustine in spiritual matters. As René Nelli points out, the Cathar teaching that "the good God" increases spiritual substances to rescue them from nothingness finds a secret echo in certain Augustinian passages.¹⁰⁶ In *Confessions* Book VII, for example, Augustine says that the soul "decreases" through sin, but "grows" through grace, as though receiving spiritual food that gradually makes it more deiform.¹⁰⁷ Wrestling, unaware, with Augustine's debt to various gnostic traditions, Giles concedes that there is "a way to give Olivi's censored article a good meaning." Indeed whereas virtues perfect the soul's powers, grace and glory perfect the soul's very essence.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁴ See Bettoni 1959 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 10), 508: "La novità principale che lo caratterizza di fronte all'agostinismo antecedente consisto, en mi parere, nel fatto che l'Olivi riduce notevolmente la necessità del concorso divino nelle operazioni naturali delle creature e tende a restituire ad esse un'autosufficienza operativa completa."

¹⁰⁵ Bettoni wrongly traces Olivi's innovation to the influence of Aristotle: "Con ciò il Maestro provenzale dimostra di aver subito profondamente l'influenza dell'aristotelismo." On the contrary! Olivi blames no one more than Aristotle for the doctrine that the will is passively moved by the object presented to it by the intellect. See *Quaestio II* of his *Quaestiones De perfectione evangelica*, ed. Emmen and Simoncioli 1964 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), 114: "objectum autem per intellectum praesentatum per se et directe movet voluntatem, secundum Aristotelem, III *De Anima*, in fine." (c. 10, 433a9-433b30).

¹⁰⁶ Nelli 1972 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 25), 164. See also Roché 1957 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), I, 153-82, on "Saint Augustin et les manichéens de son temps."

¹⁰⁷ Book VII, c. x (16), ed. Cambridge, Mass.-London (Loeb): "Inveni longe me esse a te in regione dissimilitudinis, tamquam audirem vocem tuam de excelso: 'cibus sum grandium: cresce et manducabis me. Nec tu me in te mutabis sicut cibum carnis tuae, sed tu mutaberis in me.'" Also: "pro iniquitate erudisti hominem et tabescere fecisti sicut araneam animam meam."

¹⁰⁸ *Aegidii Romani Impugnatio Doctrinae P. I. Olivi*, ed. Amorós 1934 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 30),

This is the meaning, Giles says, of Corinthians XV, 10—"Through God's grace I am what I am"—a passage also cited, coincidentally, by Jean de Lugio to argue that if we are able to convert from evil and become God's servants, this is only because God "adds" to our souls.¹⁰⁹ Giles neutralizes the thorny question of the soul's "increase" by grafting Augustine onto Aristotle as follows:

Indeed what I am, i.e. what we are supernaturally, we obtain through grace that perfects the soul's essence, or through glory, which is the consummation of grace. And since according to Augustine in *De Trinitate* VI, c. 8, "In those things that are not large because of bulk, to be greater is to be better"; and since grace and glory are in the very essence of the soul, and since the very essence of the soul is made better through grace and glory, the very essence of the soul can be said to be increased through grace and glory.¹¹⁰

Giles somewhat evasively implies that either what is increased is distinct from the essence, or that essence is "increased" only in a metaphorical sense. Untroubled by the ambiguity of his analysis, Giles concludes that, despite this possible Augustinian gloss, Olivi is not exonerated, since what he wrongly claims is that the *nature* of the soul is increased—not that its life is perfected:

Granted, however, that we appear to save this article, we nonetheless do not save it literally. For indeed, granted that grace and glory are in the essence of the soul, and that, on this account, it is possible to say that the essence of the soul is made better or increased through grace or through glory (for in such things to be better is to be greater), it does not follow from this that the essence or nature of the soul can be said to be increased in an essential sense, i.e., to be increased in its essential being, or natural being—but rather in its supernatural, or grace-bestowed being. Thus the article that asserts that the soul is essentially increased through grace or glory, is false.¹¹¹

449: "Possumus tamen, si volumus aliquo modo articulum ad bonum reducere, ut in hoc detur gratia inter gratiam et gloriam et virtutes, que gratia et gloria perficiunt essentiam animae, sed virtutes perficiunt potentias."

¹⁰⁹ As cited previously (above, n. 26) from the *Liber de duobus principijs*, ed. Thouzellier (*op. cit.*, above, n. 21), 240 ("additur") and 252 ("aliquid addere").

¹¹⁰ *Aegidii Romani Impugnatio Doctrinae P. I. Olivi*, ed. Amorós 1934 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 30), 449: "Id enim quod sum, id est, id quod sumus supernaturaliter, habemus a gratia que perficit essentiam anime, vel a gloria que est ipsa gratia consummata, et quia secundum Augustinum, VI *De Trinitate*, cap. 8: "In hiis que non mole magna sunt, hoc est esse maius quod est esse melius." Cum ergo gratia et gloria sint in ipsa essentia anime, et ipsa essentia anime sit meliorata per gratiam vel per gloriam, ipsa essentia anime potest dici augmentata per gratiam vel per gloriam."

¹¹¹ *Aegidii Romani Impugnatio Doctrinae P. I. Olivi*, ed. Amorós 1934 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 30), 449: "Sed licet sic dicendo videamur multum accedere ad salvandum articulum, adhuc non salvamus ipsum secundum propria verba; nam licet gratia et gloria sint in essentia anime, et ipsa essentia anime ex hoc dicatur meliorata vel augmentata per gratiam vel per gloriam, quia in talibus idem est esse maius quod esse melius, non tamen per hoc essentia vel natura anime poterit dici augmentata essentialiter, id est, in esse essentiali vel

Giles' solution thus consists in exploiting a classic *essentia/esse* distinction. Specifically, he distinguishes between the soul's "nature," which he equates with the indivisible/punctual substance posited by Aristotle, and the soul's "life of grace," which he equates with Augustinian perfection—and allows to vary by degree, since it involves, at least metaphorically, a certain intensive magnitude susceptible of being increased through grace. As we saw, Olivi offers a different solution: "human form" taken indivisibly is a mere figure of speech, while human form taken *secundum rem* varies in degree from one individual to the next depending on how far or how close this individual is from the status of *alter Christus*. Olivi's distinction between "man" considered *logice* and human substance considered *secundum rem*—a distinction that Olivi creatively adds to Aristotle—allows him to comply with Aristotle's discourse, but also to frame with this a genuinely philosophical theory of man's metaphysical "latitude." In particular, it allows him to characterize man's Christ-nature philosophically as a formally higher, more excellent nature than man's crippled nature. In short, Olivi formally translates into scholastic language a doctrine he shares with the Cathars and with Augustine, namely the doctrine that grace gradually feeds and increases the soul, making it more and more deiform—*tu mutaberis in me*¹¹²—and that Christ is "a certain great excellence of human nature—*magna quadam naturae humanae excellentia*."¹¹³

In the process of translating his esoteric beliefs into the language of philosophy, Olivi initiates a second significant departure, also connected with man's dignity as an epistemologic subject. Olivi's innovative distinction between what is true *logice* and what is true *secundum rem* renders Giles' *essentia/esse* distinction superfluous in this sensitive case, but, more importantly, it calls fresh attention in a general way to the hiatus that separates word-systems and things: the fact that we know how to speak about things consistently and unambiguously does not imply that we know what they are *secundum rem*. A generation after Olivi, William of Ockham will systematically analyse this hiatus, with broad repercussions on the conduct of philosophical inquiry.

in esse naturali, sed in esse supernaturali et gratuito, ut etiam hoc modo falsus sit articulus asserens per gratiam vel per gloriam animam essentialiter augmentari etc."

¹¹² See *Confessions*, Book VII, c. x, cited above in footnote 107.

¹¹³ *Confessions*, VII, c. xix (25): "Ego vero aliud putabam tantumque sentiebam de domino Christo meo, quantum de excellentis sapientiae viro . . ." Then: "Totum hominem in Christo agnoscebam: non corpus tantum hominis aut cum corpore sine mente animum, sed ipsum hominem, non persona veritatis (he says that this is the Manichean view), sed magna quadam naturae humanae excellentia et perfectiore participatione sapientiae praeferri ceteris arbitrabar."

What we learn from examining the context of Olivi's censored article is that the rational pursuit of a distinctly Franciscan spirituality prompted philosophical initiatives aimed at formalizing an esoteric *entendensa del Be*, based, like Catharism, on a complex and highly metaphysical version of *imitatio Christi*.¹¹⁴ Whether in the long run Olivi's philosophical initiatives served to defend Catholic Europe or instead to bring about a new and more complex spiritual "catholicity" remains to be determined. Soon after Olivi's death, while the Franciscan Minister General John of Murrho marshelled Franciscan doctors to defend Papal hierocracy in Paris, the "Poor Brethren of Penitence of the Third Order of St. Francis" whom he fought to suppress in Languedoc spread Olivi's spiritual teaching to the four corners of Europe.¹¹⁵ In the XVth century, Franciscan Observance will owe much to Olivi's teaching—and little to John of Murrho's.¹¹⁶ The role played by the more authentically spiritual aspirations of Franciscan Observance in the genesis of modern science must be carefully scrutinized. Observant *milieux* seem to have been pivotal in transmitting to Piero della Francesca, Luca Pacioli, Johannes Kepler, Marin Mersenne, Descartes and Blaise Pascal, some version or other of the gnostic idea—so close to Plato, so alien to Aristotle—that we are "in the world, but not of the world": *car nos no em del mon nil mon es de nos*.¹¹⁷

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¹¹⁴ See, e.g. Willibrord de Paris, *Rapports de saint François d'Assise avec le mouvement spirituel du XII^e siècle*, in: *Etudes franciscaines*, XII (1962), 139: "Un trait nouveau? [...] Ce qu'il (i.e. Saint François d'Assise) semble ajouter sinon de nouveau, du moins de plus précis, de plus audacieux, à leur leçon spirituelle, cela paraît être l'accent mis très fortement sur l'exigence d'une imitation assidue de Jésus-Christ." Compare with what René Nelli says about the "rôle de Jésus-Christ dans la métaphysique cathare" in: *Le phénomène cathare. Perspectives philosophiques et morales*, Toulouse 1964, 43-8.

¹¹⁵ See Bernard Gui, *Practica inquisitionis haereticae pravitatis*, ed. Célestin Douais, Paris 1886; and Duvernoy 1965 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 91). On the context of John of Murrho's strategies, see André Callebaut, *La Maîtrise du Bx. Jean Duns Scot en 1305*, in: *Archivum Franciscanum historicum*, 21 (1928), 206-39. On the relationship between these persecuted *beguini* and Olivi's teaching, see David Burr's article and Louisa Burnham's study of Na Prous Boneta in the forthcoming *Actes du Colloque International Pierre de Jean Olivi: 1298-1998* held in Narbonne, France, 11-15 Mars 1998.

¹¹⁶ See Livarius Oligier, *De Relatione inter Observantium Querimonias Constantiensis (1415) et Ubertini Casalensis Quoddam Scriptum*, in: *Archivum Franciscanum historicum*, 9 (1916), 3-41.

¹¹⁷ "For we are not of the world and the world is not of us." From a prayer for simple believers communicated by Bélibaste and preserved in Duvernoy 1965 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 91), II, 461-2. Duvernoy 1976 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 20) 172, n. 5 points out that the term "*bonshommes*" was eventually applied to the Minims, e.g. to Father Marin Mersenne.

Ockham on Part and Whole

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On the standard Aristotelian understanding, material substances are composites of matter and form. Matter and form are not, on this view, the only parts into which a material substance can be analysed. Material substances have, for example, integral parts too. (Material substances are bodies, and no body lacks integral parts.) But the possession of integral parts is, for the Aristotelian, fully explained by the composition of matter and form. Matter and form are the explanatorily basic parts of a substance. For a medieval Aristotelian, then, the most interesting question about the relationship between the parts of a substance and the whole substance concerns the relationship between the matter and form of the substance, on the one hand, and the substance itself, on the other. Ockham sometimes asks—following the lead of his eminent predecessor, Duns Scotus—what, if anything, a whole adds to its parts; whether, in other words, a whole is something over and above the sum of its parts. The parts Ockham has in mind, as a good Aristotelian, are matter and form. So the question Ockham asks is whether a composite of matter and form is more than just the sum of matter and form.¹

¹ I use the following editions and abbreviations here. Aquinas, *Summa contra Gentiles* (= *ScG*), ed. Petrus Marc *et al.*, 3 vols. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1961-7); *Summa Theologiae* (= *ST*), ed. Petrus Caramello, 3 vols. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1952-6); Aristotle, *Metaphysica* (= *Metaph.*) (standard editions); Averroes, *Commentaria magna in libros Physicorum Aristotelis* (= *In Ph.*), in *Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentaria*, 11 vols. (Venice, 1550); Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* (= *Ord.*), in Scotus, *Opera Omnia*, ed. Luke Wadding, 12 vols. (Lyons, 1639); William of Ockham, *Quaestiones Variæ* (= *Qu. Var.*), in William of Ockham, *Opera Theologica*, ed. Iuvenalis Lalor *et al.*, 10 vols. (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University Press, 1967-86) (= *OTH*); *Quodlibeta Septem* (= *Quod.*), in *OTH*; *Scriptum/Quaestiones in libros Sententiarum* (= *In Sent.*), in *OTH*; *Summulae Philosophiae Naturalis* (= *Sum. Ph.*), in *Opera Philosophica*, ed. Iuvenalis Lalor *et al.*, 7 vols. (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University Press, 1974-88) (= *OPh*); William of Ware, *In Sententias* (= *In Sent.*); Adam Wodeham, *Lectura Secunda* (= *Lect.*), ed. Rega Wood and Gedeon Gál, 3 vols. (St Bonaventure, NY: St Bonaventure University, 1990). I am assuming that books two to four of Ockham's *Sentence* commentary date from 1317-19, that his *Summa Philosophiae* dates from 1319-21, and that book one of Ockham's *Sentence* commentary dates from 1321-3. The date of the central text I examine—question six, article two, of Ockham's *Quaestiones Variæ*—is unknown, though it

Aristotelian accounts of matter are, of course, ambiguous. Many Aristotelians—and perhaps even Aristotle himself—believe that the ultimate correlate of form is *prime* matter: a more or less bare substrate in potency to any form whatsoever. All the thinkers I consider here accept that prime matter should be included among the components of a material substance. But I describe prime matter as ‘more or less’ bare because the thinkers I look at in detail here—Duns Scotus and William of Ockham—both want to dissociate prime matter from pure potency. Prime matter, for these thinkers, has some properties all its own, all the time—though none of these properties is in any way incompatible with any substantial form. Prime matter has to have some such properties, according to the thinkers I examine here, otherwise it could not remain constant over substantial change, and thus could not perform the most central role ascribed to it in Aristotelian physics.²

On this sort of view, prime matter has some properties all its own. According to the thinkers I examine here, form, too, should be thought of as some sort of individual object with its own properties. It is, minimally, an individualized collection of a substance’s necessary states or properties, where such a collection should be understood itself to have certain properties of its own. It is in virtue of a form’s having the properties that it has that its substance has the properties that the substance has.³

So Ockham’s question has to do with the unity of two objects—matter and form. The question is whether or not a composite of these two objects is itself a further object, numerically distinct from the sum of its two parts. As we shall see, Ockham’s reply is negative. And this reply immediately raises certain problems. For there are at least two views that on the face of it a medieval Aristotelian would want to avoid here. One is to reduce a material substance to a mere *aggregate* of matter and form. The other is to reduce a material substance to some sort of *accidental* unity. Whatever a material substance is or is not, its unity cannot be

certainly post-dates book four of Ockham’s *Sentence* commentary, to which it refers. I shall argue below that it should be thought of as post-dating book one of the *Sentence* commentary too—though presumably not by much, since Ockham is usually thought of as having completed all his non-political writings by 1324.

² For Scotus on the actuality of prime matter, see Richard Cross, *The Physics of Duns Scotus: The Scientific Context of a Theological Vision*, Oxford 1998, 14–23, and the texts cited there; for Ockham, see Marilyn McCord Adams, *William Ockham*, 2 vols., Notre Dame, Ind. 1987, II, 639–46, and the texts cited there.

³ For Scotus on this question, see Cross 1998 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), 34–41, and the texts cited there; for Ockham, see André Goddu, *The Physics of William of Ockham*, Leiden/Köln 1984, 99–101, and the texts cited there.

merely the unity of an accidental whole. But, while avoiding these two views, Ockham does not want to have to commit himself to the claim that a material substance is something over and above its two parts. So there is a sense in which Ockham's account of the issue is reductionistic: a whole material substance is reducible to the sum of its parts (matter and form), even though it is neither an aggregate of these parts nor an accidental whole. As I shall try to show, Ockham's theory yields a way of distinguishing these various sorts of whole (aggregative, accidental, and substantial).⁴

The sort of view that Ockham wants to defend was not original to him. But the view had, prior to Ockham's defence of it, received considerable criticism from Scotus. Ockham quotes Scotus's arguments, trying to defend his reductionistic account against these attacks. In what follows, I shall briefly describe the Scotist view and its antecedents (section one), and then look in detail at Ockham's account, focusing first on his theory of substance (section two), and secondly on the account of properties that he believes his theory to entail (section three). In the course of this, I will describe his various attempts to defeat Scotus's objections.⁵

I

Scotus offers a series of arguments in favour of the view that a material substance is an object over and above its parts and the relation between them. The parts available on Scotus's account are matter, form, and the relation between them. (Scotus allows that the relation can count as a part here because he believes that relations are things, analogous to matter

⁴ For a discussion of various sorts of unity in Ockham, see Gottfried Martin, *Wilhelm von Ockham: Untersuchungen zur Ontologie der Ordnung*, Berlin 1949, 234-43.

⁵ For a brief discussion of the issue I examine in detail here, see Adams 1987 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), II, 662-7. Neither Adams nor Martin (see the previous note) goes into any detail about Ockham's distinctive theory of material substance which I examine here; neither do they realize the extent to which Ockham's distinctive (and very unexpected) theory of the subjects of various sorts accidents (discussed briefly in Adams, II, 662-3) is driven by prior concerns in his theory of substance. (I discuss this theory in section three below.) The reason is that writers on Ockham have failed—perhaps because of formerly widespread doubts about its authenticity—to pay any attention to the crucial text in Ockham where these issues are all discussed in detail: namely, *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 207-19). For the authenticity of this philosophically sophisticated text, see the editorial introduction to *Qu. Var.* (Ockham, *OTh*, VIII, 16*). Without this text, it is impossible to see the extent and precise nature of Ockham's disagreement with Scotus; in particular, it is hard to see that (as I show in part three of this paper) Ockham's argument with Scotus relies on his unequivocal acceptance of Scotus's central anti-reductionistic principle.

and form.⁶ As we shall see, Ockham (at least in the text I focus on here) does not share this belief. For him, the only possible parts of a composite substance are matter and form. We need to keep this in mind to understand what follows.) Scotus's view is that a material substance is numerically distinct from the union of its parts.⁷ His most important arguments—which I discuss in a moment—all spring from a crucial central premiss:

- (1) If a substance *x* has a property that does not inhere in (one or more of) its parts, then *x* is numerically distinct from the sum of its parts.

Both Scotus and Ockham accept (1). Scotus believes that the antecedent of (1) is demonstrably true, and he offers three sorts of property that he believes satisfy it: generation, corruption, and the possession of three sorts of necessary but non-defining property: proper passions, proper actions, and proper accidents.⁸ As just pointed out, the parts available on Scotus's

⁶ On this, see Mark G. Henninger, *Relations: Medieval Theories 1250-1325*, Oxford 1989, 68-78; also Cross 1998 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), 107-12.

⁷ Eleonore Stump has recently drawn attention to a rather different sort of anti-reductionistic sort of account in the middle ages: 'On Aquinas's account, the fact that material objects are composites of matter and form means that material objects can have emergent properties', properties that 'are properties of the system but not properties of the material parts of the system': Stump, *Non-Cartesian Substance Dualism and Materialism without Reductionism*, in: Faith and Philosophy, 12 (1995), 505-31 (p. 510). This is a different sort of account from the Scotist view I am discussing here. The sorts of parts that Scotus has in mind are matter and form; on Stump's account of Aquinas, the relevant parts are material parts—the physical, chemical, and biological components of an object. I shall ignore this different sort of anti-reductionism in what follows, though there is no doubt that Stump's account is far closer to modern accounts of emergent properties than the more distinctively medieval variety of anti-reductionism I consider here. While there is no doubt that the analysis of the mind-body problem offered by Stump is challenging, and a significant contribution to modern debate in the issue, I strongly doubt that it bears much obvious resemblance to Aquinas's account. According to Stump, Aquinas holds that 'understanding is to be attributed to the whole material composite that is a human being' (p. 512). While this is true, Stump glosses over a crucial difference between the case of intellectual activities on the one hand and non-intellectual activities on the other. Understanding is to be attributed to a human composite on the grounds that it is properly attributed to a substance—the soul—that is itself the substantial form of the body of the composite: see Aquinas, *ScG* 2. 69, n. 1464 (II, 204^b); *ST* 1.75.2 (I/i, 352^a). (Note here that for Aquinas the body is not identical with the whole human composite. A human being includes, in addition to body, a part that is 'not immersed in matter': *ST* 1.76.1 ad 4 (I/i, 359^b).) Non-intellectual activities are properly attributed not to the soul but to the body considered as a composite of matter and form: see *ST* 1. 77. 5 (I/i, 373^b).

⁸ I suspect that by 'proper actions' Scotus means the necessary causal powers of a substance (rather than the actions elicited in virtue of these powers), since he elsewhere holds that a substance can possess all of its active causal powers and yet lack any opportunity

account are matter, form, and the relation between them. So Scotus's claim is that none of these properties can be possessed by matter alone, by form alone, by the relation between them, or by any aggregate of two or more of these parts. Scotus therefore concludes, on the basis of (1), that a substance is numerically distinct from the sum of its parts.⁹

Scotus offers two other arguments in favour of his anti-reductionistic claim that a substance is an object over and above the sum of its parts. The first is that anyone denying that a substance is an object numerically distinct from the sum of its parts has to accept that a substance is numerically identical with the sum of its parts. But it is true of aggregates that they are numerically identical with the sum of their parts. So without some added criterion for substancehood, Scotus's opponents would have to reduce all substances to aggregates.¹⁰

The second argument is that, according to Aristotle, matter and form are (in some sense) causes of something—they are respectively Aristotelian material and formal causes of a composite. And if the substance that has matter and form as parts is numerically identical with the sum of these two parts, then there is no object for the matter and the form to cause.¹¹

Scotus's account is directed against the views of his teacher William of Ware, and ultimately (according to Scotus) against Averroes. I doubt that the view Scotus opposes can be found in Averroes.¹² But it certainly

for exercising them (on this, see my *Incarnation, Indwelling, and the Vision of God: Henry of Ghent and Some Franciscans*, in: *Franciscan Studies*, forthcoming). Perhaps Scotus would make a similar claim in relation to passive liabilities, in which case 'proper passions' should be interpreted accordingly. But I am not sure about this.

⁹ See Scotus, *Ord.* 3. 2. 2, nn. 7-8 (VII, 76, 79), quoted in Ockham, *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh.* VIII, 211-12, ll. 104-14, 118-20). For discussion, see Cross, *Duns Scotus's Anti-Reductionistic Account of Material Substance*, in: *Vivarium*, 33 (1995), 137-70 (146-8, 155); also Cross 1998 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), 81-2, 86. Presupposed to Scotus's argument here is that properties of the sort he lists here cannot belong to aggregates: there must be a strong sense in which their subjects are numerically one. As we shall see, this claim turns out to be central in both Scotus's account and Ockham's. We should note that Scotus argues on the basis of a stronger principle than (1), namely, if a substance *x* has a property that is different in kind from any property had by (one or more of) its parts, then *x* is numerically distinct from the sum of its parts. (For Scotus's acceptance of this principle, see Cross 1995 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 9), 163-6; Cross 1998 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), 90-1.) This principle itself entails (1). But the debate between Ockham and Scotus focuses on (1), and we do not need to consider Scotus's stronger principle here.

¹⁰ Scotus, *Ord.* 3. 2. 2, nn. 7-8 (VII, 76, 79), quoted in Ockham, *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh.* VIII, 211, ll. 96-103), discussed in Cross 1995 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 9), 145-6, 153-4; Cross 1998 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), 81, 85-6.

¹¹ Scotus, *Ord.* 3. 2. 2, nn. 7-8 (VII, 76, 79), quoted in Ockham, *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh.* VIII, 212, ll. 115-17), discussed in Cross 1995 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 9), 147-8, 155.

¹² Averroes at one point claims that a material substance is identical with the sum of

can be found in Ware, writing in the late 1290s, and thus just a few years before the Scotist text I am looking at here. Ware argues that the sort of account proposed by Scotus entails an infinite regress. Suppose a whole includes something over and above its matter and form. This additional thing is presumably required to explain the unity of the matter and form. But we will need to invoke a further object to explain the unity of matter, form, and the first unity explainer: and so on *ad infinitum*.¹³

Ware too seems to accept (1). So, given his belief that the consequent of (1) is false, Ware argues (like Ockham after him) that the properties of a material substance must primarily be properties of its parts—that is to say, they must be properties either of its matter, of its form, of the relation between these two, or of any aggregate of two or more of these parts. Ware argues that when a substance is generated or corrupted, what is *really* generated or corrupted is the relation between the substance's matter and its form: the matter and form begin, or cease, to be united.¹⁴

Clearly, Scotus's view is rather different from the view Ware attacks. According to Scotus, a whole does not in any way *include* anything beyond its matter, form, and the relation between them. It does not have any further part other than these parts. A whole *really is* an object numerically distinct from the sum of all its parts. It is this view that Ockham criticizes.¹⁵

Various beliefs that both Scotus and Ockham share allow the considerations debated here to be applicable in exactly the same way both to the general case of matter and form and to the specific case of body and soul. The reason is that both Scotus and Ockham believe that certain sorts of bodies—animate bodies, for example—have a series of hierarchically ordered substantial forms. An animate body includes prime matter, bodily form (giving the body the basic structure it has), and an animating form (giving the body thus basically structured the sorts of function

its material parts: see *In Ph.* 1. 17 (IV, 7*), cited in Cross 1995 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 9), 144, n. 20; Cross 1998 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), 80, n. 7. But this reductionistic claim is the sort of view opposed not by Scotus, but by the rather different sort of anti-reductionism that (as noted above) Eleonore Stump finds in Aquinas.

¹³ See Ware, *In Sent.* q. 164, discussed in Cross 1995 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 9), 149-50; Cross 1998 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), 83-4.

¹⁴ See Ware, *In Sent.* qq. 164, 172, 175, discussed in Cross 1995 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 9), 150-2; Cross 1998 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), 84-5.

¹⁵ The Ockhamist Adam Wodeham, writing around 1330, claims that Ockham mistakenly understands Scotus to accept the theory rejected a few years earlier by Ware: see Wodeham, *Lect.* prol. 1 (I, 12, ll. 23-6). But I hope that the account I am about to give makes it clear that Wodeham is mistaken about this.

that it has—presumably by giving further slight structural features such that the body with this final structuring is alive).¹⁶ I do not want to debate the desirability of this relatively complex account of the composition of animate substances, except to note that both Scotus and the parsimonious Ockham believe there to be good reasons for wanting to accept it over the simpler Thomist (and Aristotelian) account according to which every body is a composite of matter and (necessarily) just one substantial form. The accounts of part and whole that I consider here are equally applicable both to standard matter-form composition and to body-soul composition (where body is a composite of matter and form, and soul is a further form constituting, jointly with body, a living substance).

II

Ockham unequivocally rejects the claim that a material substance is numerically distinct from the sum of its parts:

I say that, beyond the parts that are matter and form, there is no third entity distinct from these. So a composite is neither matter, nor form, but matter and form together, united and conjoined.¹⁷

On this view, a composite of matter and form is numerically identical with the sum of its parts. After I describe Ockham's position and his motivations for accepting it, I will show precisely how Ockham distinguishes a substance on his theory from an aggregate. In doing this, I hope that the way in which Ockham understands his theory will become plain.

Ockham's motivations for denying any numerical distinction between a whole and the sum of its parts all have to do with difficulties Ockham finds with Scotus's theory. There seem to me to be four substantive arguments against Scotus, scattered through Ockham's writings. First, suppose that a substance is numerically distinct from the sum of its parts. Is this substance itself simple or composite? If it is simple, then it is either matter or form, over and above the matter and form that are parts of the composite. It presumably cannot be matter. Ockham does not suggest why not, but I take it that it would be impossible for one object to fail to

¹⁶ For Scotus on this, see Cross 1998 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), 55-71; for Ockham, including a general account of the whole debate, see Adams 1987 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), II, 647-61. Note that, as Adams makes clear, Ockham, unlike Scotus, accepts the need for separate vegetative and sensory souls in addition to the bodily form and intellective soul.

¹⁷ *Sum. Ph.* 1. 19 (*OPh.* VI, 206, ll. 30-3).

exhibit unity of its prime matter. Neither, more interestingly, can this substance be form. Ockham offers several reasons, one of which is one offered by Ware a few years earlier: the substance cannot be form, since we would then have the appeal to further forms to explain the unity of the parts of the composite substance (i.e. matter, form, and the unity-explaining form), and so on *ad infinitum*.¹⁸

If, however, the substance is not simple, it must be composite:

If this third entity is composite, however, it is clear that it can only be composite of matter and form. Therefore, over and above matter and form, it is nothing other than a certain composite that is nothing other than its parts joined together.¹⁹

According to Ockham, then, the proposed composite that exists over and above its matter and form turns out, on closer inspection to be identical with the union of matter and form. But this scarcely does justice to Scotus's position. Clearly, in Scotus's view, the whole substance is composite; but it is composite in such a way as to fail to be reducible to the union of its matter and form. Scotus does not have to accept Ockham's conclusion here at all. (I will return to Scotus's composition claim in section three below.)

Ockham's second strategy is perhaps more hopeful. When dealing with Scotus's Aristotelian argument that unless a substance is numerically distinct from its parts, there will be nothing of which these parts be (material and formal) *causes*, Ockham makes use of an *ex nihilo nihil fit* strategy of the sort employed in modern rejections of emergence:

I say that intrinsic causes [viz. matter and form] do not cause anything, whether absolute or relational, in any way distinct from themselves, because if they did, then they would be efficient causes in relation to this thing, and thus they would be extrinsic causes. . . . And for this reason that fantasy which ascribes to matter and form some other causality is false and unintelligible.²⁰

(Intrinsic causes here are Aristotelian material and formal causes—not the sorts of thing that *bring about* effects.) Ockham's argument is that Scotus's theory of the 'emergence' of a substance as an object numerically distinct from the sum of its parts entails that the parts in some way (efficiently) cause the object to emerge from them. And, Ockham reasons, this causal claim must be false, because matter and form do not have the relevant causal powers (they are intrinsic, not extrinsic causes, and do not have the sorts of powers that could allow them to be extrinsic causes). It is

¹⁸ *Sum. Ph.* 1. 19 (*OPh*, VI, 205-6, ll. 16-25).

¹⁹ *Sum. Ph.* 1. 19 (*OPh*, VI, 206 ll. 26-9).

²⁰ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 216, ll. 214-17, 224-6).

easy to feel some sympathy for this. On Scotus's view, it seems that the mere conjunction of objects of the certain types can result in the production of a further object. And it would be nice to know which agents were responsible for this production, and what sort of causal powers they had. On the face of it, we would not expect matter and form to possess the relevant sorts of causal powers.

Doubtless, Scotus would want to reply that the causal agency underlying the production of the substance, over and above any sum of the substance's parts, belongs not to the matter and form of the substance but to the originating cause of the substance. But this production is somehow achieved via the mere union matter and form; so perhaps Ockham should still be concerned about the causal relations operative here. Any Scotist account seems to involve some sort of (possibly causally underdetermined) emergence. Nevertheless, how we ultimately assess Ockham's argument will, I think, depend on how successfully Ockham manages to give an account of the way in which a composite substance possesses properties—a topic that is central to Ockham's third argument against Scotus.

According to Ockham—for reasons that I will examine in the next section—accidents can be no more or less complex than their subjects. According to Scotus's (1), we need to posit the existence of a substance numerically distinct from its matter and form on the grounds that certain of a substance's properties are different in kind from the properties of any of that substance's parts. Let us label such accidents 'C-accidents'—*composite-entailing* accidents. Ockham argues that at least some of the C-accidents proposed by Scotus are necessarily less complex than the putative composite in which they inhere. For example, many accidents, if they have parts at all, have parts that are of the same type as the whole accident—patches of redness, for example, or certain sorts of mental state. And some—mental acts, for example—presumably lack any sort of part at all. On Ockham's simplicity claim, none of these accidents could inhere in a composite substance such as Scotus proposes. With reference to Scotus's claim that the sorts of thing that Scotus categorizes as C-accidents cannot inhere in any of the parts of a composite, Ockham concludes: 'therefore what [Scotus] believes to be unreasonable is in fact necessary'.²¹ I will return to this argument of Ockham's—which seems to me to have some very odd consequences—in the next section.

²¹ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 217, ll. 237-8; for the whole argument see pp. 216-17, ll. 227-38).

A fourth argument against Scotus does not look as though it need present him with too many problems. On Scotus's view, a composite includes—though is not identical to—matter, form, and relation. Relations, however, are accidents. So, according to Ockham, Scotus's view entails that a substance necessarily includes an accident, and thus that a substance is necessarily a merely accidental unity. As Ockham notes, any serious Aristotelian would regard the conclusion as absurd.²² Scotus, of course, could simply deny that all relations are accidental. In fact, he already has to hand a set of relations that are necessary features of their subjects—transcendental relations, as he calls them. All creatures have a dependence relation to God. This relation is necessary, since no creature could exist without God's causal sustenance. Perhaps the relation between matter and form could be like this.²³

The gist of Ockham's arguments is that there cannot exist any composite that is numerically distinct from its parts. Ockham proposes two different theories for how a composite could be numerically identical with the sum of its parts. As we shall see, Ockham believes there to be overwhelming objections to the first of these, and consequently accepts the second one.

The point of both theories is to overcome an obvious (but not simple-minded) objection to the sort of view proposed by Ockham. How can a substance be identical with the sum of its parts, if it is the case (as it seems to be for at least some substances) that the parts can exist without the whole's existing? (As we shall see in a moment, Ockham holds that human beings, for example, have parts that could be separated from each other, such that the parts exist but the person no longer does.) Ockham discusses an analogous objection in the case of an artefact, a house: how can a whole house be identical with its parts, given that (if we are very careful) we can disassemble a house, and thus destroy it, without destroying any of its parts—its bricks, timber, and so on?²⁴

²² *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTH*, VIII, 209, ll. 49-57; for Ockham's grasp of the relevance of the argument to Scotus's view, see p. 207, ll. 14-20).

²³ For 'transcendental' relations (as they are called) in Scotus, see Henninger 1989 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 6), 78-85. Claiming that the relations between matter and form are essential features of their subjects (i.e. the matter and the form) might still pose a problem for Scotus, because he has other reasons for believing matter and form to be separable. But perhaps Scotus would argue that the relation need not be essential to matter or form; rather, it needs to be essential to the substance. For accidental unity in Scotus, and its distinction from substantial unity, see Cross 1998 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), 100-7.

²⁴ *Sum. Ph.* 1. 19 (*OPh*, VI, 206-7, ll. 43-8).

In the case of a house, Ockham argues that the whole is identical with its parts 'when they are united in the required way and placed together properly'.²⁵ This looks reasonable enough. The ordering and placement of the components of a house are not themselves parts of the house; but they are certainly the sorts of thing that we would need to include in a description of the house, and are certainly the sorts of thing that look to be necessary for the identity of a house.

What does Ockham say about the case of a composite substance? Ockham's first theory is that a whole is identical with its two parts (matter and form) along with a relation between them. Ockham proposes two different versions of this theory, a philosophical version and a theological one. The distinguishing feature of the two versions lies in their different assessments of the ontological status of real relations. Both versions of the theory are treated at great length in the distinction thirty of the *Ordinatio*, a text that has been discussed in detail elsewhere.²⁶ Here I focus on the summary account given in question six *Quaestiones Variae*, since Ockham in this latter text rejects both versions of the first theory.

On the less theological proposal, Ockham argues that the relation between matter and form is caused by the existence of matter and form in the same place. Matter and form, on this account, are causally disposed such that, when placed together, they possess a relation of union—specifically, a relation of 'information'—between themselves.²⁷ The idea here is that the real relation between matter and form is reducible to their spatial coincidence. A real relation on this theory is not a thing really distinct from the two *relata* (in this case, matter and form).

Ockham's second proposal is more theological. Christ's soul existed at the same place as his (dead) body after the crucifixion, but nevertheless did not form a composite whole with this body. So merely existing in the same place cannot be sufficient for matter and form to cause a relation of union. Rather, Ockham argues, we should think of the union between matter and form as itself, along with matter and form, a partial cause of the composite whole.²⁸ The point here is that the theological example—

²⁵ *Sum. Ph.* 1. 19 (*OPh*, VI, 206, ll. 42-3).

²⁶ See Adams 1987 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), I, 250-9, and Henninger 1989 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 6), 127-35 for the first version of the theory; Adams, I, 267-76, and Henninger 1989 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 6), 140-5 for the second. The accounts given by Adams and Henninger are extremely similar, sometimes oddly to the point of verbatim identity.

²⁷ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 207, ll. 5-14, pp. 208-9, ll. 42-4).

²⁸ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, 208, ll. 24-42).

Christ's dead body in the tomb—forces Ockham to posit that a real relation is itself an object, a 'partial cause' of the composite of which it is a part.

The thrust of Ockham's first theory is clear enough. On both versions of this first theory, Ockham claims that a real relation of union between matter and form is essential to the composite.²⁹ But according to Ockham this makes the theory vulnerable to an objection that Ockham raises against Scotus. The objection is that a composite substance necessarily includes something accidental—namely, a relation. And, as we have seen, the Aristotelian Ockham sees this as unacceptable. (I have already indicated some reservations about this, so I will not repeat them here.)

Ockham therefore proposes a second, more subtle, theory, one that he regards as 'more rational'.³⁰ This second theory denies that the union between matter and form should count as a real relation at all. Rather, the union between matter and form amounts to the denial of a certain sort of distinction between them. On this theory, there are various sorts of *being distinct*, one of which, as we shall see in a moment, is a real relation. For matter and form to be united is thus for them to fail to have this real relation of distinction between each other.

Ockham in fact discerns two sorts of *being distinct*. On the first sort, two objects are distinct if it is impossible for them to become parts of one and the same composite.³¹ Ockham believes that this sort of distinction is not a real relation at all, but merely a rational one.³² The second sort of distinction obtains between two objects that naturally unite to form one composite. Disunited matter and form are distinct in this way: if united, form would naturally inhere in matter:

When form inheres in matter it causes something non-distinct and one by a unity that is opposed to this sort of distinction. . . . This second distinction seems to imply and signify a real actual relation of the informative to the informable.³³

On the second theory union is not a relation but rather the lack of a relation: it is the lack of a real relation of distinction, where the relevant sort of distinction is that which would obtain between disunited matter and form:

²⁹ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 207, ll. 14-16, p. 209, ll. 45-8).

³⁰ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 209, l. 58).

³¹ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 209-10, ll. 62-70).

³² For rational relations in Ockham, and their distinction from real relations, see the accounts in Adams 1987 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), I, 259-67, and Henninger 1989 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 6), 136-40.

³³ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 210, ll. 75-7).

The union that is opposed to this distinction does not signify a real relation, but merely the negation of the real relation by which the informable is distinguished from the informative.³⁴

The union of matter and form, then, is just for them to lack real relations of matter-form distinction. On this sort of view, a substance is identical with the sum of its parts, where the sum of parts is just the parts' lacking any real relations of distinction. A substance is not identical with its disunited parts, since disunited parts include further entities blocking identity.³⁵ On this account, a real relation is not a component part of a composite substance, since composition entails merely the lack of real relations of distinction as just outlined. It is for this reason that I claimed above that Ockham would not count relations among the possible parts of a substance. For Ockham, the only ultimate components of a substance are its matter and form.³⁶

This account—or all its metaphysical sophistication and richness—might not look very explanatory. But the crucial claim, I think, is that matter and form have a natural tendency to unite. Matter and form unite unless prevented. What prevents matter and form from uniting are their relations of distinction. But no such explanatory real features are required for their union. Union is just the lack of blocks on union; no more, no less. Of course, on this account, we need a theory of relations sufficiently rich to distinguish real relations from merely rational relations. But the medievals, including Ockham all accept accounts that will allow for this. (Presumably, Ockham is going to need to invoke an additional negative

³⁴ Qu. Var. 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 210, ll. 80-4; for the whole discussion, see p. 210, ll. 71-84).

³⁵ An obvious Aristotelian objection to this sort of account, according to which matter and form when disunited have real relations of distinction, is that any given form seems to have relations of distinction to infinitely many chunks of matter, and any chunk of matter, likewise, to infinitely many forms. But Ockham does not believe that a form is naturally united to more than one existent chunk of matter, or a chunk of matter to more than a finite number of forms. And, according to Ockham, the relations of distinction are required only between objects that have natural inclinations to union: see Qu. Var. 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 218, ll. 265-70).

³⁶ Previous commentators, because of their focus on the discussion in *Ord.* 1. 30, have failed to spot this central modification in Ockham's account of substance. The discussion, I think, gives us sufficient warrant for wanting to date question six, article two of the *Quaestiones Variæ* later than distinction thirty of the *Ordinatio*. In Qu. Var. 6. 2, Ockham recounts and rejects both versions of the theory he defends in *Ord.* 1. 30, and replaces them with a further theory not susceptible to the sort of objection he raises against his theories in the *Ordinatio*. This does not, of course, tell us anything about the dates of the other articles of question six of the *Quaestiones Variæ*, since this question is itself merely an editorial composite of miscellaneous articles, supplementing Ockham's *Sentence* commentary, in most of which Ockham directly targets some of Scotus's views.

theological criterion. God could in principle intervene such that spatially coincident matter and form retain the distinction relations that they have when spatially separate. I take it that this means that the real relations of distinction found in Ockham's second theory will have to be things over and above the disunited matter and form. But Ockham does not make this explicit.)

So on the face of it Ockham's theory looks as though it is coherent. To assess it against the Scotist alternative, we need to see how well it can defeat the various Scotist objections to this sort of reductionistic account. As I showed in the previous section, Scotus's arguments fall into three groups: first, those that argue for the anti-reductionistic view on the basis of (1); secondly, those that argue from the need to distinguish substances from aggregates; and thirdly, those that argue from the Aristotelian need to allow matter and form to be in some sense intrinsic causes of a thing. I have already looked at the third of these. I will spend the rest of this section thinking about ways in which Ockham can deal with the second of these, and then in the next section think about Ockham's options in relation to the first Scotist objection.

How, then, can Ockham distinguish substances, as described by him, from mere aggregates? Scotus, of course, can do this easily enough. An aggregate, unlike a substance, is not numerically distinct from (the sum of) its parts. An aggregate is not an object over and above all its parts and the relations between them. Ockham is certainly aware that his account of substances means that an aggregate can on occasion be useful as an analogy for what a substance is. When dealing with the Scotist worry that there must be something for form and matter to be causes of, Ockham at one point suggests that matter and form can be causes of a whole that is numerically identical with the union of matter and form, just as they can be parts of a whole that is numerically identical with their union. Ockham appeals to the notion of a whole people for support in this second case: people can be parts of a whole that is identical with the union of all its parts.³⁷

But this is not to say that Ockham is committed to reducing a substance to an aggregate. Ockham in fact believes that, even though a whole substance, like an aggregate, is identical (not numerically identical, however, as we shall see in a moment) with the sum of its parts, there are clear and principled ways of distinguishing substances from mere aggre-

³⁷ *Sum. Ph.* 1. 19 (*OPh.* VI, 207, ll. 64-76).

gates. In one central passage Ockham claims that substances, unlike aggregates, are properly speaking numerically one:

'Numerically one' . . . can be taken in two senses. In one way, [it is taken] strictly and properly, and then 'numerically one' is said of that which is in itself one (*per se unum*), namely a simple thing, or a composite whose parts are matter and form, or [a composite whose parts are] numerically distinct but not of different kinds; and in this way this fire, or this whiteness, is numerically one, and likewise in other cases. In another way, 'numerically one' is taken broadly and improperly for that which is one by the aggregation of many things (whether distinct by species or merely by number) that do not make one thing in themselves (*per se unum*). In this way a heap of stones is one heap (rather than many heaps), and a kingdom or a people is numerically one, since although there are many human beings, there are not many peoples.³⁸

Substances, unlike aggregates, are properly numerically one, and thus on Ockham's principles numerically identical with the sum of their parts. Equally, aggregates might be identical with the sum of their parts, but we cannot properly refer to this identity as 'numerical' identity, since an aggregate is not properly numerically one. But none of this gives clear principles for distinguishing genuine numerical unities from aggregates.

What sort of criteria does Ockham offer? When explicitly responding to Scotus's argument that reductionists like Ockham will be forced to reduce substances to aggregates (on the grounds that both substances and aggregates are merely sums of their parts), Ockham suggests two criteria necessary for substancehood. The parts of a substance belong to the same genus, and the parts of a substance are such that, although one is potential and the other actual, none is by itself a complete member of a genus.³⁹

On the first criterion, whatever material and formal components we want to analyse a substance into, these components will always themselves belong to (be parts of) the same genus: that is to say, they will belong to the genus of substance.

The second criterion seems to involve two separate conditions. The first is that one of the parts of a substance is potential and the other actual. The second is that neither of the parts of a substance is itself a complete member of a genus. The potentiality/actuality claim is just that one of the parts is something like a property of the other—form is a state or mode of matter, as I suggested above.⁴⁰ To understand this, we need

³⁸ *Sum Ph. praeambula* (*OPh*, VI, 138-9, ll. 27-39). I take it that the numerically distinct parts of the same kind of a *per se* unity should be understood to be the parts of a continuum.

³⁹ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 213-14, ll. 151-62).

⁴⁰ On the relevant senses of potentiality and actuality in Ockham, see Adams 1987 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), II, 643-5.

to keep in mind that, although both matter and form are individuals with their own properties (or at least, individuals that admit of certain true non-trivial descriptions), there is a crucial sense in which form is a set of properties of matter. This is just a common medieval presupposition about the nature of the form-matter union.

As Ockham makes clear, this potentiality/actuality criterion is hardly a mark of substancehood. The union between substance and accident satisfies this criterion as well.⁴¹ The idea behind the claim that none of the parts of a substance is a complete member of a genus is that matter and form, by themselves, are not complete substances. Accidents, by contrast, and the parts of an aggregate, are complete members of genera. A definition of whiteness does not include anything over and above whiteness; a definition of a substance necessarily includes both matter and form.

Of these various criteria, I think we should prioritize the potentiality/actuality one over the others. The parts of a substance—prime matter and form—are necessarily such that we can plausibly speak in some sense of the form organizing the matter; and this is clearly not the case for the parts of an aggregate such as a people, or (to use another of Ockham's examples) a house.⁴² But if we prioritize the potentiality/actuality criterion, we will need some way to distinguish substances from accidental unities. In fact, Ockham's discussion makes it clear that he would want to regard accidental unities as more akin to aggregates than to substances.

⁴¹ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 213, ll. 158-9).

⁴² For the house example, see *Sum. Ph.* 1. 19 (*Oph*, VI, 206-7, ll. 43-9). I do not want to discuss now the question of artefact unity, and in particular whether there is any sense in which an artefact such as a house has a form. When discussing his claim that the essence of a thing is defined in relation to its function, Aristotle uses the example of a house (see Aristotle, *Metaph. H.* 2 (1043^a14-19)), though the point of the example is just to show that the essence of a thing is defined in relation to its function, not that artefacts have essences. The discussion in the text cited here at least seems to make it clear that Ockham would not have thought that a house has a form. It might in fact be thought that appealing to the presence of just one form in matter would be a natural way of distinguishing between substances and aggregates (or, for that matter, substances and artefacts). But Ockham cannot make this appeal, since, like Scotus, he believes there to be overwhelming reasons for supposing that at least some substances have more than one substantial form. Perhaps Ockham might want to make the presence of just one form sufficient but not necessary for the existence of a substance. But what is troubling him here is finding a principled way of distinguishing a composite of matter and form (whether one form or many) from an aggregate of matter and form, given that the union of matter and form does not result in an object numerically distinct from the mere union of matter and form. So he is unlikely to find the appeal to the presence of just one substantial form sufficiently explanatory. Why matter and form compose a substance is precisely what, for Ockham, needs explaining.

So perhaps the most fruitful approach would be to look more closely at his claims about completeness. Presumably, part of what Ockham wants to say is that the identity of the parts of a substance in some sense derives from the substance; whereas the identity of at least one the parts of an accidental whole, and perhaps both (where an accidental whole includes exactly one substance and one accident), is determined independently of the identity of the whole, or perhaps itself determines the identity of the whole.

In addition to the three criteria for distinguishing substances from aggregates just mentioned, I think we can in fact find several other possibilities in Ockham's various discussions. One can probably be found in the reflections on different sorts of distinction already discussed. For Ockham, the parts of a substance are such that one informs or inheres in the other.⁴³ This presumably adds nothing in itself to the potentiality/actuality criterion. But what Ockham's discussion of it entails is that incomplete objects related to each other in the relevant way are such that when united they compose numerically one thing—albeit one thing that is numerically identical with the sum of its parts. And I take it that Ockham does not want to make this sort of claim about aggregates. (I will try to substantiate my claim here in the next section. But briefly, Ockham is quite happy to claim that the (non-trivial) properties of the parts of a substance are in some sense properties of the whole; a claim that he does not make about aggregates—presumably because an aggregate is not in any sense numerically one thing.)

More enlightening, certainly in relation to the distinction between a substance and an aggregate, is Ockham's spatial coincidence claim, examined briefly above. At one point, Ockham actually distinguishes different sorts of unity in terms of the spatial relations between their parts:

For different wholes there are required different unions of parts. For sometimes it is required that the parts are spatially coincident; sometimes that the parts are not distant (such that there is nothing between them); sometimes there can be something between them, but the parts must have a right order, just as when many human beings make one people.⁴⁴

I have already looked in detail at Ockham's discussion of this spatial condition. Presumably he can plausibly use these coincidence, continuity/contiguity, and discontinuity claims to distinguish between substances, integral wholes, and aggregates. (Again, Ockham cannot use these spatial claims

⁴³ See also *Sum. Ph.* 1. 19 (*OPh*, VI, 207, ll. 74-6).

⁴⁴ *Sum. Ph.* 1. 19 (*OPh*, VI, 208, ll. 93-8).

to distinguish between substances and accidental wholes, because accidents satisfy the spatial coincidence criterion too.)⁴⁵

Ockham holds, then, that there are some clear grounds for distinguishing substances from aggregates, even on his reductionistic account of substance. In the next section, I want to look at Ockham's proposals for the inherence of accidents in a composite substance. By doing this, I hope to be able to expose another distinguishing feature of substances on Ockham's account.

III

As we have seen, Ockham holds that Scotus's anti-reductionistic theory of substance is false. According to Ockham, it is not the case that a substance is numerically distinct from the sum of its parts. As Ockham understands this claim, it has some important consequences for the way in which properties inhere in substances. Basically, Ockham, like Scotus, accepts (1). The premiss of Ockham's argument about properties is—roughly—the contrapositive of (1):

- (1*) If it is not the case that a substance x is numerically distinct from the sum of its parts, then any property of x inheres in (one or more of) x 's parts.

In this last section, I want to examine this part of Ockham's theory a bit more closely, showing, first, that for Ockham at least some of the properties that Scotus would have held to inhere directly in a whole composite substance—Scotus's C-accidents—actually inhere directly only in one of the substance's simple parts. Secondly, I shall try to show that, for Ockham, properties that inhere directly in one of the parts of a substance inhere indirectly in the whole. It is this second claim that, I shall argue, really distinguishes substances from aggregates in Ockham's reductionistic account of substance. (I do not mean that this claim allows us to *explain* the difference between substances and aggregates; merely that

⁴⁵ At *Sum. Ph.* 1. 19 (*OPh*, VI, 208, ll. 87-90), Ockham notes that an accident and its substance exists in the same place, such that 'if numerically one and the same accident were in the same place as two subjects, it would inform both of them, and there would be two composites, of which one would be composed of the first subject and the accident, and the other composed of the second subject and the same accident.' In her discussion of substantial unity in Ockham, Adams focuses on the incompleteness criterion: the parts of a substance are incomplete things (see Adams 1987 (*op.cit.*, above, n. 2), 667, referring to Ockham, *Quod* 2. 10 (*OTh*, IX, 161). Attention to the discussion in *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 allows us to give a much fuller account of Ockham's theory of substantial unity.

it is the most metaphysically significant difference between substances and aggregates.) In the course of this discussion, I shall see whether Ockham's (and Scotus's) reliance on (1), or a principle closely related to it, can be defended. If it can, I shall suggest that Scotus's account is to be preferred to Ockham's. I shall conclude by trying briefly to see which thinker—Ockham or Scotus—was right to think that his view is the one held by Aristotle.

Ockham's defence of (1*) forms part of a wider defence of the logical equivalence of a whole series of claims. What the argument lacks in elegance it gains in thoroughness. Ockham distinguishes between two different sorts of Scotus's C-accidents. Some—which I shall label 'C₁-accidents'—are simple in the sense of having parts the same in kind as their whole. (I briefly discussed this sort of Ockhamist accident above.) Others—C₂-accidents—are not simple in this way. Making use of this distinction, Ockham understands (1*) as follows:

- (1**) If it is not the case that a substance *x* is numerically distinct from the sum of its parts, then both (a) any C₁-accident of *x* inheres in exactly one *x*'s parts, and (b) any C₂-accident of *x* inheres in the sum of (more than one of) *x*'s parts.

Ockham's arguments require close analysis, via four relevant texts which I label '(I)'–'(IV)'. First, it is easy enough to show that, for Ockham, C₁-accidents belong to a whole only secondarily, and in virtue of their inhering primarily in one of the parts of a whole. Ockham offers the following reply to Scotus's first argument against reductionism:

- (I) I reply that, if we accept 'passion' as it implies a thing distinct from its subject and formally inherent in it, then I say that a composite does not have any proper operation or proper passion that does not belong first to its parts. And the reason for this is that, just as is proved elsewhere in Ockham, a subject is always exactly as simple as an accident received in it. For this reason no accident that has parts of the same sort as itself can be received firstly by a [composite] whole. Rather, all the operations and real passions that belong to a composite belong to it through the parts to which [these properties] first belong—for example, understanding, willing, and sensing through the soul; laughing, descending, and such like through the body. For this reason I say that what [Scotus] believes to be unreasonable is in fact necessary.⁴⁶

⁴⁶ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTh*, VIII, 216-17, ll. 227-38). See also *In Sent.* 4. 9 (*OTh*, VIII, 16,

The premiss here is that an accident can be no more or less complex than the object in which it inheres. We should not misunderstand this to entail that every C-property inheres in a whole only because it inheres primarily and properly in a part of the whole. One of Ockham's examples is laughing, and another descending. These properties, according to Ockham, inhere in the body, a reducible complex whole of matter and bodily form. On Ockham's simplicity criterion, laughter and descent are C_2 -accidents. Elsewhere, Ockham gives further examples of properties— C_2 -accidents—that are properties genuinely of the whole construed as a sum of its parts:

- (II) The *per se* end term of generation is the composite of matter and form. And I concede that one part [alone] is not the complete *per se* end term of generation, though it could be the end term of formal and partial generation.⁴⁷

'Being generated', as described by Ockham, is a complex state of affairs, not a simple property at all. I take it that C_2 -accidents are all like this, and hence such that they can belong properly to a whole reducible complex.⁴⁸

Taking (I) and (II) together, I think we can reasonably claim that Ockham is committed to the following principle:

- (2) If a property is exactly as simple as the object in which it inheres, then both (a) any C_1 -accident of a substance x inheres in exactly one x 's parts, and (b) any C_2 -accident of x inheres in the sum of (more than one of) x 's parts.

And this principle is the basis for Ockham's response to the first of Scotus's anti-reductionistic arguments discussed in section one above. Because any property is exactly as simple as the object in which it inheres, there are

ll. 12-16): 'This is confirmed by the common saying that some accidents are in their whole in virtue of matter (for example quantity), and some in virtue of form (for example quality). This would not hold unless there were some accident immediately received in matter (for example quantity), and some in the substantial form (for example quality).'

⁴⁷ *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTH*, VIII, 214, ll. 163-6).

⁴⁸ Aggregates too, of course, can have similarly complex properties on Ockham's theory—even to the point of having complex properties that cannot be properties of the parts of the aggregate. For example, Ockham spends some time analysing the proposition 'All the Apostles are twelve' to show how 'being (numerically) twelve' is a property of the whole aggregate of the Apostles without being a property of any one of the Apostles: see *Qu. Var.* 6. 2 (*OTH*, VIII, 214-15, ll. 183-191). For a different example, see Ockham, *In Sent.* 1. 24. 2 (*OTH*, IV, 106, ll. 19-22).

no properties had by a substance that are not had either by one of the objects parts, or by the sum of one or more of the objects parts.

In (I), Ockham claims to have demonstrated the antecedent of (2) elsewhere. The argument he offers runs as follows:

(III) I assume an accident received in a composite. I then ask whether that accident is received only into one part of the composite, or into each part, since according to you [i.e. Ockham himself] there is no third form [really distinct from its parts]. If it is received only into one part, for example matter or form, then we have proved what we proposed, that an immediate subject is exactly as simple as an accident received into it. If it is received into each part, either the whole accident is in each part, or part of it is in one, and part in the other. If the first, then numerically the same accident is equally immediately received into two numerically distinct accidents. This seems to be false, since thus one subject, with that accident could by divine power be destroyed, while the other subject with the same accident could remain. In this case, the same accident would remain after its destruction, which is absurd. If the second [viz. part of the accident is received into one part of the subject, and the other part of the accident into the other part of the subject], then we have also proved what we proposed, since that part which is received into one part of the composite has a subject exactly as simple as the accident, and the other part likewise. And this is what I call the first subject.⁴⁹

There are two parts to this crucial argument. The first is that the reducibility of a substance to its parts entails that any C_1 -accident of a substance x is had by exactly one of x 's parts. I take it that Ockham would be happy to claim analogously that the reducibility claim entails that any C_2 -accident is had by the sum of more than one of x 's parts. So the first part of the argument in this passage is just that (1**) is true. The second part of the argument is that the consequent of (1**)—namely, both (a) any C_1 -accident of a substance x inheres in exactly one x 's parts, and (b) any C_2 -accident of x inheres in the sum of (more than one of) x 's parts—entails the antecedent of (2)—namely, a property is exactly as simple as the object in which it inheres. Since the conclusion of (1**) and

⁴⁹ *In Sent.* 4. 9 (*OTh.* VII, 163, l. 13-p. 164, l. 9).

(2) is the same, it follows that the premiss and conclusion of (2) are logically equivalent.

(III) is in fact no help in Ockham's attempt to attack the first of Scotus's arguments against reductionism, since (III) establishes the crucial simplicity claim by inference from a reductionistic account of substance. Ockham's argument against Scotus here turns out to be circular: the proof of its premiss relies on its conclusion. Nevertheless, there might be other ways for Ockham to establish the crucial simplicity claim. Or perhaps he could just appeal to it as an obvious basic truth.

The final piece of Ockham's overall argument is found in another passage:

(IV) John [i.e. John Duns Scotus] posits a form of the whole. So he can consequently posit that the immediate subject of an accident is that third form of the composite, and thus according to him the immediate subject of an accident is not exactly as simple as the accident itself. But those who do not posit such a third form would have to posit that the immediate subject of any accident is exactly as simple as the accident.⁵⁰

There are two claims here. First, that if a substance x is numerically distinct from the sum of its parts, then it is not the case that a property is exactly as simple as the object in which it inheres. In other words, Scotus's anti-reductionism entails that the antecedent of (2) is false. Secondly, if it is not the case that a substance is numerically distinct from the sum of its parts, then a property is exactly as simple as the object in which it inheres. Ockham's reductionism entails the antecedent of (2). Thus Ockham believes that his reductionism is logically equivalent to his simplicity criterion for property inherence.

Taking all of Ockham's arguments together, he evidently regards the following three claims as logically equivalent:

- (i) It is not the case that a substance is numerically distinct from the sum of its parts.
- (ii) A property is exactly as simple as the object in which it inheres.
- (iii) Both (a) any C_1 -accident of a substance x inheres in exactly one x 's parts, and (b) any C_2 -accident of x inheres in the sum of (more than one of) x 's parts.

⁵⁰ *In Sent.* 4. 9 (*OTh.* VII, 163, ll. 5-11).

We learn from (IV) that (i) and (ii) are logically equivalent; and we learn from (I), (II), and (III) that (ii) and (iii) are logically equivalent. (We also learn from (III) that (i) entails (iii), but this entailment is itself implied by the equivalence relations just outlined.)

In fact, however, to understand Ockham's basic metaphysical insight, we do not need to focus on all of these logical equivalences. The crucial claims are (1**) and (2). As Ockham understands (1**), it is logically equivalent to (1), a principle accepted by Scotus. So Scotus and Ockham share a crucial metaphysical insight, namely that if an object is reducible to its parts, we should regard these parts as the immediate subjects of the object's properties. So if an object really is reducible to its parts, its properties should be reducible to properties of its parts. Ockham infers (2) from this, since he believes that the antecedent of (1**) (i.e. (i)) entails the antecedent of (2) (i.e. (ii)). There is no reason for Scotus to deny this inference, though he, of course, rejects the antecedent of (1**), and thus need not accept the antecedent of (2). (In fact, as Ockham points out, Scotus will certainly want to reject the consequent of (2), and thus reject its antecedent as well.) Scotus's implicit rejection of Ockham's simplicity claim—as noticed by Ockham—means that Scotus does not have to concede that C_1 -accidents inhere in the parts of a substance, or that C_2 -accidents inhere in the sum of (two or more of) a substance's parts. For Scotus, many C_1 -accidents inhere in a composite whole. And on Scotus's basic claim (1), this entails that a reductionistic account of substance is false.

It seems to me likely that Scotus and Ockham are right about (1) and (2). Given that (1) and (2) are true, can we say which account—Scotus's or Ockham's—is to be preferred? (1) and (2) are both principles about reductionism. (1) is about the reducibility of a substance to its parts, and (2) about the reducibility of the properties of a substance to the properties of parts of the substance. Given that a composite substance, in Ockham's account, is identical with the sum of its parts (where these parts are different in kind from each other—matter and form, for example),⁵¹ such a substance is simply not a possible subject of inherence for C_1 -accidents. Put more bluntly, since on Ockham's account the only available composite substances are reducible to their parts, it follows that the

⁵¹ By 'kind' I do not mean genus, since as we have seen Ockham accepts that a whole substance has parts (i.e. matter and form) of the same genus (i.e. the genus of substance). The point is just that no parcel of a substance's matter is form, and no parcel of a substance's form is matter.

properties of such substances are reducible to the properties of the parts of the substance.

So Ockham holds that C_1 -accidents inhere in the parts of the composite. Sensing, to use Ockham's example, is primarily an accident of the (sensory) soul. But this whole account of things is, on the face of it, immensely implausible. An analysis of substance ought to allow that operations such as sensing inhere in the whole, and not just in a parts of the whole. Sensing is properly an operation of an animate composite, not of the sensory soul of that composite. So I conclude that we should prefer Scotus's anti-reductionistic account to Ockham's more parsimonious one.

Of course, Ockham's account does not commit him to the claim that there is no way in which an operation such as sensing belongs to the composite. All of the passages cited make it clear that every property of a substance truly belongs to the substance, though some of these properties—the C_1 -accidents—are primarily properties of various parts of the substance. C_1 -accidents are nevertheless derivatively properties of the whole, in virtue of their being properly properties of various parts. So Ockham is quite explicit that the properties that inhere in a part of a composite—its C_1 -accidents—in some sense belong to the whole of which it is a part. These properties are properties *of* the whole, for example, as we have seen. This yields a further way for Ockham to distinguish substances from aggregates. For Ockham never makes an analogous claim about the properties of a part of an aggregate. A property of a human being, for example, is not a property of a people. So I take it that what really distinguishes substances from aggregates is that the (non-trivial) properties of a part of a substance—its C_1 -accidents—are in some sense, and in every case, properties of the whole. The same is not true of aggregates. So Ockham has a plausible way of distinguishing substances from aggregates, even given his reductionistic account of substance.

Equally, none of this entails that an Ockhamist substance is not numerically one. In fact, Ockham is explicit that a substance is *per se* one, and as we have seen this commits him to the numerical unity of a substance. A substance is in a full sense 'one thing'. It is more 'one thing' than any of its parts are, since its parts are in some sense incomplete; but it is less 'one thing' than its parts are in another sense, since it is not sufficiently unified to be the immediate subject of simple accidents. As Ockham sees the debate, the significant feature of his position is the claim that a substance is reducible to its parts.

One final point needs to be made, however. As I noted above, the

debate between Scotus and Ockham relies on the claim that matter and form are *individual constituents* of a substance. Both thinkers claim Aristotle for their views on the reducibility or non-reducibility of a substance to its parts. If we ask how Aristotelian the whole debate is, however, I suspect that we will immediately have to face the possibility that Aristotle does not think of matter and form in this way at all. For Aristotle, part of the point of a matter-form analysis is that a substance just is matter with form, such that the only object is the substance, and the only properties are the form. Compared with this sort of analysis, the views of both Scotus and Ockham involve an account of substance that makes substance considerably more complex than in Aristotle's account. On Aristotle's account, the debate between Scotus and Ockham about reductionism could not even get started.

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The Oxford "School of Heretics": the Unexamined Case of Friar John

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In the past two decades or so, considerable strides have been made in understanding the history of Oxford and the thought of Oxford scholars in the fourteenth century. The work of historians such as William J. Courtenay, Christopher Ocker, John D. North, and Girard Etzkorn, among others, has shed considerable light on the years between 1325 and 1375, which only a few decades ago David Knowles termed "a dark period in the history of Oxford thought".¹

This scholarship has mainly concentrated on the content of the major thinkers of this period, and somewhat less attention has been paid to incidents of academic discipline, in part because such incidents are fewer and less well-understood than parallel cases at Paris.² This is certainly regrettable, because these incidents reveal a good deal about the climate in which scholars operated and the limitations which were imposed on academic thought.

Of the known cases of academic discipline at Oxford in the fourteenth century, the least examined is the case of Friar John, who found himself in conflict with the university over statements made during a determination in 1357. Scholars have generally ignored this case, except in passing mention, because there was evidently little to be said about it, since the only surviving document on the incident fails to fully identify Friar John. However, my own research has suggested the friar's identity, and having discovered that, a great deal can be established about this set of events. Detailed examination of this case reveals some of the political tensions which pervaded Oxford in the 1350s and suggests that scholars need to re-appraise the relationship between intellectual freedom and academic discipline that existed at Oxford, and quite possibly at Paris and other universities as well.

¹ David Knowles, *The Censured Opinions of Uthred of Boldon*, in: *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 1951, 305-42, at 307.

² Cf. William J. Courtenay, *Inquiry and Inquisition: Academic Freedom in Medieval Universities*, in: *Church History*, 58 (1989), 168-81, and J.M.M.H. Thijssen, *Censure and Heresy at the University of Paris, 1200-1400*, Philadelphia 1998.

In 1358, John of Hotham, the chancellor of Oxford, and the proctors William Denby and Richard Toulworth, passed sentence on a certain Brother John, who was a master of theology.³ According to the record of the incident, during the resolution of a determination, John maintained that the friars deserved the tithes of churches more than the rectors did, that the king had the right to take away the temporalities from clerics of bad living, and that the university was a "*gymnasium haereticorum*".⁴ During the ensuing investigation, Brother John appealed the case to unspecified lords and magnates and caused the university great expense. Whoever he appealed to was either unwilling or unable to intervene, and the chancellor and proctors passed sentence. As punishment he was forced to make a public recantation at the church of St. Mary at the start of the academic year 1358-9, with the actual statement having been written for him. He was fined 100 shillings and forbidden to ever lecture without the express license of the chancellor, the proctor, and the masters of theology. The form of his recantation is included in the notice of the event.

John's identity is impossible to determine from this document alone, and this is perhaps why scholars have avoided examining the case in detail. The record refers to him as "frater Johannes" and then leaves a blank, and then says "doctor" followed by a second blank. Presumably the scribe in question did not know John's last name or what he was a doctor of and left the blanks empty to be filled in later.⁵ A marginal note in a later hand reads "Jo: Wyclif", and a second hand has written, "*non accedo Wiclifus enim 'frater' non erat, sed coram impugnator, si quis alius, accerimus.*"⁶ The first note was clearly prompted by the fact that Brother John was discussing the issue of dominion, one of the major issues in Wyclif's teachings, but the second hand has correctly stated the flaw in that identification, since Wyclif was not a monk or friar. The record also notes that John made his revocation in the presence and by the agreement of his principal and the other doctors, and the priors of 'the said order', but it doesn't actually say what order is referred to. Given his claim about mendicants deserving tithes more than rectors, it is safe to assume that John

³ *Munimenta Academica or Documents Illustrative of Academical Life and Studies at Oxford*, ed. H. Anstey, pt. 1: *Libri cancelarii et procuratorum*, London 1868, 208-11 (RS 50).

⁴ *Munimenta*, ed. Anstey 1868 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), 209-10.

⁵ Since the document later refers to John's 'said order' without having mentioned the order, it is possible that one of the spaces, probably the latter, was intended to identify John's order.

⁶ *Munimenta*, ed. Anstey 1868 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), 208, n. 7.

was himself a mendicant, but it is impossible to say from this document alone to which order John belonged.

The only previous scholars to cite this incident made no suggestion as to who John may have been.⁷ However, there were at least two regent masters in 1357 who were named John, and both are possible candidates. In 1358, the university complained about the 'Wax Doctors' mendicants who obtained privileges from authorities outside the university ordering that they be given exemptions from some of the normal requirements and procedures.⁸ One of the two people the university specifically complained about was the Franciscan Richard Leomynstre, who was a protégé of the Black Prince. He was permitted to incept without having to reign in theology, and instead the regency of another master, John Nutone, was extended to cover what should have been Richard's regency. John Nutone, therefore, was evidently a regent master in 1356 and 1357. A.B. Emden identifies him as a Dominican without offering any evidence, but the only document he is mentioned in does not specify his order, and Leomynstre was a Franciscan, making it probable that Nutone was as well. However, had John been a Franciscan, we would expect to find the guardian present, not a prior, who played a different role in the Franciscan order from that in the other mendicant orders, and thus it is unlikely that John Nutone should be identified with this Friar John.

The other regent master named John in 1357 was the Augustinian John Kedington. In 1357, Kedington was removed from office for some offense, which he appealed to the Court of Arches without the permission of his prior. We possess testimony from the Austin Friars of Oxford about the matter, as well as a record of the expenses incurred by the Chancellor and Proctors, who had to travel to London to deal with the case.⁹ The events of Kedington's case fit perfectly with the known facts in Friar John's case. Both were mendicant regent masters in theology in 1357, both got into trouble with the university, both appealed to authorities outside the university, and both involved the university in considerable legal expense. Aubrey Gwynn noticed Kedington's case, but thought that Kedington had been removed from office to make room for the

⁷ See John Rea Bacher, *The Prosecution of Heretics in Medieval England*, Philadelphia 1942, 16; Christopher Ocker, *Johannes Klenkok: A Friar's Life, c. 1310-1374*, Philadelphia 1993, 35; Courtenay 1989 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 2), 169.

⁸ *Munimenta*, ed. Anstey 1868 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), 207-8.

⁹ *Medieval Archives of the University of Oxford*, ed. Rev. H.E. Salter, Oxford 1920, vol. 1, 171-5, 179.

incoming master Geoffrey Hardeby and made his appeal to protest his removal.¹⁰ However, nothing in those documents says why he was removed, and it is just as plausible that Kedington got himself in trouble during a determination and was removed from office, which sparked his appeal.

Once Friar John's identity is established as John Kedington, the exact events of the case become fairly straight-forward. Sometime in the winter term of 1357 he presided over a theology debate which evidently involved the then controversial topic of dominion, and during his resolution of the issue he declared that the Mendicant Orders had a greater right to tithes than rectors of churches did, presumably using as his basis for this statement Archbishop Fitzralph's theories on dominion.¹¹ He also said that the king had the right to deprive ecclesiastics of their livings "for bad and disorderly living", again presumably using Fitzralph's arguments.¹² The record also says that he called the University a "*gymnasium haereticorum*", but it seems highly unlikely that he would make such a statement during a determination, unless he did so as tempers rose in reaction to his statements.

Word of his statements clearly spread, and someone at the University attempted to intervene. Most likely it was either a secular or monastic student, or a member of the University hierarchy. In a formal proceeding for heresy, a friar's order had the first responsibility to investigate the matter, and the university normally only stepped in if this did not happen.¹³ While this was not strictly speaking a matter of heresy, a similar procedure would probably have been followed in this instance. There is nothing in either of the documents relating to this incident to suggest that the Austins took any action against Kedington, and in the letter which formed part of his appeal, the chancellor John of Hotham and his proctors for the previous year, John Joskin and Alexander of Feribrigg, are repeatedly mentioned as having taken actions against Friar John. This particularly undermines Gwynn's assumption that it was John's order that removed him. Rather, Hotham and his proctors removed Kedington from

¹⁰ Aubrey Gwynn, *The English Austin Friars in the Time of Wyclif*, Oxford 1940, 90-1. Ocker speculates that Kedington was suspended because he was one of the 'Wax Doctors'; Ocker 1993 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 7), 34.

¹¹ See page XXX below, where I discuss what his probable argument was.

¹² *Munimenta*, ed. Anstey 1868 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), 209: "rex a clericis et viris ecclesiasticis male et inordinate viventibus absque injuria possessiones posset auferre".

¹³ William J. Courtenay, *The Articles Condemned at Oxford Austin Friars in 1315*, pp. 9-10, in: Heiko A. Oberman and Frank A. James III (eds.), *Via Augustini: Augustine in the Later Middle Ages, Renaissance, and Reformatio Medieval Archives n*, Leiden 1991, 5-18, at 9-10.

his office. There is no mention of a committee investigating Kedington, but by the end of the whole matter, a brief list of condemned propositions had been drawn up, as was normal in cases of academic error.

At some point during the reaction to him, Friar John appealed his case. He persuaded Richard de Plessy, the archdeacon of Colchester and deacon of St Mary Arches in London to write to Archbishop Simon Islip of Canterbury, asserting that Friar John was a legitimate doctor of theology who had lectured praiseworthily until the university officials removed him without cause. Plessy's letter emphasizes at considerable length that the action had been taken without due process and without legitimate cause.¹⁴ Although this may be exaggeration on John or Richard's part to strengthen their case, it is entirely plausible. John had, so far as we can see, done nothing to merit actual removal from his office, and there is no sign that his order had taken any action against him. The local and provincial priors of his order subsequently denied the facts of Richard's letter, which would presumably mean that Kedington had done something worth removal and that the law had been followed, but the charges listed in the final verdict against him contradict that. It is more likely that his order opposed his appeal because they found it politic to do so.

This appeal started a legal struggle that involved the University in considerable legal expense.¹⁵ This expense is partially reflected in an account book for the University from the 1357-8 academic year, which includes the expenses of the chancellor and proctors when they went to London to deal with the matter.¹⁶

It was likely during this process of appeal that John called the University a school of heretics. In support of this reading is the fact that John's retraction treats this statement separately from the other two, as if it had been added on after the list of propositions was drawn up. The prior of John's convent, also named John, forbade Kedington from pursuing the process any further, but by this time the Archbishop had apparently developed an interest in the case. Hotham was cited to appear at the court

¹⁴ *Medieval Archives*, ed. Salter 1920 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), 173: "non legitime citatum, non convictum, nec confessum, cause cognitione et iuris ordine in ea parte de iure requisitis penitus pretermisissis, absque causa rationabili seu legitima quacumque, ab officio doctoratus seu magisterii huiusmodi exercicio, cura, statu et honore sic regendi, docendi et legendi . . .".

¹⁵ *Munimenta*, ed. Anstey 1868 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), 210: "totam Universitatem indebite vexavi, improvide appellando, dominis et magnatibus querelando, et aliis multiplicibus expensis gravando".

¹⁶ *Medieval Archives*, ed. Salter 1920 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), 179-82.

of Arches and he went there in January of 1358, along with his proctors, Richard the Cistercian abbot of Lowth Park, John of Lancaster, and other clerics. Hotham brought with him a letter from William, the Augustinian prior provincial, and Prior John, which attested that John Kedington had made his appeal without the permission of his order and which rejected his claims.

This letter was witnessed by Friar William of Alneto, Richard of Lowth Park, master John Bodi, Richard of Tennemuth, Galfridus of St. Botulph, John Bourtone, John Bernewik, and other unspecified individuals. Unfortunately we know little about any of these men. William, Richard, and John Bodi are specifically described as doctors of theology, so the others apparently weren't. John Bodi was a Benedictine who had been insulted by an unknown Friar John in 1357 (presumably not John Kedington). The others are completely unknown except from this document.

How much further the matter went is unknown, but Kedington ultimately lost his case. The appeal cannot have dragged out much longer, since John was being punished by July, and with John having been forbidden to pursue the matter, the court of Arches probably rendered its final verdict a few months later. The court of Arches turned the matter back to the chancellor. Kedington's punishment was overseen by the proctors of the University for 1358-9, William Denby and Richard Toulworth. John of Hotham may also have been present, although the record only says in "the year of the Lord 1358, in the time of Chancellor John Hotham, with the presence of the proctors William Denby and Richard Toulworth".¹⁷ The judgment was made in the presence of and with the permission of John's principal, other doctors, presumably of theology, and priors of John's order. It would appear, then, that Denby, Toulworth, and possibly Hotham determined the sentence in consultation with the others mentioned. The reference to John's principal is puzzling, since the Augustinians do not appear to have employed an official with that title, but it is probably a reference to John, the prior of the Oxford convent.

The elements of John's punishment need to be considered, because they are unusual within English universities. His punishment involved being forced to publicly read a statement of apology written for him, to

¹⁷ *Munimenta*, ed. Anstey 1868 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), 208: "Memorandum, quod anno Domini millesimo trecentesimo quinquagesimo octavo, tempore Johannis Hothom Cancellarii, existentibus Procuratoribus Willhelmo Denby et Ricardo Toulworth . . .". The fact that the document is recorded in the Book of the Proctors, rather than in the Book of the Chancellor, seems to support this.

pay a fine of 100 shillings, and to be barred from ever lecturing in theology again without the permission of the chancellor, the proctors, and all the doctors of theology. The fine of 100 shillings is extremely heavy, and may have been imposed to help the University make up for the expenses involved in the appeal. It is certainly a non-standard punishment, with no parallel in any other case involving academic debate, although imposing a fine was justified by the rules governing unjust appeals.¹⁸ John, being a friar, would not have been able to pay such a fine, and it would have fallen to his order to make good the payment. No other case at Oxford or Cambridge involves such a punishment. The recantation, although unparalleled in heresy cases in England, has a parallel in at least one non-heresy case at Oxford and was a standard punishment at continental universities.¹⁹ The document explicitly notes that John was to read the recantation exactly as it had been written for him, without any changes, additions or deletions.²⁰ Although we cannot be certain, it appears that this punishment ruined John's career, since he is not mentioned in any other surviving document.

It is important to note that John was never explicitly accused of heresy, undoubtedly because the statements he made were the source of considerable controversy at the time and had not been formally condemned by the Church. The overall impression, however, is that John was treated as if he were a heretic, and his retraction reads like a recantation of heresy. In it, he is forced to retract the opinions he expressed about tithes and the deprivation of ecclesiastics and to affirm the contrary, and to

¹⁸ Unjust appeals had been a problem for the university as far back as c. 1300, when the university had been forced to increase the penalties for making unjust appeals. Unjust appellants were divided into three categories based on their net worth, and a scale of fines was established that increased with the appellant's wealth. The wealthiest offenders were fined 10 shillings. Even given inflation, John's fine was vastly in excess of standard fines. In the late 15th century, fines for appeals normally amounted to 2s. or 3s.4d. See *Munimenta*, ed. Anstey 1868 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), 73-6, as well as Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, ed. F.M. Powicke and A.B. Emden, Oxford: 1936), vol. 3, 136-7), and *Medieval Archives*, ed. Salter 1920 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 9), vol. 2, 281. It is worth noting that the Crown passed a statute forbidding appeals from the Chancellor's court to the Archbishop's just a few years after this case.

¹⁹ *Munimenta*, ed. Anstey 1868 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), 211-2. An unidentified preaching friar attacked a University group known as the Sophists in a sermon the same year that Brother John was punished. It touched off a quarrel and the friar was forced to apologize in a second sermon for having insulted the arts students. His retraction was much milder, amounting to a statement that he didn't intend to detract from the study of arts.

²⁰ *Munimenta*, ed. Anstey 1868 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), 209: "quod legeret palam et publice revocationem infrascriptam, nec addendo, nec diminuendo, nec aliqua verba {*erasure*} ddo in publico in ecclesia Beatae Mariae Virginis Oxoniae".

promise never to hold those opinions again, either publicly or privately.²¹

John's punishment was fairly severe, about as severe as the university could make against someone who was not actually a heretic. To some extent, this may have been due to the expense he caused the university and even more so to the offense he gave by calling it a school of heretics. But even so, we must also take into consideration the broader context of his statements.

John's case must be seen in the context of the debate over lordship which erupted in 1356 between Archbishop Fitzralph of Armagh and the Augustinian friars.²² Fitzralph circulated his *De pauperie Salvatoris*, first privately at Oxford and then publicly, in which he accused the mendicant orders of abusing their vows of poverty and humility and usurping the pastoral function of the episcopate. This put them in a state of sin by which they lost their lordship over their property and privileges.²³ Then, in a series of sermons preached at London in 1356-7, he attacked the mendicant orders openly.²⁴ The friars, led by the Augustinians, responded by accusing him of erroneous teaching. Fitzralph retaliated by attacking the worldliness and wealth of the friars. By the end of March 1357, the friars had enlisted the aid of King Edward III, and Fitzralph went to Avignon to carry on the debate.

²¹ *Munimenta*, ed. Anstey 1868 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), 210-1: "Reverendi domini astantes et singuli, in determinatione quadam, termino hyemali ultimo praeterito facta, materias aliquas determinando tractavi odiosas quam plurimis et displicentes, et praecipue matris nostrae Universitatis nimium offensivas, de quo dolens et anxius fui tempore non modico, verum pro meo posse satisfacere cupiens, in hac parte de mandato ejusdem Universitatis venerabilis dicam in scripto; Imprimis, quod istam matrem nostram Universitatem venerabilem scio Catholicam esse, in doctrina sana fundatam et sanae fidei protectricem; Item, doctores reverendos ejusdem esse catholicos viros dico et affirmo; Item, quod praedictam matrem nostram et reverendos doctores et magistros, et praecipue dominum Cancellarium et Procuratores pluries offendi, humiliter quo possum ab eisdem veniam peto una voce; et quia totam Universitatem indebite vexavi, improvide appellando, dominis et magnatibus querelando, et aliis multiplicibus expensis gravando, ideo ire at satisfactionem offero juxta vires; Item quia plures valentes me reportaverunt in determinatione praedicta dixisse, asseruisse, et determinasse, quod quicumque domini temporales pro suo libito absque auctoritate Ecclesiae possunt aliqua temporalia Deo et ecclesiis donata auferre ab eisdem et perpetuo revocare; Item; quod decimae Ecclesiae magis sunt debitae fratribus mendicantibus quam rectoribus et curatis; Idcirco praedictas quaestiones de temporalibus et decimis erroneas et falsas esse dico, earumque contradictorias fateor esse veras, et illas quaestiones affirmativas, et earum quamlibet, tamquam minus catholicas ex nunc et in perpetuum detestor, nec eas vel earum aliquam de caetero aliquo modo sustinebo tacite vel expresse."

²² Gwynn 1940 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 10), 80-9. See also Ocker 1993 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 7), 33-8, and Katherine Walsh, *A Fourteenth-Century Scholar and Primate: Richard Fitzralph in Oxford, Avignon, and Armagh*, Oxford 1981, 349-451.

²³ Walsh 1981 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 22), 402-3.

²⁴ Walsh 1981 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 22), 409-21.

Running throughout Fitzralph's attacks on the mendicants is his theory of lordship. Drawing on Augustinian theology, he suggested that only those clergy of sound living had a right to the lordship of their temporalities, something he had asserted as early as 1340.²⁵ His assertion that the mendicants ought to lose their privileges because they abused them evolves out of this principle.

This debate was by no means confined to London. Fitzralph was in the vicinity of Oxford in October 1356, where he preached against the mendicants, and he circulated *De pauperie Salvatoris* in Oxford at that time, and may even have debated the issues formally.²⁶ By the end of 1357, Geoffrey Hardeby, Kedington's replacement as Augustinian regent master at Oxford, had debated the topic, either with Fitzralph himself or one of his supporters, and was responding to Fitzralph with his *De vita evangelica*, in which he asserted that lordship was independent of the merit of the holder.

John's statements, whatever the exact details, are clearly another element of the response to Fitzralph. Unlike Hardeby, who tried to undercut Fitzralph's argument, John seems to have tried to turn them around. The exact lines of his argument are unclear, but the most likely interpretation is that he claimed that the mendicants had a superior life, and that therefore they had a superior claim to church property than that of the seculars.

Given that the mendicants are likely to have supported, or at least not strongly objected to John's arguments, the impetus for his punishment must have come from the secular or monastic masters. The secular masters are the most likely leaders of the action against John. Not only would they have had cause to be offended by his suggestion that the mendicant lifestyle was superior, his argument that mendicants deserved the tithes of churches more than the rectors did was a direct threat to them, since many secular masters expected to become rectors after leaving the University. It is also worth noting that Archbishop Islip, himself a secular, is known to have favored the secular clergy against the friars on at least one other occasion, and this may have played a factor in his decision to return the case to the University.²⁷

²⁵ See Gwynn 1940 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 10), 59-73, and Walsh 1981 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 22), 377-86, for the theological background to this issue. Fitzralph was drawing on Giles of Rome.

²⁶ Walsh 1981 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 22), 411-5.

The mendicants were under a good deal of pressure within the University at this time. In 1357, another Friar John (presumably not the same one) was forced to apologize for having dishonored the Benedictine monk John Bodi, while a third friar was forced to apologize for insulting the arts students. In 1358, the mendicants were forbidden to recruit among the students, while in 1360 or 1361 the regent masters condemned the 'wax doctors' of the mendicant orders, mendicants who received degrees by virtue of connections with important patrons rather than by having followed the normal academic track.²⁸ Given this atmosphere of hostility to the mendicants, it is unsurprising that John was treated so harshly for what was hardly a major offense. Indeed, the size of his fine may reflect a desire on the part of secular or monastic masters to punish his entire order. This context also helps to explain why his superiors chose to forbid his appeal and wrote a letter undermining his case. They were under a good deal of pressure at Oxford, and Kedington's actions had evidently embarrassed them.

John Kedington's case offers us a window into political and intellectual tensions during what is in many ways still a murky period in Oxford's history. It demonstrates clearly the lengths to which University authorities were willing to go to punish someone who had offended them, and it highlights the fact, too little acknowledged, that academic condemnations did not occur for purely religious reasons.

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²⁷ He limited the rights of friars to hear confession and discharge pastoral functions, owing to a concern for the secular clergy. See D. Wilkins, *Concilia magnae Britanniae et Hiberniae*, London 1737, v. 3, p. 64, and the *Dictionary of National Biography*, vol. 10, 512: "SIMON ISLIP". He also established Canterbury College for secular students at Oxford; A.B. Emden, *A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford*, Oxford 1957-9, vol. 2, 1008.

²⁸ Ocker 1993 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 7), 34-5. See *Munimenta*, ed. Anstey 1868 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 3), 207-8.

A Fifteenth-Century Spanish Treatise on Consequences

JOKE SPRUYT

During a visit to Spain in the Autumn of 1971, Professor De Rijk came across two copies of an introductory *Sum of Logic* in the libraries of Sevilla and Zaragoza, which in the Zaragoza copy was entitled "Logica Morelli".¹ This *Logica*, which presents a complete account of the material usually discussed in late medieval textbooks, seems to neatly testify to the way in which logic was taught in fifteenth-century Spain.

The present edition is of the section of the *Summa* entitled *De consequentiis*. It is first of all intended as a modest contribution to the ongoing research on the development of the theory of consequences in the Middle Ages, which forms one of the most important parts of medieval logic. Again, while the fourteenth century may be regarded as the most important period as far as the development of the theory of consequences is concerned, the fifteenth century deserves our attention to determine, among other things, to what extent certain traditions (e.g. nominalism) managed to thrive during the late Middle Ages.² Particularly in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the theory of consequences formed a very important subject within Spanish logic.³

In the present, fifteenth-century treatise we can recognise elements from a number of earlier sources. For one thing its contents appear to fit in with what we find in the *De consequentiis* written by Ralph Strode. Furthermore, it contains technical language that has its origin in the works of Paul of Venice, particularly as far as the semantics of the proposition is concerned. Finally, the author also proves himself to be quite familiar with Buridan's type of semantics, which clearly comes to the fore when issues pertaining to word order are dealt with.⁴

¹ Professor de Rijk and I are preparing a critical edition of the entire *Logica*.

² For Spanish developments in this direction, see V. Muñoz Delgado, *La Logica Nominalista en la Universidad de Salamanca (1510-1530)*, Madrid 1964. For the schools and traditions extant in the Late Middle Ages, see Gabriel Nuchelmans, *Late Scholastic and Early Humanist Theories of the Proposition*, Amsterdam/New York 1980, 6-8.

³ Cf. Muñoz Delgado 1964 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 2), *passim*.

⁴ For the familiarity of our author with Buridan's works on logic, particularly his semantic

Before going into details about the treatise, I shall first, by way of introduction, present a survey of the contents of the *Logica*.

Let me start with a short description of the manuscripts.⁵

1 *About the manuscripts and the author*

The two manuscripts we have at our disposal are written in a similar hand. They seem to be unrelated to each other. At times they have different readings, and both have omissions occurring in different places. This distinction between the Sevilla and Zaragoza codexes suggests that the two scribes each must have had access to some other copy.

1.1 *Ms Sevilla, Biblioteca Capitulare Colombina, 7-3-13*

Our first copy is found in codex 7-3-13 of the Biblioteca Capitulare Colombina in Sevilla. This *in quarto* manuscript, dating from the fifteenth century, contains 145 folios. The text is written in one column of about 30 lines each. In many places the text is extremely difficult to read as a result of damp stains. On the first folio a later hand wrote "Guillelmus Ferrer" (presumably the name of the scribe), followed by the title "Logica M." Our *Logica* begins on the second folio and ends on the page that is numbered 132^r, but is in fact 142^r, because the numbers "102—(in fact "1012"!)—111" are used twice. In the upper margin of f.2^r, the same hand of f.1^r added the old siglum "C'Z. Tab. N° 6° 113". The scribe frequently writes hispanisms such as "sich", "tunch", "diferencia", "discribere", "neguare", "sequella", and so on instead of "sic", "tunc", "differentia", "describere", "negare" and "sequela".

The *Logica* found in this manuscript (ff.2^r-132 (□□42)^r) has the following *incipit*:

LOGICA EST rationalis sciencia veri a falso discretiva. Primo logica dicitur rationalis sciencia. Et in hoc convenit cum aliis scienciis seu artibus liberalibus . . . *etc.*⁶

The colophon runs as follows:

DEO GRACIAS. Laus tibi sit Christe, quia liber explicit iste. littera non est formosa set est bene studiosa. guil'ermus ferer vocatur quis(!) scripsit. benedicatur virgo laudetur postquam finis libri habetur detur pro pena(!) scriptori gloria eterna. Amen.

views, see Joke Spruyt, *Some Remarks on Semantic Topics in Two Spanish Tractatus de consequentiis*, in: *Acts of the 12th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics: "Logic and Semantics in Spain 1220-1550", held in Pamplona, 26-30 May, 1997*.

⁵ I am very grateful to Professor De Rijk for sharing his information with me.

⁶ For the continuation see our section 2, below.

On folio 133 (□□43)^r some other contemporary hand started copying another tract, leaving some room for a rubrica, "A", even though the text opens with the complete word "ad". The *incipit* is that of the well-known tract by Petrus Thomae OFM, sc. *De distinctione predicamentorum*,⁷ which has been preserved under different names in quite a number of manuscripts:

Ad evidenciam distinctionis predicamentorum sic intendo procedere. Primo enim ponam alica necessaria; secundo conculdam(!) alica probabilia. Quantum ad primum primo permittam(!) alicas distinciones, secundo declarabo alicas proposiciones.

1.2 *Ms Zaragoza, Biblioteca del Cabildo Metropolitano*

The other copy is extant in the Biblioteca del Cabildo Metropolitano in Zaragoza under the siglum 15-57 (formerly "Reg. 922"). This codex of 134 folios of one column was also written in the fifteenth century, in a handwriting very similar to that of the Sevilla manuscript. In the colophon it is dated "Anno Domini MCCCCLXXVI". Unlike the Sevilla scribe, the scribe of the Zaragoza manuscript seldom uses hispanisms. The manuscript in question contains two other tracts, and our tract on logic is found in between. The first five folios are not numbered, and the sixth one is numbered "1".

The first item, which is an anonymous incomplete tract on syllogistic figures, opens as follows:

STUDIOSISSIME perquisivi ut<rum> illa figura quam dat Aristotiles in primo libro priorum esset facilius manifesta et clara omnibus desiderantibus eam scire . . . *etc.*

On the sixth folio, the same hand begins with a complete copy of our *Logica*, renumbering the folios from 1 onwards (which is quite unusual, as a matter of fact):

1^r: LOGICA EST RACIOⁿalis sciencia . . . *etc.*

The text has been written in one column, with a rather large margin on the right side, which is sometimes used for adding a few glosses, particularly on the first pages. Sometimes the margins at the top and the bottom of the page are used for that purpose as well. The work winds up on folio 142^r.

The first folios on which the text of the *Logica* is found contains several glosses. Thus f.1^r has the gloss:

⁷ Printed at Venice, 1517 by Hieronymus Romanus de Nuciarellis; for Petrus Thomae, see G.G. Bridges, *Identity and Distinction in Petrus Thomae O.F.M.*, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1959.

Nota. Secundum Scotum logica est clavis aurea pupureijs argumentis decorata, per cuius auxilium . . . (?) libra philosophie reservantur. Vel aliter secundum Abicennam, logica est que tractat de secundis intentionibus adiunctis primis . . . *etc.*

On f.1^r the marginal gloss is found:

Nota secundum Albertum quod signum se extendit uno modo ad omne illud quod apprehensum facit aliquid evenire in cognitionem alicuius . . . *etc.*

On the next page, after the *Logica*, a fresh start has been made with a grammatical tract, still in the same hand:

<S>ECUNDUM QUOD DICIT philosophus primo etichorum(!) capitulo 4^o in illa parte in qua docetur incidentaliter quomodo inventores scienciarum et preactores(!) circa earum materi<a>s diversimode se habent, principia arcium non solum sunt arcium dimidium ymo plus quam dimidium . . . *etc.*

Like the first one, this tract is incomplete. It breaks off on f.145.

The first fly-leaf of the Zaragoza copy calls our treatise "Logica Morelli". The Sevilla copy only has "Logica M". It is likely to assume that "Morellus" is a nickname, but as yet we do not know who it belongs to. The author is obviously a Spanish master who skillfully compiled his introductory work from textbooks that were current in Southern Europe in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

2 *The contents of the Logica*⁸

The treatise opens with two preliminary remarks about the art of logic. First logic is defined in the usual manner as the "rational skill of discerning between what is true and what is false". The components of this definition are then explained. Because of its rational nature, logic is identified as one of the seven liberal arts, which are all *sciencie racionales* owing to the fact that they are founded in a rational subject, namely the rational soul:⁹

2^r: LOGICA EST rationalis sciencia veri a falso discretiva. Primo logica dicitur rationalis sciencia. Et in hac convenit cum aliis scienciis seu artibus liberalibus, scilicet cum gramatica, rethorica, geometria, arismetica, musica, et astrologia(!), que omnes dicuntur sciencie racionales a subiecto rationali in quo sunt, scilicet in anima rationali.

⁸ Professor de Rijk has presented an interesting account of semantic issues featuring in the section on terms and propositions, in: *Logica Morelli. Some Notes on the Semantics of A Fifteenth Century Spanish Logic*, forthcoming in the *Acts of the Twelfth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics (Pamplona, 26-30 May 1997)*: "Logic and Semantics in Spain (1250-1550)".

⁹ All quotations are from the Sevilla copy, but the hispanisms, which are not found in Zaragoza, have been corrected.

Its discrete nature is explained as the proprium that makes logic differ from the other liberal arts:

Ibid.: Secundo logica dicitur veri a falso discretiva ad differenciam aliarum arcium seu scienciarum, quia ad solam logicam pertinet verum a falso discernere, vel e converso.

Next an alternative definition is presented, in which logic is equated with “dialectic” and called “the art of disputation”. Again, its position among the other liberal arts is described:

VEL ALITER et brevius describitur sic: logica seu dialectica est ars disputationis. Primo in descriptione ponitur ly ‘ars’, et in hoc convenit cum aliis artibus supradictis. Secundo ponitur ly ‘disputationis’ ad differenciam aliarum arcium predictarum, quia sola logica seu dialectica dicitur ars disputationis. Disputatio est actus racionabiliter opponendi et racionabiliter respondendi.

Our treatise consists of five parts:

- (1) the logic of terms, including the so-called properties of terms, ampliation and appellation,
- (2) the logic of propositions, including their diverse “probationes”,
- (3) the theory of argumentation,
- (4) the doctrine of the predicables and the categories,
- (5) the doctrine of the so-called “obligaciones”.

This division of the *Logica* is accompanied by a didactic advice (which in fact has quite a modern ring to it) to start the study of logic with the second rather than with the first part, because it is easier for tyrones to fathom the logic of propositions than the logic of terms:

2^v: [...] quia materia prima partis, scilicet terminorum, est difficilior quam materia propositionum, idcirco propter ipsorum terminorum difficultatem et puerorum pro quibus sunt primitus [promotus(?) S] ruditatem consulo ante primam partem huius logice secundam partem legi, scilicet materia propositionum, saltem usque ad materiam probationum, quia puerorum ingressus facilius est in materia propositionum quam in materia terminorum.

2.1 *On the logic of terms*

The first part of the *Logica* opens (2^v-3^v) with an interesting discussion of the notions of ‘sign’, ‘signifying’ and ‘significative’. Next *terminus* is defined (3^v) as an incomplex concept in the soul or something expressed in words or in writing that is significative in a non-complex way,¹⁰ and thus the definition comprises mental, vocal and written terms.

¹⁰ Terminus hic acceptus et proprie describitur sic: terminus est simplex conceptus anime aut aliquid vocale vel scriptum incomplexum significativum.

Next follow (4^r-9^v) twelve divisions of incomplex terms. First (4^{r-v}) incomplex terms are divided into categorematic and syncategorematic terms, and those that are partly categorematic and partly syncategorematic, such as adverbs of time and place (e.g. *ubique*, *semper*) as well as substantivated quantifiers (e.g. *aliquid*, *omnia*). The remaining divisions all concern categorematic terms. The second division (4^v) is into concrete and abstract terms, the third (*ibid.*) is into absolute and correlative terms—a term of the latter type is defined as a term that cannot be understood without understanding the opposite term with regard to which it is called correlative (such as the pairs *pater-filius* and *filia*, and *dominus-servus*). The fourth division (5^{r-v}) concerns disparate, convertible and opposite (i.e. contrary, contradictory, relatively opposed, and privatively opposed) terms. The fifth division (5^v-6^r) is into superior and inferior terms (e.g. *animal* compared to *homo* and the other way round, respectively). The sixth division (6^{r-v}) is into opposite or real terms and *termini ficti* (i.e. signifying a *res ficta*, such as *chimaera* and *vacuum*).

The seventh division (6^v-7^r) concerns the *dicta simpliciter* and the *dicta secundum quid*. The former are terms without a restrictive, ampliative or some other addition which prevents it from designating its principal significate, such as *homo*, *animal*. Their counterparts are phrases such as *albus secundum dentes*, *homo corruptus*, in which the principal significates of *homo* and *albus* are qualified. In this context the labels *terminus diminuens*, *terminus distrahens* and *terminus ampliativus* are explained. The eighth division (7^{r-v}) is into finite and infinite terms, the ninth (7^v-8^r) into positive and privative terms, the tenth (8^r) into terms of first and second intention or imposition, the eleventh (8^{r-v}) into common and discrete or singular terms, and the twelfth and last one (8^v-9^v) concerns immediate as opposed to mediate terms—the former are terms owing to which a proposition cannot be proved, that is, analysed into protocol sentences, whereas the latter are such that a proposition can be proved. The mediate terms are divided into resolvable, explicable and officiable ones.

Next the properties of terms are discussed, *viz.* supposition (9^v-20^v), including six divisions of supposition (material-personal, and five kinds of personal supposition), ampliation (20^v-22^v) and appellation (22^v-23^v). The discussion of these properties also contains a number of rules.

2.2 *On the logic of propositions*

The second Part discusses the definition of *proposicio* and its different kinds, and the so-called *probaciones proposicionum*. The first chapter deals with the proposition, which is defined as follows:

24^r: PROPOSICIO est oracio indicativa perfecta vera vel falsa, aut equivalens.

The phrase “aut equivalens” is added for two reasons, the author says:

Ibid.: Quinto ponitur ly ‘equivalens’ propter duo. Primo quia si aliqua littera vel syllaba vel diccio vel oracio imponitur ad significandum tantum sicut aliqua propositio, tunc talis potest dici propositio seu equivalens propositioni. Secundo propter condicionalem vel expletivam, compositam ex partibus coniunctis, que apud logicos bene dicitur propositio vel saltem equivalens propositioni, licet non sit oracio indicativa; ut cum dicitur ‘si homo esset asinus, homo esset rudibilis’, et huiusmodi.

After the distinction between categorical and hypothetical propositions has been explained, the former’s nature and components (subject, predicate, copula) are discussed (24^r-25^v). Next ten divisions of the proposition are dealt with. First, the division into *vera* and *falsa*, including an interesting discussion of the *significatum propositionis* (25^v-27^r). The second division (27^r-28^v) concerns the modality of the significate (*possibilis-impossibilis, necessaria-contingens*). The third division is into *scita, dubita vel nescita, and credita* (28^v-29^v); the fourth into *repugnantes* and *compossibiles vel simul stantes* (29^v-30^r); the fifth into *de inesse* and *modalis*, the modality of the assertion, that is (30^{r-v}). The sixth division deals with the distinction *affirmativa* and *negativa*, and in this connection some rules regarding negation are presented (30^v-31^r). The seventh division concerns propositional quantification, which is divided into *universalis, particularis, indefinita, and singularis* (31^v-33^r). The eighth one concerns the distinction between different types of categorical proposition according to its matter, the relationship, that is, between the subject- and predicate term; thus categorical propositions can be of the type *in naturali materia, in contingenti materia* or *in remota materia* (33^{r-v}). The ninth division concerns the relationship between propositions quantified in different ways; this division is into *contrarie, contradictorie, subcontrarie, and subalterne*. The discussion of this division includes the rules of inference governing their truth and falsity (33^v-40^r). The last division concerns the different relationships of equivalence between categorical propositions (40^v-42^r). Finally, the three ways of conversion of categorical propositions are discussed, *viz. conversio simplex, conversio per accidens* and *conversio per contrapositionem* (42^r-44^v).

After the account on the categorical proposition, the second chapter of the second Part pays attention to the different kinds of hypothetical proposition. No less than eight kinds of hypothetical proposition are taken into consideration, *viz. copulativa* (e.g. ‘tu es homo, et tu es animal’), *disiunctiva* (e.g. ‘tu es homo, vel tu es animal’), *racionalis* (e.g. ‘homo currit, ergo animal currit’), *condicionalis* (e.g. ‘si tu es homo, tu es animal’), *causalis* (e.g. ‘quia tu es homo, tu es animal’), *expletiva* (e.g. ‘tu es homo, licet tu

es animal”), *similitudinaria* (e.g. ‘ego curro, sicut tu curris’), *localis* (e.g. ‘ego sum ubi [ibi S] tu es’), and *temporalis* (e.g. ‘tu curris, dum tu moveris’) (44^v-48^v). Four rules are added (48^v-49^r):

[1] “Secundum quosdam oppositum ypotetice non dicitur propositio ypotetica”,

[2] “Oppositum copulative equivalet disiunctive facte ex contradictoriis parcium illius copulative”,

[3] “Oppositum disiunctive equivalet copulative facte ex contradictoriis parcium illius disiunctive”,

[4] “Oppositum rationalis significat opposito modo ad proposicionem rationalem, et propositio condicionalis significat opposito modo ad proposicionem condicionalem, et oppositum causalis significat opposito modo ad proposicionem causalem, et ita de omnibus aliis speciebus”.

The third chapter of the second Part (49^v-75^r) deals with the *probaciones proposicionum*, in the wake of the fourteenth-century Billingham tradition.¹¹ Making use of the twelfth division presented in the first Part, in which mediate terms as opposed to immediate terms were defined as those owing to which propositions can be verified or falsified by reducing them to simple protocol sentences, the author distinguishes three types of mediate propositions, *viz.* resolvable, exponible and officiable propositions. Next their different verifications are discussed along much the same lines as in the treatises of the Billingham tradition. This discussion includes an extensive account of exclusive (54^v-58^r), exceptive (58^r-60^r) and reduplicative (60^r-62^v) propositions. Next the remaining types of exponible propositions (containing exponible terms as *idem*, *differt*, comparative and superlative terms, or *incipit* and *desinit etc.*) are dealt with (62^v-71^r). The chapter winds up with the verification of modal propositions (71^r-75^r).

2.3 On argumentation

Starting off with the well known Boethian definition of *argumentum*, the third Part of our *Logica* deals with induction, exemplum,¹² enthymema, and syllogism (75^r-81^v). The syllogistic modes and figures are extensively

¹¹ See L.M. de Rijk, *Some 14th Century Tracts on the Probationes Terminorum*. *Martin of Abwick O.F.M., Richard Billingham, Edward Upton and Others*, Nijmegen 1982 (= *Artistarium*, 3).

¹² As usual, the way *exemplum* is instanced is indicative of the *couleur locale* of our treatise: “Exemplum est quo unum simile probatur per alterius similitudinem, ut cum dicitur ‘Anglicos contra Gallicos pugnare malum est; ergo Aragonenses contra Castellanos pugnare malum est’”. The same example is found in the Zaragoza manuscript.

discussed (75^v-81^v). Part Three concludes with a detailed examination of *consequentie* (82^r-109^v).¹³

2.4 *On universals and categories*

The Part on universals and categories opens with five preliminary remarks about the structure of the discussion (109^v-115^v):

109^v-110^r: CIRCA UNIVERSALIA Seu predicabilia et predicamenta pro ipsorum noticia adquirenda[m] sunt primitus determinanda quinque per ordinem. Primo quid sit terminus univocus et quid terminus equivocus et quid terminus analogus, quia omne universale hic acceptum oportet esse univocum. Secundo quid sit predicacio essentialis et quid predicacio accidentalis, quia omne universale hic acceptum est predicabile essentialiter vel accidentaliter. Tercio quid sit predicari in quid et quid sit predicari [predicare *S*] in quale et quid sit predicari in quantum et quid in quot, et sic de quibusdam aliis predicacionibus per quas investigamus vel cognoscimus terminos respondibiles. Quarto quid [110^r] sit diffinico et quid diffinitum, quia per diffinicionem investigamus quid est esse rei. Quinto quid sit divisio, quia per divisionem facimus descensum a superiori ad eius inferiora.

The other remark tells the reader in what way the author intends to deal with the universals and categories. It contains a reference to the *logici moderni*:

110^r: Et consequenter dicetur de ipsis universalibus et predicamentis. De quibus secundum usum seu modum loquendi modernorum logicorum breviter pertransibo. Et ratio est quia ad habendum perfectissimam et generalem introduccionem ipsorum non solum logicalem et physicalem sed etiam methaphisicalem presupponunt noticiam, propter etiam varietatem opinionum et modorum loquendi tam logicorum quam naturalium quam methaphisicorum.

The univocal, equivocal and analogous uses of terms are discussed first (110^r-112^v);¹⁴ subsequently essential and accidental predication (112^v-113^r), and then predication *in quid*, *in quale*, and so on. Next division and definition (113^r-115^v) are brought up.

After these *praenotanda*, the proper tract on universals and categories opens with the discussion of the five predicables, namely genus, species, differentia, proprium, and accident, including their *communitates* (115^v-118^v). The discussion of the ten Aristotelian categories is remarkable for its semantic approach to the matter: the categories are spoken of as significative terms coordinated in different ways. Thus the ten categories are listed as ten “modes of signification” (*maneries significacionum*). The opening section is quoted in full:

¹³ For a short survey of this tract, see our section 3 below.

¹⁴ The folios that come after 111v are erroneously numbered ‘1012(!)’, ‘103’, ‘104’, ‘105’, and so on. This error has been corrected.

118^v-119^r: PREDICAMENTUM large accipitur pro generalissimo genere alicuius coordinacionis¹⁵ predicamentalis. [119^r] Et isto modo dicuntur decem predicamenta decem genera generalissima, scilicet substantia, quantitas, qualitas, relacio, accio, passio, ubi, quando [quanta S], situs, et habitus. Sed predicamentum proprie accipitur pro tota coordinacione omnium terminorum, scilicet generum et specierum, differencia<ru>m et individuorum facta a generalissimo ad specialissima seu individua. Et isto modo similiter dicuntur decem predicamenta decem coordinaciones predicamentales sumpte ex decem modis predicandi vel significandi diversimode, scilicet predicamentum substantie, quantitatis, qualitatis, relacionis, accionis, passionis, ubi, quando, situs, et habitus. Unde predicamentum substantie est coordinacio terminorum significat<iv>orum substantie; et predicamentum <quantitatis est coordinacio terminorum significativorum quantitatis; et predicamentum qualitatis> est coordinacio terminorum significativorum qualitatis; et predicamentum relacionis est coordinacio terminorum significativorum relacionis; et predicamentum accionis est coordinacio terminorum significativorum accionis; et predicamentum passionis est coordinacio terminorum significativorum passionis; et predicamentum ubi est coordinacio terminorum significativorum loci; et predicamentum quando est coordinacio terminorum significativorum temporis; et predicamentum situs est coordinacio terminorum significativorum posicionis; et predicamentum habitus est coordinacio terminorum significativorum habitus circa corpus.

Ex quibus patet quod terminus significativus substantie dicitur de predicamento substantie, ut ly 'homo', 'animal', sed terminus de predicamento quantitatis est de predicamento quantitatis; et ita de omnibus aliis. Et sic<ut> sunt decem maneries significacionum terminorum, sic dicuntur decem predicamenta.

Secundo patet quod idem terminus per eandem significacionem non potest [ponunt S] esse diversorum predicamentorum, sed per diversas significaciones potest poni in diversis predicamentis. Ut ly 'albus', quia formaliter significat qualitatem, ideo [et S] ponitur per se in predicamento qualitatis, <sed quia fundamentaliter significat substantiam>, ideo ponitur per accidens in predicamento substantie. Similiter ly 'pater' formaliter significat relacionem, ideo ponitur per se in predicamento relacionis, sed quia fundamentaliter significat substantiam, ideo [non S] ponitur per accidens in predicamento substantie. Sed quia ly 'homo' solum significat substantiam, ideo [non S] ponitur <per se> in predicamento substantie. Et huiusmodi.

Next, the ten categories are discussed one by one (119^r-131^v). Folio 120^v has a picture of the *Arbor porphyriana*.

2.5 On the ars obligandi

The fifth and last Part (131^v-142^r) of the *Logica Morelli* is about the *ars obligandi*. *Obligacio* is defined as follows:

131^v: OBLIGACIO hic sumpta describitur sic: obligacio est admissio respondentis ad opponentem qua respondens ad aliquid admissum si fuerit propositum, tenetur respondere secundum exigenciam signi [S^e significatum S] obligacionis. Exemplum: si opponens dicat respondenti "Pono tibi istam 'tu es Rome'", et respondens dixerit "Admitto", tunc facta est ista obligacio sive admissio qua respondens tenetur respondere "Concedo illam proposicionem 'tu es Rome', si fuerit proposita", et hoc secundum exigenciam

¹⁵ The spelling of this word both in the Zaragoza and in the Sevilla copies ("cohordinacionis") betrays the tacit association of 'ordo' and 'cohors'.

huius signi obligacionis 'pono'. Et deponens tenetur respondere, scilicet negando secundum exigenciam istius signi obligacionis 'depono', ut inferius dicitur.

Subsequently, the author refers to an alternative definition, which in his opinion, however, is inadequate:

131^v-132^r: Vel aliter secundum quosdam: Obligacio est oracio [ordinacio *S*] composita ex signis obligacionis et obligato. Exemplum, ut cum dicitur "Pono tibi istam 'tu es Rome'", tunc tota ista oracio vocatur obligacio, et ly 'pono tibi istam' vocatur signum obligacionis, et 'tu es Rome' vocatur obligatum; et huiusmodi. Sed talis descriptio videtur insufficiens, quia ex tali descriptione sequitur quod, si opponens dixerit respondententi "Pono tibi istam 'tu es Rome'" absque admissione [dimissione *S*] facta ab ipso respondente, esset obligacio; quod esset falsum, quia non dicitur [132^r] proprie obligacio donec respondens admiserit proposicionem quam opponens sibi posuit [opponit *S*] vel imposuit [deponit *S*] vel deposuit [imponit *S*]; et huiusmodi.

Next, the three kinds of obligation are discussed, viz. *posicio*, *deposicio* and *imposicio*, including a large number of rules (132^r-142^r). After the last rule, which concerns the imposition of an impertinent proposition (e.g. 'tu es lapis'), the explicit runs as follows:

142^r: Et hec sint dicta de tercia specie et ultima obligacionum et, per consequens, de quinta parte sive ultima huius logice.

DEO GRACIAS

There is a colophon in the same hand.¹⁶

So much for the contents of the *Logica*. Let us now say a few things about the section on consequences.¹⁷

3 *The section on consequences*

3.1 *Short survey of the contents*

Like the other parts of the *Logica*, the section on consequences is clearly meant as an introduction for students. It is very neatly structured and pays much attention to theoretical reflection of the items that are brought up. Thus definitions and rules are presented with great consideration for detail, such as the exact phrasing.

The contents of our tract bears considerable resemblance to Ralph Strode's treatise on consequences.¹⁸ Most of the rules (especially the general

¹⁶ Quoted above, p. 179.

¹⁷ For a more detailed account of some particularly interesting features of this tract, see Joke Spruyt, *Some Remarks on Semantical Topics in Two Spanish Tractatus de consequentiis*, forthcoming in the *Acts of the Twelfth European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics (Pamplona, 26-30 May 1997): "Logic and Semantics in Spain (1250-1550)"*.

¹⁸ I have used the edition by Wallace Knight Seaton, *An Edition and Translation of the*

and specific ones) can be traced back to Strode's work. But while Strode postpones the discussion of his rules (the ways in which they can be 'proved' and possible objections to them) until he has them all summed up, our author immediately proceeds to discuss their theoretical foundation and issues that relate to precise wording.

The opening chapter of this section (which comprises six small chapters in all) starts off with a description of consequences in general and of the kinds of consequences that are studied in logic. There are two ways in which the notion of consequence is described, namely from the perspective of the linguistic expression involved, and of the mental activity underlying it. The author's account of a valid consequence centres round the relationships between 'the first and adequate significatum' (*primum et adequatum significatum*) of the antecedent and of the consequent. The chapter winds up with some remarks about causal consequences, of which it is said that they can cause some problems when talking about the validity of inferences.

In the second and third chapters we find general rules of inference, accompanied by a discussion of alternative ways of phrasing them. Furthermore, we come across the distinction between *consequencia materialis* and *consequencia formalis*. The third chapter is concerned with rules of *consequencia formalis* alone. The fourth chapter deals with different kinds of terms that feature in propositions, and the rules that have to do with the relationships between these terms (e.g. the relationship of an *inferius* to its *superius* and the other way round, of *incipit* to *desinit* and the other way round, and the relationship between relatives). Explicit attention is paid to propositions that contain divine terms. Chapter five is devoted to inferences governing categorical propositions, and the final chapter discusses inferences governing hypothetical inferences.

It would be beyond the scope of this introduction to give a complete analysis of all the details presented in our treatise. Instead, I believed it would be interesting to look somewhat more closely into some of the subjects it deals with and to compare what our author has to say with discussions of previous authors. In the following I shall confine myself to, first of all, exploring a number of topics that pertain to the notion of validity of consequences. Furthermore, I shall pay attention to general rules of valid consequence. To wind up the introduction, attention will

Tractatus De consequentiis by Ralph Strode, *Fourteenth Century Logician and Friend of Geoffrey Chaucer*, University of California, Berkeley Ph.D., 1973, reproduced as an authorized facsimile in 1981 by University Microfilms International, Ann Arbor, Michigan, U.S.A./London, England.

be given to some of the rules that pertain to relationships between the different terms involved in consequences.

3.2 *The description of consequences*

The first chapter of Morelli's section *De consequenciis* (hereafter cited as *MDC*) presents a description of all the elements a consequence consists of. The consequence is described in a similar manner as was done by Strode as an *illacio sive sequela consequentis ex antecedente*.¹⁹ Based upon the opinion of others (*secundum quosdam*),²⁰ a further distinction is then made into valid and invalid consequences, i.e. *consequencia bona* and *consequencia mala* (*MDC* I,1). Subsequently an alternative description is given, viz. consequence as a 'rational' or 'conditional' proposition with an explanation of the difference between the two²¹ (*MDC* I,2-3). The description of *consequencia* in general winds up with the an explanation of the notions *antecedens* and *consequens*. Our author is somewhat more elaborate on this subject than Buridan, for instance, showing how these concepts function in different ways in a conditional and in a rational proposition:

antecedens = *in rationali propositio precedens vocaliter notam consequencie*
 = *in condicionali propositio sequens immediate notam consequencie*
consequens = *in rationali propositio sequens notam consequencie*
 = *in condicionali alia propositio, sive precedat sive subsequatur, notam consequencie* (*MDC* I,3).

In this description the word *vocaliter* is used. In the next paragraph *antecedens* is defined again as a *propositio sequens mentaliter notam consequencie, que denotatur sequi ex antecedente* (*MDC* I,4).

The remainder of the first chapter of our tract is devoted to the description of a valid consequence. These descriptions are rather like the ones given by Strode. A valid consequence is defined in our treatise as a

consequencia cuius primum et adequatum significatum antecedentis non potest esse absque primo et adequato significato sui consequentis (*MDC* I,5), or
cuius oppositum consequentis non potest stare cum suo antecedente (*MDC* I,6).

¹⁹ Cf. Ralph Strode, *De cons.* 1.1.01, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 1.

²⁰ The idea of some people that any hypothetical proposition of the conditional or rational type can be called a consequence, but that some will only apply this label to the true ones is also found in John Buridan, *De consequentiis*, 3, ed. H. Hubien, Louvain-Paris 1976, 21¹⁶⁻²⁰ (*Philosophes médiéaux*, XVI).

²¹ Buridan just mentions the difference between a hypothetical proposition conjoined by "si" and by "ergo", but does not give them the separate names of *condicionalis* and *rationalis* respectively; *De cons.* 3, ed. Hubien 1976 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 20), 21⁷⁻¹⁵.

For an invalid consequence the definition runs the other way round (*MDC* I,7-8). Strode defines thus:

*consequentia bona dicitur cuius consequentie non potest esse sicut adequate significatur per antecedens nisi sit sicut adequate significatur per consequens suum and dicitur consequentia non bona vel non valere quando stat esse sic sicut significatur adequate per suum antecedens licet non sit sicut significatur adequate per suum consequens*²²

As to the expression *primum et adequatum significatum*, this was one of the significates of a proposition, as opposed to the secondary one, which were distinguished by logicians in the wake of Paul of Venice.²³ Our author spoke about this notion in a preceding section of the *Logica*, when dealing with the signification of propositions. The adequate or total significate of a proposition is the result of the combination of all the parts that make up the proposition, whereas the partial significate is the result of the combination of only part of the propositions's elements. As an example the author uses *homo est asinus*, which adequately signifies *hominem esse animal*, and partially *hominem esse*. Again, the primary (adequate) significate of a proposition is set apart from the secondary one; the primary (adequate) significate of e.g. *Sortes est homo* is *Sortem esse hominem* and the secondary one is *hominem esse animal*. The latter is what follows from the proposition we started off with.²⁴ This use of primary and secondary meaning is closely linked up with Paul of Venice's terminology in the *Logica magna* (II, 11).²⁵

Our author summarises his descriptions of the *consequencia bona* with the remark that the only thing required for a valid consequence is that the consequent follows from the antecedent, irrespective of whether they are both true or false, whereas for a consequence to be invalid it is sufficient that the consequent does not follow from the antecedens. His last remark about what it means to concede or to deny a consequence seems to be a practical remark about how one should handle consequences in actual arguments (*MDC* I,9).

The final paragraphs of this introductory chapter raise the notion of causal consequences. Our author is inclined to follow those who reckon them among the consequences, but in that case a different definition should be used: in a valid causal consequence the state of affairs signified by its

²² *De cons.*, 1.1.02, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 1.

²³ For the general background of this idea, see Nuchelmans 1980 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 2), 45 ff.

²⁴ See De Rijk (*op. cit.*, above, n. 8).

²⁵ See L.M. de Rijk, *Semantics in Richard Billingham and Johannes Venator*, in: Alfonso Maierù (ed.), *English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries* (= Acts of the 5th European Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, Rome, 10-14 November 1980), 167-83, esp. 172-5.

antecedent is the true cause of the state of affairs signified by its consequent (*talīs dicitur consequentia bona quando res significata per eius antecedens est vera causa rei significate per suum consequens*), whereas for an invalid consequent this condition is not met (*MDC* I,10).

The last paragraph completes the introduction about *consequentia* in general, adding a warning that the descriptions of valid and invalid consequences presented earlier do not apply to the causal ones—for in the latter the notion of something's being a true cause is an additional requirement for there being a valid consequence—and that the rules he is about to give are to be applied to non-causal consequences only (*MDC*, I,11).

Thus far we have seen that consequences are divided into valid and invalid ones. Furthermore, a specific type of consequence has been introduced, *viz. consequentia causalis*. There is one other division of valid consequences that comes up later, in the second chapter, namely into the *consequentia formalis seu bona de forma* and the *consequentia materialis seu bona de materia*. This is of course a division well known from earlier treatises on consequences. The definitions the author gives reflect both a traditional outlook, one found in Strode as well, and the more novel approach found in Buridan. The definition of a formally valid inference runs

consequentia formalis est consequentia bona cui quilibet consequentia ei similis in forma seu in modo arguendi, si formetur, est bona, in quibuscumque terminis fiat, et consequens eiusdem est de intellectu sui antecedentis.

The first part of this definition is quite in line with Buridan's, which runs

*consequentia formalis est cui omnis propositio similis in forma quae formaretur esset bona consequentia.*²⁶

It expresses the idea of validity (which became current after the second half of the fourteenth century) that a consequence is formally valid if it obtains no matter what terms are used. The second part, similar to the definition found in Strode's treatise, which runs

*in tali consequentia [sc. consequentia bona de forma] consequens est de formali intellectu antecedentis.*²⁷

is reminiscent of the traditional idea of inclusion in valid formal consequences.²⁸

²⁶ John Buridan, *De cons.* 4, ed. Hubien 1976 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 20), 237⁸.

²⁷ *De cons.*, 1.1.03, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 2.

²⁸ For the change in the notions of material and formal consequence, see Franz Schupp, *Logical Problems of the Medieval Theory of Consequences*. With the edition of the *Liber consequenti- arum*, Napoli 1988, 29 (= History of Logic, VI).

The materially valid consequence is defined as a

consequencia bona cui non quelibet consequencia similis in modo arguendi, si formetur, est bona, vel cuius antecedens est impossibile in quo non includitur eius consequens aut cuius consequens est necessarium quod non includitur in eius antecedente. (MDC I,9)

In the subsequent paragraphs, in which the anonymous lists the different kinds of materially valid consequence, the idea of inclusion (and hence the relationships between terms that account for the validity of a consequence) is even more prominent. The interesting thing is that the first kind of materially valid consequence is a form of an enthymematic consequence, in which an extra premiss will do to complete the argument. But, oddly enough, this argument is also labelled a valid material one in virtue of the terms:

Quedam enim dicitur materialis seu bona de materia vel gracia terminorum, quia non quelibet consequencia ei similis in modo arguendi, si formetur, est bona. Ut talis consequencia est bona de materia vel gracia terminorum 'tu es animal; ergo tu es homo', demonstrato homine. (MDC I,10)

The second type of materially invalid consequence is one whose antecedent is impossible, such as *homo est asinus; ergo baculus stat in angulo* (MDC I,10). The example given here is exactly the same one as Strode's.²⁹ The third type is one whose consequent is necessary, e.g. *tu curris; ergo Deus est* (MDC I,10).

Unlike Strode, our author does not add the remark that all formal consequences are materially valid, but not vice versa (*De cons.* p. 2 (ed. Seaton), 1.1.03). Nor does he state that all material consequences can be reduced to formal ones either, as Buridan does;³⁰ instead he mentions that there are consequences in which an impossible antecedent is formally included in the consequent, in which case the consequence is a formal one, and there are consequences in which an antecedent is formally included in a necessary consequent, in which case the consequence is a formal one as well (MDC I,12). Moreover, unlike Strode, he separates the types of materially valid consequence from the rules that apply to them. There are only two rules connected with material consequence: *ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet*³¹ and *necessarium sequitur ad quidlibet* (MDC I,13).

²⁹ *De cons.*, 1.1.04, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 2.

³⁰ *De cons.*, ed. Hubien 1976 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 20), 23¹⁴⁻¹⁵.

³¹ The rule *ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet* was a subject of great debate until well into the thirteenth century. For earlier twelfth century sources of this rule, see Y. Iwakuma, *Parvipontani's Thesis ex impossibili quidlibet sequitur: Comments on the Sources from the Twelfth Century*, in: Klaus Jacobi (ed.), *Argumentationstheorie: Scholastische Forschungen zu den logischen und semantischen Regeln Korrekten Folgerns*, Leiden-New York-Köln 1993, 123-51 (= Studien und Texte

3.3 *Rules of valid consequence*

In the second chapter the anonymous lists four general rules of valid consequence. In fact what is presented is a more elaborate account of validity as it pertains to consequence. The first and second rules (*MDC* II, 1-2) actually follow from the definition of a valid consequence the author had given earlier on. In Strode's treatise they are not mentioned as separate rules, but merely as parts of the description of what a *consequentia bona* is.³² The third rule (*MDC* II,3) corresponds with Strode's 24th,³³ and the fourth rule (*MDC* II,4) with Strode's 21st.³⁴

Having presented these general rules of valid consequence, the author then proceeds to look at a number of consequences which appear to be true but are disqualified by the rules. The consequences he discusses are all aimed to show that one should always make a distinction between a proposition and its significate, and that consequence concerns the significate of propositions. In his explanation of what goes wrong, it seems that what underlies this type of distinction is the principle that validity is applied to states of affairs, and not to the truth of the propositions themselves. For instance, one cannot infer *Deus est; ergo hec propositio est vera 'Deus est'*, because it is possible that no such proposition exists, while it still is the case *that God exists* (*MDC* II,5), nor is one entitled to infer *hec propositio 'homo est asinus' est vera; ergo homo est asinus*, for the reason that at some future time the proposition '*homo est asinus*' could signify *that God exists*, while obviously it would still not be the case *that man is an ass* (*MDC* II,6). Again, the consequences *nulla propositio est vera; ergo homo est asinus* and *nulla propositio est negativa; ergo omnis propositio est affirmativa* are rejected on the supposition that there could be a time when no proposition exists. The consequence *omnis propositio est affirmativa; ergo nulla propositio est negativa*, on the other hand, is valid, because, owing to the existential import of the antecedent, there is no case in which the opposite of the consequent does not contradict the antecedent (*MDC* II,6-7).

In the third chapter the general rules pertaining to valid formal inferences are discussed. Most of the rules the author presents can be found

zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, XXXVIII). A discussion of later developments is found in Joke Spruyt, *Thirteenth Century Positions on the Rule Ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet*, in the same volume, 161-93.

³² *De cons.*, 1.1.02, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 1.

³³ *De cons.*, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 5: 24a regula: oppositum contradictorium consequentis non potest stare cum antecedente.

³⁴ *De cons.*, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 5: 21a regula: si arguitur ex contradictorio consequentis ad contradictorium antecedentis, consequentia est bona.

in Strode's tract. There are a few exceptions. Two rules have a different wording in Strode. The twenty-second rule of our author runs

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis consequens est affirmativum, antecedens eiusdem non est pure negativum. (MDC III,22)

where Strode has

*12a regula est, si consequens est pure affirmativum, igitur antecedens vel aliqua pars antecedentis est pure affirmativum.*³⁵

Both authors present counter-examples to the rules. Strode pays attention to the consequences *Deus non est; ergo Deus est*³⁶ which he concedes, but as a materially valid consequence only.³⁷ Another counter-example is borrowed from Aristotle, viz. the equivalence of *necesse est esse* and *possibile est non esse*;³⁸ this equivalence too is granted on the grounds that the two propositions are not absolutely equivalent, but only together with an affirmative *medium* expressing that *esse* and *non esse* are contradictory opposites.³⁹ The final counter-example Strode presents concerns the consequence *non est ita quod nihil est; ergo aliquid est*.⁴⁰ Strode concedes that consequence as a materially valid one, not formally.⁴¹

Like Strode, our author too presents some possible counter-examples to the rules. The first example is *nichil est; ergo aliquid est*. Like Strode, he also accepts it, but as a material consequence only, on the grounds that its antecedent is impossible or its consequent necessary, and its consequent is not formally included in its antecedent. Unlike Strode, however, he refrains from discussing why there is no question of formal inclusion. Strode, on his part, explains that one can understand *nihil esse* in understanding *non esse ita quod nihil est*, because one can infer *nihil est; ergo non est ita quod aliquid est, nec est ita quod nihil est* in the same manner as one can infer *tu non es; ergo tu non es homo, nec non homo*.⁴²

Apart from the solution that the consequence *nichil est; ergo aliquid est* is materially valid and not formally, our author gives another way out of the problem. The inference upon which the validity of the proposed consequence was supposed to rest ran *si nichil est; ergo sic est quod nichil est*.

³⁵ *De cons.*, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 4.

³⁶ *De cons.*, 1.2.23, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 14.

³⁷ *De cons.*, 1.2.27, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 15.

³⁸ *De cons.*, 1.2.24, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 14.

³⁹ *De cons.*, 1.2.28, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 15-6.

⁴⁰ *De cons.*, 1.2.26, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 15.

⁴¹ *De cons.*, 1.2.30, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 16-7.

⁴² *De cons.*, 1.2.30, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 17.

The operative word in this consequence is *sic* (or *ita*). This word can be understood in two ways. First it can be interpreted as a state of affairs (our author speaks of a 'mode of being') which is asserted. In that case the consequent, expressing in some mode of being that nothing is, contradicts the antecedent, which states that nothing is. And if nothing is, this means that it is not true to say that in some mode of being it is the case that nothing is. If, on the other hand, the word *sic* (or *ita*) is taken as a mode of nothingness or negation, then the consequence *nichil est; ergo sic est quod nichil est* does hold good, but then it follows that nothing is (*MDC III*,25-26), which means that the inference *nichil est; ergo aliquid est* is not acceptable.

Another rule found in Morelli's tract that does not feature in Strode's treatise is one that does not pertain to a single consequence, but to the relationship between a number of consequences used in an longer argument. This rule states the conditions for the validity of an argument *a primo ad ultimum* (*MDC II*,36).

Of the general rules mentioned in Strode some are missing in our author's tract. These are the 3rd and 4th,⁴³ and the 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th⁴⁴ rules. As far as Strode's 23rd⁴⁵ rule is concerned, our author does not approve of it as it stands, on the grounds that one can know that a consequence is valid, and know the antecedent, but this does not mean that one knows the consequent. Thus to the phrase *intellectum a te* our author prefers the expression *scitum a te esse verum*, which is something other than simply *scitum a te*. The reason for putting it this way is his contention that in order for you to know a proposition, you must know the terms. And this is not the case if you are dealing with some Hebrew proposition, for instance, of which you know that it is true, but you do not know what the terms signify (*MDC III*,16).

So much for the rules of consequence headed under the category of general ones. In the fourth chapter of our treatise the author turns to specific rules.

⁴³ *De cons.*, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 4: 3a regula: aliquando erit ita sicut significatur per antecedens; igitur tunc erit ita sicut significatur per consequens. 4a regula: aliquando non erit sicut significatur per consequens; igitur tunc non erit ita sicut significatur per antecedens.

⁴⁴ *De cons.*, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 5: 21a regula: si arguitur ex contradictorio consequentis ad contradictorium antecedentis, consequentia est bona. 22a regula: si arguitur ex opposito conclusionis cum altera premissarum, sequitur oppositum alterius premisse. . . . 24a regula: oppositum contradictorium consequentis non potest stare cum antecedente.

⁴⁵ *De cons.*, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 5: 23a regula: si antecedens est intellectum a te, consequens est intellectum a te.

3.4 *Some remarks on specific rules of consequence*

This first chapter devoted to specific rules of consequence deals with rules of consequence concerning special relationships between terms. This chapter is organised along similar lines as Strode's *capitulum de specialibus regulis*.⁴⁶ It starts off with rules relating to the *inferius-superius* relationship between terms. The first four rules of our treatise (*MDC* IV,2; IV,7; IV,8; IV,9) resemble Strode's. One significant difference between the two authors here is that our anonymous presents two rules that are not found in Strode (*MDC* IV,10-11), and furthermore adds five new rules, of which he says that they follow from the first six he has given (*MDC* IV,16-20).

The five new rules listed in this section of the fourth chapter do not really appear to have any direct connection with the *inferius-superius* relationship. The first one seems to link up with a remark made by Burley,⁴⁷ and also by Buridan concerning the invalidity of consequences involving "*est*" *secundum adiacens* and "*est*" *tertium adiacens*. According to Buridan, a consequence from "*est*" *tertium adiacens* to "*est*" *secundum adiacens* is formally not valid due to the fact that a proposition of the form '*B est A*' could be an instance of ampliation, as in *homo est mortuus*. Our anonymous states that such a consequence in the affirmative mode is permitted, provided no terms are involved that would prevent this, in the form of a distracting (*distrahens*),⁴⁸ ampliative or equivocating term (*MDC* IV,16).⁴⁹ To this he adds another rule accounting for the validity of consequences in the negative mode from "*est*" *secundum adiacens* to "*est*" *tertium adiacens* (*MDC* IV,17). The third rule on the list, stating that a consequence from a *dictum secundum quid* to a *dictum simpliciter* is not valid is actually a reformulation of the fallacy *secundum quid et simpliciter*. The last couple of rules of this section state the invalidity of consequences from a non-ampliated term to an amplified one and vice versa (*MDC* IV,19-20).

The next relationship our anonymous deals with is convertibility and correlativity. The first rule (*MDC* IV,22) resembles one of Strode's, but

⁴⁶ *De cons.*, 2.1.01, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 42.

⁴⁷ *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior*, I, 3, ed. Ph. Boehner, St. Bonaventure, N.Y. 1955, 57¹⁷⁻²⁰.

⁴⁸ For an explanation of this term see Gabriel Nuchelmans, *Secundum/tertium adiacens. Vicissitudes of a logical distinction*, Amsterdam 1992 pp. 29-30 (= Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen. Mededelingen van de Afdeling Letterkunde, Nieuwe Reeks, 55 no. 10).

⁴⁹ For other logicians who mentioned inferential schemes pertaining to "*est*" *secundum adiacens* and "*est*" *tertium adiacens*, see Nuchelmans (*op. cit.*, above, n. 48), pp. 30ff.

is stated differently.⁵⁰ The only exception explicitly mentioned in our tract is a consequence containing a verb signifying a mental act. However, in the subsequent paragraphs, where our author goes into the exact nature of convertibility, an incorrect consequence is brought up that is ruled out by Strode's rule, *viz.* a consequence that fails due to distinct suppositions in antecedent and consequent (*MDC IV*,25). Our author's second rule (*MDC IV*,26) is more precise than the one given by Strode⁵¹ in that the former rules out consequences in the plural. A little further down an important addition to the rule is given, to the effect that sometimes the rule has to be adapted, depending on the type of correlatives that are involved. For example, sometimes instead of arguing from *est* to *est*, one must argue from *est* to *est vel fuit* or *erit* (*MDC IV*,28).

Having dealt with correlativity, the last relationship the anonymous brings up for discussion in this chapter is the one between terms that are somehow opposite to each other. The rules cover all the kinds of opposition between terms, *viz.* *termini disparati*, *opposita contradictoria*, *contradictoria incomplexa*, *opposita privative*, *habitus-privacio* (*MDC IV*,30-39).

In chapter five of the tract consequences between categorical propositions are discussed. The arrangement of this chapter is tied up with his discussion of propositions, which featured earlier in the treatise (see above, pp. 183-5). The only remarkable thing here is that our author explicitly links up some rules of consequence with the doctrine of the *probaciones terminorum* (*MDC V*,18-23). Finally, in the last chapter besides the usual discussion of different kinds of hypothetical propositions (copulatives, disjunctives and conditionals), a separate set of 'consequence' is brought up, divided into causal, expletive, *similitudinariae*, temporal, and local ones. Of these the discussion of causal and temporal seem to go back to Burley.⁵²

⁵⁰ Cf. Strode, *De cons.*, 2.4.02, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 81: Secunda regula est: quando subiecta duarum propositionum convertuntur, et copule et predicate; et propositiones sunt eiusdem quantitatis et qualitatis et pro eiusdem precise supponunt; et consimiliter termini se habent quo ad ordinem situs; tunc ab una ad aliam, consequentia tenet.

⁵¹ *De cons.*, 2.4.03, ed. Seaton 1973 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 18), 82: Tertia regula est quod relativa dicuntur ad convertentia, quia ex propositione in qua predicatur illud verbum 'est' secundum adiacens, et subicitur unus simplex terminus relativus, sequitur propositio in qua subicitur alter terminus relativus.

⁵² *De puritate artis logicae tractatus longior*, III 2, ed. Boehner 1955 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 47), 124⁵-131¹³.

4 *Concluding remarks*

From the themes discussed I hope to have shown how the present treatise on consequences has benefited from previous authors and uses material from a number of traditions. Particularly Ralph Strode's work appears to play a major role in our tract. Of course there are differences too, not only in the ways in which the rules are formulated. The present tract seems to have a more strict organisation than Strode's. For example, the modal terms and the different rules that pertain to them are discussed in a separate section. The ways in which the authors formulate their rules is not entirely the same either, nor are the types of examples analysed. Moreover, sometimes Strode has rules which are missing in our tract, or the other way round. Besides borrowing from Strode, the treatise also contains elements that go back to other important works on logic. As we have seen, connections can be made with Walter Burley, John Buridan, Paul of Venice, and Richard Billingham.⁵³

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⁵³ Sincere thanks are due to Professor Braakhuis for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

sigla:

$\mathcal{Z}$	= Zaragoza (BCM), codex 15-57
$\mathcal{S}$	= Sevilla (BCC), codex 7-3-13
$\mathcal{Z}^c$	= manus quae correxit $\mathcal{Z}$
$\mathcal{S}^c$	= manus quae correxit $\mathcal{S}$
<i>add.</i>	= addidit, addiderunt
<i>con.</i>	= conieci
<i>exp.</i>	= expunxit
<i>om.</i>	= omittit, omittunt
...	= usque ad
]	= scripsi(t), scripserunt
?	= fortasse
!	= sic
< ... >	= inserui
[. . .]	= seclusi

* * *

[$\mathcal{Z}$ 65^v; $\mathcal{S}$ 82^r]

DE CONSEQUENCIIS

CAPITULUM PRIMUM

De descriptionibus consequenciarum

1 Consequencia proprie et stricte accepta describitur sic: consequencia est illacio sive sequela consequentis ex antecedente. Ut cum dicitur homo currit; ergo animal currit', hic talis consequencia dicitur quedam illacio seu habitudo consurgens per intellectum ex antecedente ad ipsum consequens. Et isto modo accipiendo consequenciam, omnis consequencia est bona et nulla consequencia est mala, quia ubi est consequencia, ibi est illacio sive sequela, que non dicitur proprie nisi de consequencia bona. Sed non ita stricte accipitur consequencia in communi usu logicorum. Secundum quosdam^a aliquando consequencia dicitur bona, aliquando dicitur consequencia mala, ut patet in sequentibus.

^a quosdam] $\mathcal{Z}$ aliquos $\mathcal{S}$

2 Consequencia large accepta describitur sic: consequencia est propositio rationalis vel condicionalis. Exemplum rationalis, ut cum dicitur 'homo currit; ergo animal currit'. Exemplum condicionalis, ut 'si homo currit, ergo animal currit'. Vel aliter: consequencia est aggregatum ex antecedente

et consequente cum nota consequencie, ut cum dicitur 'homo currit; ergo animal currit', et huiusmodi.

3 Ex quibus descripcionibus^a patet quod consequencia est duplex, scilicet propositio rationalis et propositio condicionalis. Et tales differunt in hoc quia in rationali propositio precedens vocaliter notam consequencie dicitur 'antecedens' et propositio sequens notam consequencie vocatur 'consequens', sed in condicionali propositio sequens immediate notam consequencie dicitur 'antecedens', et alia^b propositio, sive precedat sive subsequatur, [Z 66^r] vocatur 'consequens'. Ut^c cum dicitur 'tu es animal, si tu es homo', hic talis propositio 'tu es homo' dicitur antecedens, et talis propositio 'tu es animal' vocatur consequens huius consequencie. Quidam ponunt proposicionem causalem esse consequenciam et alii non, ut cum dicitur 'quia homo currit, animal currit'; de qua dicitur inferius.

^a descripcionibus]S discrecionibus Z ^b alia]Z aliqua S ^c ut]Z et S

4 Antecedens est propositio precedens mentaliter notam consequencie, ex qua denotat sequi sequens. Sed consequens est propositio sequens mentaliter notam consequencie, que denotatur sequi ex antecedente. [S 82^v] Ut cum dicitur 'homo currit; ergo animal currit', hic talis propositio 'homo currit' precedens notam consequencie dicitur antecedens, sed talis propositio 'animal currit' sequens notam consequencie vocatur consequens istius consequencie. Ex quibus patet quod antecedens semper precedit sive antecedit suum consequens, et hoc dupliciter: aliquando enim precedit mentaliter et vocaliter in^a simul, ut in sillogismo et in consequencia rationali, aliquando precedit solum mentaliter, ut in consequencia condicionali, ut cum dicitur 'animal currit, si homo currit', et huiusmodi.

^a in . . . ut]Z om. S

5 Consequenciarum^a quedam dicitur bona, quedam dicitur mala. Consequencia bona est consequencia cuius primum et adequatum significatum antecedentis non potest esse absque primo et adequato significato^b sui consequentis. Ut talis consequencia est bona 'homo currit; ergo animal currit', quia hominem currere, quod est primum et adequatum significatum sui^c antecedentis, non^d potest esse absque hoc, scilicet animal currere, quod est primum et adequatum significatum sui consequentis. Similiter talis consequencia est bona 'si homo est asinus, homo est rudibilis', quia hominem esse asinum non potest esse nisi sit ita quod homo sit rudibilis, et huiusmodi.

^a consequenciarum]Z consequencia Z ^b significato]Z^cS om. Z ^c sui]S om. Z ^d non . . . consequentis]Z om. S

6 Vel aliter: consequentia bona est cuius oppositum consequentis non est natum stare cum suo antecedente. Et ideo talis consequentia est bona 'homo currit; ergo animal currit', quia 'nullum animal currit' et 'homo currit' repugnant ad invicem. Similiter talis consequentia est bona 'si homo est asinus, homo est rudibilis', quia ly^a 'nullus homo est rudibilis', quod est oppositum consequentis, et ly^b 'homo est asinus', quod est antecedens istius consequentiae, repugnant ad invicem.

^a ly nullus]Z^c ly homo nullus Z nichil sic saepius S^b ly]Z hec S

7 [Z 66^v] Consequentia mala est consequentia cuius primum et adequatum significatum antecedentis potest esse absque primo et adequato significato sui consequentis. Ut talis consequentia non valet 'animal currit; ergo homo currit', quia animal currere potest esse absque hoc quod homo currat. Similiter talis consequentia non valet 'si tu es homo, tu curris', quia te esse hominem potest esse absque hoc quod tu curras. Ex quo patet quod si, aliquo casu possibili posito, antecedens alicuius consequentiae est verum et consequens falsum, tunc consequentia non valet. Et iste modus arguendi servatur frequenter ad probandum aliquam consequentiam non esse bonam.

8 [S 83^r] Vel aliter: consequentia mala est consequentia cuius oppositum consequentis est natum stare cum suo antecedente. Et ideo talis consequentia non valet^a 'animal currit; ergo homo currit', quia 'nullus homo currit', quod est oppositum consequentis, 'et animal currit', quod est antecedens istius consequentiae, possunt simul stare, posito casu quod solus asinus currat. Ex quo patet quod omne negans aliquam consequentiam habet admittere oppositum consequentis cum antecedente eiusdem consequentiae. Et talis modus arguendi communiter servatur contra negantem aliquam consequentiam.

^a valet]Z^cS om. Z

9 Ex predictis infertur quod ad bonitatem consequentiae non plus requiritur nisi quod consequens sequatur ex antecedente eiusdem consequentiae, sive ambo sint vera sive falsa; et ad consequentiam malam sufficit quod consequens eius non sequatur ex eius antecedente. Secundo infertur quod concedere consequentiam est concedere eius consequens sequi ex eius antecedente, sed negare consequentiam est negare eius consequens sequi ex eius antecedente.

10 Sed quidam ponunt propositionem causalem esse consequentiam. Et tunc talis dicitur consequentia bona quando res significata per eius

antecedens est vera causa rei significate per suum consequens, ut cum dicitur 'quia tu es homo, tu es animal'. Sed causalis dicitur consequentia mala quando res significata per eius antecedens^a non est vera causa rei significate per suum consequens. Ut cum dicitur 'quia tu loqueris, tu es homo', quia te loqui non est vera causa quod tu sis homo, et cum dicitur 'quia tu curris, tu moveris', posito casu quod sedeas, et huiusmodi.

^a antecedens] *S ex consequens* Ζ

11 Ex quibus patet^a quod concedere causalem esse consequentiam [Ζ 67^r] bonam est concedere causalem esse veram, et e converso, sed concedere causalem esse malam consequentiam seu non bonam est concedere causalem esse falsam, et e converso. Secundo patet quod ad causalem veram seu bonam requiritur quod tam antecedens quam consequens sit verum^b, quia antecedens falsum non potest esse vera causa sui consequentis. Tercio patet quod predictae descriptiones consequentiae bone vel consequentiae male^c et regule generales consequentiarum sequentes solum intelliguntur de consequentia rationali et condicionali, sed non [S 83^v] de consequentia causali. Quod^d probatur sic, quia talis causalis est falsa seu non bona consequentia 'quia tu curris, tu moveris', ut dictum est supra, tamen primum et adequatum significatum huius antecedentis 'tu curris' non potest esse absque primo et adequato <significato> sui consequentis; vel aliter: oppositum consequentis non est natum stare cum suo antecedente. Similiter talis causalis est falsa seu^e non bona 'quia tu es asinus, tu es rudibilis', cuius oppositum consequentis non est natum stare cum suo antecedente. Et ita de similibus^f.

^a patet] Ζ *om.* *S* ^b verum] vera Ζ ^c male] Ζ *false* *S* ^d quod] Ζ *et S* ^e seu] vel Ζ ^f et . . . similibus] *S etc.* Ζ

CAPITULUM SECUNDUM

De regulis generalibus

1 Regule generales ad probandum aliquam consequentiam esse bonam vel malam sunt quatuor. Quarum^a prima regula talis est:

Si alicuius consequentiae non potest esse sicut primo et adequate^b significatur per antecedens nisi sit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per eius consequens, tunc consequentia est bona.

Ut cum dicitur tu es homo; ergo tu es animal. Sed si alicuius consequentiae potest esse sicut primo et adequate significatur per^c antecedens absque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per eius

consequens, tunc consequentia non est bona. Ut cum dicitur 'tu es homo; ergo tu loqueris', et huiusmodi.

^a quarum ... regula] $\mathcal{Z}$ regule consequentiarum prima S^b adequate] $\mathcal{Z}$ adequato S^c per] eius consequens add. necnon exp. $\mathcal{Z}$

2 Secunda regula:

Si alicuius consequencie ex^a contradictorio consequentis cum eius antecedente fit una copulativa impossibilis, tunc consequentia est bona.

Exemplum: talis consequentia est bona 'tu es homo; ergo tu es animal', quia talis copulativa est impossibilis 'tu non es animal et tu es homo', eodem demonstrato^b. Sed si alicuius consequencie ex contradictorio consequentis cum eius antecedente fit copulativa possibilis, tunc consequentia non valet. Exemplum: talis consequentia non valet 'tu moveris; ergo tu curris', quia talis copulativa est possibilis 'tu non curris^c et tu moveris', et huiusmodi.

^a ex] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^b demonstrato] $\mathcal{Z}$ determinato S^c curris] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S

3 [$\mathcal{Z}$ 67'] Tercia regula:

Si alicuius consequencie contradictorium consequentis repugnat eius antecedenti, tunc consequentia est bona.

Exemplum: talis consequentia est bona 'tu curris; ergo tu non sedes', quia 'tu sedes' et 'tu curris' repugnant ad invicem. Sed [S 84'] si alicuius consequencie contradictorium consequentis stat vel potest stare cum eius antecedente, tunc^a consequentia non est bona. Exemplum: talis consequentia non valet 'animal currit; ergo homo currit', quia 'nullus homo currit' et 'animal currit' sunt propositiones simul stantes, et huiusmodi.

^a tunc] $\mathcal{Z}$ tu S

4 Quarta regula:

Si alicuius consequencie ex contradictorio consequentis sequitur contradictorium antecedentis eiusdem consequencie, tunc^a consequentia est bona.

Exemplum: talis consequentia est bona 'homo currit; ergo animal currit', quia sequitur 'nullum animal currit; ergo nullus homo currit'. Similiter talis consequentia est bona 'tu es homo; ergo tu non^b es asinus', quia sequitur 'tu es asinus; ergo tu non es homo', eodem^c demonstrato.

^a tunc] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^b non] $\mathcal{Z}$ S om. $\mathcal{Z}^c$ eodem demonstrato] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S

5 Ex predictis descripcionibus consequencie bone et consequencie male inferuntur quedam consequencie que videntur esse bone et^b non sunt bone. Primo: talis consequentia non valet 'Deus est; ergo hec propositio est vera "Deus est"', quia potest esse sicut primo et adequate significatur

per eius antecedens absque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per eius consequens, quia, posito tali casu quod cras nulla sit propositio, tunc erit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per^d hoc antecedens 'Deus est', tamen non erit ita^e sicut primo et adequate significatur per hoc consequens 'hec propositio est vera "Deus est"', quia talis propositio non erit.

^a predictis] regulis et *add.* *S*^b et . . . bone] *℥ om.* *S*^c est] *℥^c S om.* *℥*^d per . . . significatur] *℥^e om.* *S*^e ita] *℥^e ista S*

6 Secundo: talis consequentia non valet 'hec propositio "homo est asinus" est vera; ergo homo est asinus', quia, posito quod cras talis 'propositio homo est asinus' significet Deum esse, tunc erit ita^a sicut^b primo et adequate significatur per eius antecedens, tamen non erit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per eius consequens. Tercio: talis consequentia non valet 'nulla propositio est vera; ergo homo est asinus', quia, posito casu quod pro aliquo tempore futuro nulla propositio sit, tunc erit ita^c sicut primo et adequate significatur per eius antecedens, tamen non erit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per eius consequens.

^a ita] *℥ ista S* ^b sicut . . . ita] *℥^c S om.* *℥*^c ita] *℥^c S om.* *S*

7 Quarto: talis consequentia non valet 'nulla propositio est negativa; ergo omnis propositio est affirmativa', eodem casu posito. Sed talis consequentia est bona 'omnis [S 84^v] propositio est affirmativa; ergo nulla propositio est negativa', quia oppositum consequentis repugnat eius antecedenti. Quinto: talis consequentia non valet 'solus asinus demonstratur; ergo tu non es homo', quia, posito casu quod post unam horam solus [℥ 68^r] asinus demonstratur te dicente 'iste asinus currit', tunc erit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per eius antecedens; tamen^a non erit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per hoc consequens 'tu non es homo', quia propter demonstrationem asini non oportet te desinere esse hominem.

^a tamen] *℥^c S om.* *℥*

8 Consimiliter conceditur talis propositio 'hoc est et hoc non est', eodem demonstrato, quia hoc est, demonstrato^a Sorte, et hoc non est, demonstrato Antichristo vel chimera. Ergo^b hoc est et hoc non est, eodem demonstrato, idest dum idem demonstratur, quia verum est quod idem demonstratur, quia si Sortes demonstratur, idem Sorti demonstratur, et per consequens idem demonstratur, licet per utrumque 'hoc' non idem demonstratur, et huiusmodi. Sed si arguatur 'Antichristus vel chimera demonstratur per ly^c "hoc"; ergo Antichristus vel chimera est', non valet

consequencia, quia^d istud verbum 'demonstratur' vel eius participium est ampliativum, <ita> quod potest verificari de termino supponente pro re existente vel non existente, ut dictum est in prima parte huius logice, in ultima regula ampliacionum.

^a demonstrato . . . est]Z^cS om. Z^b ergo]S om. Z^c ly]Z^cS om. Z^d quia]Z quod S

9 Consequenciarum bonarum quedam^a est formalis seu bona de forma, quedam est materialis seu bona de materia. Consequencia formalis est consequencia bona cui quilibet^b consequencia ei^c similis in forma seu in modo arguendi, si formetur, est bona^d, in quibuscumque terminis fiat, et consequens eiusdem est de intellectu sui antecedentis. Exemplum: talis consequencia est formalis^e, scilicet^f 'homo^g currit; ergo animal currit', quia^h talis consequencia eiⁱ similis in^j forma^k est bona, scilicet 'asinus currit; ergo animal currit' et talis consequentia ei similis est bona 'capra currit; ergo animal currit'. Et ita de omnibus^l aliis similibus in^m modo arguendi. [S 85^r] Consequencia materialis est consequencia bona cui non quilibet consequencia similis in modo arguendi, si formetur, est bona, vel cuius antecedens est impossibile in quo non includitur eius consequens aut cuius consequens est necessarium quod non includitur in eius antecedente.

^a quedam]S enim add. Z^b quilibet]Z libet S^c ei]S om. Z^d bona]S consequencia add. Z^e formalis]Z bona S^f scilicet]S om. Z^g homo]Z asinus S^h quia]Z^c et S om. Zⁱ ei]S eis(!) Z^j in . . . similis]Z om. S^k forma]con. modo arguendi Z^l omnibus]Z multis S^m in]S om. Z

10 Ex qua descriptio^a patet quod consequencia materialis est triplex. Quedam enim dicitur materialis seu bona de materia vel gracia terminorum, quia non quilibet consequencia ei similis in modo arguendi, si formetur, est bona. Ut^b talis consequencia est bona de materia vel gracia terminorum 'tu es animal; ergo tu es homo', demonstrato homine. Sed talis consequencia ei similis in^c modo arguendi non valet 'tu es animal; ergo tu es asinus', cuius antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. [Z 68^r] Similiter talis consequencia est bona 'tu non es homo; ergo tu non es animal', demonstrato homine. Sed talis consequencia ei similis in modo arguendi non valet 'tu non es asinus^d; ergo tu non es animal', cuius antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, et huiusmodi. Alia dicitur materialis quia eius antecedens est impossibile, in quo non^e includitur consequens eiusdem, ut cum dicitur 'homo est asinus; ergo baculus stat in angulo'. Alia dicitur materialis quia eius consequens est necessarium quod non includitur in eius antecedente, ut cum dicitur 'tu curris; ergo Deus est', et huiusmodi.

^a descriptio]Z discripcionem S^b ut]Z et S^c in . . . similis]Z om. S^d asinus . . . es]Z^cS om. Z^e non includitur]Z includit S

11 Ex istis infertur quod talis consequentia est materialis 'nichil^a est; ergo aliquid est', quia eius antecedens est impossibile, et^b consequens eiusdem non includitur formaliter in eius antecedente. Et similiter talis consequentia est materialis 'nulla chimera est; ergo aliquid est', quia eius consequens est necessarium et non includitur formaliter in eius antecedente. Similiter talis consequentia est materialis 'nichil est; ergo Deus est^c', quia eius antecedens est impossibile et consequens necessarium, et consequens non includitur formaliter in antecedente. Et ita de multis similibus^d.

^a nichil]Z'S vel Z^b et . . . antecedente]Z om. S^c est]Z'S om. Z^d similibus]S aliis Z

12 Secundo infertur quod, si alicuius consequentie antecedens est impossibile in quo formaliter includitur eius consequens, tunc consequentia est formalis; ut cum dicitur 'homo est asinus; ergo homo est animal', et huiusmodi. Tercio infertur [S 85^v] quod, si alicuius consequentie consequens est necessarium quoda formaliter includitur in eius antecedente, tunc consequentia est formalis; ut cum dicitur 'Deus est; ergo Deus est', et huiusmodi.

^a quod]ZS^c om. S

13 Quarto inferuntur due regule communes. Quarum prima regula talis est:

Ex impossibili sequitur^a quidlibet,

quia^b hoc potest fieri dupliciter: aliquando formaliter, et tunc consequens est de intellectu sui antecedentis; aliquando materialiter^c, et tunc consequens non est de intellectu sui antecedentis, ut patet in predictis exemplis. Secunda regula:

Necessarium sequitur ad quidlibet,

quia hoc potest fieri dupliciter: aliquando formaliter, aliquando materialiter, ut patet ex nunc dictis.

^a sequitur]Z ad add. S^b quia]S quod Z^c materialiter]S materialis Z

CAPITULUM TERTIUM

De regulis generalibus consequentie formalis

1 Regule generales consequentie formalis sunt decem et octo. Prima regula:

Si alicuius consequentie bone et formalis antecedens est verum, consequens eius est verum^a.

Exemplum: talis consequentia est bona 'tu es homo; ergo tu es animal'; cuius antecedens est verum, ergo consequens eiusdem est verum. Unde dicitur communiter quod ex vero non sequitur nisi verum, sed ex falso quandoque verum et^b quandoque falsum. Exemplum quod ex falso sequitur^c verum, ut cum dicitur 'homo est asinus; ergo homo est animal'. Exemplum quod ex falso sequatur falsum, ut cum dicitur 'homo est asinus; ergo homo est rudibilis', et huiusmodi.

^a verum]Z^c falsum S^b et]Z^c om. S^c sequitur... falso]Z^c om. S

2 Si quis negat istum modum arguendi habet^a admittere oppositum consequentis stare^b cum antecedente. Et tunc est danda consequentia bona et formalis cuius antecedens est verum [Z 69^r] et consequens eiusdem non est verum, ergo consequens est falsum, cum tale consequens sit propositio, et omnis propositio sit vera vel falsa. Et gracia exempli: sit C^c illa consequentia est^d bona, cuius antecedens^e verum sit A, et consequens^f falsum sit B. Et tunc arguitur sic: C consequentia est bona cuius antecedens est verum et^g consequens falsum. Ergo sicut primo et adequate significatur per A, antecedens, potest esse absque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per B, consequens. Ergo C, consequentia facta ab A ad ipsum B, non est bona, et per te est bona. Et^h per consequens eadem consequentia erit bona et non bona, quod est contradiccio.

^a habet]Z abet(!) S^b stare]Z^c om. ZS^c c]Z^cS^c om. Z^d est]Z^cS^c om. Z^e antecedens... A] antecedens est verum A sit Z verum sit A S^f consequens... B]S consequens sit falsum B Z^g et]Z^c om. S^h et... consequens]Z ergo S

3 Sed contra regulam^a arguitur sic^b: Talis consequentia est bona 'tu es homo et tu es asinus; ergo tu es asinus', cuius antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. [S 86^r] Ergo regula falsa. Sed quod antecedens huius consequencie sit verum probatur quia: Talis propositio 'tu es homo' est vera; que est eius antecedens, accipiendo 'antecedens' de virtute vocabuli pro illo quod antecedit seu precedit notam consequencie, et accipiendo 'consequens^c' pro illo quod sequitur. Quidam dicunt quod in ista regula et aliis regulis sequentibus debet poni ly 'totale antecedens' et^d ly 'totale consequens', accipiendo ly 'totale' categorice. Sed dico quod non oportet poni ly 'totale' categorice sumptum, neque^e sincategorice sumptum, quia, accipiendo proprie 'antecedens' et 'consequens', quicquid est antecedens alicuius consequencie dicitur totale antecedens^f, et e converso. Et^g quicquid est consequens alicuius consequentie dicitur totale consequens, et e converso. Et ideo talis propositio 'tu es homo' non dicitur antecedens

illius consequencie, licet sit pars illius antecedentis. Et ratio est quia pars non est suum totum, neque totum est sua pars^h, ut patet intuitiⁱ.

^a regulam] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^b sic] $\mathcal{Z}^c S$ om. $\mathcal{Z}^c$ consequens] $\mathcal{Z}^c S$ consequentiam $\mathcal{Z}^d$ et . . . consequens] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^e neque . . . sumptum] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^f antecedens] consequens $\mathcal{Z} S^g$ et . . . e converso] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^h pars] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^i intuiti] S et huiusmodi add. $\mathcal{Z}$

4 Secunda regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis consequens est falsum, antecedens eiusdem^a est falsum.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona ‘tu es asinus; ergo tu non es homo’; cuius consequens est falsum, ergo antecedens eiusdem est falsum, et huiusmodi. Si quis negat istum modum arguendi, habet admittere oppositum consequentis cum antecedente. Et tunc est danda consequencia bona et formalis cuius consequens est falsum et antecedens eiusdem non est falsum, ergo antecedens est verum, cum omnis propositio^b sit vera vel falsa. Et tunc erit consequencia bona et formalis cuius antecedens est^c verum et consequens^d falsum, quod est oppositum prime regule precedentis. Ex quo potest inferri contradiccio, sicut in predicta^e regula.

^a eiusdem] $\mathcal{Z}$ eius S^b propositio] vel add. S^c est] $\mathcal{Z}$ erit S consequens] $\mathcal{Z}$ erit add. S^e predicta] S prima $\mathcal{Z}$

5 Sed talis modus arguendi non valet “antecedens illius consequencie precise et primarie significando sicut [$\mathcal{Z}$ 69^v] nunc significat non potest esse verum sine consequente, vel nisi consequens sit verum; ergo illa consequencia est bona”, quia talis consequencia non valet ‘nulla propositio est vera; ergo tu es asinus’, cuius antecedens^a precise et primarie significando sicut nunc significat non potest esse verum; ergo non potest esse verum sine consequente nec cum consequente, quia si tale antecedens sit verum, sequitur quod aliqua propositio est vera et nulla propositio est vera, quod est contradiccio.

^a antecedens] $\mathcal{Z}$ antecedente S

6 Secundo: talis modus arguendi non valet “antecedens illius consequenciea potest esse verum sine consequente utroque precise et primarie significante^b; ergo illa consequencia non valet”, quia talis consequencia est bona^c ‘tu es homo, [S 86^v] ergo tu es animal’; cuius antecedens potest esse verum sine consequente, posito casu quod in aliquo futuro^d instanti talis propositio sit vera ‘tu es homo’, nulla alia^e remanente, et huiusmodi. Tercio: talis modo arguendi non valet “antecedens illius consequencie potest esse verum, consequente existente falso; ergo illa consequencia non valet”, quia talis consequencia est bona ‘tu es asinus; ergo tu non es

homo'; cuius antecedens potest esse verum consequente existente falso, quia illud antecedens potest imponi ad significandum aliquid verum, consequente remanente falso, et huiusmodi.

^a consequencie] $\mathcal{Z}$ non add. S^b significante] $\mathcal{Z}$ significate S^c bona] $\mathcal{Z}$ si add. S^d futuro] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^e alia] aliqua $\mathcal{Z}S$

7 Quarto: etiam talis modus arguendi non valet "antecedens illius consequencie potest esse verum consequente existente falso, utroque significante precise et primarie sicut nunc significat; ergo illa consequencia non valet", quia talis consequencia est bona 'tu curris; ergo tu non^a sedes'—posito casu quod sedeas—cuius antecedens est verum, consequente existente falso. Quod probatur sic: Et sit A illud instans in quo tam antecedens quam consequens illius consequencie sint^b falsum, et tunc arguatur sic: in A instanti antecedens illius consequencie est falsum dum consequens existit falsum, utroque significante precise et primarie sicut nunc significat; ergo vel contingenter vel necessario; sed non necessario; ergo contingenter; et per consequens in A instanti antecedens illius consequencie potest non esse falsum dum consequens existit falsum. Ex quo infertur quod in eodem instanti antecedens illius consequencie potest esse verum, consequente existente falso, idest dum consequens existit falsum, utroque significante precise et primarie sicut nunc significat, et huiusmodi.

^a non] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^b sint] sit S

8 Tercia regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis antecedens est necessarium, consequens eiusdem est necessarium.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona 'Deus est; ergo Deus est', cuius antecedens est necessarium, ergo consequens eiusdem est necessarium, et huiusmodi. Unde dicitur quod ex necessario non sequitur [$\mathcal{Z}$ 70^r] nisi necessarium. Si quis negat istum modum arguendi, habet admittere oppositum consequentis cum antecedente. Et tunc est danda consequencia bona et formalis cuius antecedens est necessarium et consequens eiusdem non est necessarium, ergo tale consequens est contingens vel impossibile, cum omnis propositio sit necessaria vel contingens vel impossibilis. Et^a gracia exempli: sit C^b illa consequencia, cuius antecedens^c necessarium sit A, et consequens^d contingens vel impossibile sit B. [S 87^r] Et tunc arguitur sic: A est necessarium; ergo sicut primo et adequate significatur per A non potest non esse; et B, sive sit contingens sive sit impossibile, ergo^e sicut primo et adequate significatur per B potest non esse. Ex quo sequitur quod sicut primo et adequate significatur per antecedens A potest esse^f

absque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur^g per consequens B; ergo C, consequentia facta ab A ad ipsum B, non est bona. Et^h per te est bona. Ergo eadem consequentia est bona et non bona, quod est contradiccio.

^a et]Z ut S ^b C]Z^cS A Z^c antecedens]S est add. Z^d consequens]S om. Z^e ergo]Z^cS om. Z^f esse]Z^cS om. Z^g significatur]Z om. S ^h et . . . tertium bona]Z^cS om. Z

9 Contra regulam arguitur sic: Talis consequentia est^a bona ‘omnis homo est animal; et tu es homo; ergo tu es animal’, cuius antecedens est necessarium et consequens^b contingens. Ergo illa^c regula falsa. Dico quod tam antecedens quam consequens huius consequencie est contingens. Licet enim prima pars antecedentis sit necessaria, et secunda pars sit contingens, tamen totum antecedens dicitur contingens, quod^d est una copulativa composita ex una parte necessaria et altera contingenti. Sed talis modus arguendi non valet “hec propositio est necessaria; ergo necesse est esse sicut illa significat”, quia si necesse est esse^e sicut illa significat, ergo necesse est illam^f significare, et per consequens necesse est illam esse; quod est falsum. Sed talis modus arguendi valet “hec propositio est necessaria; ergo sicut per illam primo et adequate significatur necesse est esse”, vel sic “hec propositio est necessaria; ergo primum et adequatum significatum^g eius necesse est esse”, et huiusmodi.

^a est]Z om. S ^b consequens]S contingens Z quod del. Z^c illa]S om. Z^d quod]S quia Z^e esse]Z^cS om. Z^f illam]Z illa S ^g significatum]Z^cS om. Z

10 Quarta regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone^a et formalis^b consequens est contingens, antecedens eiusdem est contingens vel impossibile.

Exemplum: talis consequentia est bona ‘tu curris; ergo tu moveris’, cuius consequens est contingens, et antecedens similiter est contingens. Similiter talis consequentia est bona ‘tu differs ab ente; ergo tu es’, cuius^c consequens est contingens et antecedens impossibile, et huiusmodi. Si quis negat istum modum arguendi, habet admittere oppositum consequentis cum antecedente. Et tunc^d est danda consequentia bona et formalis cuius consequens est contingens et antecedens eiusdem non est contingens neque impossibile, ergo tale antecedens est necessarium, cum omnis propositio sit necessaria vel contingens vel [S 87] impossibilis. Et tunc erit^e consequentia bona et formalis cuius antecedens est necessarium et consequens est^f contingens, quod est oppositum tertie regule precedentis.

^a bone] est add. necnon exp. S ^b formalis] est add. S ^c cuius]Z^c tu pos(?) Z alicuius S ^d tunc]S sequitur quod add. Z^e erit]S est Z^f est]S erit Z

11 [Z 70^v] Quinta regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis antecedens^a est possibile^b, consequens eiusdem est possibile.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona et^c formalis 'tu curris; ergo tu non sedes', cuius antecedens est possibile, ergo consequens eiusdem est possibile, et huiusmodi. Si quis negat istum modum arguendi, habet admittere oppositum consequentis cum antecedente. Et tunc est danda consequencia bona et formalis cuius antecedens est possibile et consequens eiusdem non est possibile, ergo tale consequens est impossibile, cum omnis propositio sit possibilis vel^d impossibilis. Et gracia exempli: sit C illa consequencia, et arguitur sic: C consequencia est bona et formalis cuius antecedens est possibile et consequens impossibile; ergo sicut primo et adequate significatur per eius antecedens potest esse absque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per eius consequens; ergo C consequencia non est bona, et per te est bona; ergo eadem consequencia erit bona et non bona^e, quod est contradiccio.

^a antecedens]Z om. S ^b possibile]S ex impossibili Z ^c et formalis]Z om. S ^d vel impossibilis]Z om. S ^e bona]Z^cS om. Z

12 Contra regulam arguitur sic: Talis consequencia est bona 'omne currens est asinus^a; omnis homo est currens; ergo omnis homo est asinus', cuius antecedens est possibile et consequens impossibile. Ergo regula falsa. Dico quod tam antecedens quam consequens illius consequencie est impossibile. Licet enim^b utraque pars antecedentis sit possibilis, tamen totum antecedens est impossibile, quia est una copulativa composita ex maiori et minori que sunt propositiones impossibiles^c.

^a asinus]Z et add. S ^b enim]Z in S del. S ^c impossibiles]Z^cS impossibiles Z

13 Sexta regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis consequens est impossibile, antecedens eiusdem^a est impossibile.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona 'si homo est asinus, homo est rudibilis'; cuius consequens est impossibile, ergo antecedens eiusdem est impossibile, et huiusmodi. Si quis negat istum modum arguendi, habet admittere oppositum consequentis cum antecedente. Et tunc est danda consequencia bona [S 88^r] et formalis cuius consequens est impossibile et antecedens eiusdem non est impossibile, ergo tale antecedens est possibile, cum omnis propositio sit possibilis vel impossibilis. Ex quo infertur quod erit bona consequencia et formalis cuius antecedens erit possibile

et consequens erit impossibile. Quod est oppositum quinte regule precedentis.

^a eiusdem]S eius Z

14 Sed talis modus arguendi non valet “hec propositio est^a impossibilis; ergo non potest esse^b sicut illa significat”, quia quilibet propositio^c mundi impossibilis potest esse, significando sicut illam significat, ergo potest esse’ sicut illa significat. Sed iste modus arguendi valet “hec propositio est impossibilis; ergo sicut per illam primo et adequate significatur non potest esse”. Vel aliter: “hec propositio est impossibilis; ergo primum et adequatum significatum eius non potest esse”, et huiusmodi.

^a est]Z om. S ^b esse]Z^cS om. Z ^c propositio mundi]Z^c propositio[n]um Z est add. S

15 Septima regula:

Si alicuius consequencie^a scite^b a te esse bone antecedens [Z 71^r] est scitum a te esse verum, consequens eiusdem est scitum a te esse verum.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona et scita a te esse bona ‘tu es homo; ergo tu es animal’, quia scis eius consequens sequi ex eius antecedente. Ergo si antecedens istius consequencie est scitum a te esse verum, consequencie eiusdem est scitum a te esse verum, et huiusmodi. Quilibet expertus logicus volens istam regulam probare et alias regulas sequentes potest consimiles rationes seu probationes facere. Quare dimitto, causa brevitatis retinende et prolixitatis evitande.

^a consequencie]ZS bone et formalis add. *necnon del.* Z b a te]Z ante S

16 Sed talis modus arguendi non valet “hec consequencia est bona et scita a te esse bona, cuius antecedens est scitum a te; ergo consequens eiusdem est scitum a te”, quia talis consequencia est bona et scita esse bona ‘Deus est; ergo A est’, posito casu possibili^a quod ly^b A sit quedam^c propositio ebrayca significans Deum esse, et hoc sit scitum a te, tamen eius terminos ignores; tunc ista consequencia est bona et scita a te esse bona^d, quia tu scis bene consequens sequi ex eius antecedente. Sed istius consequencie antecedens est scitum a te, et consequens eiusdem non est scitum a^e te, quia tale consequens non intelligis cuius terminos [S 88^v] ignoras^f. Ex quo infertur quod iste modus arguendi similiter non valet “hec^g consequencia est bona et scita a te esse bona, cuius antecedens est intellectum a te; ergo consequens eiusdem est intellectum a te”, ut patet in consequencia nunc dicta, et huiusmodi.

^a possibili]Z om. S ^b ly]Z hoc S ^c quedam]S^c quoddam S om. Z ^d bona]Z^cS om. Z ^e a te]Z om. S ^f ignoras]S ignores Z ^g hec]Z om. S

17 Octava regula:

Si alicuius consequencie scite a te esse bone consequens est tibi dubium, antecedens eiusdem est tibi dubium vel creditum esse falsum.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona et scita a te esse bona ‘rex sedet; ergo rex sedet’, cuius consequens est tibi dubium et antecedens eiusdem^b est tibi dubium. Similiter talis consequencia est scita a te esse bona ‘rex sedet et^c nullus rex sedet; ergo rex sedet’, cuius consequens est tibi dubium et antecedens creditum esse falsum, quia tale antecedens est copulativa composita^d ex partibus ad^e invicem contradictoriis^f, et huiusmodi. Sed talis modus arguendi non valet “consequens illius consequencie est tibi dubium et antecedens eiusdem est tibi dubium vel creditum esse falsum; ergo illa consequencia est^g bona”, quia^h talis consequencia non valet ‘rex sedet; ergo papa dormit’, cuius tam consequens quam antecedens est tibi dubium, et huiusmodi.

^a eiusdem]Z^cS om. Z^b eiusdem]Z^cS om. Z^c et]Z ergo S^d composita]S facta Z^e ad invicem]Z^cS om. Z^f contradictoriis]S contradicentibus Z^g est bona]Z^cS om. Z^h quia] oppositum consequentis stat cum antecedente add. Z

18 Nona regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis antecedens est concedendum, consequens eiusdem est concedendum.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona et formalis ‘tu es homo; ergo tu es^a animal’, cuius antecedens est concedendum, ergo consequens eius est concedendum, et huiusmodi. Sed talis modus arguendi non valet “antecedens illius consequencie [Z 71^v] est concedendum et^b consequens eiusdem est concedendum; ergo consequencia est bona”, quia talis consequencia non valet ‘tu moveris; ergo tu curris’, cuius tam antecedens quam consequens est concedendum^c, posito casu quod tu curras, et huiusmodi.

^a es animal]Z non es asinus S^b et]Z om. S^c concedendum] dum add. S

19 Decima regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis consequens est negandum, antecedens eiusdem est negandum.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona et formalis ‘si tu es asinus, tu non es homo’, cuius consequens est negandum, ergo antecedens eiusdem est negandum. Similiter talis consequencia est bona [S 89^r] ‘nichil est; ergo nullus deus est’, cuius consequens est negandum, ergo antecedens eiusdem est negandum, et huiusmodi.

20 Ex istis regulis patet quod si alicuius consequencie antecedens est concedendum et consequens eiusdem est negandum, illa consequencia

non valet, licet stet aliquam consequentiam esse bonam cuius antecedens est negandum et consequens eiusdem est concedendum, ut cum dicitur 'homo est asinus; ergo homo est animal', et huiusmodi. Sed talis modus arguendi non^a valet "consequens illius consequencie est negandum et antecedens eiusdem est negandum; ergo consequencia est^b bona", quia talis consequencia non valet 'tu curris; ergo tu sedes', cuius tam antecedens quam consequens est negandum, posito casu quod tu non curras neque sedeas, et huiusmodi.

^a non valet] *℥* om. *℥*^b est] *S* om. *℥*

21 Undecima regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis antecedens est pure negativum, consequens eiusdem non est affirmativum.

Exemplum: talis consequencia^a est bona et formalis 'nullum animal currit; ergo nullus homo currit', cuius antecedens est pure negativum et consequens eiusdem est negativum, et huiusmodi. Unde dicitur communiter quod ex pura negativa formaliter non sequitur affirmativa. Sed e converso, ex affirmativa bene sequitur negativa, ut bene sequitur 'tu es homo; ergo tu non es asinus', et huiusmodi. Sed primo in regula dicitur^b "ex pura negativa", quia ex propositione affirmativa exceptiva negativa bene potest sequi affirmativa, ut 'nullus homo preter Sortem currit; ergo Sortes currit'. Sed talis exceptiva non dicitur pura negativa, quia in se includit affirmativam. Secundo dicitur "formaliter", quia materialiter ex pura negativa potest sequi affirmativa, ut 'nichil est; ergo Deus est', et huiusmodi.

^a consequencia] *℥* om. *S*^b dicitur] quod add. *℥*

22 Dua decima regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis consequens est affirmativum, antecedens eiusdem non est pure negativum.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona et formalis 'homo currit; ergo animal currit', cuius consequens est affirmativum, [*℥* 72^r] et antecedens eiusdem non est pure negativum, et huiusmodi.

23 Contra istas duas regulas arguitur sic: Talis consequencia est bona et formalis 'nichil est; ergo aliquid est', cuius antecedens est pure negativum, et consequens esta affirmativum. Ergo iste regule sunt false. Antecedens probatur, scilicet quod talis consequencia sit bona et formalis, quia: Formaliter [*S* 89^v] sequitur 'nichil est; ergo sic est quod nichil est', quia ex opposito consequentis sequitur oppositum antecedentis^b, ut non est ita quod nichil est. Ergo^c aliquid est. Et inde sequitur sic: sic est quod nichil

est. Ergo aliquo modo est quod nichil est, et aliquo modo est quod nichil est^d. Ergo aliquis modus est^e et^f aliquis modus est. Ergo aliquid est. Ergo^g a primo antecedente ultimum consequens sequitur formaliter 'nichil est; ergo aliquid est'.

^a est] *S om.* ^b antecedentis] *Z consequentis S^c ergo ... tertium est] Z om. S^d est] Z om. S^e est] bis in S^f et ... est] *Z^e S om. Z^g ergo ... antecedente] S a primo autem antecedente Z**

24 Dico quod talis consequentia est materialis 'nichil est; ergo aliquid est', quia eius antecedens est impossibile, vel consequens necessarium, et eius consequens non^a includitur formaliter in antecedente. Sed ad probationem potest responderi dupliciter. Uno modo quod illa^b prima consequentia probationis est materialis et non formalis^c 'si nichil est; ergo sic est quod nichil est', quia eius antecedens est^d impossibile, et consequens non est de intellectu sui^e antecedentis. Et ideo non omnes ille consequencie^f sunt bone et formales^g. Quare formaliter non includitur 'nichil est'. Ergo aliquid est^h.

^a non] *bis in S^b illa] consequentia add. S^c formalis] Z formaliter S^d est] S dicitur Z^e sui antecedentis] Z consequentis S^f consequencie] que add. necnon del. Z^g formales] formalis S^h est] *S om. Z**

25 Alio modo faciendo talem distinctionem de ly 'sic' vel 'ita'. Quod^a potest accipi dupliciter: aliquando enim ly 'sic' vel 'ita' dicit modum entitatis^b vel affirmationis, ut cum dicitur 'homo est; ergo sic est vel ita est quod homo est', idest *aliquo modo entitatis vel affirmationis est quod homo est*. Et tunc illa consequentia non valet de forma 'nichil est; ergo sic est quod nichil est', quia eius consequens significat quod aliquo modo entitatis est quod nichil est. Quod esset falsum antecedente supposito, quia^c si nichil est, nec aliquis modus entitatis est, et per consequens neque aliquo modo entitatis est quod nichil est. Aliquando ly 'sic' vel 'ita' dicit modum nichilitatis vel negacionis. Et^d isto modo conceditur illa prima consequentia 'nichil est; ergo sic est quod nichil est'. Via vero nichilitatis vel negacionis est quod nichil est.

^a quod ... ita] *Z^e S om. Z^b entitatis] Z emittatis(!) sic saepius S^c quia] S quod Z^d et ... negacionis] Z om. S*

26 Sed negetur secunda consequentia, scilicet^a 'sic est quod nichil est; ergo aliquo modo est quod^b nichil est; ergo aliquis modus est^c', quia arguitur a *secundum quid* ad *simpliciter*, quia modus nichilitatis vel negacionis proprie vel simpliciter non est aliquis modus, scilicet entitatis. Et ideo <non> omnes iste consequencie sunt bone et formales, quia formaliter non includitur 'nichil est; ergo aliquid est'. Consimiliter potest responderi ad tale argumentum 'nulla chimera est; ergo sic est quod nulla chimera

est; ergo aliquo modo est quod nulla chimera est et aliquo modo est quod nulla chimera est; ergo^d aliquis modus est et aliquis modus est; ergo aliquid est; a primo antecedente ad^e ultimum consequens sequitur 'nulla chimera est; ergo [S 90^r] aliquid est', cuius antecedens est pure negativum et consequens affirmativum. Et ita de similibus^f.

^a scilicet]Z si S^b quod . . . est]Z^c S om. Z^c est]Z om. S^d ergo . . . alterum est]Z^e S om. Z^e ad]Z quia S^f similibus] et huiusmodi add. Z

27 [Z 72^v] Tercia decima regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis aliquid stat cum antecedente, illud potest stare cum eius consequente, sed non econverso.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona et formalis 'homo currit; ergo animal currit'. Sed talis propositio 'homo est albus' stat cum hoc antecedente 'homo currit', quia simul stant 'homo currit' et 'homo est albus'. Ergo illa potest stare cum eius consequente, quia simul stant 'animal currit', et 'homo est albus', et huiusmodi. Sed dixi in regula "sed non econverso", quia talis propositio 'nullus homo currit' potest stare cum hoc consequente 'animal currit', sed illa non potest stare cum eius antecedente^a, quia 'nullus homo currit' et 'homo currit' repugnant ad invicem. Sed talis modus arguendi non valet "ista consequencia est bona; ergo quicquid stat cum eius antecedente stat cum consequente eiusdem", quia stat aliquam consequenciam esse bonam, ut in^b ista 'homo currit; ergo animal currit', et quod nichil stet cum eius antecedente et consequente, et huiusmodi.

^a antecedente]Z consequente S^b in ista]Z ille S

28 Quarta decima regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis aliquid repugnat consequenti, illud potest repugnare eius antecedenti, sed non econverso.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona et formalis 'homo currit; ergo animal currit'. Sed^a talis propositio 'nullum animal currit' vel talis 'nullum corpus currit' repugnat huic consequenti 'animal currit'. Ergo illa potest repugnare huic antecedenti 'homo currit', et huiusmodi. Sed dixi in regula "sed non econverso", quia talis propositio 'nullus homo currit' repugnat huic antecedenti 'homo currit', sed illa non^b repugnat eius consequenti, quia simul stant 'nullus homo currit' et 'animal currit'. Sed talis modus arguendi non valet "ista consequencia est bona; ergo quicquid repugnat eius consequenti, repugnat eius antecedenti", quia stat aliquam consequenciam esse bonam et quod nichil repugnat^c eius antecedenti nec consequenti, et^d huiusmodi.

^a sed]Z exemplum S^b non]Z^c S om. S^c repugnat]S repugnet Z^d et huiusmodi]Z om. S

29 Quinta decima regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis aliquid [S 90^v] antecedit ad antecedens, illud potest antecedere ad eius consequens, sed non econverso.

Exemplum: talis consequentia est bona et formalis homo currit^a; ergo animal currit^b. Sed talis propositio Sortes currit antecedit ad hoc antecedens homo currit, quia bene sequitur Sortes currit; ergo homo currit. Ergo illa potest antecedere ad illud consequens animal currit, quia bene sequitur Sortes currit; ergo animal currit. Sed loquendo hic de “bene antecedere” semper^d facit consequentiam bonam. Sed dixi in regula “sed non econverso”, quia talis propositio asinus^c currit potest antecedere ad illud consequens animal currit, quia bene sequitur asinus currit; ergo animal currit. Sed illa non potest antecedere ad illud antecedens homo currit, quia^g non sequitur asinus currit; ergo homo currit, et huiusmodi. Sed talis modus arguendi non valet “ista consequentia [Z 73^r] est bona et formalis; ergo quicquid antecedit ad illud^h antecedens antecedit ad eius consequens”, quia statim consequentiam esse bonam et quod nichil antecedit ad eius antecedensⁱ.

^a currit]Z est S ^b currit]Z est S ^c quia . . . alterum currit]Z^cS om. Z ^d semper]Z quod S ^e asinus . . . alterum currit]Z animal currit sequitur ex illo antecedente asinus currit S ^f quia . . . currit]Z om. S ^g quia]S quod Z ^h illud]Z^c om. ZS ⁱ stat]S estant(!) Z ^j antecedens] et huiusmodi add. Z

30 Decima sexta regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis aliquid sequitur ex consequente, illud potest sequi ex eius antecedente, sed non econverso.

Exemplum: talis consequentia est bona et formalis ‘homo currit; ergo animal currit’. Sed talis propositio ‘corpus currit’ vel ‘substantia currit’ sequitur ex tali consequenti^b ‘animal currit’, quia bene sequitur ‘animal currit; ergo corpus currit’ vel ‘ergo substantia currit’. Ergo^c illa potest sequi ex illo antecedente ‘homo currit’, quia bene sequitur ‘homo currit; ergo corpus currit’ vel ‘ergo substantia currit’, et huiusmodi. Sed dixi in regula “sed non econverso”, quia talis propositio ‘rationale currit’ sequitur ex illo antecedente ‘homo currit’, quia^d bene sequitur ‘homo currit; ergo rationale currit’. Sed illa non potest sequi ex illo consequente ‘animal currit’, quia^e non sequitur ‘animal currit; ergo rationale currit’, et huiusmodi. Sed talis^f modus arguendi non valet “ista consequentia est bona; ergo quicquid sequitur ex consequente sequitur ex^g eius antecedente, vel quicquid sequitur ad eius consequens sequitur ad eius antecedens”, quia stat aliquam consequentiam esse bonam et quod^h nichil sequitur ex eius consequente, et huiusmodi.

^a illud]Z aliquis S ^b consequenti]Z antecedenti S ^c ergo . . . quantum currit]Z^cS om. Z ^d quia . . . currit]Z^cS om. Z ^e quia]S quod Z ^f talis]Z^cS om. Z ^g ex]Z om. S ^h quod]Z om. S

31 Decima septima regula:

Si alicuius consequencie bone et formalis aliquid sequitur ex antecedente et consequente, illud potest sequi ex eius antecedente per se.

Exemplum: talis consequencia est bona et formalis 'homo currit; ergo animal currit'. Sed talis propositio 'substantia currit' sequitur ex antecedente et consequente. Ergo illa potest sequi ex antecedente per se, ut patet intuenti.

32 [S 91^r] Contra istas duas^a regulas precedentes arguitur dupliciter. Primo contra decimam quintam regulam sic. Talis consequencia est bona et formalis 'pater est; ergo suus filius est'. Sed ista propositio 'filius est'^b antecedit ad eius antecedens, quia bene sequitur 'filius est; ergo pater est'. Tamen ipsa non antecedit ad eius consequens, quia non sequitur 'filius est; ergo suus filius est'. Ergo istius consequencie bone et formalis aliquid antecedit ad eius antecedens quod non potest antecedere ad eius consequens. Ergo regula est^c falsa.

^a duas]Z om. S ^b est]Z om. S ^c est]S om. Z

33 Secunda arguitur contra decimam sextam regulam sic. Talis consequencia est bona et formalis 'bipedalis linea est; ergo pedalis linea est'. Sed talis propositio 'linea semipedalis est eius maxima medietas' sequitur ad eius consequens, quia bene sequitur 'pedalis^a linea est'^b; ergo linea semipedalis^c est eius maxima medietas'. Tamen ipsa non sequitur ex eius antecedente, quia non sequitur 'bipedalis linea est; ergo linea semipedalis est eius maxima medietas', cum sit^d antecedens verum [Z 73^v] et consequens falsum. Ergo illius consequencie bone et formalis aliquid sequitur ex eius consequente quod non sequitur ex eius antecedente. Et per consequens regula est falsa.

^a pedalis]Z^cS pedis Z ^b est]S om. Z ^c semipedalis]Z^cS semipedis Z ^d sit]Z om. S

34 Dico quod predictae regule intelliguntur^a non variata relacione, quia facta alicuius relacionis variacione non remanet eadem propositio. Et ideo ad primum, quando dicitur 'pater est; ergo suus filius est', tunc ly 'suus' refertur ad ly 'pater'. Sed^b quando dicitur in ultima illacione 'filius est; ergo suus filius est', tunc refertur ad ly 'filius'. Et sic non remanet illud idem consequens, sed dicitur alia propositio similis^c in virtute^d illi consequenti propter relacionis variacionem. Et sic nichil contra regulam, quia illud^e quod antecedit ad tale antecedens 'pater est' non antecedit ad eius consequens, sed ad aliam propositionem similem consequenti.

^a intelliguntur]Z^cS om. Z ^b sed]S et Z ^c similis]Z simili S ^d virtute]S voce Z ^e illud quod]Z^cS om. Z

35 Ad secundum^a respondetur consimili modo, quando eius talis propositio 'linea semipedalis est eius maxima [S 91'] medietas' infertur ex consequente, tunc illud relativum 'eius' refertur ad ly^a 'pedalis linea'; sed quando infertur ex antecedente, tunc refertur ad ly 'bipedalis linea'^b. Et sic non remanet eadem propositio propter^c relacionis variacionem, sed dicitur alia propositio que refertur ad consequens et^d alia propositio que refertur ad antecedens. Et sic non est contra regulam. Et ita^e de similibus.

^a secundum]S secundam Z^b ly]S illud Z^c bipedalis linea]S bipedalis Z^c pedalis Z^d et . . . refertur]Z^cS om. Z^e ita]Z sic S

36 Decima octava regula, et ultima

Si sint multe consequencie intermedie bone et formales et non variate, arguendo a primo ad ultimum consequens est consequencia bona et formalis.

Exemplum, ut cum dicitur 'homo currit, ergo animal currit; et animal currit, ergo corpus currit; et corpus currit, ergo substantia currit; et substantia currit, ergo ens currit; ergo a primo antecedente ad ultimum consequens sequitur formaliter "homo currit; ergo ens currit"', et huiusmodi.

^a consequencia]Z^cS om. Z

37 Primo dicitur in regula "consequencie intermedie bone et formales", quia si aliqua ipsarum consequenciarum intermediarum fuerit consequencia mala, tunc arguendo a primo antecedente ad ultimum consequens formaliter non valet consequencia. Ut cum dicitur: si nullum tempus est, dies non est^a; et si dies non est, nox est; et si nox est, aliquod tempus est; ergo a primo antecedente ad ultimum consequens formaliter non sequitur 'si nullum tempus est, aliquod tempus est', quia illa secunda consequencia intermedia non valet 'si dies non est, nox est', quia ex pura negativa formaliter^b non sequitur affirmativa. Et dico "formaliter", quia talis consequencia potest dici bona de materia, 'si nullum tempus est, aliquod tempus est', quia eius antecedens dicitur impossibile saltem naturaliter, et consequens non est de intellectu antecedentis^c.

^a est]Z^cS om. Z^b formaliter]Z om. S^c antecedentis]Z consequentis S

38 Secundo dicitur in regula "et non variate", quia [Z 74^r] tunc consequencie non dicuntur variate quando solum illud quod est consequens prioris consequencie est^a antecedens alterius consequencie immediate^b sequentis, et sic de singulis consequenciarum intermediarum usque ad ultimam. Ut patet in primo exemplo huius regule. Sed consequencie dicuntur variate quando aliquid^c fuerit antecedens [S 92^r] vel pars antecedentis alicuius consequencie intermedie quod non fuerit consequens alterius consequencie immediate^d precedentis. Ut cum dicitur: homo currit, ergo

animal currit; et animal currit, ergo corpus currit; et corpus currit, et omne corpus est album, ergo substantia alba currit; ergo a primo antecedente usque^c ad ultimum consequens formaliter non sequitur 'homo currit; ergo substantia alba currit', quia talis propositio 'omne corpus est album' fuit antecedens vel pars antecedentis tercię consequencie, que non fuit consequens secunde consequencie immediate^f precedentis. Et ita de similibus.

^a est] $\mathcal{Z}^c S$ et $\mathcal{Z}^b$ immediate sequentis] $\mathcal{Z}$ intermedie sequentes S^c aliquid] S aliquod $\mathcal{Z}^d$ immediate] $\mathcal{Z}$ intermedie S^c usque ad] $\mathcal{Z}$ ad S^f immediate] $\mathcal{Z}$ intermedie S

CAPITULUM QUARTUM

De regulis specialibus tangentibus habitudinem terminorum vel propositionum

1 Regule speciales consequenciarum sunt multe. Quarum ordo est triplex. Primo enim ponuntur regule consequenciarum tangentes habitudinem terminorum. Secundo ponuntur regule consequenciarum tangentes habitudinem propositionum cathegoricarum. Tercio ponuntur regule tangentes habitudinem propositionum ypoteticarum. De primis est triplex ordo. Primo de consequenciis terminorum ab inferiori ad suum superius, et e converso. Secundo de consequenciis terminorum convertibilium et correlativorum. Tercio de consequenciis disparatorum et aliorum terminorum oppositorum vel impertinentium. De quibus per ordinem est agendum.

De consequenciis terminorum ab inferiori ad superius

2 De consequenciis terminorum ab inferiori ad suum superius et e converso ponuntur sex regule sequentes. Prima regula:

Ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative et sine impedimento, idest^a distributione et dictione habente vim negacionis et verbo significante actum anime, omnibus aliis terminis eiusdem consequencie manentibus omnino consimilibus, consequencia est bona et formalis.

Exemplum arguendo a parte subiecti, ut sequitur 'homo currit; ergo animal currit'. Exemplum a parte predicati, ut 'homo currit; ergo^b homo movetur', et huiusmodi.

^a idest] S et $\mathcal{Z}$ et sine $\mathcal{Z}^c$ $\mathcal{Z}^b$ ergo] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S

3 Ex tali regule patet quod, arguendo ab inferiori [S 92^v] ad suum superius negative, consequencia formaliter non valet. Ut non sequitur 'asinus non^a currit; ergo animal non currit', quia antecedens est verum et consequens

falsum, posito casu quod nullus asinus sit^b, sed^c omne animal currat. Sed dico “formaliter”, quia talis consequentia est bona de materia ‘tu non es homo; ergo tu non es animal’, demonstrato homine. Secundo patet quod ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative cum distributione superioris et inferioris consequentia formaliter non valet. Ut non sequitur [Z 74^v] ‘omnis homo currit; ergo omne animal currit’. Sed dico “formaliter”, quia talis consequentia est bona de materia ‘omnis homo est; ergo omne animal est’.

^a non]Z^cS om. Z^b sit]Z^cS om. Z^c sed] bis in S

4 Tercio patet quod^a ab inferiori ad suum superius cum distributione habente vim negacionis consequentia formaliter non valet, ut sunt ly^b ‘incipit’ et^c ‘desinit’ et dicciones exclusive vel exceptive vel reduplicative^d et similes. Exemplum cum ly ‘incipit’, ut non sequitur ‘Sortes incipit esse albus; ergo Sortes incipit esse coloratus’. Exemplum cum ly ‘desinit’, ut non sequitur ‘Sortes desinit currere; ergo Sortes desinit moveri’. Exemplum cum diccione exclusiva, ut non sequitur ‘tantum homo currit; ergo tantum homo movetur’. Exemplum cum diccione exceptiva, ut non sequitur ‘omnis homo preter Sortem currit; ergo omnis homo preter Sortem movetur’, et huiusmodi. Sed dixi “formaliter”, quia talis consequentia est bona de materia ‘Sortes incipit esse homo; ergo Sortes incipit esse animal’. Similiter ista consequentia est bona de materia ‘Sortes desinit esse homo; ergo Sortes desinit esse animal’, et huiusmodi.

^a quod]S om. Z^b ly]Z^c om. S^c et]Z^c om. S^d reduplicative] scilicet negative add. Z

5 Quarto patet quod^a ab inferiori ad suum superius cum verbo significante actum anime consequentia formaliter non valet. Ut non^b sequitur ‘dubito illud esse hominem; ergo dubito illud esse animal’, et huiusmodi. Sed dixi “formaliter”, quia talis consequentia est bona de materia ‘Sortem scio esse hominem; ergo Sortem scio esse animal’, et ita de similibus in terminis substantialibus.

^a quod]S om. Z^b non sequitur]S om. Z

6 Ultimo ponitur [S 93^r] in regula “omnibus^a aliis terminis eiusdem consequencie manentibus omnino consimilibus”. Et ideo talis consequentia non valet ‘homo currit; ergo animal disputat’. Similiter non sequitur ‘homo currit; ergo asinus movetur’, licet in utraque istarum consequentiarum arguitur ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative et sine impedimento. Tamen alii termini eiusdem consequencie non sunt omnino consimiles^b, ut patet intuenti.

^a omnibus]S omnis Z^b consimiles]S similes Z

7 Secunda regula:

Ab inferiori ad suum superius a parte subiecti cum negacione postposita, et facta debita constancia eiusdem superioris de eodem inferiori et sine distribucione inferioris et superioris, omnibus aliis terminis eiusdem consequencie manentibus omnino consimilibus, consequencia est bona et formalis.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'homo non currit; ergo animal non currit', et huiusmodi. Primo dicitur in regula "cum negacione postposita", quia cum negacione preposita consequencia formaliter non valet. Ut non sequitur 'non homo currit; et omnis homo est animal; ergo non animal currit'. Secundo dicitur "cum debita constancia subiecti", quia sine constancia superioris de eodem^a inferiori consequencia formaliter non valet. Ut non sequitur 'asinus non currit; ergo animal non currit', ut dictum fuit^b in regula precedente. [Z 75^r] Tercio dicitur "sine distribucione inferioris et superioris", quia cum tali distribucione consequencia formaliter non valet. Ut non sequitur 'omnis homo non currit; et omnis homo est animal; ergo omne animal non currit'. Quarto dicitur "omnibus aliis terminis eiusdem consequencie manentibus omnino consimilibus". Et ideo talis consequencia non valet 'homo non est albus et omnis homo est animal; ergo animal non est coloratum', et huiusmodi.

^a eodem]Z^c om. ZS ^b fuit]Z est S

8 Tercia regula:

Ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative, sed^a a parte predicati, et^b cum distribucione affirmativa eiusdem subiecti existentis in antecedente et consequente, consequencia est bona.

Exemplum, ut <sequitur> 'omnis homo currit; ergo omnis homo movetur', et huiusmodi. Primo in regula dicitur "affirmative^c", seu^d cum distribucione affirmativa, quia negative, seu cum distribucione negativa, consequencia formaliter non valet. Ut non sequitur 'nullus homo currit; ergo nullus homo [S 93^v] movetur'. Sed dico "formaliter", quia talis^e consequencia est bona de materia 'nullus homo est homo; ergo nullus homo est animal', et huiusmodi.

^a sed]S om. Z ^b et]S om. Z ^c affirmative]Z affirmativa S ^d seu ... affirmativa]ZS del. Z^e talis]Z om. S

9 Quarta regula:

Ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative, sed a parte subiecti, cum dictione exclusiva addita inferiori et superiori, ceteris terminis eiusdem consequencie manentibus omnino consimilibus, consequencia est bona et formalis.

Exemplum, ut^a sequitur 'tantum homo currit; ergo tantum animal currit', et huiusmodi. Sed dixi "a parte subiecti", quia a parte predicati consequencia

non valet. Ut non sequitur 'tantum homo currit; ergo tantum animal^b movetur', et huiusmodi.

^a ut]Z'S om. Z^b animal]Z' homo ZS

10 Quinta regula:

A superiori distributo affirmative ad suum inferius distributum affirmative cum debita constancia eiusdem superioris de eodem^a inferiori, ceteris terminis eiusdem consequencie manentibus omnino consimilibus, consequencia est bona et formalis.

Exemplum arguendo a parte subiecti, ut sequitur 'omne animal currit; et omnis homo est animal; ergo omnis homo currit'. Exemplum a parte predicati, ut sequitur 'tu es omne animal; et omnis homo est animal; ergo tu es omnis homo', et huiusmodi.

^a eodem]Z'S om. Z

11 Ex qua regula patet quod a superiori ad suum inferius sine distributione consequencia formaliter non valet. Ut non sequitur 'animal currit; ergo homo currit'. Sed dico "formaliter", quia talis consequencia est bona de materia [Z 75^r] 'tu es animal; ergo tu es homo', demonstrato homine. Secundo patet quod a superiori distributo affirmative ad suum inferius distributum affirmative sine debita constancia superioris de inferiori, consequencia formaliter non valet. Ut non sequitur 'omne animal currit; ergo omnis homo currit', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod nullus homo sit et omne animal currat. Ultimo ponitur in regula "ceteris terminis eiusdem consequencie manentibus omnino consimilibus", sicut dictum fuit in regulis precedentibus.^a

^a precedentibus] et huiusmodi *add.* Z

12 Sexta regula, et ultima:

A superiori distributo negative ad suum inferius distributum negative, ceteris terminis eiusdem consequencie manentibus omnino consimilibus, consequencia est bona et formalis.

Exemplum arguendo a parte subiecti, ut sequitur 'nullum animal currit; ergo nullus homo currit'. Exemplum a parte [S 94^r] predicati, ut sequitur 'tu non es animal; ergo tu non es homo', et huiusmodi. Ex qua regula patet quod arguendo a superiori distributo negative ad suum inferius distributum negative est bona consequencia, sive arguendo cum debita constancia sive arguendo sine^a ipsa^b constancia superioris de inferiori.

^a sine]Z'S cum Z^b ipsa]Z debita S

13 Contra primam regulam, probando^a quod ab^b inferiori ad suum superius affirmative sine impedimento consequencia non valet, <arguitur

sic>. Et arguitur communiter^c quatuor modis primo sic: talis consequentia non valet 'Sortes legit Vergilium; ergo Sortes agit Vergilium'. Secundo non sequitur 'iste est apparens asinus; ergo iste est ens asinus'. Tercio non sequitur 'iste est monachus albus; ergo iste est homo albus'. Quarto non sequitur 'li "homo" est masculinum; ergo ly "animal" est masculinum', et non sequitur 'ly "homo" est species specialissima; ergo ly "animal" est species specialissima'. In quibus videtur per regulam argui ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative *etc.*

^a probando] $\mathcal{Z} \dots (?)$ S^b ab] ad S^c communiter . . . modis] communiter S quatuor modis $\mathcal{Z}$

14 Ad primum dico quod quando ly 'legit' et 'agit' accipiuntur sine aliquo addito, se habent tamquam inferius et superius. Et tunc bene sequitur 'Sortes legit; ergo Sortes agit'. Sed^a quando accipiuntur cum addito^b, non semper se habent tamquam inferius et superius, ut cum dicitur 'Sortes legit Vergilium; ergo Sortes agit Vergilium'. Similiter non sequitur 'Sortes amat Petrum; ergo Sortes agit Petrum'. Consimiliter potest responderi^c ad secundum et ad tertium. Ad quartum dico quod quando^d ly 'homo' et 'animal' accipiuntur personaliter, se habent tamquam inferius et superius, sed quando accipiuntur materialiter, non se habent [$\mathcal{Z}$ 76'] tamquam inferius et superius. Ex quibus patet quod in nulla istarum consequentiarum arguitur ab inferiori ad suum superius affirmative.

^a sed] S quia $\mathcal{Z}^b$ addito] $\mathcal{Z}$ additis S^c responderi] S dici $\mathcal{Z}^d$ quando] non *add.* S

15 Contra quintam regulam, probando quod a superiori^a ad suum inferius^b affirmative et sine distribucione valet consequentia, arguitur sic: talis consequentia est bona 'numerus est; ergo binarius est', quia^c non est imaginabile numerum esse et quod nullus binarius sit, quia si est^d aliquis numerus, oportet quod sit binarius vel maior quam binarius, et talis semper includit numerum binarium. [S 94'] Dico quod talis consequentia est bona de materia, et non de forma. Similiter bene sequitur de materia 'tu es animal; ergo tu es homo', demonstrato homine. Et ita de similibus.

^a superiori] $\mathcal{Z}^c$ S inferiori $\mathcal{Z}^b$ superiori] $\mathcal{Z}^c$ S inferiori $\mathcal{Z}^c$ quia . . . sit] $\mathcal{Z}^d$ S om. $\mathcal{Z}^d$ est] $\mathcal{Z}^c$ S om. $\mathcal{Z}$

16 Circa regulas predictas ponuntur quinque regule sequentes, in quibus arguitur vel videtur argui ab inferiori ad suum superius, vel econverso. Prima regula^a:

A tercio adiacente ad ipsum secundum adiacens affirmative et sine termino distrahente et ampliativo^b et termino equivocante seu impediante alium terminum a suo principali significato^c, consequentia est bona, sed non econverso.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'homo est albus; ergo homo est', et 'sequitur homo currit; ergo homo est', et huiusmodi. Primo dixi in regula "sine termino

distrahente”, quia non sequitur ‘Adam est mortuus; ergo Adam est’. Secundo dixi “sine termino ampliativo”, quia non^d sequitur ‘Antichristus est generabilis; ergo Antichristus est’. Tercio dixi “sine termino equivocante seu impediante alium terminum a suo principali significato”, quia non sequitur ‘Cesar est pictus^e; ergo Cesar est’, vel ‘Cesar est homo pictus; ergo Cesar est’. Quarto dixi “sed non econverso”, quia non sequitur ‘homo est; ergo homo est albus^f’, vel ‘ergo homo currit’, et huiusmodi.

^a regula] quod *add.* $\mathcal{Z}^b$ ampliativo] S apiante $\mathcal{Z}^c$ significato] significate S^d non] $\mathcal{Z}^e S$ *om.* $\mathcal{Z}^e$ pictus . . . *alterum* est] $\mathcal{Z}$ *om.* S^f albus] $\mathcal{Z}$ asinus S

17 Secunda regula:

A secundo adiacente ad ipsum tertium adiacens negative et sine termino distrahente et ampliativo et^a termino equivocante seu impediante alium terminum a suo principali significato, consequentia est bona, sed non econverso.

Exemplum, ut sequitur ‘nullus homo est; ergo^b nullus homo est^e albus’, et sequitur ‘nullus homo est; ergo nullus homo currit’, et huiusmodi. Primo dixi in regula “sine termino distrahente, quia non^d sequitur ‘Adam non est; ergo Adam non est mortuus’. Secundo dixi “sine termino ampliativo”, quia non sequitur ‘Antichristus non est; ergo Antichristus non est generabilis vel [$\mathcal{Z}$ 76] generandus’. Tercio dixi “sine termino equivocante seu impediante alium terminum a suo principali significato”, quia non sequitur ‘Cesar non est; ergo Cesar non est pictus’ vel^e ‘ergo Cesar non est homo pictus’. Quarto dixi “sed non econverso”, quia non sequitur ‘nullus homo est albus^f; ergo nullus homo est’, et huiusmodi.

^a et] $\mathcal{Z}^e S$ a $\mathcal{Z}^b$ ergo] $\mathcal{Z}^e S$ *om.* $\mathcal{Z}^c$ est] $\mathcal{Z}^e S$ *om.* $\mathcal{Z}^d$ non sequitur] $\mathcal{Z}$ sequitur non S^e vel] $\mathcal{Z}$ *om.* S^f albus] $\mathcal{Z}$ asinus S

18 [S 95^r] Tercia regula:

A dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter consequentia non valet, sed accipiendo “dictum secundum quid” stricte. Quod potest fieri quatuor modis. Primo cum termino diminvente stricte accepto. Et ideo non sequitur ‘Ethiops est albus secundum dentes; ergo Ethiops est albus’. Similiter non sequitur ‘chimera est ens fictum; ergo chimera est ens^a’. Secundo cum termino distrahente, ut non sequitur ‘homo est homo mortuus; ergo homo est homo’. Tercio cum termino ampliativo, ut non sequitur ‘Antichristus est homo generabilis; ergo Antichristus est homo’, et non sequitur ‘chimera est ens opinabile; ergo chimera est ens’. Quarto cum termino equivocante seu impediante alium terminum a suo principali significato, ut non sequitur ‘iste est^b homo pictus; ergo iste est homo’. Unde iste terminus ‘homo’ per se significat hominem verum, sed cum adiunctione huius termini ‘pictus’ equivocatur^c ad significandum hominem pictum, et per consequens tunc impeditur a suo principali significato, quia principaliter

significat hominem verum, et minus principaliter significat^d rem pictam cum termino adiuncto, que proprie non dicitur homo, et huiusmodi.

^a ens] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S ^b est homo] S homo est $\mathcal{Z}$ ^c equivocatur ad significandum] $\mathcal{Z}$ impeditur quod significaret S ^d significat . . . que] $\mathcal{Z}$ cum tali adiunctione significante esse pictum sed S

19 Quarta regula:

A termino non ampliato^a ad ipsum ampliatum^b, tam affirmative quam negative, consequentia formaliter non valet.

Exemplum affirmative, ut non sequitur ‘omne currens est homo; ergo omne currens potest esse homo’. Similiter non sequitur^c ‘Deus est creans; ergo Deus de necessitate est creans’, et huiusmodi. Sed dixi “formaliter”, quia talis consequentia est bona de^d materia ‘Deus est; ergo Deus potest esse’, et talis consequentia est bona ‘homo est; ergo homo potest esse’, et huiusmodi. Exemplum negative, ut non sequitur ‘Antichristus non est; ergo Antichristus non potest esse’, et non sequitur ‘Antichristus non est; ergo Antichristus non est generabilis’. Sed dixi “formaliter”, quia talis consequentia est bona de materia ‘Deus non est; ergo Deus non potest esse’, et huiusmodi.

^a ampliato] ampliativo $\mathcal{Z}$ S ^b ampliatum] $\mathcal{Z}$ compilatum S ^c sequitur] S valet $\mathcal{Z}$ ^d de materia] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S

20 Quinta regula, et ultima:

A termino ampliato^a ad ipsum non ampliatum, tam [$\mathcal{Z}$ 77^r] affirmative quam negative, consequentia [S 95^r] formaliter non valet.

Exemplum affirmative, ut non sequitur ‘Antichristus est^b generabilis; ergo Antichristus est’, et non sequitur ‘Antichristus potest esse^c; ergo Antichristus est’. Similiter non sequitur ‘omne creans necessario est Deus; ergo omne creans est Deus’, et huiusmodi. Sed dixi “formaliter”, quia talis consequentia est bona de materia ‘Deus potest esse; ergo Deus est’, quia in Deo, qui est purissimus actus, non distat actus a potencia. Exemplum negative, ut non sequitur ‘nullum animal de necessitate est currens; ergo nullum animal est currens’, et non sequitur ‘nullus deus de necessitate est creans; ergo nullus deus est creans’. Sed dixi “formaliter”, quia talis consequentia est bona de materia ‘Deus non potest esse; ergo Deus non est’, et huiusmodi.

^a ampliato] S ampliativo $\mathcal{Z}$ ^b est] $\mathcal{Z}$ non est $\mathcal{Z}$ S ^c esse] antichristus add. S

De regulis tangentibus terminos convertibiles et correlativos

21 De consequentiis terminorum^a convertibilium et correlativorum ponuntur tres regule sequentes. Prima regula:

Ab uno convertibili ad reliquum suum convertibile, sine verbo significante actum anime, tam affirmative quam negative, consequentia est bona.

Exemplum affirmative, ut sequitur 'homo currit; ergo risibile^b currit', et sequitur 'tu es homo; ergo tu es risibilis'. Exemplum^c negative, ut sequitur 'nullus homo currit; ergo nullum risibile currit'. Et sequitur 'tu non es homo; ergo tu non es risibilis', et huiusmodi. Sed dicitur in regula "sine verbo significante actum anime", quia cum verbo significante actum anime consequentia formaliter non valet. Ut non sequitur 'scio istum esse hominem; ergo^d scio istum esse risibilem', quia stat quod sciam et intelligam aliquem esse hominem, seu rationem^e formalem quare est homo, ignorando^f seu nesciendo^g eius propriam passionem.

^a terminorum] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^b risibile] S rationale $\mathcal{Z}^c$ exemplum . . . risibilis] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^d ergo . . . hominem] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^e rationem formalem] $\mathcal{Z}^f$ rationalem formalem $\mathcal{Z}$ ratione formaliter S^f ignorando] et hoc non intelligendo suam propriam passionem add. $\mathcal{Z}^m$ ^g nesciendo] $\mathcal{Z}$ neciendo(!) S

22 Ex qua regula patet quod^a

arguendo a^b diffinitione ad suum diffinitum tam affirmative quam negative consequentia est bona, et e converso.

Exemplum affirmative, ut sequitur 'tu es homo; ergo tu es animal rationale mortale', et e converso. Exemplum^c negative, ut sequitur 'tu non es homo; ergo tu non es animal rationale mortale', et huiusmodi.

^a quod] $\mathcal{Z}$ quare S^b a diffinitione] $\mathcal{Z}$ ad diffinitionem S^c exemplum . . . mortale] S om. $\mathcal{Z}$

23 [S 96^r] Termini convertibili sunt multiplices. Primo termini sinonimi, ut 'Marcus^a', 'Tullius', 'Cicero^b'. Secundo species et sua propria passio, ut sunt ly 'homo' et ly^c 'risibilis^d' et ly 'asinus' et 'rudibilis^e', et ly 'equus' et ly hinnibilis^f, et huiusmodi. Tercio diffinitio et suum diffinitum, ut ly 'homo' et ly^g 'animal rationale mortale'. Quarto descriptio et suum descriptum, et similes. Similiter convertibilia dicuntur propositiones que mutuo se^h sequuntur, [$\mathcal{Z}$ 77^v] ut sunt propositiones equipollentes ad invicem. Et propositio convertens et sua conversaⁱ, et propositio exponibilis et copulativa composita ex omnibus suis exponentibus^j, et propositio resolubilis^k et copulativa facta ex omnibus suis solventibus, cum quibus convertitur; etiam propositio descriptibilis et^l sua describens, et similes, de quibus inferius dicitur, ubi determinatur^m de consequentiis categoricarum.

^a marcus] et add. S^b cicero] scicero(!) $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^c ly] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^d risibilis] resibilis(!) sic saepius S^e rudibilis] resibilis S^f hinnibilis] hinnibile $\mathcal{Z}$ bos et mugibilis S^g ly] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^h se] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^i conversa] $\mathcal{Z}$ converso(!) S^j exponentibus] $\mathcal{Z}$ compositis S^k resolubilis] $\mathcal{Z}$ exponibilis S^l et] $\mathcal{Z}^m$ S cum $\mathcal{Z}^m$ determinatur] $\mathcal{Z}$ determinantur S

24 Contra regulam arguitur sic, quia non sequitur 'iste asinus est risibilis^a; ergo iste asinus est homo', quia antecedens est verum et^b consequens falsum, posito casu quod iste asinus sit Sortis^c. Secundo non^d sequitur 'risibile est proprium hominis; ergo homo est proprium hominis'. Tercio, isti termini sunt convertibiles: ly 'homo' et 'tantum homo', sed non sequitur 'homo est; ergo tantum homo est'. Ergo regula est falsa.

^a risibilis] idest homo *add.* $\mathcal{Z}^m$ ^b et] $\mathcal{Z}$ *om.* ^c sortis] S sortes $\mathcal{Z}^d$ non] $\mathcal{Z}$ *om.* S

25 Ad primum dico quod ly 'homo' et ly 'risibilis' consimilium casuum sunt termini convertibiles. Sed ly 'homo' nominativi casus et ly 'risibilis' genitivi casus non sunt convertibilia, ut patet in proposito. Ad secundum dico quod quando ly 'risibile' et ly^a 'homo' accipiuntur personaliter^b, sunt termini convertibiles, sed quando accipiuntur materialiter, ut in proposito, non sunt convertibilia. Ad tertium dico quod ly 'homo' et 'tantum homo' non^c convertuntur. Sed talis propositio 'tantum homo est' potest accipi dupliciter: uno^d modo de subiecto excluso, et tunc sequitur et convertitur cum illa [S 96'] 'homo est^e', alio modo exclusive seu tamquam propositio proprie exclusiva, et tunc non sequitur ex illa 'homo est'. Et ita de similibus^f.

^a ly] $\mathcal{Z}$ *om.* S ^b personaliter . . . accipiuntur] $\mathcal{Z}$ ' S *om.* $\mathcal{Z}^c$ non] S *om.* $\mathcal{Z}^d$ uno modo] S primo $\mathcal{Z}^e$ est] et significat quod aliquid quod est homo et nichil aliud quam homo est *add.* S de hoc habetur in quinta regula de exclusivis addita subiecto *add.* $\mathcal{Z}^m$ ^f similibus] et huiusmodi *add.* $\mathcal{Z}$

26 Secunda regula:

Ab uno correlativorum ad reliquum suum correlativum a parte subiecti cum isto verbo 'est' <singulari> de secundo adiacente, tam affirmative quam negative, consequentia est bona.

Exemplum affirmative, ut sequitur 'pater est; ergo filius est', et sequitur 'dominus est; ergo servus est', et sequitur 'agens est; ergo patiens est'. Exemplum negative, ut sequitur 'pater non est; ergo filius non est', et huiusmodi. Primo dixi in regula "a parte subiecti", quia a parte predicatorum consequentia non valet, ut non sequitur 'tu es pater; ergo tu es filius'. Secundo dixi "cum isto verbo 'est'^a singulari", quia cum verbo plurali consequentia non valet, ut non sequitur 'filii sunt; ergo patres sunt'. Similiter cum verbo de preterito consequentia non valet, ut non sequitur 'pater fuit; ergo filius fuit'. Similiter cum verbo de futuro consequentia non valet, ut non sequitur 'pater erit; ergo filius erit'. Similiter cum verbo adiectivo consequentia non valet, ut non sequitur 'pater^b currit; ergo filius currit'. Tercio dixi "de secundo adiacente", quia cum tercio adiacente consequentia formaliter non valet, ut non sequitur 'pater est bonus; ergo filius est bonus', et huiusmodi.

^a est singulari] est $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S ^b pater . . . sequitur] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S

27 Quidam dicunt quod ly 'parens' et 'filians' sunt proprie^a [$\mathcal{Z}$ 78^r] correlative, et non ly^b 'pater' et 'filius', quia bene sequitur 'parens est; ergo filians est', et e converso, sed non sequitur 'pater est; ergo filius est', neque e converso, quia^c stat esse patrem et habebit filiam, et non filium. Similiter potest esse filius quia habeat^d matrem, et non^e patrem, et istud stat^f satis simplicitate opinionis. Alii dicunt quod ly 'pater' et 'filius'^g possunt accipi dupliciter. Uno modo logicaliter seu in communi genere, et tunc dicuntur^h proprie correlativa sicut ly 'parens' [S 97^r] et 'filians'. Alio modo gramaticaliter seu in masculino genere, et tunc simpliciter non dicuntur correlativa nisi cum disiunctione utriusque sexus—ut suntⁱ ly 'pater vel mater', et ly 'filius vel filia'—, et tunc sequitur 'pater est; ergo filius vel filia est', et e converso 'filius est; ergo pater vel mater est', et huiusmodi. Et istud est satis defendibilis opininonis. Consimiliter potest dici de istis correlativis 'dominus' et 'servus', et 'magister' et 'discipulus', et huiusmodi.

^a proprie] S propria $\mathcal{Z}$ ^b ly] S om. $\mathcal{Z}$ ^c quia] $\mathcal{Z}$ S om. $\mathcal{Z}$ ^d habeat] S habebat $\mathcal{Z}$ ^e non] $\mathcal{Z}$ S om. $\mathcal{Z}$ ^f stat . . . opinionis] S est satisfacere opinionis $\mathcal{Z}$ ^g filius] quia bene sequitur *add. necnon exp.* S ^h dicuntur] $\mathcal{Z}$ dicunt S ⁱ sunt] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S ^j vel] S et $\mathcal{Z}$

28 Sed talis regula non est generalis omnibus correlativis, nisi arguitur cum tali adiunctione^a 'est' vel 'fuit' vel 'erit' vel 'poterit esse'. Et ratio est: Aliquando enim consequentia valet cum isto verbo 'est' de secundo adiacente, ut 'pater est; ergo filius est'. Aliquando consequentia valet cum ly 'est' vel 'fuit', ut^b sequitur 'quantum est; ergo quantum est vel fuit'. Aliquando consequentia valet cum ly^c 'est' vel 'erit', ut sequitur 'prius est; ergo poterit esse vel erit'. Dum enim prior pars motus vel temporis est, pars posterior^d non est, sed erit vel poterit esse. Ideo non sequitur 'hoc prius est; ergo suum posterius est', et huiusmodi. Aliquando consequentia valet cum ly^e 'est' vel 'poterit esse', ut sequitur 'scibile est; ergo sciencia est vel poterit esse'. Similiter sequitur 'productum est; ergo productibile est vel poterit esse', et huiusmodi. Unde talis materia correlativorum tangit materiam relacionum^f. Que est altioris speculacionis^g. Et ideo de hac materia supersedeo, causa brevitatis retinende et puerorum facilioris intellectionis servande^h.

^a adiunctione] $\mathcal{Z}$ adiuncio S ^b ut sequitur] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S ^c ly] S hoc verbo $\mathcal{Z}$ ^d posterior] S motus posterioris $\mathcal{Z}$ ^e ly] S tali verbo $\mathcal{Z}$ ^f relacionum] S relativi $\mathcal{Z}$ ^g speculacionis] $\mathcal{Z}$ speculaciones S ^h servande] $\mathcal{Z}$ conservande S

29 Tercia regula, et ultima:

Ab activa^a ad suam^b passivam, terminis supponentibus consimili modo, consequentia est bona, et e converso.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'Sortes cenat piscem^c; ergo piscis^d cenatur a Sorte'. Similiter sequitur 'intelligo rosam; ergo a me intelligitur rosa', et econverso^e. Sed dixi in regula "terminis supponentibus consimili modo". Et ideo talis consequentia^g non valet 'omnis homo videt aliquem [Z 78^v] hominem; ergo aliquis homo videtur ab omni homine', [S 97^v] quia eius antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod omnis homo videat semet^h ipsum et nullus homo videatur ab omni homine. Sed bene sequitur 'omnis homo videtⁱ aliquem hominem; ergo ab homine videtur^j aliquis homo', et^k huiusmodi.

^a activa] activam S ^b suam] suum S ^c piscem] picem S ^d piscis] picem S ^e econverso]S huiusmodi Z ^f et]S om. Z ^g consequentia]S om. Z ^h semet]Z se S ⁱ videt]S videat Z ^j videtur]S videatur Z ^k et huiusmodi]S om. Z

De consequentiis terminorum disparatorum et oppositorum

30 De consequentiis terminorum disparatorum et aliorum terminorum oppositorum ponuntur quinque regule sequentes. Prima regula:

De quocumque termino in recto cum verbo substantivo de presenti et sine impedimento affirmatur unum disparatorum, ab eodem est negabile reliquum suum disparatum.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes non est asinus', et huiusmodi. Sed econverso consequentia formaliter non valet, quia ex pura negativa formaliter non sequitur affirmativa; ut non sequitur 'Sortes non est asinus; ergo Sortes est homo', quia antecedens est verum et^a consequens falsum, posito casu quod nullus Sortes sit. Unde dicitur communiter quod ab uno disparatorum affirmative ad reliquum negative est bona consequentia, sed non econverso.

^a et]Z om. S

31 Primo in regula dixi "de quocumque termino in recto", quia de aliquo termino in^a obliquo possunt affirmari duo termini disparati, ut cum^b dicitur 'Sortis est asinus et Sortis est capra', et huiusmodi. Secundo dixi "cum verbo substantivo de presenti", quia cum verbo adiectivo consequentia formaliter non valet. Ut non sequitur 'Sortes videt hominem; ergo Sortes non videt asinum', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod Sortes videat hominem et asinum. Tercio dixi "sine impedimento", quia cum aliqua dictione habente vim negacionis consequentia non valet. Ut non sequitur tantum homo est homo; ergo tantum homo non est asinus, quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, et huiusmodi.

^a in]S om. Z ^b cum]Z om. S

32 Secunda regula:

De quocumque termino in recto cum verbo substantivo de presenti et sine impedimento affirmatur unum oppositorum contrariorum, tam mediatorum quam immediatorum, ab eodem est negabile reliquum suum contrarium.

[S 98^r] Exemplum contrariorum mediatorum tam^a in concreto^b quam in abstracto, ut sequitur ‘Sortes est albus; ergo Sortes non est niger’, et sequitur ‘istud accidens est albedo; ergo istud accidens non est nigredo’, et huiusmodi^c. Exemplum contrariorum immediatorum tam concretorum quam abstractorum, ut sequitur ‘Sortes^d est sanus; ergo Sortes non est eger’, et sequitur ‘hoc accidens est sanitas; ergo hoc accidens non est egritudo’. Similiter sequitur ‘hec virtus est iusticia; ergo hec virtus non est iniusticia^e’, et huiusmodi. Sed e converso formaliter consequentia non valet, quia ex pura negativa formaliter non sequitur affirmativa. Ut non sequitur [Z 79^r] ‘Sortes non est albus; ergo Sortes est niger’, quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod nullus Sortes sit, vel^f posito casu quod Sortes non sit albus^g neque niger, sed sit medio colore coloratus. Sed cum constancia in contrariis immediatis^h valet consequentia, uti sequitur ‘Sortes non est sanus et Sortes est; ergo Sortes est eger’, et huiusmodi. Et predictae condiciones regule possunt declarari sicut in regula precedenti.

^a tam]Z^cS om. Z^b concreto]S recto Z^c huiusmodi]Z e converso S^d sortes . . . sequitur]Z om. S^e iniusticia]Z iusticia S^f vel]S sed Z^g albus]Z om. S^h immediatis] in mediatis Sⁱ ut]Z et S

33 Tercia regula:

De quocumque termino in recto cum verbo substantivo de presenti et sine terminis divinis sive correlativis affirmatur unum contradictorium incomplexo, et ab eodem est negabile reliquum suum contradictorium incomplexorum.

Exemplum, ut sequitur ‘Sortes est homo; ergo Sortes non est non-homo’, et sequitur ‘Sortes est non-asinus; ergo Sortes non^a est asinus’, et huiusmodi. Sed e converso formaliter consequentia non valet, quia ex pura negativa formaliter non sequitur affirmativa. Ut non sequitur ‘Sortes non est homo; ergo Sortes est^b non-homo’, quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod nullus Sortes sit. Similiter non sequitur ‘chimera non est animal; ergo chimera est non^c-animal’, quia antecedens [S 98^v] est verum et consequens falsum. Sed e converso cum constancia subiecti valet consequentia, ut sequitur ‘Sortes non est homo et Sortes est; ergo Sortes est non-homo’, et sequitur ‘Sortes non est asinus et idem^d Sortes est; ergo Sortes^e est non-asinus’, et huiusmodi.

^a non est]Z est non S^b est non]Z non est S^c est non]Z^cS non est Z^d idem]Z om. S^e sortes]Z^cS om. Z

34 Primo dixi in regula “de quocumque termino in recto”, quia iste propositiones sunt vere ‘Sortis est asinus’ et ‘Sortes est non^a-asinus’, posito casu quod asinus et capra sint Sortis, et huiusmodi. Secundo dixi “cum verbo substantivo”, quia cum verbo adiectivo tales propositiones sunt vere ‘Sortes videt hominem’ et ‘Sortes videt non-hominem’, posito casu quod Sortes videat hominem et asinum, et huiusmodi. Tercio dixi “cum^b verbo de presenti”, quia cum verbo substantivo de preterito tales propositiones sunt vere ‘Sortes fuit albus’^c et^d ‘Sortes fuit non-albus’, posito casu quod Sortes uno tempore preterito^e fuit albus^f et^g alio^h tempore fuit non-albus. Similiter cum verbo de futuro tales propositiones sunt vere ‘Sortes erit albus’ⁱ et ‘Sortes erit non-albus’ pro diversis temporibus, et huiusmodi. Quarto dixi “sine terminis divinis sive^j correlativis”, quia cum terminis divinis tales propositiones sunt vere ‘Deus est^k pater’ et ‘Deus est non-pater’; et ratio est quia Deus est pater et Deus est filius, qui est non-pater. [Z 79^r] Ergo Deus est pater et Deus est non-pater, ut patet intuiti.

^a est non]Z non est S ^b cum verbo]Z om. S ^c albus] asinus S ^d et . . . albus]Z^eS om. Z ^e preterito]S om. Z^f albus] asinus S ^g et . . . tempore] bis in S ^h alio] aliquo S ⁱ albus] posito casu quod Sortes uno tempore preterito add. necnon exp. Z ^j sive]Z seu S ^k est]Z^eS et Z ^l est]Z^eS et Z

35 Ex ista regula patet^a talis regula communis:

De quolibet dicitur alterum contradictorium incomplexorum et de nullo simul ambo, idest de quocumque termino singulari seu supponente^b pro^c eadem re existente cum verbo substantivo^d de presenti in rectis casibus et sine terminis divinis seu correlativis affirmatur unum contradictorium incomplexorum, et de nullo tali termino affirmantur^e ambo contradictoria in simul.

Unde dicitur^f quia talis propositio est vera tu es homo, et^g talis copulativa est falsa tu [S 99^r] es homo et tu es non-homo, et huiusmodi.

^a patet] quod add. S add. necnon exp. Z ^b supponente]Z^eS suppono Z ^c pro eadem]Z om. S ^d substantivo]S subiecto sic saepius Z ^e affirmantur]Z^e affirmatur ZS ^f dicitur]Z^e om. ZS ^g et]Z^e om. ZS

36 Contra regulam arguitur sic. Tales propositiones sunt vere ‘Sortes est albus’ et ‘Sortes est non-albus^a’, uno Sorte existente^b albo et alio existente nigro. Ergo de eodem termino in^c recto cum verbo substantivo de presenti et sine terminis divinis^d affirmatur duo contradictoria incomplexa. Ergo regula est^e falsa. Quidam ad evitandum istud argumentum vel simile ponerent in regula “de quocumque termino singulari seu discreto”. Sed^f non oportet, quia licet ille propositiones sint vere in quibus affirmantur duo contradictoria incomplexa, tamen cum hoc^g stat quod ex^h utraque illarum potest sequi propositio negativa in qua negabitur alterum con-

tradictorum incomplexorum. Unde si Sortes est albus, bene sequitur quod aliquis Sortes non est albus, etⁱ si Sortes non est albus, bene sequitur quod aliquis Sortes est albus, quia omnes iste propositiones stantⁱ simul sine contradiccione, posito casu predicto. Consimile^k argumentum potest fieri contra secundam regulam precedentem de oppositis contrariis, quia tales propositiones stantⁱ simul 'Sortes est albus' et 'Sortes est niger', uno Sorte existente albo et alio existente nigro, et huiusmodi.

^a albus] unde *add.* $\mathcal{Z}^b$ sorte existente] $\mathcal{Z}$ modo existente sorte S^c in] S *om.* $\mathcal{Z}^d$ divinis] $S\mathcal{Z}^e$ *om.* $\mathcal{Z}^c$ est] S *om.* $\mathcal{Z}^f$ sed non] $\mathcal{Z}^g$ S idem $\mathcal{Z}^h$ hoc] S verbo $\mathcal{Z}^h$ ex] S in $\mathcal{Z}^i$ et . . . *alterum* albus] $\mathcal{Z}$ *om.* S^j stant] S sunt $\mathcal{Z}^k$ consimile] S consimiliter $\mathcal{Z}^l$ stant] S sunt $\mathcal{Z}$

37 Quarta regula:

De quocumque termino in recto cum verbo substantivo de presenti affirmatur unum oppositorum privative, ab eodem est negabile reliquum suum oppositum privative.

Exemplum, ut sequitur^a 'Sortes est videns; ergo Sortes non est cecus'. Similiter sequitur 'Sortes est cecus; ergo Sortes non est videns', et huiusmodi. Sed e converso consequentia formaliter non valet, quia ex pura negativa formaliter non sequitur affirmativa. Ut non sequitur 'Sortes non [$\mathcal{Z}$ 80^r] est cecus; ergo Sortes est videns', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod nichil^b sit Sortes. Sed cum constancia et tempore determinato valet consequentia, ut sequitur 'Sortes non est cecus; et Sortes est; ergo Sortes est videns', et huiusmodi^c. Et dixi "cum tempore determinato", quia canis non dicitur proprie 'cecus' ante novem dies. Et ideo sine tali tempore determinato, non sequitur^d 'iste canis non est videns, et iste canis est; ergo iste canis est cecus', et huiusmodi. Et predictae condiciones regule possunt declarari sicut in regula precedente.

^a sequitur] S *om.* $\mathcal{Z}^b$ nichil sit sortes] S nullus sortes sit $\mathcal{Z}^c$ huiusmodi] sed dixi cum tempore determinato valet consequentia ut sequitur sortes non est cecus et sortes est ergo sortes est videns *add. necnon exp.* $\mathcal{Z}^d$ sequitur] $\mathcal{Z}$ *om.* S

39 [S 99^v] Quinta regula, et ultima:

A nomine habitus affirmative cum isto verbo 'est' ad nomen sue opposite privacionis cum isto verbo 'potest'^a consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'Sortes est videns; ergo Sortes potest^b esse cecus'. Sed e converso, a nomine privacionis affirmative cum isto verbo est ad nomen sui habitus cum isto verbo 'potest', consequentia formaliter non valet, saltem naturaliter loquendo, ut non sequitur 'Sortes est cecus; ergo Sortes potest^c esse videns', et huiusmodi. Unde secundum Aristotilem, in *Postpredicamentis*, ab^d habitu possibile est devenire in privacionem, sed a privacione ad habitum impossibilis est regressio^e.

^a potest] $\mathcal{Z}$ possunt S^b potest] poterit $\mathcal{Z}^c$ potest] poterit $\mathcal{Z}^d$ ab habitu] $\mathcal{Z}$ habitum S^e regressio] S regressus $\mathcal{Z}$ sequente scilicet habitu *add.* $\mathcal{Z}^m$ et huiusmodi *add.* $\mathcal{Z}$

CAPITULUM QUINTUM

De consequenciis propositionum categoricarum

1 De consequenciis propositionum categoricarum est quintuplex ordo. Primo de consequenciis concernentibus habitudinem terminorum infinitorum^a et privativorum^b et suorum oppositorum. Secundo de consequenciis concernentibus quantitatem^c propositionum. Tercio de consequenciis concernentibus probationes propositionum Quarto de consequenciis propositionum exclusivarum, exceptivarum^d et reduplicativarum. Quinto, et ultimo, de consequenciis concernentibus sensum compositum et sensum divisum. De quibus per ordinem est agendum.

^a infinitorum]S infinitivorum(!) $\mathcal{Z}$ ^b privativorum] $\mathcal{Z}$ privativorum S ^c quantitatem . . . concernentibus] $\mathcal{Z}$ ^d exceptivarum . . . reduplicativarum]S et exceptivarum propositionum et reduplicativorum $\mathcal{Z}$

*De consequenciis concernentibus habitudinem terminorum infinitorum,
privativorum et suorum oppositorum*

2 De consequenciis concernentibus habitudinem terminorum infinitorum^a et privativorum^b et suorum oppositorum ponuntur quatuor regule sequentes. Prima regula:

Ab affirmativa de predicato infinito ad negativam de predicato finito illius consimilium^c subiectorum et in rectis casibus cum verbo substantivo de presenti et sine terminis divinis, consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur ‘Sortes est^d non-iustus; ergo Sortes non^e est iustus’, et huiusmodi.

^a infinitorum]S infinitivorum(!) $\mathcal{Z}$ ^b privativorum] $\mathcal{Z}$ privativorum S ^c consimilium] $\mathcal{Z}$ similitiorum S ^d est non] $\mathcal{Z}$ non est S ^e non est] $\mathcal{Z}$ est non S

3 Primo dixi in regula “consimilium subiectorum”, quia si sint dissimilium subiectorum, consequentia [$\mathcal{Z}$ 80^v] non valet, ut non sequitur ‘Sortes est^a non-iustus; ergo Plato non est iustus’. Secundo dixi “in rectis casibus”, quia in obliquis casibus consequentia non valet, ut non sequitur ‘Sortes est non-asinus; ergo Sortis non est asinus’. Tercio dixi “cum verbo substantivo”, quia cum verbo adiectivo non valet^b consequentia, ut non sequitur ‘Sortes videt non-asinum; ergo Sortes non videt asinum’. Quarto dixi “de presenti”, quia cum verbo de preterito vel de futuro [S 100^r] consequentia^c non valet, ut non sequitur ‘Sortes fuit non-iustus; ergo Sortes non fuit iustus’, et huiusmodi. Quinto dixi “sine terminis divinis”, quia cum^d terminis divinis non sequitur ‘Deus^e est non-pater; ergo Deus^f

non est pater', quia istarum consequenciarum antecedenca possunt esse vera, consequentibus existentibus falsis. Sed hec regula comprehenditur in tertia regula supradicta terminorum contradictoriorum incomplexorum, ut patet intuenti.

^a est non] $\mathcal{Z}$ non est S^b valet . . . non] $\mathcal{Z}^c S$ om. $\mathcal{Z}^c$ consequencia . . . ut] S om. $\mathcal{Z}^d$ cum] S in $\mathcal{Z}^e$ deus] filius add. $\mathcal{Z}^m$ ^f deus] est add. necnon exp. $\mathcal{Z}$

4 Secunda regula:

A negativa de predicato finito ad^a affirmativam de predicato infinito illius consimilium subiectorum in rectis casibus et cum verbo substantivo de presenti, consequencia formaliter non valet,

quia ex pura negativa formaliter non sequitur affirmativa. Exemplum, ut non sequitur 'Sortes non est iustus; ergo Sortes est non-iustus', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, nullo Sorte existente. Sed cum constancia et^b debito modo valet consequencia, ut sequitur 'Sortes non est iustus^c; et idem Sortes est; ergo Sortes est non-iustus'. Similiter^d sequitur 'tu non es asinus; et tu es; ergo tu es^e non-asinus', et huiusmodi. Condiciones huius regule intelliguntur sicut in regula precedente^f.

^a ad . . . infinito] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^b et] $\mathcal{Z}$ seu S^c iustus] ergo add. S^d similiter] non add. $\mathcal{Z}^e$ es non] $\mathcal{Z}$ non es S^f precedente] patet add. S

5 Tercia regula:

Ab affirmativa de predicato privativo ad affirmativam de predicato infinito illius consimilium subiectorum in rectis casibus et cum verbo substantivo de presenti, consequencia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'Sortes est iniustus; ergo Sortes est non-iustus', et sequitur 'Deus est infinitus^a; ergo Deus est non-finitus', et huiusmodi. Sed e converso consequencia formaliter non valet. Ut non sequitur 'lapis est non-iustus; ergo lapis est iniustus^b', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, quia ex^c consequente sequitur quod^d lapis est aptus natus esse iustus, quod est falsum. Aliquando valet consequencia de materia, ut sequitur 'Sortes est non-iustus; ergo Sortes est iniustus'. Similiter bene^e sequitur 'punctus est non-divisibilis; ergo punctus est indivisibilis', et sequitur 'celum est non-corruptibile; ergo celum est incorruptibile', et^f sequitur 'Deus est non-mortalis; ergo Deus est immortalis', quia in terminis connotantibus actum et potenciam talis negacio 'non' et^g illa privacio 'in^h' negantⁱ seu privant^j actum et^k potenciam, ut patet in prima parte huius^l logice, octava^m et nona divisioneⁿ terminorum.

^a infinitus] $\mathcal{Z}$ finitus S^b iniustus] non iustus S^c ex consequente] S eius antecedente $\mathcal{Z}^d$ quod] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^e bene] S non $\mathcal{Z}^f$ et] S ut $\mathcal{Z}^g$ et] S est $\mathcal{Z}^h$ in] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^i negant] $\mathcal{Z}$ negat S^j

privant]Z privat S^k et poteciam]S om. S^l huius]Z om. S^m octava . . . terminorum]S om.
Zⁿ divisione] de omnibus S

6 Quarta regula, et ultima:

Ab affirmativa de predicato privativo^a ad negativam de predicato finito seu positivo^b illius consimilium subiectorum in rectis casibus, et cum verbo substantivo^c de presenti [S 100^v] consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'Sortes est iniustus; ergo Sortes non est iustus', et sequitur 'Deus est infinitus; ergo Deus non est finitus', et huiusmodi. Sed econverso formaliter non valet consequentia^d, etiam quando^e arguitur cum constancia seu debito modo, ut non sequitur 'lapis non est iustus; et lapis est; ergo lapis est iniustus', et huiusmodi. Aliquando consequentia valet de materia seu gracia terminorum, sicut in regula precedente, ut sequitur 'Sortes non^f est iustus; et idem Sortes est; ergo Sortes est iniustus'. Similiter sequitur 'punctus non est divisibilis et punctus est; ergo punctus est indivisibilis', et sic de multis aliis similibus^g.

^a privativo] privato Z^b positivo]Z posito S^c substantivo]Z subiecto S^d consequentia]Z om. S^e quando] quod Z^f non est]Z est non S^g similibus]Z om. S

De consequentiis concernentibus quantitatem propositionum

7 De consequentiis concernentibus quantitatem^a propositionum ponuntur octo regule sequentes. Prima regula:

Ab universali ad sua<m> particularem vel indefinitam, sive affirmative sive negative, consequentia est bona.

Exemplum affirmative, ut sequitur 'quilibet homo currit; ergo quidam homo currit' vel 'homo currit', et sequitur 'necesse est Deum esse; ergo possibile est Deum esse', et huiusmodi. Exemplum negative, ut sequitur 'nullus homo currit; ergo quidam homo non currit' vel 'homo non currit, et sequitur 'impossibile est hominem esse asinum; ergo possibile est hominem^b non esse asinum', et huiusmodi. Ex ista regula patet quod a termino stante confuse^c et distribuibile^d ad eundem stantem determinate^e valet consequentia.

^a quantitatem]S quantitatum(!) Z^b hominem non]Z non hominem S^c confuse]S commune Z^d distribuibile]S distributive Z^e determinate]S determinante(!) Z

8 Sed contra regulam arguitur sic: Talis consequentia non valet 'nullus homo est animal; ergo homo non^a est animal', et arguitur ab universali negativa ad suam indefinitam negativam. Ergo regula est^b falsa. Antecedens probatur: posito casu quod nullus homo masculus sit, tunc^c antecedens

est verum, ut patet per casum; et consequens est^d falsum, quia eius contradictorium est verum, scilicet 'omnis homo est animal', ut patet intuenti.

^a non] *S*^c *om.* *S*^b est] *S*^c *om.* *Z*^c tunc] enim *add.* *Z*^d est] *Z*^c *om.* *S*

9 Ad istud argumentum vel simile potest dici quod talis propositio indefinita 'homo non est animal' potest considerari dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum ly 'homo' supponit pro masculis, et isto modo dicitur indefinita illius universalis 'nullus homo est animal'; et^a tunc illa consequentia^b est bona, et tam antecedens quam consequens est verum, posito casu predicto. Alio modo inquantum ly 'homo' supponit pro femellis, et isto modo non dicitur indefinita illius universalis. Et tunc consequentia non valet, et per consequens non est contra [*Z* 81^r] regulam, ut patet intuenti.

^a et] *Z*^c *om.* *S*^b consequentia] *S*^c *om.* *Z*

10 Vel aliter potest dici quod illa propositio indefinita 'homo non est animal'^a non est proprie vel^b simpliciter singularis indefinita illius universalis 'nullus homo est animal', quia propositionis universalis cuius subiectum solum supponit pro masculis, sua particularis vel indefinita est de subiecto supponente [*S* 101^r] solum^c pro masculis, ut 'quilibet homo est animal', et^d 'quidam homo est^e animal' vel 'homo masculus est animal'. Sed propositionis universalis cuius subiectum supponit solum pro femellis, sua particularis vel indefinita est de subiecto supponente solum pro femellis, ut 'quilibet homo est animal' et 'quidam homo est animal' vel 'homo femella est animal. Sed propositionis universalis cuius subiectum supponit indifferenter pro masculis et femellis, sua particularis vel indefinita est^f de subiecto supponente indifferenter pro masculis vel^g femellis. Exemplum de propositionibus affirmativis, ut 'omnis homo est animal' et 'aliquis homo est animal' vel 'homo est animal'^h. Exemplum de propositionibusⁱ negativis, ut 'nichil^j homo est animal' et 'aliquid homo non est animal' vel 'homo non est animal', et huiusmodi. Et talis particularis potest dari dupliciter: uno modo cum signo particulari neutri generis, ut 'aliquid homo est animal', alio modo cum disiunctione signorum particularium masculini et feminini generis, ut 'aliquis vel aliqua homo est animal', et huiusmodi.

^a animal] *S*^c *om.* *Z*^b vel . . . singularis] vel simpliciter *Z*^c *om.* *S*^c solum] *S*^c *om.* *Z*^d et] *Z*^c sed *S*^c est animal] *bis in S*^f est] et *S*^c *om.* *Z*^g vel] *S*^c et *Z*^h animal] *Z*^c *om.* *S*ⁱ propositionibus] *S* probationibus *Z*^j nichil] *Z*^c nullus *S*

11 Secunda regula:

A particulari vel indefinita ad suam universalem formaliter consequentia non valet. Exemplum affirmative, ut non sequitur 'quidam homo currit; ergo quilibet homo currit'. Exemplum negative, ut non sequitur 'quidam homo

non currit; ergo nullus homo currit', et huiusmodi. Ex ista regula patet quod a termino stante determinate ad eundem stantem confuse^a et distributive, consequentia formaliter non valet. Aliquando valet consequentia de materia, et hoc dupliciter. Primo ex necessariis, ut^b bene sequitur 'quidam homo est animal; ergo quilibet homo est animal', et sequitur 'Deus est; ergo omnis deus est'. Similiter sequitur 'quidam homo non^c est asinus; ergo nullus^d homo est asinus'. Secundo ex impossibilibus^e, ut sequitur 'quidam homo est asinus; ergo quilibet homo^f est asinus', et sequitur 'Deus non est; ergo nullus deus est', et huiusmodi.

^a confuse] *S* commune *sic saepius* *S*^b ut] *Z* et *S*^c non] *Z* om. *S*^d nullus ... ergo] *S* om. *Z*^e impossibilibus] *imposicionibus* *S*^f homo] non *add.* *Z*

12 Tercia regula:

Ab universali affirmativa ad eius singularem cum constancia valet consequentia, sed non e converso.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'quilibet homo currit; et iste est homo; ergo iste homo currit', et huiusmodi. Sed si arguatur sine constancia, non valet consequentia. [*Z* 81'] Ut non sequitur 'quilibet homo [*S* 101'] est animal; ergo iste homo est animal', quia antecedens est necessarium et consequens est^a contingens. Vel aliter^b, quia post mille annos poterit esse sicut primo et adequate significatur per illud antecedens^c, et tunc non erit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per illud consequens, quia ille homo qui per tale consequens denotatur^d vel significatur, tunc non^e erit^f. Aliquando valet consequentia de materia, ut sequitur 'omnis sol lucet; ergo iste sol lucet'. Similiter sequitur 'omnis deus est; ergo iste Deus est'. Similiter sequitur 'quilibet homo est asinus; ergo^g iste homo est asinus', et huiusmodi.

^a est] *Z* om. *S*^b aliter] *Z*^c *S* om. *Z*^c antecedens ... illud] *Z* om. *S*^d denotatur] demonstratur *Z* denominatur *S*^e non] *Z*^f *S* om. *S*^f erit] sicut dictum est in regula precedente *add.* *Z*^g ergo ... asinus] *Z* om. *S*

13 Quarta regula:

Ab universali affirmativa ad omnes eius singulares sufficienter enumeratis cum debita constancia valet consequentia, et e converso.

Exemplum^a, ut sequitur 'quilibet homo est animal; et isti sunt omnes homines masculi; ergo iste homo est animal, et^b iste homo est animal, et iste^c homo est animal, et sic de singulis'. Exemplum^d e converso, ut bene sequitur 'iste homo est animal, et iste homo est animal, et sic de singulis; et isti sunt omnes homines masculi; ergo quilibet homo est animal', et huiusmodi. Sed^e si arguatur sine constancia, non valet consequentia. Ut non sequitur 'quilibet homo est animal; ergo iste homo est animal, et iste

homo^f est animal, et sic de singulis', quia antecedens est necessarium et consequens est^g contingens. Vel aliter, quia post mille annos poterit esse sicut primo et adequate significatur per^h illud antecedens, tamenⁱ non erit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per^j illud consequens, quia illi homines qui per tale consequens denotantur^k vel significantur, tunc non erunt, sicut dictum est in regula precedente. Aliquando valet consequentia de materia, ut sequitur 'quilibet homo est asinus; ergo iste homo est asinus et iste homo est asinus, et sic de singulis', quia ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet^m.

^a exemplum ut] $\mathcal{Z}$ et S^b et ... *alterum animal*] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^c iste] isti $\mathcal{Z}^d$ exemplum] et *add.* $\mathcal{Z}^e$ sed] S et $\mathcal{Z}^f$ homo ... *animal*] $\mathcal{Z}^g$ S om. $\mathcal{Z}^h$ g est] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^h per ... significatur] $\mathcal{Z}^i$ om. $\mathcal{Z}^i$ tamen] $\mathcal{Z}$ et tunc S^j per ... *alterum consequens*] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^k denotantur] demonstrantur $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^l impossibili] S possibili(!) $\mathcal{Z}^m$ quidlibet] et huiusmodi *add.* $\mathcal{Z}$

14 Quinta regula:

Ab universali negativa ad eius singularem^a, vel ad omnes eius singulares sufficienter numeratas^b, valet consequentia, sive arguitur cum constancia sive arguitur^c sine constancia, sed non e converso.

Exemplum ab universali ad^d eius singularem, ut sequitur 'nullus homo currit; ergo iste homo non currit'. Exemplum^e ab universali ad <omnes> eius singulares, ut 'nullus homo currit; ergo iste homo <non> currit et iste homo non currit', et sic de singulis^f. Sed e converso, scilicet^g si arguitur^h cum constancia, valet consequentia, ut sequitur [S 102^r] 'iste homo non currit et iste homo non currit, et sic de singulis, et isti sunt omnes homines masculi; ergo nullus homo currit', etⁱ huiusmodi. Sed si arguitur sine constancia, formaliter non valet consequentia. Ut non sequitur 'iste homo non currit et iste homo non currit et sic de singulis; ergo nullus homo currit', quia post [$\mathcal{Z}$ 82^r] mille annos antecedens poterit esse verum et consequens falsum, quia illi homines qui per illud antecedens notantur^j vel significa<n>tur non erunt, ut patet intuitu.

^a singularem] $\mathcal{Z}$ singulares S^b numeratas] $\mathcal{Z}$ numeratis S^c arguitur] S arguatur $\mathcal{Z}^d$ ad] omnes *add. necnon exp.* $\mathcal{Z}^e$ exemplum ... *alterum currit*] S om. $\mathcal{Z}^f$ singulis] exemplum ab universali ad omnes eius singulares ut sequitur nullus homo currit ergo iste homo non currit et iste homo non currit et sic de singulis *add.* $\mathcal{Z}^g$ scilicet] sed S om. $\mathcal{Z}^h$ arguitur] S arguatur $\mathcal{Z}^i$ et huiusmodi] S om. $\mathcal{Z}^j$ notantur] demonstrantur $\mathcal{Z}$ numeratur S

15 Sexta regula:

A particulari ad suam indefinitam, sive affirmative sive negative, consequentia est bona et formalis, et e converso.

Exemplum affirmative, ut sequitur 'aliquid homo currit; ergo homo currit', et e converso. Exemplum negative, ut sequitur 'aliquid homo non currit; ergo homo non currit', et e converso. Ex ista regula patet quod propositionis

indefinite cuius subiectum supponit solum pro masculis, sua particularis est de subiecto supponente solum pro masculis, ut 'asinus currit; ergo quidam asinus currit'. Sed^a propositionis indefinite cuius subiectum solum supponit pro femellis, sua particularis est de subiecto supponente solum pro femellis, ut 'asina currit; ergo quedam asina currit'. Sed propositionis indefinite cuius subiectum supponit indifferenter pro masculis et femellis, sua^b particularis est de subiecto supponente indifferenter pro masculis et femellis, ut 'homo currit' et 'aliquid homo currit'. Sed talis particularis potest dari dupliciter. Uno modo cum signo particulari neutri generis, ut 'aliquid homo currit'. Alio modo cum disiunctione signorum particularium, scilicet masculini^c et feminini generis, ut 'aliquis vel aliqua homo currit^d', sicut dictum fuit in prima regula precedente.

^a sed . . . alterum currit] ζ om. S ^b sua . . . femellis] ζ om. S ^c masculini] feminini S ^d currit] ζ om. S

16 Septima regula:

A particulari vel indefinita ad aliquam eius singularem consequentia formaliter non valet.

Exemplum affirmative, ut non sequitur 'homo est animal; ergo iste homo est animal', quia antecedens est necessarium et consequens est^a contingens. Exemplum negative, ut non sequitur 'homo non currit; ergo iste homo non currit', et huiusmodi. Aliquando consequentia est bona de materia, ut sequitur 'Deus est; ergo iste Deus est', quia tam antecedens quam consequens est necessarium. Similiter sequitur 'quidam homo est asinus; ergo iste homo est asinus', quia ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet^b.

^a est] S om. ζ ^b quidlibet] quodlibet ζ S et huiusmodi add. ζ

17 Octava regula, et ultima:

A particulari vel indefinita ad omnes eius singulares sufficienter numeratasa et disiunctive [S 102^v] sumptas cum debita constancia valet consequentia, et e converso.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'quidam^b homo est animal; et isti sunt omnes homines masculi; ergo iste homo est animal, vel^c iste homo est animal, et sic de singulis'. Sed^d e converso cum constancia subiecti valet consequentia. Exemplum, ut <sequitur> 'iste homo est animal vel iste homo est animal; et isti sunt omnes homines masculi; ergo quidam homo est animal'. [ζ 82^v] Sed dicitur^e in regula "cum debita constancia", quia si arguitur sine constancia, non valet consequentia. Ut non sequitur 'homo est animal; ergo^f iste homo est animal vel iste homo est animal, et sic de singulis', quia antecedens est necessarium et consequens contingens. Vel aliter, quia post mille annos antecedens poterit esse verum et consequens falsum, ut patet intuitu. Similiter, si arguitur e converso sine

constancia, non valet consequentia. Ut non sequitur 'iste homo non est animal vel iste homo non est animal, et^h sic de singulis; ergo homo non est animal', quia post mille annos poterit esse sicut primo et adequate significatur per antecedensⁱ et non erit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per eius consequens, ut patet intuenti.

^a numeratas] ζ numeratis S^b quidam] ζ qui S^c vel . . . animal] ζ om. S^d sed . . . alterum animal] ζ om. S^e animal] et huiusmodi add. S^f dicitur] S om. ζ^g ergo . . . animal] S om. ζ^h et . . . animal] ζ om. S^i antecedens . . . per] ζ om. S

De consequentiis concernentibus probationes propositionum

18 De consequentiis concernentibus probationes propositionum ponuntur sex regule sequentes. Prima regula:

Ab exponibili copulative ad omnes eius exponentes simul sumptas valet consequentia, et e converso.

Exemplum, ut^a sequitur 'omnis homo est animal; ergo homo est animal et nichil est homo quin illud sit animal', et e converso. Similiter sequitur 'tantum homo currit; ergo homo currit et nichil non-homo currit', et e converso. Sed ab exponibili copulative ad unam eius exponentem valet consequentia, sed non e converso. Ut sequitur 'tantum homo currit; ergo homo currit', et sequitur 'tantum homo currit; ergo nichil non-homo currit'. Sed e converso non valet consequentia, ut non sequitur 'homo currit; ergo tantum homo currit', et non sequitur 'nichil non-homo currit; ergo tantum homo currit', et huiusmodi. Aliquando valet consequentia de materia, ut bene sequitur 'homo est homo; ergo tantum homo est homo'. Similiter sequitur 'homo est asinus; ergo tantum homo est asinus', quia ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet^b.

^a ut sequitur] S om. S^b quidlibet] S quodlibet ζ et huiusmodi add. S

19 Secunda regula <est> quod

Ab exponibili^a disiunctive secundum^b duplicem modum exponendi disiunctive ad utrumque sui modum exponendi cum disiunctione valet consequentia, et e converso.

Ex qua regula patet quod ab exponibili^c huius verbi 'incipit' vel huius verbi 'desinit' ad utrumque sui modum exponendi cum disiunctione valet consequentia, et e converso. Et si arguatur ad unum [S 103^r] eius modum exponendi vel e converso, non semper valet consequentia. Ut non sequitur 'Sortes incipit esse; ergo in presenti instanti Sortes non est, et^d immediate post instans presens Sortes erit'. Similiter non sequitur 'Sortes incipit currere; ergo in presenti instanti Sortes [ζ 83^r] currit, et non immediate ante^e instans presens Sortes currebat', et huiusmodi. Sed si arguatur ad unum modum exponendi secum^f convertibilium, valet consequentia, et e converso. Exemplum huius verbi 'incipit', ut^g bene sequitur 'Sortes incipit

esse; ergo in presenti instanti Sortes est et non immediate ante presens instans Sortes fuit', et^h e converso. Similiter sequitur 'Sortes incipit currere; ergo in presenti instanti Sortes non currit et immediate post instans presens Sortes curret', et e converso. Consimiliter potest exemplificari de ly 'desinit', ut patet intuenti.

^a exponibili] $\mathcal{Z}$ ex impossibili(!) S^b secundum] seu $\mathcal{Z}$ seu per S^c exponibili] $\mathcal{Z}$ ex impossibili(!) S^d et immediate] S sed modo mediate $\mathcal{Z}^e$ ante] S post(!) $\mathcal{Z}^f$ secum convertibilium] S seu convertible $\mathcal{Z}^g$ ut] $\mathcal{Z}$ et S^h et] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S

20 Tercia regula:

A^a resolubili ad omnes eius resolventes vel ad unam illarum consequencia non valet. Exemplum de affirmativis proposicionibus, ut non sequitur 'homo est animal'^b; ergo hoc est animal et^c hoc est homo', quia antecedens est necessarium et consequens contingens. Vel aliter, quia post^d mille annos antecedens erit^e verum et consequens falsum. Exemplum de negativis, ut non sequitur 'chimera non est animal; ergo hoc non est animal et hoc est chimera', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, et huiusmodi. Aliquando valet consequencia de materia, ut bene sequitur 'Deus est ens; ergo hoc est ens et hoc est Deus', quia tam antecedens quam consequens est necessarium. Similiter sequitur 'homo est asinus; ergo hoc est asinus et hoc est homo', quia ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet. Et huiusmodi.

^a a resolubili] S om. $\mathcal{Z}^b$ animal] et hoc est homo add. S^c et . . . homo] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^d post] $\mathcal{Z}S^e$ om. S^e erit] S est $\mathcal{Z}$

21 Quarta regula:

Ab^a omnibus resolventibus simul sumptis ad suam resolutam seu resolvablem valet consequencia, si tales resolventes sint nate inferre proposiciones universales de subiectis circumlocutis.

Exemplum de^a affirmativis, ut sequitur 'hoc est animal; et hoc^b est homo; ergo homo est animal'. Exemplum de negativis, ut 'hoc^c non currit; et hoc est homo; ergo homo non^d currit', et huiusmodi. Sed dixi in regula "si tales resolventes sint nate inferre proposiciones universales de subiectis circumlocutis"; et ideo non [S 103^v] sequitur 'hoc est pater; et hoc est filius; ergo filius est pater', quia^e, capta prima resolvente, non sequitur 'hoc est pater; ergo quicquid est hoc est pater', quia filius est aliquid quod est hoc, tamen filius non est pater^f. Similiter, capta secunda resolvente, non sequitur 'hoc est filius; ergo omne quod est hoc, est filius', quia pater est aliquid quod est hoc, tamen pater non est filius. Unde licet enim idem Deus sit pater et filius, tamen pater non est filius, neque e converso. Ut patet secundum determinacionem fidei^g catholice christiane.

^a ab omnibus] S om. $\mathcal{Z}^b$ hoc] $\mathcal{Z}$ homo S^c hoc] $\mathcal{Z}$ homo S^d non currit] $\mathcal{Z}S^e$ currit non S^e quia . . . pater] $\mathcal{Z}$ om. S^f pater] $\mathcal{Z}$ quia capta secunda resolvente non sequitur hoc est pater add. S^g fidei catholice christiane] $\mathcal{Z}$ fidei christiane etc. S

22 Quinta regula:

A descriptibili accepta descriptibiliter ad eius describentem consequentia est bona, et e converso.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'necesse est Deum esse; ergo talis propositio est necessaria "Deus est", primo et adequate significans Deum esse', et e converso, et huiusmodi. Sed dixi in regula "accepta descriptibiliter", quia talis propositio 'necesse est Deum esse', vel aliqua similis, potest accipi tripliciter. Uno modo descriptibiliter, et tunc bene sequitur 'necesse est Deum esse; ergo talis propositio est necessaria "Deus est", primo et adequate significans Deum esse', et e converso. Alio modo exponibiliter vel resolubiliter, et tunc non sequitur 'necesse est Deum esse; ergo talis propositio est necessaria "Deus est"', quia^a antecedens est necessarium et consequens contingens. Vel aliter, quia potest esse sicut primo et adequate significatur per antecedens absque hoc quod sit ita sicut primo et adequate significatur per consequens. Ut patet intuenti.

^a quia]S et Z

23 Sexta regula, et ultima:

A propositione habente plures causas sue veritatis ad omnes suas causas simul acceptas cum disiunctione valet consequentia, et e converso.

Exemplum, ut^a sequitur 'non tantum homo est animal; ergo nullus homo est animal vel aliquid non-homo est animal', et^b e converso. Et si arguatur ad unam illarum causarum, non valet consequentia. Ut non sequitur 'non tantum homo est animal; ergo nullus homo est animal', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Sed si arguatur e converso ab una causa veritatis ad propositionem habentem plures causas veritatis, consequentia est bona. Ut^d bene sequitur 'aliquid non-homo est animal; ergo non tantum homo est animal'. Et ita de omnibus oppositis exclusivarum, exceptivarum, et aliarum propositionum exponibilium, que habent probari per suas causas veritatis, ut dictum fuit superius, ubi determinatur de probationibus propositionum^e.

^a ut sequitur]S sequitur ut Z^b et]Z om. S^c est] homo est add. Z^d ut]S et Z^e propositionum] etc. add. S

De consequentiis concernentibus propositiones exclusivas, exceptivas et reduplicativas

24 [S 104r] De consequentiis propositionum exclusivarum, exceptivarum et reduplicatarum ponuntur quatuor regulae sequentes. Prima regula:

Ab exclusiva affirmativa ad suam universalem affirmativam de terminis transpositis rectis simplicibus^a et cum verbo de presenti non ampliativo consequentia est bona, et e converso.

Exemplum, ut sequitur ‘tantum animal est homo; ergo omnis homo est animal’, [Z 84^r] et e converso. Similiter sequitur ‘tantum animalia sunt homines; ergo omnes homines sunt animalia’, et huiusmodi.

^a simplicibus] quibus non sit aggregatu terminorum *add.* Z^m

25 Primo dixi in regula “de terminis rectis”; ideo talis consequentia non valet ‘cuiuslibet hominis^a est asinus; ergo tantum asinus^b est hominis^c’, quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod omnis homo habeat asinum et capram. Secundo dixi “simplicibus”; ideo talis consequentia non valet omnis homo vel asinus est homo; ergo tantum homo est asinus vel homo, quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, supposito quod in antecedente solum una^d pars subiecti distribuatur. Tercio dixi “cum verbo de presenti non ampliativo”; ideo talis consequentia non valet ‘tantum animal fuit homo; ergo omnis homo fuit animal’, quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod Sortes nunc incipiat esse homo sive animal. Similiter non sequitur ‘tantum verum erit verum; ergo omne verum erit verum’, quia huius consequentie antecedens est^e verum et consequens falsum, ut <patet> per eorum exponentes, posito tali^f casu quod *nunc* sint vere iste tres propositiones ‘Deus est’ et ‘celum movetur’ et ‘hoc instans est’, sed post hoc instans nichil erit verum nisi aliquid istarum ‘Deus est’ vel ‘celum movetur’, et tertia erit falsa, scilicet^g ‘hoc instans est’. Et huiusmodi.

^a hominis] Z homines S ^b asinus] S hominis Z ^c hominis] S asinus Z ^d una] scilicet prima *add.* Z^m ^e est] S erit Z ^f tali . . . nunc] Z casu quod tali nunc S ^g scilicet] si S

26 Ex ista regula patet quod propositio exclusiva termini numeralis, ut ‘tantum duodecim sunt apostoli Dei’ debet considerari dupliciter. Uno modo in quantum fit exclusio ratione alietatis vel infinitacionis. Et tunc est propositio falsa et sibi correspondet universalis accepta divisiva que est falsa, ut ‘tantum duodecim sunt apostoli Dei; ergo omnes apostoli Dei sunt duodecim’. Alio modo in quantum fit exclusio ratione pluralitatis. Et tunc est propositio vera et sibi correspondet universalis accepta collective que est vera, ut patet per earum exponentes seu probantes. Secundo patet quod talis propositio exclusiva ‘tantum unum est’ potest [S 104^v] considerari dupliciter. Uno modo si fiat exclusio^a ratione alietatis vel infinitacionis. Et tunc est propositio vera, cui correspondet hec^b universalis ‘omne ens est bonum’, que est vera. Et isto modo valet consequentia ‘tantum unum est; ergo omne ens est unum’. Alio modo in quantum fit exclusio ratione pluralitatis^c. Et tunc propositio est falsa, cui correspondet hec universalis falsa ‘omnia sunt unum’. Ut patet per earum exponentes. Tercio patet quod si talis propositio exceptiva sit vera ‘tantum homo et^d

asinus et capra currunt^e, posito talif casu quod non plura quam ista tria currant, tunc^g sibi debet correspondere universalis accepta collective, que est vera. Et isto modo valet consequentia 'tantum homo et asinus et capra currunt; ergo omnia currencia sunt homo et asinus et capra', quia tam antecedens quam consequens sunt vera^h, ut patet intuenti.

^a exclusio]Z om. S ^b hec . . . correspondet]Z^cS om. Z ^c pluralitatis]Z alietatis S ^d et]Z^e est ZS ^e currunt] ergo omnia currencia add. S ^f tali]Z om. S ^g tunc]Z nunc S ^h vera]Z om. S

27 Secunda regula:

Ab exceptiva negativa ad exclusivam affirmativam sibi correspondentem^a, cuius subiectum est pars extra capta et predicatum est aggregatum ex termino distributo cum residuo eiusdem propositionis exceptive, consequentia est bona, et e converso.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'nullus homo preter Sortem currit; ergo tantum Sortes est aliquis homo currens', et e converso. Similiter sequitur 'nullum animal preter hominem est rationale; ergo tantum homo est [Z 84^e] animal^b rationale', et huiusmodi. Ex ista regula patet quod talis consequentia non valet 'nullus homo preter Sortem currit; ergo tantum Sortes currit', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod nullus homo currat nisi Sortes et cum hoc asinus currat. Similiter non sequitur 'nullum animal preter hominem est rationale; ergo tantum homo est rationalis', quia ista non est sua exclusiva, sed illa tantum homo est animal rationale^c. Et huiusmodi.

^a correspondentem]Z correspondente S ^b animal rationale]S rationalis Z ^c rationale]Z^eS om. Z

28 Tercia regula:

Ab exceptiva affirmativa ad exclusivam affirmativam sibi correspondentem, cuius subiectum est pars extra capta et predicatum est aggregatum ex termino distributo cum residuo eiusdem propositionis exceptive^a, preposita negacione ultimo termino, consequentia est bona, et e converso.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'omne ens preter accidens [S 105^e] est substantia; ergo tantum accidens est ens non-substantia', et e converso. Similiter 'omne animal preter hominem est^b irrationale; ergo tantum homo est animal non-irrationale'. Similiter sequitur 'omnis homo preter Sortem currit; ergo tantum Sortes est homo non-currens', et huiusmodi.

^a exceptive]Z sed S ^b est] S^c om. S

29 Quarta regula, et ultima:

A reduplicativa ad suam preiacentem est consequentia bona, sed non e converso.

Exemplum affirmative, ut^a sequitur 'homo in quantum animal est corpus; ergo homo est corpus'. Exemplum negative, ut sequitur^b 'homo inquan-

tum animal non est lapis; ergo homo non est lapis', et huiusmodi. Similiter

Ab exclusiva ad suam preiacentem valet consequentia, sed non econverso.

Ut sequitur 'tantum homo est animal rationale; ergo homo est animal rationale', et huiusmodi^c. Sed

Ab exceptiva ad suam preiacentem non valet consequentia, neque econverso.

Exemplum, ut non sequitur 'omnis homo preter Sortem currit; ergo omnis homo currit'. Similiter non sequitur 'nullus homo preter Sortem currit; ergo nullus homo currit', et huiusmodi. Et ratio est quia omnis exceptiva propria et sua preiacens repugnant ad invicem, ut dictum fuit superius de probationibus exceptivarum^d.

^a ut]S om. ζ non add. S ^b sequitur]S om. ζ ^c huiusmodi] exemplum ut non sequitur add. necnon exp. ζ ^d exceptivarum] et huiusmodi add. ζ

De consequentiis concernentibus sensum compositum et sensum divisum

30 De consequentiis concernentibus sensum compositum et sensum divisum ponitur talis regula generalis:

Arguendo^a a^b sensu composito ad sensum divisum vel econverso consequentia formaliter non valet^c.

Et talis sensus compositus vel^d sensus divisus potest fieri multis modis. De quibus hic^e ponuntur sex regule [ζ 85^r] sequentes.

^a arguendo] ζ om. ζ S ^b a sensu] assensu sic saepius ζ S ^c valet]S om. ζ ^d vel sensus]S om. ζ ^e hic]S om. ζ

31 Prima regula:

Terminus modalis precedens in propositione vel formaliter subsequens facit sensum compositum, sed quando intermediat dictum eius, facit sensum divisum.

Ex quo patet quod talis consequentia non valet inquantum arguitur a sensu composito ad sensum divisum 'impossibile est te currere velocius quam tu^a curris; ergo impossibile^b est te currere velocius quam tu^c curris', quia eius antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Secundo patet quod talis consequentia non valet, in qua arguitur a sensu diviso ad sensum compositum 'album possibile est esse nigrum; ergo possibile est [S 105^v] album esse nigrum', quia eius antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, et huiusmodi. Aliquando valet consequentia de materia, ut bene sequitur 'necesse est Deum esse; ergo Deum necesse est esse', quia eius^d consequentie consequens^e est necessarium; quod potest sequi ad^f quodlibet. Similiter sequitur 'hominem possibile est esse asinum; ergo possibile est hominem esse asinum', quia huius consequentie antecedens est impossibile; ex quo potest sequi quodlibet. Similiter sequitur possibile est

hominem esse animal; ergo hominem possibile est esse animal, quia huius consequencie oppositum consequentis repugnat antecedenti. Et ita de similibus.

^a tu]Z om. S ^b impossibile est te]Z te possibile est S ^c tu]Z om. S ^d eius]S huius Z ^e consequens] antecedens S ^f ad quodlibet]Z ex quolibet S

32 Secunda regula:

Terminus communis stans determinate facit sensum divisum, sed quando stat confuse tantum facit sensum compositum.

Ideo talis consequencia non valet ‘scio alterum contradictorium esse verum; ergo alterum contradictorium scio esse verum’—in qua arguitur a sensu composito ad sensum divisum—quia antecedens huius consequencie est verum et consequens falsum, positis vel demonstratis istis duobus contradictoriis ‘rex sedet’ et ‘nullus rex sedet’, quorum neutrum scio esse verum. Ex qua regula patet quod a termino stante determinate ad eundem stantem confuse tantum et e converso, formaliter^b consequencia non valet, ut patet intuenti.

^a tantum]S om. Z ^b formaliter]S om. Z

33 Tercia regula:

Quilibet talium terminorum ‘infinite, -ta, -tum’ vel ‘totus -ta, -tum’, precedens in propositione tenetur sincathegorematice, et tunc facit sensum divisum; sed quando subsequitur seu ponitur a parte predicati tenetur cathegorematice, et tunc facit sensum compositum.

Exemplum de ly ‘infinite, -ta^a, -tum’, ut talis consequencia non valet in qua arguitur a sensu diviso ad [Z 85^v] sensum compositum ‘infinite partes sunt in continuo; ergo partes in continuo sunt infinite’. Similiter^b non sequitur ‘infinita sunt finita^c; ergo finita sunt infinita’, vel non sequitur ‘infiniti homines sunt finiti^d; ergo finiti^e homines sunt infiniti’, et huiusmodi, quia cuiuslibet istarum consequenciarum antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Exemplum de ly ‘totus, -ta, -tum^f’, ut non sequitur ‘totus Sortes est minor Sorte; ergo minor Sorte [S 106^r] est totus Sortes’. Similiter non sequitur ‘in oculo meo est totum quod est in mundo; ergo totum quod est in mundo est in oculo meo’, et huiusmodi. Sed quid significant^g tales propositiones accepte in sensu diviso et quid in sensu composito, dictum fuit superius^h in prima parte huius logiceⁱ, in sexta^j regula supposicionum.

^a ta tum]Z om. S ^b similiter . . . alterum infinita]Z^cS om. Z ^c finita]Z^cS infinita]Z ^d finiti]Z^cS infiniti]Z ^e finiti]Z^cS infiniti]Z ^f ta tum]Z om. S ^g significant] significans S ^h superius]S om. Z ⁱ logice]Z logices S ^j sexta]S octava Z

34 Quarta regula:

Tale relativum qui sequens immediate suum antecedens et precedens verbum sui antecedentis facit sensum compositum,

ut cum dicitur 'omne animal quod^a est rationale est homo'. Sed

quando subsequitur verbum sui antecedentis, tunc facit sensum divisum,

ut cum dicitur 'omne animal est rationale^b quod est homo^c'. Et^d ideo talis consequentia non valet 'omne animal quod est rationale est homo; ergo omne animal est rationale quod est homo'. Antecedens enim significat quod omne animal rationale est homo, quod est verum, sed consequens significat quod omne animal est rationale, et omne^e animal est homo, quod est falsum. Similiter non sequitur 'omnis homo qui est albus currit; ergo omnis homo currit qui est albus', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod solus Sortes sit albus et solus Sortes currat, et huiusmodi.

^a quod]Z om. S ^b rationale]Z homo S ^c homo]Z rationale S ^d et . . . alterum homo]Z^e S om. Z^e omne]Z homme(!) S

35 Quinta regula:

Coniunctio copulativa coniungens solum^a terminos et non propositiones facit sensum compositum, sed coniungens propositiones facit sensum divisum.

Ex qua regula patet quod a propositione categorica de copulato extremo ad copulativam sibi^b correspondentem vel ad alteram eius partem consequentia formaliter non valet; tunc arguitur a sensu composito ad sensum divisum. Exemplum a parte subiecti, ut non sequitur 'Sortes et Plato dixerunt totum psalterium^c; ergo Sortes dixit totum psalterium et Plato dixit totum psalterium', quia huius consequentie^d antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito tali casu quod Sortes dixit^e unam medietatem et Plato dixit^f alteram medietatem, et huiusmodi. Exemplum a parte predicati, ut non sequitur 'tu es corpus et anima; ergo tu es corpus et tu es anima'. [Z 86^r] Similiter non sequitur 'tu non es homo et asinus; ergo tu non es homo^g et tu non es asinus'. Similiter non sequitur 'tu^h differs [S 106^v] abⁱ homine et ab^j asino; ergo tu differs ab homine et tu differs ab asino^k', quia cuiuslibet istarum consequentiarum antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, et^l copulativa falsa. Aliquando valet consequentia de materia, ut bene sequitur 'Deus et homo sunt; ergo Deus est et homo est'. Similiter sequitur 'tu es homo et animal; ergo tu es homo et tu es animal'. Similiter sequitur 'Sortes et Plato currunt^m; ergo Sortes currit et Plato currit'. Similiter sequitur 'Sortes et Plato biberunt vinum; ergo Sortes bibit vinum et Plato bibit vinum', et huiusmodiⁿ.

^a solum]Z om. S ^b sibi] bis in S ^c psalterium] salterium sic saepius Z S ^d huius consequentie]Z eius S ^e dixit]S dixerit Z^f dixit]S dixerit Z^g homo]Z^e S om. Z^h tu] es add. necnon exp. Zⁱ

ab] omni *add.* S^j ab] omni *add.* S^k ad asino] tu es et homo et asinus sunt et tu non es homo et asinus ergo tu differs ab omni homine et ab asinus *add.* $\mathcal{Z}^m$ et] S est $\mathcal{Z}^m$ currunt . . . *alterum* Plato] $\mathcal{Z}$ *om.* S^n et huiusmodi] S *om.* $\mathcal{Z}$

36 Secundo patet quod a^a copulativa ad propositionem de copulato extremo sibi corresponsentem consequentia formaliter non valet. Et tunc arguitur a sensu diviso ad sensum compositum. Exemplum, ut^b non sequitur 'Sortes est homo et Plato est homo; ergo Sortes et Plato sunt homo', sed sequitur 'Sortes et Plato sunt homines'. Similiter non sequitur 'Sortes est in domo et Plato est in domo; ergo Sortes et Plato sunt in domo', sed bene sequitur 'Sortes et Plato sunt in^c domo vel in domibus'. Aliquando valet consequentia de materia, ut sequitur 'Deus est et homo est; ergo Deus et homo sunt'. Similiter sequitur 'Sortes <currit> et Plato currit; ergo Sortes et Plato currunt', et ita de multis similibus.

^a a copulativa] $\mathcal{Z}$ ad copulativam S^b ut] $\mathcal{Z}$ *om.* S^c in domo vel] S *om.* $\mathcal{Z}$

37 Sexta regula et ultima:

Coniunctio disiunctiva coniungens terminos et non propositiones facit sensum compositum, sed coniungens propositiones facit sensum divisum.

Ex qua regula patet quod a propositione categorica de disiuncto extremo ad disiunctivam sibi^a correspondentem vel ad alteram eius^b partem consequentia formaliter non valet. Et tunc arguitur a sensu composito ad sensum divisum. Exemplum a parte subiecti, ut non sequitur 'omnis propositio vel eius contradictoria^c est vera^d; ergo omnis propositio est vera vel omnis eius contradictoria^e contradictorium $\mathcal{Z}$ est vera^f'. Exemplum a parte predicati, ut non sequitur 'omne animal est rationale vel irrationale; ergo omne animal est rationale vel omne animal est irrationale'. Similiter non^g sequitur 'omnis propositio est vera vel falsa; ergo omnis propositio est vera vel omnis propositio est falsa', et huiusmodi. Aliquando valet consequentia de materia, ut bene sequitur 'omnis homo vel asinus est homo; ergo omnis homo est homo vel omnis^h asinus est homoⁱ'. [S 107^r] Similiter sequitur 'tu es homo vel asinus; ergo tu es homo vel tu es asinus', et huiusmodi.

^a sibi] $\mathcal{Z}^c$ S *om.* $\mathcal{Z}^b$ eius] disiunctive *add.* $\mathcal{Z}^m$ ^c contradictoria] S contradictorium $\mathcal{Z}^d$ vera] et verum *add.* $\mathcal{Z}^e$ contradictorium $\mathcal{Z}^c$ contradictoria] S ^f vera] et verum *add.* $\mathcal{Z}^g$ ^g non sequitur] $\mathcal{Z}$ *om.* S^h omnis] $\mathcal{Z}^f$ *om.* S^i homo] $\mathcal{Z}$ asinus S

38 Secundo patet <quod> a disiunctiva ad propositionem de disiuncto extremo sibi correspondentem consequentia formaliter non valet; [$\mathcal{Z}$ 86^v] et tunc arguitur a sensu diviso ad sensum compositum. Exemplum, ut non sequitur 'tu non es homo vel tu non es asinus; ergo tu non es homo vel asinus'. Similiter non sequitur 'tu^a non^b differs ab homine^c vel tu non^d

differs ab asino; ergo tu non^e differs ab homine vel ab asino', quia cuiuslibet istarum consequenciarum antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Aliquando valet consequentia de materia, ut bene sequitur 'tu es homo vel tu es asinus; ergo tu es homo vel^f asinus'. Similiter sequitur 'homo currit vel asinus currit; ergo homo vel asinus currit', et ita de multis similibus.

^a tu] *om.* ^b non] *om.* *et* ^c homine . . . ab] *om.* ^d non] *om.* *et* ^e non] *om.* *et* ^f vel] tu es *add.* *S*

CAPITULUM SEXTUM

De consequenciis propositionum ypoteticarum

1 De consequenciis propositionum^a ypoteticarum est multiplex ordo. Primo de consequenciis copulativarum. Secundo de consequenciis disiunctivarum. Tercio de consequenciis condicionalium vel^b rationalium. Quarto de consequenciis causalium. Quinto^c, per ordinem, de consequenciis aliarum specierum propositionum ypoteticarum.

^a propositionum] *om.* ^b vel rationalium] *om.* ^c quinto] *hec S*

De consequenciis copulativarum

2 De consequenciis copulativarum ponuntur tres regulæ sequentes. Prima regula:

A tota copulativa significativa ut sue partes principales ad alteram eius partem principalem consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'homo currit et asinus currit; ergo homo currit', et^a huiusmodi. Sed dixi in regula "significativa ut sue partes principales^b", quia predicta consequentia^c non valet, posito casu quod illa copulativa que est antecedens sit imposita ad significandum Deum esse vel aliud verum ex quo non sequatur eius^d consequens.

^a et huiusmodi] *S om.* ^b principales] *et S om.* ^c consequentia] consequentiam ^d eius] *ad S*

3 Secunda regula:

A parte principali copulative ad eius copulativam significativam^a ut sue partes principales consequentia formaliter non valet.

Exemplum, ut non sequitur 'homo currit; ergo homo^b currit et asinus currit', quia huius consequencie antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod homo currat et nullus asinus currat. Aliquando valet consequentia de [*S* 107^v] materia, quando copulativa fit ex duabus

partibus quarum una pars sequitur ex alia, et arguitur ex parte que antecedit ad aliam. Et potest fieri quatuor vel quinque modis. Primo quando partes principales copulative sunt convertibiles ad^e invicem, ut bene sequitur 'homo currit; ergo homo currit et rationale^d currit'. Secundo quando una pars copulative est inferior ad aliam, ut sequitur 'homo currit; ergo homo currit et animal currit'. Tercio quando una pars copulative ex qua arguitur est^e impossibilis, ut sequitur 'homo est asinus; ergo homo est asinus et tu curris'. Quarto quando una pars copulative est necessaria et alia pars ex qua arguitur est contingens, [Z 87^e] ut sequitur^f 'tu curris; ergo tu curris et Deus est'. Quinto quando una pars copulative est contingens, ut sequitur ad aliam quarum nulla^g una est convertibilis, nec inferior nec impossibilis neque necessaria, ut bene sequitur 'tu curris; ergo tu curris et tu non sedes', et huiusmodi.

^a significativam]Z significativa S ^b homo . . . et]Z^cS om. Z ^c ad]Z^cS om. Z ^d rationale]S risibile Z ^e est . . . arguitur]Z om. S ^f sequitur . . . contingens]Z om. S ^g nulla]Z una S

4 Tercia regula:

A tota copulativa significativa ut sue partes ad disiunctivam de partibus omnino consimilibus consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'homo currit et asinus currit; ergo homo currit vel^a asinus currit'. Sed e converso non valet consequentia, ut non sequitur 'tu es homo vel tu es asinus; ergo tu es homo et tu es asinus', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum^b.

^a vel]Z^cS et Z ^b falsum] et huiusmodi add. S

De consequentiis disiunctivarum

5 De consequentiis disiunctivarum ponuntur tres regule sequentes. Prima regula:

A parte principali disiunctive ad eius disiunctivam^a significativam^a ut sue partes principales consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'tu es homo; ergo tu es homo vel tu es asinus'. Sed dixi in regula "significativa ut sue partes principales", quia predicta^b consequentia non valet, posito casu quod aliqua^c disiunctiva que est consequens sit imposita ad significandum te esse capram vel aliud^d falsum, quod non sequatur ex eius antecedente.

^a significativam]Z significativa S ^b predicta consequentia] predictam consequentiam S ^c aliqua]S illa Z ^d aliud]S aliquid Z

6 Secunda regula:

A tota disiunctiva significativa ut sue partes principales ad alteram eius partem principalem consequentia formaliter non valet.

Exemplum, ut non sequitur 'tu es homo vel tu es asinus; ergo tu es asinus', quia huius consequencie antecedens est verum et consequens falsum. Aliquando valet consequencia de materia, quando disiunctiva fit ex duabus partibus quarum una pars sequitur ad alteram et arguitur a^a disiunctiva ad suam^b partem que^c sequitur. Et potest fieri quatuor vel quinque modis. Primo [S 108^r] quando partes principales disiunctive sunt convertibiles ad invicem, ut sequitur 'homo currit vel rationale currit; ergo homo currit'. Secundo quando una pars disiunctive est inferior ad aliam, ut sequitur 'homo currit vel animal currit; ergo animal currit'. Tercio quando disiunctiva est impossibilis, ut sequitur 'homo est asinus vel nullus deus est; ergo homo est asinus', quia ex impossibili sequitur quidlibet. Quarto quando una pars disiunctive est necessaria et alia pars disiunctive^d est contingens et concluditur pars necessaria, ut sequitur 'Deus est vel tu curris; ergo Deus est', quia^e necessarium^f sequitur ad quidlibet. Quinto quando una pars disiunctive est impossibilis et alia possibilis et concluditur pars possibilis, ut sequitur 'tu curris vel tu es [Z 87^v] asinus; ergo tu curris', et huiusmodi.

^a a disiunctiva] ad disiunctivam S ^b suam]Z om. S ^c que]Z om. S ^d disiunctive]S om. Z ^e quia] ad add. S ^f necessarium]S necessario(!) Z

7 Tercia regula:

A tota disiunctiva significativa^a ut sue partes principales cum contradictorio unius partis principalis ad alteram eius partem principalem consequencia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'tu es homo vel tu es asinus; sed tu non^b es asinus^c; ergo tu es homo', et huiusmodi.

^a significativa]Z^cS om. Z ^b non]Z^cS om. Z ^c asinus]Z^cS^c homo S

8 Contra regulam^a arguitur sic. Talis consequencia non valet 'rex sedet vel nullus rex sedet; sed nullus rex sedet; ergo rex sedet', quia huius consequencie antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod nullus rex sedeat. Ergo regula falsa. Secundo arguitur sic. Talis consequencia non valet 'tu es asinus vel manus mea est clausa; sed manus mea non^b est clausa; ergo tu es asinus', quia huius consequencie antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito tali casu quod dum profertur illa disiunctiva sit ita quod manus mea sit clausa, sed dum profertur contradictorium illius partis nulla manus mea sit clausa. A simili non sequitur 'tu es asinus vel tu sedes; sed tu non sedes^c; ergo tu es^d asinus', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod^e dum profertur illa^f disiunctiva sit ita quod tu sedeas, sed dum quod profertur contradictorium illius partis^g sit ita quod tu non sedeas^h, et huiusmodi.

^a regula]Z^cS regulas Z ^b non]S nulla Z ^c sedes]Z es asinus S ^d es asinus]Z sedes S ^e quod] sedes add. necnon exp. Z ^f illa . . . profertur]Z om. S ^g partis]S om. Z ^h sedeas]Z sedes S

9 Ad primum dico quod arguitur non^a per regulam, quia arguitur a disiunctiva cum contradictoria unius partis ad eandem partem cuius accipitur contradictorium, et non arguitur ad alteram eius partem principalem. Ut patet bene advertenti [S 108^v] Ad secundum vel ad tertium dico quod regula^b intelligitur in eodem instanti temporis, quia sic intelliguntur omnes regule consequenciarum^c.

^a non] *om.* S ^b regula] bene *add.* S ^c consequenciarum] *om.* S

De consequenciis condicionalium

10 De consequenciis condicionalium vel racionalium ponuntur tres regule sequentes. Prima regula:

A^a condicionali cum suo antecedente ad eius consequens est consequentia bona.

Exemplum, ut bene sequitur 'si tu es homo, tu es animal; sed tu es homo; ergo tu es animal'. Sed illa regula intelligitur de condicionali significativa ut sue partes, et sic debent intelligi omnes regule sequentes.

Secunda regula:

A condicionali cum^b contradictorio consequentis ad contradictorium antecedentis eiusdem consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'si tu es asinus, tu es rudibilis; sed tu non es rudibilis; ergo tu non es asinus', et huiusmodi.

Tercia regula: [Z 88^r]

A^c rationali^d ad condicionalem de partibus omnino consimilibus consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'tu es homo; ergo tu es animal; ergo si tu es homo tu es animal', et ita de similibus^e.

^a a] *om.* S ^b cum] suo *add.* S ^c a] condicionali *add. necnon exp.* Z ^d rationali] *om.* S ^e condicionali *add. necnon exp.* Z ^e similibus] exemplis *add.* S

De consequenciis causalium

11 De consequenciis causalium ponuntur tres regule sequentes. Prima regula:

A causali significativa ut sue partes principales ad alteram eius partem principalem consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'quia sol lucet, dies est; ergo sol lucet vel^a dies^b est'. Sed^c econverso non valet consequentia, ut non sequitur 'proficis vel^d doleo; ergo quia proficis doleo', et huiusmodi^e.

Secunda regula:

A causali ad condicionalem de partibus omnino consimilibus consequentia est bona.

Exemplum^f, ut sequitur 'quia sol lucet, dies est; ergo^g si sol lucet, dies

est'. Sed e converso non valet consequentia, ut non sequitur 'si tu es asinus, tu es rudibilis; ergo quia tu es asinus, tu es rudibilis', quia illa^h condicionalis est vera, sedⁱ causalis est falsa, et per consequens huius consequentie antecedens est verum et consequens falsum.

Tercia regula:

A causali ad copulativam de partibus omnino consimilibus consequentia est bona. Exemplum^j, ut sequitur 'quia sol lucet, [S 109^e] dies est; ergo sol lucet et dies est'. Sed e converso non valet consequentia, ut non sequitur 'proficis et doleo^k; ergo quia proficis, doleo^l', et huiusmodi.

^a vel] ergo add. Z^b dies] deus S^c sed] non add. S^d vel doleo] con. ergo doleo Z om. S^e et huiusmodi] Z om. S^f exemplum] S om. Z^g ergo . . . est] bis in Z^h illa] facit bonam consequentiam add. Zⁱ sed] S et Z^j exemplum] S om. Z^k doleo] Z doles S^l doleo] Z doles S

De consequentiis expletivarum

12 De consequentiis expletivarum ponuntur due regule sequentes. Prima regula:

Ab expletiva composita ex partibus indicativis ad alteram eius partem principalem consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'tu es homo quamvis tu^a sedes; ergo tu es homo' vel 'ergo^b tu sedes'. Sed e converso non valet consequentia, ut non sequitur 'tu es homo; ergo tu es homo quamvis tu sedes', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, posito casu quod non sedeas. Similiter non sequitur 'tu curris; ergo tu curris quamvis tu sedes', et huiusmodi.

Secunda regula:

Ab expletiva composita ex partibus indicativis ad copulativam de partibus omnino consimilibus consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'tu es homo quamvis tu sedes; ergo tu es homo et tu sedes', et e converso, et^c huiusmodi.

^a tu] bis in S^b ergo] Z om. S^c et huiusmodi] S^c huius modis S om. Z

De consequentiis similitudinarie

13 De consequentiis similitudinarie ponuntur due regule sequentes. Prima regula:

A similitudinaria [Z 88^v] significativa ut sue partes ad alteram eius partem principalem consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'Sortes currit sicut Plato currit; ergo Sortes currit' vel 'ergo^a Plato currit'. Sed e converso non valet, ut non sequitur 'aquila volat; ergo tu volas sicut aquila volat', quia antecedens est verum et consequens falsum, et huiusmodi.

Secunda regula:

A similitudinaria ad copulativam de partibus omnino consimilibus consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'Sortes currit sicut Plato currit; ergo Sortes currit et Plato currit'. Similiter sequitur 'tu volas sicut aquila volat; ergo tu volas et aquila volat'. Sed e converso non valet consequentia, ut non sequitur 'Sortes currit et Plato sedet; ergo Sortes currit sicut Plato sedet'. Similiter non sequitur 'tu es albus et corvus est niger; ergo tu es albus sicut corvus est niger', et huiusmodi.

^a ergo] *S om. Z*

De consequentiis localium

14 De consequentiis localium ponuntur due regule sequentes. Prima regula:

A locali significativa ut sue partes principales ad alteram eius partem principalem consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, [S 109] ut sequitur 'Deus est ubi homo est; ergo Deus est' vel 'ergo homo est'. Sed e converso consequentia non valet, ut non sequitur 'Sortes sedet; ergo Sortes sedet ubi Plato sedet', et huiusmodi.

Secunda regula:

A locali ad copulativam de partibus omnino consimilibus consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'Deus est ubi homo est; ergo Deus est et homo est'. Sed e converso non valet consequentia, ut non sequitur 'Sortes sedet et Plato sedet; ergo Sortes sedet ubi Plato sedet', et huiusmodi.

De consequentiis temporalium

15 De consequentiis temporalium ponuntur due regule sequentes. Prima regula:

A temporali significativa ut sue partes principales^a ad alteram eius partem principalem consequentia est bona.

Exemplum, ut sequitur 'Sortes currit dum Plato currit; ergo Sortes currit' vel 'ergo Plato currit'. Sed e converso non valet consequentia, ut non sequitur 'sedebo; ergo sedebo quando curram', et huiusmodi.

Secunda regula:

A temporali ad copulativam de partibus omnino consimilibus consequentia est bona. Ut^b sequitur 'Sortes currit dum Plato currit; ergo Sortes currit et Plato currit'. Similiter sequitur 'sedebo quando curram; ergo sedebo et curram'.

Et e converso non valet consequentia, ut non sequitur 'sedebo et curram; ergo sedebo quando curram', et huiusmodi.

^a principales] *S om.* $\mathcal{Z}$ ^b ut] $\mathcal{Z}$ et *S*

16 [$\mathcal{Z}$ 89^r] Et hec sunt^a dicta de consequentiis seu argumentacionibus. Et per consequens de tertia parte huius logice.

^a sunt] *S sint* $\mathcal{Z}$

*A Forced March Towards Beatitude:
Christian Trottmann's Histoire of the Beatific Vision*

KENT EMERY, JR.

Christian Trottmann, *La vision béatifique des disputes scolastiques à sa définition par Benoît XII* École Française de Rome, Rome 1995 899 pp. with 3 plates (Bibliothèque des Écoles Françaises d'Athènes et de Rome 289).

The medieval discussion of the beatific vision involves fundamental questions about the metaphysical and psychological structure of intelligent creatures in relation to God; it tests noetic theories at their outer limits; it disputes the ultimate ethical ends of human life; it entails logical paradoxes that require sophisticated treatment; it likewise involves crucial hermeneutical questions about the interpretation of "divine" and human writings. In his abridged(!) doctoral thesis, from the topical vantage point of the beatific vision (than which only one can be higher), Christian Trottmann surveys the universal progress of medieval theories of knowledge, focusing on the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries until Benedict XII's dogmatic Constitution, *Benedictus Deus* (1336), but casting his sight backwards to the early Church fathers and glancing forward to the theological discussions of our own day.

Trottmann's book is an encyclopedia and will be the standard reference-work concerning the beatific vision for years to come. For this reason it merits a long review. His study, moreover, suggests countless topics for further research; he himself promises several critical editions (pp. 1-2), a complete study of the process against Durand of Saint-Pourçain (p. 592 n. 12), and monographs on the noetic status of theology and on synderesis, which will offer "une critique de la raison pure et une critique de la raison pratique au Moyen Age" (p. 818 n. 1).

Trottmann means further to exemplify a proper, corrective method for interpreting medieval intellectual history. Alluding to a recent book on medieval theories of vision, which excludes from its purview the theological topic of the beatific vision (p. 9), he states:

L'histoire de la pensée médiévale a trop souffert d'une lecture positiviste qui prenait au pied de la lettre l'adage: "*Philosophia ancilla theologiae*" et considérait que la philoso-

phie du Moyen Age était étouffée par la théologie. Les rapports entre science, philosophie et théologie n'étaient-ils pas réciproques et dialectiques, en ce siècle, comme en d'autres? (p. 10; *nota bene*: Trottmann frequently expresses his conclusions in the form of rhetorical questions).

Trottmann's demonstrations will persuade readers that movements in medieval theology and philosophy were reciprocal and inextricably related, and that questions concerning the beatific vision were central to the major intellectual disputes of the thirteenth century. Nevertheless, he formally excludes from his own treatment "specifically theological" questions concerning the beatific vision of Christ's human soul, the beatified and natural knowledge of angels (see the reference to S.D. Dumont, p. 10), and the glorified condition of the resurrected body (p. 8 n. 1). Likewise, only in passing does he mention the special problems concerning the soul's knowledge of the Trinity (e.g., pp. 364-65), the highest object of Christian contemplation in this world and presumably in the next. No one, I think, would wish Trottmann's book to be any longer. To address all of these related topics in the thought of any author would probably require an independent monograph; moreover, to introduce them would obscure the conceptual clarity of Trottmann's undeviating narrative line.

The book is divided into three parts. As a prelude, the first chapter surveys "the heritage of ten centuries of theological reflection," from the early fathers to Bernard of Clairvaux and Peter Lombard. Naturally enough, Trottmann pays most attention to those authors (e.g., Augustine, pseudo-Dionysius, Eriugena, Bernard) whose texts were contested in the later Scholastic disputes. Otherwise, he strives to establish a dialectic relation between Greek doctrines of the unknowability of God and Augustine's doctrine of the immediate vision of the divine essence, and between intellectualist and affective conceptions of beatitude.

Thereafter, Trottmann divides his book into two major parts, according to an order of questions, *Quid? et Quomodo?* on the one hand, and *Quando?* on the other. For Trottmann, this division is more than rhetorically convenient, for the order of questions, he argues, follows an inner logic that corresponds to the emphases in the chronological sequence of debates. The first division "What?" and "How?" embraces the Scholastic philosophical and theological discussions of the thirteenth century. It is subdivided according to doxographical categories and historical phases established more or less securely by modern historians (see below). The last division of the book "When?" comprises the dramatic "reaction" of John XXII and the subsequent disputes, concluding with the dogmatic Constitution of Benedict XII. In this section, Trottmann offers a paraphrase-commentary

of nearly every item in the debate, edited or newly uncovered from manuscripts, and a detailed examination of all the historical events.

In effect, Trottman has yoked together what could be two separate books. He unifies his huge narrative by means of a philosophical conception of *Histoire*. His conception, not surprisingly, is dialectical. Thus, each dialectical phase of the thirteenth-century discussion was propelled by a new penetration of Aristotle's theory of knowledge, and was delimited by successive theological Condemnations (1210, 1241, 1277). Each "wave" of Aristotelian theory engendered a reaction and an alternative interpretation, motivated especially, Trottman argues, by a concern to preserve or meet the theological requirements of the beatific vision, and to distinguish its elevated cognition from ordinary knowledge. The dialectical process of thirteenth-century Scholastic thought culminated in the "perfect synthesis" of Thomas Aquinas, who understood Aristotle better than anyone else, and who most successfully resolved the noetic issues involved in the beatific vision by way of his doctrine of the *lumen gloriae*. Afterwards, progressive movement seemed to stall amidst refinements of already established positions and responses to criticisms, until Pope John XXII reinvigorated the dialectic and extended its historical range by asking the question "When?" The new dialectical movement initiated by this question, and the "archaic" way in which it was proposed, in turn, demanded a more comprehensive historical synthesis, this time between patristic and monastic theology, on the one hand, and Scholastic theology, on the other. This synthesis was achieved privately by the "Providential Man," Jacques Fournier, who later became Pope Benedict XII. Having taken "two steps forward" as a theologian, however, as Pope he "took one step backwards," leaving out of his dogmatic Constitution the most innovative and satisfying ideas of his personal synthesis. However disappointing his decision might be, he thus left open the possibility for a later, higher synthesis in the on-going dialectical process of *Histoire*.

The thirteenth-century dialectic is kicked off by the writings of David of Dinant and Amaury of Bène, which were condemned at Paris in 1210. According to David's "materialistic" and "pantheistic" reading of Aristotle, spirit (*mens*), matter and God are essentially one thing; accordingly, the unity between the knower and the thing known, like the unity between matter and form, constitutes only one being. The consequences of this "materialistic pantheism" in regard to the human mind's knowledge of God are patent: one must needs conclude that the individual soul cannot know God, and that its substance, the universal *mens*, plays the passive role of "matter" in union with the "form" of God, thereby constituting

one reality with him (pp. 118-19). The ideas of the "spirituals" who followed Amaury and who conceived that the unity between the knower and thing known was realized in God or in his eternal creative Ideas, while not materialistic were no less "pantheistic." In the larger scheme of things, whether Trottmann's interpretation of David of Dinant's "naive" comprehension is correct or sufficiently "nuanced" seems relatively unimportant, except that he places such weight upon it as the starting point of the dialectical process. It seems, however, that many of the fragments attributed to David were in fact not written by him and date from the 1260s, that David's notion of matter derives more from twelfth-century Platonic sources than from Aristotle, and that the characterization of David as a "materialistic" philosopher has its origins in polemics of the later thirteenth century, notably in Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*.¹ In other words, at its beginning the historical dialectic purportedly set in motion by David of Dinant is vexed with chronological and interpretive questions.

Adopting Etienne Gilson's term, Trottmann labels the next "wave" of the reception of Aristotle *L'augustinisme avicennisant*. Because it "conforms more to the dominant Augustinian Platonism," Trottmann argues, Avicenna's interpretation of Aristotle's noetic theory provided "an advantageous alternative to the materialistic reading of Aristotle" proposed by David of Dinant (p. 130). According to Avicenna, an intelligible species, serving as a mean between the possible intellect and its object, is the first object in every cognitive act, even in the highest reaches of spiritual knowledge. Because Avicenna's teaching renders impossible a pantheistic interpretation of the knowledge of God, theologians were "seduced" into applying it to the question of the beatific vision:

L'intérêt des théologiens du début du XIII^e siècle pour Avicenne n'est-il pas d'abord épistémologique dans le cadre historique des premières condamnations de 1210-1225? Lorsqu'ils pensent la connaissance humaine en tant qu'illumination, ils ont en vue aussi bien la connaissance ordinaire que celle donnée par grâce, voire la vision béatifique (pp. 151-2).

In interpreting the Condemnations of 1241, which affirmed that in the beatific vision souls see the essence of God immediately without any

¹ See the study by Andreas Speer, Henryk Anzulewicz and Martin Pickavé, *David von Dinant und die Fragmente der "Quaternuli"*, forthcoming (Leiden-New York, in: *Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters*). The text most at question is the long fragment G in: *Davidis de Dinando Quaternulorum fragmenta*, ed. M. Kurdziałek, in: *Studia Mediewistyczne*, 3 (1963).

intervening species or "theophanies," Trottmann attempts to reconcile the interpretations of P.-M. de Contenson and Gilson, which emphasize "l'enjeu épistémologique de la pénétration avicennienne," with those of M.-D. Chenu and H.-F. Dondaine, which emphasize the encounter between Greek and Latin theological traditions (p. 185). Those theologians who were touched by the Condemnations (Stephen of Venisy, John Pagus, Hugh of Saint-Cher, Guerric of Saint-Quentin) tried to reconcile the Aristotelian requirement of a union between the knower and the object known and the Greek theological idea of the unknowability of God by resorting to the pseudo-Dionysian (and Eriugenian) notion of "theophanies" as the object of the soul's knowledge in the beatific vision. William of Auvergne, who authored the Condemnations of 1241, like Avicenna recognized the need for an impressed species in every act of ordinary knowledge, but saved the Latin understanding of the immediacy of the beatific vision by purging Avicenna's teaching of its cosmological inconveniences and reconciling it with Augustine's teachings about the soul. Thus, in the beatific vision the image of the soul itself, elevated by grace and glory, becomes the *medium quo* the divine essence is seen. (With many variations, other theologians adopted this basic approach for decades.) But while such solutions as William's prevented a pantheistic identity between the soul and God, and avoided the "heretical" idea that some created similitude other than the soul itself intervened in its beatific vision of God, they yet, in Trottmann's eyes, sacrificed the theological requirement of immediacy. Concerning the attractiveness of Avicenna's noetic teaching for "Augustinian" theologians, the direct nexus between the Condemnations of 1210 and 1241, and the as yet unsatisfactory outcome, Trottmann is emphatic. Avicenna's interpretation, he says,

permet ainsi de penser comme intentionnelle et non substantielle, l'union de l'intellect avec son objet. Ainsi, voulant se sauver de l'écueil panthéiste d'une noétique aristotélicienne naïvement comprise en laquelle le sujet connaissant ne ferait qu'un avec l'objet connu (Dieu dans la vision béatifique) l'augustinisme avicennisant va être amené à nier l'immédiateté de cette vision. Il devait en effet nécessairement interposer entre la divine essence et l'intellect le voile de quelque similitude. Voulant sauver la transcendance de Dieu dans la vision béatifique il en perd l'immédiateté (p. 150).

Although Trottmann attempts to balance interpretations of the Condemnations of 1241, he in fact confers more weight on the influence of Avicenna, as his dialectical pattern, propelled by interpretations of Aristotle, seems to require. In general, Trottmann seldom lingers on "Platonic" contributions to the discussion, save Augustine's, and he rarely evaluates

them positively. In this account, it is theologians' stubborn adherence to the "neo-Platonic" noetic conceptions of Augustine (p. 60 et passim) that retards their understanding and proper application of Aristotle's theory, and which drives them towards "voluntaristic" solutions concerning beatitude that are peripheral to the progress of intellect (and do not fit easily into the scheme of the book). One senses that one has heard this story before. Trottmann's remarks about recent "neo-Platonic" interpretations of Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas may shed light on this matter:

Sans dénier l'influence théologique de Denys sur Albert et Thomas. . . . nous persistons à considérer, fort de la continuité de sept siècles de tradition, que leur philosophie est principalement aristotélicienne. . . . La grandeur des deux maîtres de l'Ecole dominicaine ne réside-t-elle pas dans cette synthèse? . . . Nous refusons donc de faire d'Albert, et plus encore de Thomas, des philosophes néo-platoniciens à cause de l'influence de Denys sur leur théologie. Mais nous refusons aussi bien d'en faire de purs aristotéliciens par la réduction de leur théologie à celle attribuée au Stagirite à leur époque (p. 297 n. 49).

After the Condemnations of 1241, which supposedly resolved the question "What?" concerning the beatific vision, theologians turned their attention to the question "How?" In doing so, they responded to, and benefitted from, the next wave of Aristotelian interpretation, the "first Latin Averroism" in the faculty of Arts (1225-1265). Relying heavily on studies by R.-A. Gauthier, Trottmann emphasizes the interplay between interpretations of Aristotle's noetic theory and ethics. The "principal characteristic" of the Artists' noetic interpretations, in contrast with "the second Latin Averroism," consists in making the agent and possible intellects faculties of the individual soul (pp. 212, 218), as Albert and Thomas did later (see n. 10 below). In the treatises he recounts, Trottmann discovers a new synthesis between Averroës and Augustine, for which he coins a new term: *L'augustinisme averroïsant*. The consequences of this synthesis for the conception of the soul's beatitude (and by implication for the theology of the beatific vision) are to be found in contemporary commentaries on the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Influenced by Christian ideas, these commentators stressed that true beatitude lies beyond the natural capacities of the soul and must be received passively from God. In their conception of beatitude, they celebrated the contemplative life in the terms of traditional Christian mysticism: "la connaissance amoureuse de Dieu, par la partie supérieure de l'âme (intellect spéculatif, pratique, voire partie désidérative) sans la médiation des phantasmes" (p. 241). Although Trottmann is sympathetic towards the "first Latin Averroists" insofar as their doctrines concerning the passive and agent intellects point in the right direction, he is severely critical of their "naively Christian" interpretations, their "concordisme naïf, mais aussi

très fragile," their "betrayal" of the text of Aristotle, their "clericalism" and "prudery" (pp. 242-43). Trottmann vents this displeasure because the commentators neglect and denigrate the civic and political virtues taught by Aristotle, sacrificing them on the altar of Christian contemplation. Of course, the commentators, who were not obliged to respect the integrity of Aristotle's thought, may simply have been persuaded by Augustine's analysis of pagan virtues in light of their intentions, as Bonaventure seems to have been when he warned against the deceptiveness of Aristotle's *Ethics*.

This "naively concordist, too Christian" (p. 243) interpretation of Aristotle necessitated a dialectical response, which Trottmann calls "la laïcisation d'Aristote" (p. 246 et passim). This time, the new interpretation was moved by the theologians, Albert the Great, especially in his course on the *Ethics* in 1248-1252, and Thomas Aquinas; at the same time, the new perception of Aristotle resulted in the "second Latin Averroism" of the Arts faculty, which was the subject of the Condemnations of 1277. Trottmann's analysis of the "second Averroism" is based largely on three commentaries on the *Ethics* originally studied by Gauthier, with less reference to Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia. He characterizes this movement as displaying the "Vanité des philosophes: l'élitisme intellectueliste" (p. 279), because it posited an intellectual beatitude possible in this life for those few who are adept in philosophical speculation. This notion, evidently, challenged Christian doctrine on many fronts. Trottmann accepts Alain de Libera's powerful interpretation of the Condemnations of 1277 as being primarily directed at the strictly philosophic, contemplative, "ethical ideal" of the Artists, which undermined the need for revelation and grace. In this context, Trottmann argues, the question of the beatific vision, which differentiates Christian beatitude from its natural competitors and exposes the limits of human knowing, was central and paramount, implicitly if not always explicitly. It is within this context that one must interpret Albert's and Thomas' teachings concerning human beatitude (see pp. 279-82).

"Without doubt," Trottmann says, Albert the Great is "the father of radical Aristotelianism, but despite this, he remains a theologian" (p. 292); inversely, while Albert labors to distinguish Christian from philosophic beatitude, he "remains in a certain way dependent on Aristotelian elitism" (p. 258). In his commentary on the first book of the *Sentences*, Albert distinguishes between the natural exercise of philosophic reason in the light of its own agent intellect; mystical contemplation within the gifts of faith and wisdom, conceived in terms of the "metaphysics of flux" (*Liber de causis*), the theophanies of pseudo-Dionysius, and the "two faces of the

soul" (knowledge of sensible things by way of abstraction from phantasms, knowledge of spiritual realities by way of illumination); and the beatific vision, conceived in terms of God's interior presence in the soul (Augustine). In his commentary on pseudo-Dionysius' *Mystical Theology*, Albert is more "deliberately intellectualist," arguing (according to Trottmann) a complete break between the ordinary processes of natural knowledge and the negative way of mystical contemplation, which, while entering a "cloud of unknowing," still attains a direct contact with God, *per adhesionem intellectus*. What is attained by mystical contemplation, however, is not a transitory vision of the divine essence but theophanies that express the divine goodness through its greatest effects (pp. 293-94).

Trottmann devotes his most detailed analysis to a text from Albert's commentary on the *Celestial Hierarchy*, wherein Albert distinguishes a four-fold hierarchy of light and vision. What is at stake is Albert's understanding of the continuity of natural, mystical and beatific knowledge of God. The first two degrees pertain to the knowledge of God *in via*; the last degree, wherein the soul "sees an object which is God in a light which is God," refers expressly to the beatific vision. Albert's definition of the third degree is rather ambiguous. Here the soul sees "an object which is truly God in a divine light which is not God"; one does not see in this light as in a mean, however, as one sees a thing in its image; rather, by the effect of this light, which strengthens the intellect, God is seen immediately (p. 296). Respecting the hierarchical structure of the text, the fact that beatitude is mentioned explicitly only in the last degree, the tradition of Dionysian commentary, and Albert's teaching elsewhere, E.-H. Wéber argues that the third degree refers to the knowledge of mystical theology in the shadow of faith (which for Albert is a "light"). This interpretation establishes the continuity of knowledge possible *in via* and *in patria*. Trottmann, on the other hand, prefers to interpret Albert's third degree in a way that "approaches the meaning of Saint Thomas" (p. 298), as pertaining exclusively to the beatific vision. His reading finds in "the divine light which is not God . . . which strengthens the intellect" an anticipation of Thomas' more precise definition of the *lumen gloriae*. Thus, if Albert conceives the causality of "the light which is God" (fourth degree) in "neo-Platonic" terms, like Thomas he conceives "the light which is not God" (third degree) in Aristotelian terms (p. 297). In this way he grapples with the distinction between created and uncreated glory in the beatific vision, if less coherently than Thomas.

Thus Trottmann strives to demonstrate that Albert, like Thomas after him, established a "fundamental discontinuity" between the soul's beatific

knowledge of God and any it can have *in via* (p. 298). Such a discontinuity in Albert's thinking is contradicted by two questions (recently edited) *De raptu* and *De visione Dei in patria*, in which Albert argues that the mystical rapture experienced by some saints while still in this life approaches the form of the beatific vision ("est simile gloriae per aliquem modum"), that "elevatio haec est quodammodo praeter naturam, in quodammodo supra, et quodammodo contra," and that its intellectual vision occurs without images or phantasms ("in raptu omnes convertuntur ad intelligentiam, et in illa percipiunt de lumine divino, quantum possunt, unaquaeque secundum proportionem propriam sibi").² Moreover, Alain de Libera shows that Albert allowed the possibility of a natural contemplative felicity in this life, by way of the conjunction or continuation of the possible intellect with the agent intellect;³ *a fortiori*, this possibility would seem to admit a supernatural mystical cognition of God in this life. Rather sophistically, Trottmann adduces de Libera's evidence to reduce Wéber's interpretation *ad absurdum* (p. 299). Trottmann's overall interpretation is forced by his larger historical thesis, according to which Albert once more appears as an imperfect precursor of his student, moving the right interpretation of Aristotle forward but still infected by "neo-Platonic" elements. So Trottmann confirms a longstanding historiographical tradition, in the face of the major reassessment of Albert's teaching in the last few decades.⁴

Beyond doubt, however, Albert admitted the possibility of a philosophical cognition that Thomas denies: the knowledge of separated substances.

² The two questions are edited by A. Fries, W. Kübel and H. Anzulewicz in: *Sancti Doctoris Ecclesiae Alberti Magni . . . Opera omnia* (Cologne Edition) 25.2, Münster i.W. 1993, 85-101. For the quotations, see 86b, 92b, 93b.

³ Trottmann's rapid inference that the philosopher's beatitude "consiste à recevoir la forme même de la divine essence par continuation de l'intellect" (p. 299) seems unjustified by the text from Albert he quotes, which speaks of understanding separated substances.

⁴ Surprisingly, Trottmann does not refer to a seeming contradiction among Albert's various statements about the beatific vision, which was remarked by other medieval thinkers. Denys the Carthusian notes that in his commentary on *De divinis nominibus*, Albert says that even the blessed souls cannot know the *quid est* of the divine essence, but only its *quia est*. Denys comments: "Verum istud non videtur rite sonare, quia cognitio *quia est*, habetur etiam in praesenti; estque talis cognitio obscura, et per speculum in aenigmate, quae mentem creatam contentare et quietare non valet. . . . Insuper de hac ipsa materia Albertus, vir valde catholicus, in aliis locis melius scripsit" (see Denys' commentary on *De mystica theologia: Difficultatum praecipuarum absolutiones* a.1, in *Doctoris ecclastici D. Dionysii Cartusiani Opera omnia* 16: 482-83). Two observations should be made: (1) like some of his Dominican confrères before 1241, Albert, perhaps moved by the drift of Dionysius' text, here is still influenced by the Greek notion of God's unknowability even in the beatific vision; (2) however defined, in Albert's mind there is a graded continuity between the soul's knowledge of God *in via* and *in patria*, in this instance, a knowledge *quia est*.

This possibility follows from Albert's understanding of the soul as "an incorporeal substance moving the body" (p. 284), an independent intellectual substance, whose "essence" cannot be identified with the form of the body, and whose faculty of intellect is more than a simple power, but that by which a man is man and the soul is more than a soul (p. 286). Trottmann notes these definitions but he does not explore their profound consequences for Albert's whole teaching, and the way in which they make it incommensurate with that of Thomas Aquinas.

Thomas Aquinas achieved the perfect synthesis of Scholastic discussions concerning the beatific vision. Trottmann's account of Thomas' teaching is straightforward. Avoiding the compromises of "un augustinisme avicennisant ou averroisant," Thomas developed a "radically Aristotelian noetic" for ordinary knowledge, which he adapted or altered adroitly to satisfy the special theological requirements of the beatific vision (p. 303). As an intellectual creature, man has a natural desire for the knowledge of God, which cannot be fully satisfied except by an immediate vision of the divine essence. But this natural desire cannot be accomplished by man's own natural powers, and so must be accomplished through the supernatural means of grace and glory, which predispose and elevate his nature. Because, as faith teaches, the beatific vision of God's essence must be intuitive and immediate (face to face), it cannot be mediated by any created species or *medium in quo*; thus, in the beatific vision it is the very essence of God that is the form of the passive intellect. But how can a created, finite intellect be rendered capable of the infinite, uncreated form? This is accomplished through the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*), which is a created supernatural habit that confers an ultimate formal disposition upon the soul, rendering it deiform and capable of receiving the divine essence as its object, and serving as a *medium sub quo* (not *in quo*) the beatified soul sees God. It is not the efficient causality of the light of glory that makes possible the actualization of the intellect by the divine form; rather it is the presence of the divine essence itself, as the actualizing form of the blessed intellect, that requires its disposition by the light of glory. In this way the influence of the divine essence and the light of glory operate simultaneously in the beatific vision (pp. 313-16).

According to Trottmann, the advantages of Thomas' teaching are these: it emphasizes the difference between ordinary knowledge, based on the information of the intellect by species abstracted from material things, and beatific knowledge, in which the intellect is informed by the divine essence itself, thanks to the strengthening influence of the light of glory;

while based on a "realist epistemology," it saves the faith, for it is the essence of God itself that is seen, without some *medium in quo*, intuitively and not abstractly; while attaining the essence of God directly, the beatified intellect does not comprehend God's infinite intelligibility, and so the transcendence of God is preserved (p. 318). In terms of Trottman's historical dialectic, the advantages of Thomas' doctrine are also social and political. By keeping man dependent on sense in this world (knowledge always by way of phantasms); by foreclosing any possibility that the intellect's natural desire can be satisfied by any but supernatural means; by radically separating the knowledge of God possible *in via* from that *in patria*; by conceiving that even in the next world the beatified soul is a passive recipient of an infused, supernatural gift, Thomas thoroughly undermined the elitist philosophers of his own day and, indeed, prevented the claims of any *philosophia divina*—past, present or future.

Trottman emphasizes other features of Thomas' teaching that became prominent in the later debates. The essence of man's beatitude is an intellectual vision, from which fruition in the will flows as a consequence; God is as quick to reward as to punish, so that the soul, wherein chiefly merit is acquired, is rewarded with its desire as soon as it is separated from the body in death; the subsequent glory of the resurrected body will be mediated by the soul; changing from an earlier position, Thomas concludes that the soul's reunion with its body will bring only an "extensive", not an "intensive", augmentation of beatitude.

Yet, the triumph that Thomas achieved by establishing a sharp "discontinuity" between the soul's ordinary and beatific cognition may entail some losses, as Trottman himself acknowledges, or even some incoherence, as others perceived. Thus, for example, Thomas is silent about the role played in the beatific vision by the soul's most noble faculty, the agent intellect, which performs the most decisive operation in the soul's knowledge *in via*. Since the beatified soul no longer needs to abstract species from phantasms, what role could the agent intellect play? It is this seeming contradiction in Thomas' account that Dietrich of Freiberg attempted to correct, unsuccessfully in Trottman's opinion.⁵

Thomas' "synthesis" yields another "discontinuity," which he himself elaborates. Although man's final beatitude pertains essentially to the intellect, *in via* the faculties of his soul, in terms of their nearness to God, are reversed. Human knowledge in this world proceeds necessarily by way of abstraction from sensible realities and the representation of intelligible

⁵ See below, 269.

species. Thus, we know inferior sensible objects in a manner more noble than their being. We do not know superior realities, however, except by way of species that are inferior to their being. In contrast, love in the will attains realities directly, without the mediation of species. Thus, although in itself the will is a faculty less noble than the intellect, it is able to attain realities superior to it—God in particular—more directly than the intellect. In this world, then, it is better to know than to love realities that are inferior to us, but it is better to love realities that are superior to us—notably God—than to know them according to the inferior knowledge that we can have of them (pp. 259-60). This argument entails a further “discontinuity”: it seems to eliminate any “intellectualist” interpretation of mystical theology, and certainly any contemplation of God that is beyond all images (pseudo-Dionysius), which would provide a link *in via* to beatific knowledge. Thus, it seems that any direct mystical contact with God *in via*—if any at all can occur—must needs be accomplished by affection in the will, which outruns the intellect, as the Victorines and Bonaventure taught. In this way, too, Thomas undercuts an “aristocratic” intellectualism, still evident in Albert, to the advantage of even the simplest “old Christian woman, who knows more about God and the soul than all the philosophers together” (pp. 259-60).

Within the context of Trottmann’s dialectical narrative, Thomas Aquinas stands out as the stalwart defender of the cognitive achievements of the separated soul. As far as the next world is concerned, this profile seems accurate. But how different it is from the portrait of Thomas in standard histories of medieval philosophy, where he stands out as the peerless advocate of the unicity of substantial form in the human composite and its noetic consequent, the necessary recourse to phantasms in every act of knowledge. This portrait too seems accurate, as far as this world is concerned. The “discontinuity” implied by these diverse narratives underlies all the others. Indeed, in the thirteenth century and thereafter many theologians and philosophers (e.g., Henry Bate) sharply criticized Thomas’ “radically Aristotelian” doctrines concerning the human composite and the soul’s necessary recourse to phantasms; some judged that they jeopardized the soul’s immortality itself, prior to any speculation about its beatific knowledge. Trottmann does not pursue this “discontinuity” very far; to have done so would have led him far afield into the order of being (which for some reason he wishes to avoid).⁶

⁶ We know now that Thomas’ philosophical doctrine of the unicity of substantial form

"Operation follows nature, and the order of knowing follows the order of being."

Curiously, according to Trottmann's thorough recitations of the early fourteenth-century disputes, it is the "Augustinian" proponents of the argument that the soul's beatitude increases "intensively" when reunited with its body who most often appeal to this general principle. The Franciscan Arnaud of Clermont, for example, argues that as the human subject needs a body in order to perform its most noble act, i.e., intellection, so the separated soul, because it as yet lacks the perfection of its being, will not be able to realize its most perfect operation until reunited with its body (pp. 620-21; Trottmann judges the argument "specious"). On behalf of an "intensive" increase, an anonymous "Carmelite Bachelor" attempts to establish a similar parallel between the orders of being and of knowing, and between knowledge *in via* and knowledge *in patria*. Whereas Arnaud responds to an objection from Thomas, the Carmelite Bachelor, ironically, adduces Thomas' support (p. 633; Trottmann judges the argument "feeble"). Contrariwise, one wonders why the Dominicans, Armand of Belvézer and John of Naples, arguing that the separated soul does not require a body for its perfect operation and essential beatitude, found it necessary or at least convenient to adopt Albert the Great's definition of the soul as "an intellectual substance that subsists by itself" (pp. 568, 576). Thomas Aquinas himself changed his mind on this question, at first maintaining that the soul's beatitude will increase "intensively" when reunited to its body but later concluding that reunion would bring only an "extensive" increase. Trottmann mentions Thomas' reversal several times, but he does not search deeply the intrinsic or circumstantial reasons that might serve to explain it.

If, as Thomas teaches, the human soul, which is last in the hierarchy of Intelligences having only a potency for knowledge, by nature has need of body in order to know, would it not seem that, according to the principle that "grace and glory perfect but do not destroy nature," the soul must await reunion with its body before it partakes its full cognitive beatitude?

in the human composite came close to being condemned at Paris in 1277. The many opponents of his doctrine posited a plurality of forms in the human composite or a *forma corporeitatis*, in part to preserve the existential reality of the separated soul. Thomas' doctrine raised problems regarding Christ's three days in the tomb and descent into Hell, producing an heated controversy. His doctrine was vindicated, however, at the Council of Vienne (1311-12), which declared that "the rational, intellectual soul is by its own nature the form of the body." Trottmann scarcely mentions any of these matters or prior questions in the order of being; this is so, I think, because he wishes to limit his discussion to the acceptably modern terrain of "epistemology," that is, to "une critique de la raison pure et une critique de la raison pratique" (p. 818 n. 1).

Moreover, considering the separated soul's rather weak *natural* capacity for knowledge, which Thomas posits in his *Quaestiones disputatae de anima* (see especially qq. 15, 18, 20) and elsewhere, does not its knowledge in the light of glory seem to lack a sufficient ground in nature? At the end of the Middle Ages, from an "intellectualist" perspective, Denys the Carthusian summarized the objections to Thomas' doctrine of phantasms and the "discontinuity" that it implies. The doctrine risks making the soul's immortality undemonstrable; it is contrary to the teaching of "all the better Peripatetic philosophers"; it denies the possibility of mystical contemplation "without images," contrary to the authority of pseudo-Dionysius and the ample testimony of the saints. Furthermore, if the human soul by nature cannot operate in a completely spiritual manner, nor know itself immediately by self-reflection, nor attain any knowledge of separated substances, what is the natural operation purportedly perfected by grace and glory? Thomas' laconic response, that the act of the beatified soul is different because the condition of its nature is different, is, in Denys' mind, a *petitio principii*, which simply asserts what must be proved. In the light of such objections, it does not seem wholly surprising that later Thomists were constrained to conceive some natural ground in the soul—an "obediential potency"—to account for its beatific knowledge. However serious one may judge these objections to be, and however adequately Thomists might answer them, Trottman does not envision the problem. This is so, I suspect, because within the context of his historical dialectic the "discontinuity" established by Thomas appears so neatly advantageous.

Following the advice of E.-H. Wéber, Trottman presents only a "skeleton" of the extended treatment of Meister Eckhart found in his thesis (p. 325 n. 140). The advice was well-taken. For the sake of his dialectical scheme, Trottman presents Eckhart as one who criticized the doctrine of the *lumen gloriae* (pp. 328-30). He is wrong about Eckhart, who says:

ad videndum deum per essentiam . . . requiritur lumen gloriae. . . visio dei per essentiam est quidem impossibilis intellectui creato ex puris naturalibus, possibilis autem ex supernaturalibus. . . "in eandem imaginem transformamur a claritate in claritatem", id est a naturali lumine in supernaturale et a lumine gratiae tandem in lumen gloriae.⁷

⁷ For a discussion of Eckhart's doctrine of beatitude and criticism of Trottman, see Wouter Goris, *Einheit als Prinzip und Ziel: Versuch über die Einheitsmetaphysik des "Opus tripartitum" Meister Eckharts*, Leiden-New York 1997, 360-72 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 59). I have taken the quotations (Eckhart, *Expositio libri Exodi* and *Sermo XLIX*) from Goris, 362 nn. 126-28.

Exhibiting his usual aversion to "neo-Platonism," Trottmann censures Meister Eckhart all over again, without much regard for the efforts of modern scholars to exonerate him:

Que reste-t-il d'une eschatologie future pour cette métaphysique d'une béatitude passéiste? Le néo-platonisme émanatiste d'Eckhart ne le fait-il pas sortir des exigences de la doctrine de l'Eglise au nom de laquelle il prêche? . . . Mais sa lecture de Denys influencée par le péripatétisme arabe et son sens du néant ne le font-ils pas sortir du cadre d'une théologie proprement chrétienne? (p. 330).

Despite Trottmann's claims for the "perfect synthesis" of Thomas Aquinas, the absence of the agent intellect in Thomas' account of the beatific vision would seem to be a serious lacuna and inconsistency in relation to his general theory of knowledge. Dietrich of Freiberg attempted to redress this omission by explaining the separated soul's beatitude in terms of its most noble faculty, the agent intellect (pp. 330-6). For some modern scholars, Dietrich should be praised for his "métaphysique de la conversion" and for his theological reconciliation, concerning the beatific vision, of "la médiation dionysienne et l'immédiateté augustinienne . . . même la fine pointe de l'aristotélisme arabe."⁸ Predictably, Trottmann evaluates Dietrich's accomplishment otherwise. Precisely because of his "Platonic" and "Augustinian" predispositions, Trottmann says, Dietrich is unable to understand Thomas' teaching about the *lumen gloriae*, and his own solution is theologically unsatisfactory, because it does not conceive "le caractère surnaturel de la vision béatifique puisqu'elle ne procède pas d'une grâce" (p. 335).

The forward motion of Trottmann's narrative stalls in his treatment of late thirteenth- and early fourteenth-century theologians, whom he classifies according to their "Augustinian" (and "voluntarist"), "nominalist" or "Dominican" positions. These pure strains sometimes became contaminated; the Thomism of Peter of Palude, for example, is "marked by Scotism and even nominalism" (p. 390), whatever that might mean. In terms of the symmetry of his book, whereby the Condemnations of 1210 and 1241 spurred new developments in the doctrine of the beatific vision, one is a bit surprised that, according to Trottmann's account, the great Condemnations of 1277 did not seem to have the same fruitful effect, even though questions concerning human beatitude were among their chief concerns. (Perhaps this is because Trottmann considers solutions

⁸ Alain de Libera, *La mystique rhénane d'Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart*, 2nd ed., Paris 1994, 163-229, quotation at p. 176.

that locate beatitude primarily in the will or which treat logical and semantic questions arising from the mystery to be historically retrogressive.) In this heterogeneous section, Trottmann presents the teachings of various masters in a series of vignettes; in some instances (Henry of Ghent, theologians at the court of Viterbo, the "second Franciscan school," including Duns Scotus) he gives résumés of articles he has published separately. This tactic created some problems for the editing of the book, for later in the text there are references to points that must have been established in the thesis but are absent in the summaries. The reader, then, may wish to acquire the articles to accompany the bulky volume.

The dialectical movement of the narrative again gathers full steam in the last part, which treats the debates provoked by John XXII and their culmination in the papal Constitution of Benedict XII. This part, which brings to light several unstudied texts, represents Trottmann's most "original contribution to scholarship."

John XXII's central idea about human beatitude, first presented in a series of sermons he preached in Avignon in 1331, is this: elect separated souls must wait for the fullness of beatitude and the vision of God face to face until they are reunited with their bodies, and until the final judgment at the end of time, when the totality of the mystical body will be assembled in glory under its head and Christ will hand over his rule to the Father. Until that time, elect separated souls contemplate God through a vision of the humanity of Christ. By returning to "an archaic theological tradition, the old jurist Pope" thus "invited his contemporaries to reflect on the collective and eschatological dimension of salvation," and challenged the prevailing Scholastic theology, which, conceiving the world as eternal,⁹ tended to focus on the destiny of individual souls after death and seemed to "push back the eschatological reckoning to infinity" (p. 455).

⁹ "La réflexion scolastique avait eu tendance à porter sur le destin individuel des âmes après la mort. . . . N'y était-elle pas invitée par une philosophie pensant le monde comme éternel et semblant ainsi repousser à l'infini l'échéance eschatologique?" (p. 455). Trottmann should be more careful in his expression, for although the philosophers whose writings theologians read argued that the world is eternal, what Scholastic theologian did not teach that in fact the world was created in time and will be judged at a definite end of time? Contrary to the heathen and infidel philosophers, some theologians (e.g., Bonaventure and Henry of Ghent) judged that the creation of the world in time could be proved by reason. Too often, exact expression is sacrificed for rhetorical contrast and effect. Then again, the statement may reflect a presupposition embedded in the entire argument: it was not Scholastic theology, governed by *sacra scriptura*, that radically altered or transformed the conceptions of ancient philosophy, but ancient philosophy (assimilated in "waves" of Aristotelian interpretation) that predetermined the outcome of theological speculation.

The Pope's "archaic" theological method consisted of an appeal to abundant scriptural texts, interpreted "literally," and to patristic and monastic authorities, notably Bernard of Clairvaux. The original collection of these authorities commissioned by the Pope was enlarged several times; disputes about their interpretation permeate the subsequent discussions, giving them a strong exegetical dimension. John XXII thus turned his back on a "century of theological reflection"; at the same time, by a certain "cunning of reason" he lifted the historical dialectic into a more widely encompassing sphere, which embraced patristic and "monastic" theology at one pole and Scholastic theology at the other. Trottman brands the Pope's initiative "reactionary," as the dialectical pattern of his narrative requires. Outside the plot-line, however, one might just as well consider it "forward looking," to the "Christian humanism" of Renaissance philologists, the development of "positive theology" in the sixteenth century, and even to *la nouvelle théologie* of the recent past.

To my mind, Trottman's account of the reasons underlying John XXII's startling thesis constitutes the finest historical analysis in his book (pp. 446-53). Following the lead of A. Tabarroni, he argues that John XXII's motives were ecclesiological and political and that his idea of Christian beatitude was designed to exclude as impossible various ideas that were fueling rebellion against ecclesiastical authority throughout the western Church. By asserting that the beatific vision cannot be attained until after the last judgment, when the Church is finally united completely under its head, and that until then the jurisdiction of the human Christ and of the Vicar of his mystical body on earth extends to all souls, John XXII intended to reinforce the papacy's power of the keys and its claim to a plenitude of spiritual and temporal authority. By withholding the vision of the divine essence until after the last judgment, he undermined, *a fortiori*, the pretensions of "Averroists, Spirituals and Beghards" to a beatitude in this life and any arguments of spiritual liberty that they could derive from it. Likewise, by declaring that mankind has only one beatific end, which is not complete for any soul until the last judgment, the Pope attempted to undercut arguments that there were two autonomous powers, spiritual and temporal, each with its own finality (p. 469: e.g., Dante, *De monarchia*, pp. 456-70). However "reactionary" his theology and politics, John XXII yet receives Trottman's praise for drawing attention to the "social, ecclesial and eschatological dimensions" of the Church and the communion of saints, and for exposing a major problem in contemporary Scholastic theology: if souls are already judged, rewarded or punished

immediately upon death, what remains to be judged in the general judgment? (p. 820).

In his treatment of the disputes provoked by John XXII's opinion, Trottmann classifies texts and authors not only chronologically and geographically, but also by strong personal judgments about their intellectual quality, theological "professionalism," and low political or personal motives (e.g., inquisitorial zeal, clerical preferment). Hence, in the first round of debates the polemical opposition of William of Ockham and other Franciscan "schismatics" exiled at Munich is marked by political bad faith. Interestingly, in light of his other innovations, Ockham's arguments about the beatific vision are largely traditional, reflecting the "theology generally received by his contemporaries" (pp. 484-92). In turn, the defenders of the Pope, François Christiani (a "personality of the second rank," whose arguments "lack theological force but not rhetorical vehemence," p. 501), and Annibal Ceccano, are classified as "reactionaries" who rejected all "Scholastic rationality" (p. 523), and who were motivated mainly by personal animosity against their opponents (Thomas Waleys and Durand of Saint-Pourçain).

In a second round, happily, the disputes achieved a higher tone and became "a true theological controversy" (pp. 523-83). In round three, however, the disputes once more became "envenomed," tainted by bitter rivalry between the mendicant orders or by a time-serving concern for clerical preferment (pp. 585-648). Finally, Trottmann maps the spread of the disputes beyond Avignon, to the court of Philippe VI and thence to the University of Paris (Guiral Ot, Nicholas of Lyre, pp. 714-43). In this round, the controversy reached lay as well as clerical circles.

The disputes instigated by John XXII revolve around interpretations of scriptural and patristic authorities; the nature of the separated soul's knowledge (abstractive or intuitive); the object of the soul's beatific knowledge (divine essence or humanity of Christ); and whether the soul's reunion with its body yields an "intensive" or merely "extensive" increase in beatitude. Although the dispute produced some important new arguments and telling criticisms, the common stock of argumentation soon became repetitious. Along the way, the weary reader will find welcome relief in the fresh if traditional approach taken in a "humble critique by a priest of the Teutonic Order" (pp. 650-80), and in the "humanist" approach taken by the "Philosopher King," Robert of Anjou (pp. 695-713).

The reader will agree with Trottmann that the controversy eventually reached an "impasse." Then there appeared the "Providential Man," Jacques Fournier, the future Pope Benedict XII. Fournier was well-prepared

to resolve the dialectical dilemma posed by the theological initiative of John XXII. As a Cistercian monk, he was steeped in "monastic theology" and in the spirituality of Bernard of Clairvaux, whose writings played such a crucial role in the disputes; trained at the University of Paris, he was adept in Scholastic reasoning; he was experienced in administration, having been a bishop in two sees before being elevated to the papacy. Although he criticizes the inquisitorial activities of others, Trottmann dispatches Fournier's role as an Inquisitor, so closely documented by E. Le Roy Ladurie, in two sentences: "*Montaillou* nous a laissé l'image d'un inquisiteur méticuleux et, somme toute, assez modéré puisqu'il ne brûla jamais que quarte de ses clients! Mais ce ne fut là qu'un passage dans une vie de moine et de théologien, d'homme d'Église et d'homme de Dieu" (p. 745). Apparently, Great Men who are forces of History are immune to the petty moral criticisms that apply to ordinary human beings.

For Trottmann, Jacques Fournier's sequence of treatises *De statu animarum sanctorum ante generale iudicium* represents the synthetic culmination of the medieval discussions concerning the beatific vision. In these treatises, Fournier summons all of his skills as a monastic and Scholastic theologian to reconcile the common teaching that separated souls, at the moment of their particular judgment, partake an immediate vision of the divine essence, with John XXII's fundamental insight that a full beatitude awaits the consummation of the economy of salvation in the general judgment. Within the parameters of the conventional Scholastic debate, Fournier argues for an intensive augmentation of beatitude when the soul is reunited with its body. More exceptionally, he also finds persuasive reasons for an augmentation of cognitive beatitude at the general judgment, thereby preserving John XXII's exegetical and ecclesiological insights if not their faulty articulation. Fournier establishes the theoretical foundation for a cognitive augmentation by way of three analogies, which argue that one comprehends an art more fully when one knows the purposes of the artist and his techniques of production, a cause more fully when one knows its many effects, and a principle more fully when one knows the many consequences that flow from it. In the last analogy, Trottmann detects the influence of Duns Scotus' "formal distinction" (pp. 753-55).

Jacques Fournier's most original contribution is his specification of the new knowledge obtained at the final judgment: the merits and demerits of men as seen by God, the secret intentions of their hearts, in short, the Book of divine prescience and predestination. Save God's will to reveal them in specific instances, these things remain hidden until the final judgment not only to *viatores* and separated human souls but also to beatified

angels. Otherwise, human beings might despair or become presumptuous, angels might withhold their assistance and separated souls their intercession, which they would see to be ultimately vain or unnecessary. Although Trottmann does not say so, this last argument seems to presuppose Scotus' notion of the radical freedom of the blessed angels and saints even in the beatific vision. (Elsewhere, Trottmann declares that Scotus' doctrine jeopardizes "the substantial and eternal character of deification," and anticipates "a modernity wherein the psycho-theology of the conscience abandons a metaphysics," p. 360.) In any event, the vision of God's predestination manifested at the last judgment will surely yield a real increase in beatitude, since it fulfills a legitimate desire of the blessed mind, increases mutual knowledge among the elect, and reveals the deep reasons for God's mysterious bestowing, withholding and withdrawing of grace, which are now incomprehensible to created intelligences and can even appear absurd (pp. 749, 752). Fournier's argument restores the social and collective dimension of beatitude, for each soul (and angel) must wait upon the accomplishment of the whole in order to experience all that God has promised.

In the course of his treatise, Fournier displays his exegetical and Scholastic skills, "reconciling the apparent contradictions" of the fathers (p. 747) and achieving a "real" and "authentic dialectical surpassing" of rational "difficulties" and "oppositions" (pp. 772, 810). His exegetical skills are especially evident in his interpretation of texts by Saint Bernard (pp. 762-72); here, according to Trottmann, Fournier employs a "remarkable . . . regressive method" that restores both the letter and the spirit of Bernard's texts "against the erroneous readings proposed by John XXII and his partisans" while preserving those meanings favorable to the Pope's more profound insight (pp. 771-2). Thus Fournier achieves a "splendide synthèse entre la théologie scolastique et celle plus mystique de Bernard, entre les conceptions modernes de la lumière et la tradition grecque héritée du Damascène!" (p. 778). As Fournier resolves one exegetical and dialectical difficulty after another, Trottmann becomes increasingly exclamatory (pp. 792-3).

In terms of Trottmann's plot, Benedict XII's dogmatic Constitution *Benedictus Deus* is an anti-climax. Although on several points it reflects "the doctrinal progress" accomplished in "a century of Scholastic disputes," it appears to be a simple counter-step to the opinion of John XXII (p. 823). The Constitution declares that immediately upon its separation from the body, a soul that is purified from sin will partake an intuitive, face to face vision of the divine essence, which manifests itself to the soul nakedly,

clearly and openly; this vision is unmediated by any intervening creature or created similitude (pp. 802-7). In this definition, Trottmann discerns the influence of Duns Scotus (p. 804). Since Scotus keeps appearing, in Jacques Fournier's master synthesis and in his final word on the matter as Pope, one wonders why he does not hold a more prominent place in Trottmann's book (see pp. 359-60). Significantly, Benedict's Constitution makes no reference to the *lumen gloriae* nor to the relation between created and uncreated grace in the beatific vision. It ventures nothing about the relation between particular and general judgments or about any augmentation of beatitude at the resurrection or general judgment. Thus, in his Constitution Benedict XII abandoned the surpassing ideas of his private treatise and retreated from his own synthesis of patristic, monastic, mystical and Scholastic theologies. So, as Trottmann says, *Benedictus Deus* left unresolved the dialectical opposition between "a collective and historical conception of eschatology," expressed mythically and imaginatively, and an individual, a-temporal conception of eschatology, expressed in abstract, metaphysical terms, which sets aside the "cosmic" dimensions of salvation (pp. 814-5). Doubtless, as Trottmann conjectures, Benedict's restraint was governed by his desire to avoid the likely opposition of both Dominicans and Franciscans, and to put to rest a dispute that had caused turmoil throughout the Church. It is possible, however, that Benedict exercised intellectual judgment as well as political prudence, deciding that most questions concerning the "How?" and "When?" of beatitude fall within the realm of probable opinion and are therefore unsuitable for dogmatic declaration.

* * *

One may summarize Trottmann's argument thus: The "materialistic" and "pantheistic" Aristotelianism of David of Dinant provoked the Condemnations of 1210, which begat *L'augustinisme avicennisant* (Gilson); this movement provoked the Condemnations of 1241, which begat "the first Latin Averroism" (Gauthier) or *L'augustinisme averroisant*;¹⁰ the wanton piety of

¹⁰ Carlos Bazán, *Was There Ever a "First Averroism"?* (forthcoming in *Miscellanea Mediaevalia* 27, ed. J.A. Aertsen and A. Speer) establishes that none of the Latin commentators on Aristotle's *De anima* between 1230 and 1260 adopted Averroës' distinctive doctrine that both the Agent and Material Intellects are separate substances or any other doctrine that is distinctively Averroistic; that all of the Greek and Semitic commentators unanimously held that the Agent Intellect is a separate substance; that all of the early Latin commentators, in contrast, argued that the agent and possible intellects are parts of the human

the first Averroists necessitated a correction; this necessity gave birth to twins, namely, to "la laïcisation d'Aristote" or right interpretation of his thought, which was prepared by Albert and perfected by Thomas Aquinas (i.e., Jacob), and to the erroneous "second Averroism" (Gauthier) and "radical Aristotelianism" (Van Steenberghen) of the Arts Faculty (i.e., Esau). Thomas Aquinas' doctrine of the *lumen gloriae* represents the synthesis of Scholastic discussions on the beatific vision, and in a longer perspective, establishes the thesis of this cadence in the historical dialectic. The Condemnations of 1277, which denied the claims of radical Aristotelians, diverted theologians into "reactionary" by-paths until, mustering the troops of scriptural, patristic and "monastic" theology (Leclercq), John XXII outflanked the entire Scholastic debate and threw down the gauntlet of the great antithesis. In private treatises, Jacques Fournier accomplished a higher synthesis, but as Pope Benedict XII he retreated to the prior Scholastic thesis. Providentially, his retreat leaves the task of a higher synthesis to us. Besides popular piety and traditional theology, the main thing standing in the way of a new "development of doctrine" is the Constitution *Benedictus Deus*. Trottmann's dialectical engine provides a means for circumventing the obstacle.

Indeed, Trottmann's perceptions of the medieval disputes (and dislike of "Platonism") seem to be shaped by present theological preoccupations. In terms he echoes, advocates of *la nouvelle théologie* called for a "horizontal, temporal, collective or cosmic" eschatology, in contrast with the "vertical, a-temporal, individualistic" conception of medieval Scholasticism. Most modern biblical scholars deny any scriptural warrant for the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Waging war against philosophical "dualisms," Christian phenomenologists, often exploiting Thomas Aquinas' anthropology (and doctrine of phantasms), stress the inseparability of soul and body;¹¹ some extrapolate the eschatological implications, speaking of

soul; that this doctrine appeared among the Latins before the entrance of Averroës' writings, and that it is original to them, probably with an eye to theological orthodoxy. Thus the term "First Latin Averroism," assumed by Trottmann from Gauthier, is empty of meaning, and its use "raises some critical and general questions about the use of categories when defining complex currents of thought in the History of Ideas." Here and throughout, Trottmann uses such categories and terms to construct his sweeping dialectic; the philosophical pattern as a whole is only as cogent as the accuracy of each of its supposed phases. On this score, several pieces of Trottmann's pattern fail the test. The pattern might retain some utility as a frame upon which to hang material; it becomes misleading when it predetermines interpretations of writers and texts.

¹¹ Instructively, the papal encyclical *Veritatis splendor* (1993) for moral purposes emphasizes "the unity of the human person . . . *corpore et anima unus*" (italics in the English text), and

the beatitude of the "person" instead of the "soul," while disregarding Thomas' actual arguments in his commentary on the *Sentences* and elsewhere. In order to escape the embarrassment of an intermediate condition of separated souls, Catholic as well as Protestant theologians hypothesize a simultaneity of eschatological events for each person at the juncture of time and eternity, pointing to the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary as the model for all. Neo-orthodox theologians, defending some utility for the notion of "soul," define it as "nothing other than man's relatedness to truth"; appealing to Thomas, they agree that there is no such thing as a "body-free soul," in the sense that throughout his life man "interiorizes matter," and "even in death he does not relinquish this connection." *Lex orandi, lex credendi*: "The Missal of Paul VI dared to speak of the soul only here and there, and that in timorous fashion, otherwise avoiding all mention of it where possible"; in its Liturgy of the Dead, it suppressed the term *anima* altogether. In sum, nearly all accept the historical argument that the immortality of the soul was an alien Hellenistic import into the purity of the Gospel, and a "de-platonized eschatology" is "now almost universally accepted in Catholic circles."¹² An official revision of doctrine appears imminent.

For his part, Trottmann tingles at the prospect of a new synthesis, pre-saged by Jacques Fournier, which will not only set us straight on the beatific vision but reveal the very meaning of History:

Qui plus est, à notre époque où la théologie de l'Église est au coeur des préoccupations, son regard sur la dimension eschatologique et sociale de la communion des saints revêt à nos yeux une actualité nouvelle. [Benoît] semble dans *Benedictus Deus* définir une vision béatifique immédiate et individuelle. Ses Traités nous révèlent une réflexion profonde sur la communion finale des saints, sur l'Église telle qu'elle sera ayant accompli sa finalité. Si la sens de l'Histoire demeure transcendant et doit se révéler en cette eschatologie ultime, la communion des saints en son état finale recèle la vérité de ce qu'elle est actuellement. Le jugement dernier y retrouve ainsi un sens grandiose tant au plan de l'Histoire que de l'Eschatologie (p. 811).

For those less inclined to prophetic readings of "the signs of the times," Trottmann's investigations raise large philosophic questions. Every philosophy proves inadequate for explaining the mysteries proposed historically

declares that "In fact, *body and soul are inseparable*: in the person, in the willing agent and in the deliberate act *they stand or fall together*" (§§ 48-50; italics in the English text). The encyclical does not pursue what these statements mean for eschatological doctrines.

¹² For a summary of these discussions, see Joseph Ratzinger, *Eschatology: Death and Eternal Life*, trans. Michael Waldstein and Aidan Nichols, O.P., Washington, D.C. 1988 (vol. 9 of Ratzinger and Johann Auer, *Dogmatic Theology*). The quotations are at xiii, 105, 107-8, 248, 258-9.

by Christian faith. Each philosophy reveals its inadequacy at particular stress-points. For Aristotelian philosophy, one of those points seems to be the doctrine of the beatific vision. Thus, the defenders of the position of John XXII may have been right in adducing the anthropology and noetic of Aristotle (and of Thomas) to their side. Henry of Ghent, Thomas de Vio (Cajetan) and Pietro Pomponazzi may also have been right in arguing that Aristotle did not and could not teach the immortality of the individual human soul. Likewise, from a different perspective, the nominalists (e.g., John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen) may have been right in concluding that the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated by reason and is a matter of faith. Those who would maintain the doctrine of the separated soul's beatific vision might well need to resort to a more Platonic way of thinking, however painful and however inadequate such might be in respect of other articles of faith. Significantly, the immortality of the separated soul was officially declared a dogma of faith at Lateran Council V in 1513. (Paul Oskar Kristeller has called this Council "the finest moment of Platonists in the Church.")

Christian Trottmann displays an enormous and enviable erudition; his interpretations are stimulating, even when, compelled by his dominating dialectic, they are wrong; his style is vivid and passionate. I admire his book and look forward to his future studies. And, as regards the beatific vision, we are surely making progress. For as my former colleague and Cistercian confrère of Jacques Fournier, the historian Louis Lekai, once said in an Easter sermon, referring to Scholastic opinions concerning the beatific condition: "Each one of us, every day, is getting closer and closer to the answers to these questions."

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Reviews

C.F.J. Martin, *An Introduction to Medieval Philosophy*. Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1996, vii + 148 p. ISBN 0 7486 0790 0

It has been some years now since the publication of Julius Weinberg's short history of medieval philosophy. As Martin says, there is not enough literature which can serve as "an introduction to, and overview of" medieval philosophy. (Indeed this is true for introductory volumes in the English language. There hardly exist any. In the German language, however, there is the excellent book on the subject by Kurt Flasch,¹ and we should also mention De Rijk's classic² published in 1977 and translated into French in 1985.) It is worthy of applause, therefore, that an attempt has been made to come up with an English guidebook for students of the Middle Ages as well as students of philosophy.

When presenting a reliable introduction to the philosophy of the Middle Ages, it is important to keep a number of things in mind. First of all, one should realise that the term 'medieval philosophy' can be misleading, in that it might suggest there exists a type of philosophy that can be characterised as 'medieval', as opposed to modern or ancient philosophy. However just as it is useless to speak of modern philosophy as if there were one kind of thought worthy of that name, likewise one can hardly say that there is such thing as a medieval 'kind' of thought or philosophy. As has been adequately argued by scholars in the philosophy of the Middle Ages, the term 'medieval' can be no more than a convenient shorthand for a quite arbitrarily chosen period in the history of western thought to which one wishes to confine one's research. This is not to say that one is not entitled to distinguish certain developments or related ways of dealing with philosophical problems in a given period, but we should be careful not to mistake our findings as inherent to an historical period.³

Besides being of wary reading too much into the term 'medieval', one should not compare, as Martin does, the Middle Ages with some sort of alien culture that cannot be approached without first getting familiar with its secret codes. Although it is fair to say perhaps that many problems of philosophy of the past are now no longer an issue, it is not as if what we call philosophy nowadays has nothing to do with what was done in previous ages. Although certain traditions have faded into the background, we are as much the heirs of traditions as philosophers in the past were. In other words, in order to become familiar with what was done in the Middle Ages, philosophy-wise that is, it is not advisable to set oneself apart from the Middle Ages.

Martin begins his *An Introduction to Medieval Philosophy* with an "introduction to the introduction", as he calls it (p. 2), where he pays considerable attention to the questions 'what is philosophy?' and 'what are the Middle Ages?'. To consider these questions could be useful, but particularly regarding the second item, one should not deal with it on the assumption that there is a fixed, objective standard of 'medievality', let alone as far as its philosophy is concerned.

That the author of the *Introduction* indeed has such a standard in mind is already evident in his approach to his first problem. After sharing with us his oddly pessimistic view that "contemporary philosophy is a ruin" (p. 4), he continues on the assumption that in the past there was a philosophical structure, which Descartes started out to build, and of which at present only scattered parts are left, like in a museum. Likewise he states that medieval thinkers were also "involved in building a structure of a certain kind" (p. 4). And with the "decay" of medieval philosophy (notably after the great St. Thomas Aquinas), Martin claims, this structure fell into ruin.

In view of this preconceived idea of medieval philosophy, which was quite common in the days of historians as De Wulf, it is hardly surprising that Martin sets it widely apart from what is done in the modern era. The main difference, in his idea, is that in the

medieval period, there was no such thing as epistemology, or worries about the status of human knowledge, a problem that has entered philosophy, according to Martin, only since Descartes. Thus we should not judge medieval philosophers by our modern standards, he insists, because what they were doing was so different from our undertakings. But what we should never try to do, we are told, is to defend medieval philosophers because we can identify with what they were doing. This would only amount to using them to our profit. What kind of defenders Martin has in mind here, however, is left for us to figure out. In any case, he claims, if we wish to understand medieval philosophers, we must realise how truly different they are from us (pp. 7-8).

It is regrettable that Martin's introduction to such an interesting period in the history of philosophy has fallen into the trap of creating a notion of the philosophy in the Middle Ages as if the latter (at least where philosophy is concerned) were one distinct period with a definite beginning, starting with the philosophy of St. Augustine, and a definite end, in the philosophy of Descartes ("[...] Medieval philosophical thought is overthrown when Descartes insists on returning to self-evident principles [...]") (p. 40). While he is quite lenient on the subject of where to put the boundaries between Antiquity, Middle Ages and Modern Times (p. 10), the *differentia specifica* of Medieval thought is the "synthesis of ancient Greek learning [...] and the Jewish and Christian tradition" (*ibid.*).

As far as the 'quality' of medieval philosophy is concerned, the author lectures us on how despite the apparent similarities we might discover between them and us, we are essentially dealing with a completely alien culture (p. 14f.). The strangeness of this culture is explained to us in the second chapter, where we are told how the medievals dealt with authority. The way in which Martin explains this notion is confusing. Apparently he has the idea that unlike ourselves, the medievals were psychologically dependent upon authoritative figures, of whom God was by far the greatest authority. That Martin should discuss the idea of authority in itself is not so strange, since of course the majority of medieval works are characterised by their appeals to different authorities (Aristotle, the Commentators and so on). However, it is altogether presumptuous to ascribe to them a slavish kind of attitude as opposed to the rebellious nature of people in our own age. It is as if the only reason why we of the twentieth century do not appeal to authority anymore is that we have such a different psychological and social make up. Alternative views of *auctoritas* in the Middle Ages are completely ignored by Martin.⁴

Appeals to authority in the Middle Ages, as has been pointed out, are to be understood in terms of contemporary intellectual practices. For one thing, the way in which the medievals compiled their works, taking great care to quote from recognised authorities, can be seen as answering to norms of style. Instead of just getting on with it, it was considered polite to couch one's own views with quotations from authorities. But the appeal to authorities was more than just a matter of style. As in late Antiquity, an 'auctor' was thus labelled because one believed he represented the Truth. In other words, an authority, *i.e.* an authoritative text, is (part of) a revealed rational truth. As it appears, not all texts written by *e.g.* Aristotle, were authoritative. This means that it is not people that were the authorities but texts. Depending on the type of enquiry, different texts were the authoritative ones. Far from being different expressions of the truth which had to be reconciled, as Martin would have it, the authoritative texts were both a means to support one's own views, as well as a foundation upon which one could build new ideas.

A reading of the more general chapters of the book confirms our first impression that Martin has a biased outlook on philosophy in the Middle Ages. Medieval philosophy is considered by him as a continuous attempt to reconcile authorities in order to reach the Truth. Small wonder then that apart from St. Augustine, who is said to have started the medieval synthesis, the only medieval philosopher who is worthy of considerable attention is Thomas Aquinas. Theories and ideas of other philosophers are either misrepresented, or are merely mentioned in passing, without giving the reader any explanation.

As to Martin's representation of St. Augustine, he seems to ignore the fact that the

latter owes a great deal to Antiquity. In fact, to present the rejection of a positive evil (as opposed to a privation of goodness) as a notion that entered western philosophy through Augustine is a serious mistake. This negative description of evil is found as early as in Empedocles, and continues to feature in the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle.

As far as the philosophical systems of others than Thomas Aquinas are concerned, the way in which Martin discusses them is often quite superficial. Generally speaking it is not correct to assume that in the Middle Ages nothing was done in the field of epistemology, as Martin would have it. As regards individual philosophers, Martin's explanation of Aristotle's theory of causes, for instance, is not only confusing, but drastically oversimplified (p. 104f.). Moreover, the way in which he assumes that the medievals just took over Aristotle's notion of 'form' and used it ambiguously for both individuals and kinds (pp. 101-102) is not very fair. There are different ways in which authors could interpret this notion (e.g. Aquinas or Bacon). But it is not only Aristotle and the medieval reception of his works that is handled carelessly. What, for example, should one make of Martin's remark about Abelard's "moderate realism" on the question of universals (p. 87)? Furthermore, it is wrong to say about the problem of universals that throughout the Middle Ages an "intermediate answer", between Platonism and extreme nominalism, became widely accepted" (p. 96). Consider for instance the different approaches to this problem by people such as Abelard, Aquinas, Bacon, Ockham, Buridan, and others. Moreover, what could the expression "intermediate answer" possibly mean in this connection?

Besides being guilty of oversimplification, Martin has the irritating habit of mentioning ideas that he seems to consider of importance for the reader without bothering to give an explanation. For instance, on p. 77 we are told how Boethius had "Aristotelian tendencies" which "also give him an interest in producing definitions (. . .) some of which are still in philosophical use today (. . .)". What definitions are they? In his discussion of the Boethian approach (p. 84ff.), Martin talks about Augustine and 'fideism', as opposed to Boethius' 'rationalism'. I cannot understand at all what Martin is on about here. Where is the contrast? Why not associate Augustine with rationalism? And what exactly is unorthodox about Abelard's conclusions in theology (p. 87)? What conclusions is Martin referring to here?

It seems as if Martin is fond of attaching labels to philosophers, but he certainly fails to account for the way in which he uses them. Again, he sometimes tells us how important some work was, e.g. the "brilliant" *De veritate* by Thomas Aquinas (p. 122), but then does not explain what was so interesting about it (the fact that truth is identified with intelligibility is not mentioned; we only find his confusing account of Aristotle's idea of truth as a "match between mind and reality"). Finally, Duns Scotus is handled miserably in Martin's account. While he recognises the importance of Scotus' notion of modality (p. 127), once again an explanation is missing.

In his overestimation of the accomplishments of Thomas Aquinas, Martin has presented a one-sided picture of the Middle Ages, and thus completely disregards the widely diverse activities of many individual philosophers of that period. Medieval philosophy is measured by the standards of an Aquinas, and everything else either leads up to this achievement, or is evidence of a decline. As to details concerning the achievements of individual philosophers, Martin does no more than to repeat a few clichés one can come across in encyclopaedias of philosophy written by scholars who are in no way familiar with the sources. Furthermore, his introduction does no justice to the rich forms of intellectual pursuit in the Middle Ages. Specialists in the field will be disappointed in Martin's book, and because many things are left unexplained, I cannot recommend it to non-specialists either.

¹ Kurt Flasch, *Das philosophische Denken im Mittelalter. Von Augustin zu Machiavelli*, Stuttgart 1986.

² L.M. de Rijk, *Middeleeuwse Wijsbegeerte. Traditie en Vernieuwing*, Assen 1977. (translation: *La philosophie au moyen âge*, Leiden/Köln/New York 1985).

³ See De Rijk 1977 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 2), ch. 1-2, and Flasch 1986 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 1), 16-7.

⁴ See De Rijk 1977 (*op. cit.*, above, n. 2), ch. 4. For the frequent use of authoritative texts in the Middle Ages by Thomas Aquinas, for instance, see M.-D. Chenu, *Introduction à l'étude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin*, Paris 1954.

David Pingree, *Preceptum Canonis Ptolomei*, Academia Bruylant, Louvain-la-Neuve 1997, 172 pp. ISBN 2-87209-479-2 (Corpus des Astronomes Byzantins, viii.).

This *Preceptum* is a Latin astronomical text with such a complex history that it could have been found a home in many other series than one of Byzantine texts. Most of it is translated from the Greek, notably from Theon's Little Commentary (c. 377) on the Handy Tables. Other Theonic passages might represent a revision of Theon in Greek, an earlier translation into Latin, or an older Greek commentary used by Theon. Some of the non-Theonic material is paralleled by Vettius Valens' *Anthologiae*. It first apparently comes to the surface in western Europe when the Romanized form of the Alexandrian calendar contained in the work is attested at St Gall in the early ninth century. The oldest extant version, in MS Harley 2506 (British Library), was copied around the year 1000, either in Winchester or Fleury. Its editor David Pingree postulates an ancestor that was at Fleury in 994, and he conjectures that it or the Harley copy was sent to England by Abbo of Fleury. Other pertinent manuscripts are connected with Chartres and Canterbury, and testify to much to-ing and fro-ing of literary resources between England and France over the next two centuries. In the middle of the twelfth century Thierry of Chartres attempted, not very successfully, to transliterate the text's Latin transliterations of Greek back into the Greek alphabet. That the work goes back to the sixth century, however, is not in doubt. There is one reference to the 'present time' as a year that began on 29 August 534, and another to a date in 528, and Pingree conjectures that it might have been intended for use in the abortive Christian Academy that Cassiodorus and pope Agapetus were hoping (in 535) to establish at Rome in imitation of the academy at Nisibis. This conjecture gives Pingree some difficulty, since Cassiodorus opposed astrology while one of the main objectives of the author of the *Preceptum* was to provide western astrologers with the means to cast horoscopes; but Rome at least seems certain as the place of its composition.

The *Preceptum* was composed by a scholar with a very poor grasp of his astronomical material. It is essentially a series of computational rules without any of the underlying theoretical rationale. Fewer than half of the tables alluded to in the text are included with it, and it is doubtful whether anyone ever used the work to compute a full range of planetary longitudes well, although simple solar and lunar computation is moderately well catered for. Our chief interest in its contents must stem, if not from these sad facts, then from the occasional insights it gives into tiny fragments of ancient astronomy known only from this source. (For example, it gives evidence for the Roman use of a symbol for zero paralleling that used by the Greeks.)

Pingree includes no overall study of the work in a historical context, beyond the Introduction, dealing with the manuscript tradition. The text itself is what matters most, and the edition itself is presented in an exemplary and straightforward way. The Latin with its (footnoted) variant readings occupies fewer than fifty pages in all. In the facing

translation Pingree has fought valiantly with the text's shortcomings, and his commentary at the end offers many useful insights into parallel Greek material.

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Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, *Maimonides and St. Thomas on the Limits of Reason*, State University of New York Press, Albany, N.Y. 1995 x + 278 p. ISBN 0-7914-2416-2.

This book focuses on the views of Maimonides and Aquinas about how the place of human beings in the world limits and conditions their ability to know. Dobbs-Weinstein concludes that Maimonides and Aquinas agree that human beings, especially after their Fall, have no chance of reaching knowledge of the ultimate structure of the world on their own efforts. This is common Judaeo-Christian doctrine: revealed religion surpasses philosophical science; human beings after the Fall are deficient. What is perhaps a bit novel is Dobbs-Weinstein's insistence that Maimonides and Aquinas stress so much the danger of intellectual pride: some things we should accept, and not seek to understand. So they sharply limit the scope of philosophy. Hence she emphasizes the *Book of Job*: Job had the fault of intellectual pride [175]. This ineffectual pride comes from the place of human beings in the world: high enough to learn science from sense perception, but too tied to sense perception and material objects to apprehend the intelligible realities. Having the status of half-God, half-beast, human beings have no chance of succeeding on their own, as God or as beast. They must depend upon revelation and divine grace, which will come to those who chose to live their lives properly [168]. As most do not, most sin as well as fail in philosophy.

The bulk of the book consists in summaries, interspersed with critical comments, of various passages from Maimonides and Aquinas. Each of Chapters Two to Six takes a topic, say, Creation or divine law, and then has two parts, summarizing key passages from Maimonides and Aquinas respectively. I find the comments often thoughtful and intriguing, both in explaining the text and in evaluating how successful they are. Dobbs-Weinstein does not hesitate to criticize an account of Maimonides or Aquinas as a failure [75; 100; 121-3; 152]. On the whole she thinks that Aquinas arrives at the right account of human knowledge [133; 192ff.]. However, Dobbs-Weinstein makes these remarks in passing, and so does not work them out very far. Still she is covering so much material in a short book that perhaps she could hardly do more, given how she has defined her project. But then, her style doesn't help: e.g., p. 74, last sentence. Often I found her prose turgid, rough going.

Dobbs-Weinstein makes far greater claims for this book than what I have said so far. She frequently announces that the bulk of modern scholarship on Maimonides and Aquinas has fatal flaws. Her main complaint, with which I have some sympathy, is that modern scholars have too narrow a focus: they study either the philosophy or the religious writings of thinkers like Maimonides and Aquinas. But in doing so they miss the systematic, holistic character of their thought, encompassing both their study of the Scripture as well as of the philosophy [17-20; 30; 42; 89]. So, she says, scholars in philosophy think that Aquinas is Aristotelian, while those in theology find him Neo-Platonist because they concentrate on only a portion of the corpus [19]. Dobbs-Weinstein ends up claiming that, as religion has primacy over philosophy for Maimonides and Aquinas, the Neo-Platonist view is better, once harmonized with the Aristotelian teachings [89; 111-2].

Moreover, she charges, modern scholars, even those doing hermeneutics, pay too little attention to the historical context of the texts studied [4; 39]. In particular, they neglect the different audiences and purposes that Maimonides and Aquinas intended their various writings for. Once we regain these insights, and respect the advice on how to read

their works that these two have given us, she promises, these texts not only become more intelligible to us, but also they might rescue us from modernity [1; 5-7]. She regularly castigates modern scholarship for failing on these counts [17-20; 61-2; 67-8; 73-4; 89; 91; 186].

Despite all these complaints, I do not see that Dobbs-Weinstein has given us anything better. I find extremely troubling the absence of references to and discussion of earlier sources. E.g., Dobbs-Weinstein has asserted that Aquinas, like Maimonides, is basically a Neo-Platonist. She notes his indebtedness to Avicenna [n. 8; 131], but then does not discuss Avicenna's theory. I find this omission glaring, given her claims about the metaphysics of Aquinas and Maimonides, sc., that they are more Platonists than Aristotelians, for Avicenna offers a scheme that has some Platonist features while rejecting Forms. So perhaps Maimonides and Aquinas are merely following Avicenna here; then no radical reassessment of their view need be required. At the least, given her own frequent criticisms of scholars for ignoring context, she should have provided much more background for understanding the theories that she discusses than she does.

I find other counts of Dobbs-Weinstein ignoring her own methods. If she is so concerned about the proper audience of the various writings she discusses, why then does she not go into the historical evidence about these audiences and their intellectual background more? She does not discuss the historical evidence for Maimonides' audience and the demography of his students. She does not discuss why Maimonides wrote the *Guide* in Arabic and his Talmudic and religious works in Hebrew. Surely Maimonides himself is sending a message that he intends his works, philosophical and religious, to be read separately in some way. So too Aquinas sharply separates philosophy from theology at *ST I.Q1*: why does not Dobbs-Weinstein discuss this passage? Again, she does not discuss the university setting in which Aquinas wrote, nor the lecture format at the university of Paris. Her note [636] why Aquinas wrote the *Summa Theologiae* surely needs supplementing with this historical perspective. Finally, if she does take so seriously the remarks about the proper audiences for these texts, well, none of the works of Maimonides and Aquinas were written for us anyway!

This book probably tries to cover too much too quickly. If we eliminate the methodological remarks, in effect Dobbs-Weinstein has given us an explication of a few important texts on various issues concerning the origin, status, and knowledge of human beings by Maimonides and Aquinas. For her their religious doctrines always trump the philosophical ones: this is obvious in those cases, like Creation where Maimonides or Aquinas says so explicitly; in other cases, it is obvious more from the historical fact of their being Jew or Catholic than from the grounds that she gives. I do not get a sense from her book of how the views of Aquinas and Maimonides cohere as a whole: in their philosophical moments both Maimonides and Aquinas seem more optimistic about human ability than a lapsarian holding to the inevitable failings of human thought and practice.

Perhaps, though, I am wrong to seek coherence in their views: Dobbs-Weinstein says, "Only from a Modern perspective is a single, unifying discourse the necessary condition for philosophical knowledge" [3]. Well, for philosophy, from Parmenides on, non-contradiction has been the prevailing norm. If the discourse of Maimonides or Aquinas—or her own discourse—avoids this necessary condition, what philosophical worth can it have?

Jan A. Aertsen, *Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas*, Brill Academic Publishers, Leiden. 1996 x + 468 p. ISBN 90 04 10585 9

This book presents the doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas on the transcendentals. (Generally speaking, in the medieval sense, a transcendental term is one that describes real things that occur in more than one of the categories of beings enumerated by Aristotle.) Aertsen argues that 'transcendental' has various, differing senses in medieval and in modern times. (Here he might have cited a useful article by Ignacio Angelelli.) The Kantian sense of 'transcendental' "is concerned with the mode of our cognition of objects, insofar as this mode of cognition is possible *a priori*." [22] The modern sense then concerns the epistemological. In contrast, the medieval senses concern the ontological: the transcendentals describe things that exist *in re*. Aertsen distinguishes a Platonist sense, used by Augustine, from an Aristotelian sense, used by Aquinas. Platonist transcendentals "transcend", or go beyond, the things in the categories that provide the objects for human understanding. [92] In contrast, Aristotelian transcendentals describe what is common to all beings in the categories *qua* beings. [93] Hence they do not go beyond these beings to belong to a higher reality. This Aristotelian approach raises problems for Christians who wish to maintain a sharp division being God and other beings, while still maintaining that God is the ultimate being Who is Who He Is. God somehow has to surpass human existence and human comprehension in some respects while remaining able to act in this world and to be comprehensible, by being described by such transcendental terms as 'being', 'good', and 'one'. [111] Because this problem in effect amounts to asking, 'Is it possible to be Christian while being a philosopher?', Aertsen contends that medieval philosophy is "the core of medieval metaphysics," despite its relative neglect in modern treatments of medieval philosophy. [21]

Aertsen claims that Aquinas develops a new theory of transcendentals to address this problem. [123] His solution involves developing a theory of analogy, based on Aristotle's theory of homonymy, but going beyond it. [90; 53] (I would think it better not to use 'homonymy' to describe Aristotle's theory: Aristotle himself does not; too, the theory of focal meaning ('*τὸ πρὸς ἓν*' or perhaps '*τὸ ἀπὸ τινος*') is not the same as that of homonymy.) God has the transcendental attributes primarily, while created things have them derivatively, in the causal order of being. [382-3] In contrast, in the predication order of knowledge, we learn of the divine attributes from our experience of creatures. In this way, transcendental terms like 'being' and 'good' can apply to terrestrial substances as well as to God, without destroying the sharp distinction between Creator and creature. [374; 403]

Aquinas uses two main devices to show the transcendentals theologically and philosophically respectable. First, as just mentioned, Aquinas says that principles can be common in two ways: by predication and by causality. E.g., form is a principle for all forms as 'form' is *predicated* of them all; the Sun is a common principle for all growing things, since it *causes* them to grow. [119] Philosophy can study God as a common causal principle, whereas only theology can study God as a common predication principle, for here the nature of God in Himself, transcending the effects manifested in the world, are revolted. [120-1] Hence we can reconcile God's acting in the world with His being remote from it. Second, in order to prove the divine unity, he claims that, say in the case of God, 'one' and 'being' refer to the same thing, the divine substance, but under different aspects. That is, transcendentals make a virtual or formal distinction, one *secundum rationes*, and not a real distinction. [130-4; 145]

Aquinas uses these distinctions to resolve many difficulties. E.g., truth has two modes: a formal one in the intellect (*in ratione*) and a material one *in re*. [271-2] Again, being is equal to good in the order of predication while good is prior to being in the order of causality. [162; 313-6] Like the other divine transcendentals, being and good are identical only *in re* but differ *in ratione*. At one point Aertsen correlates resolution *secundum rem*

with commonness by causality, and resolution *secundum rationem* with commonness by predication. [135]

Aertsen begins by presenting some historical antecedents of Aquinas' theory: Philip the Chancellor, Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Great. He also notes the importance of the "Arabic philosophers", notably Avicenna, to whom Aquinas was the first to make explicit reference in taking 'being' as the primary transcendental. [81; 136] However, while Avicenna has three primary notions, 'being', 'thing' and 'necessary', Aquinas keeps only the first two, while adding others: unity, truth, goodness. Again, Avicenna sees the notion of being to be impressed upon soul from the World Soul while Aquinas sees it grasped by the activity of the individual human intellect. [82-3; 160; 171] Aquinas rejects Avicenna's view that we know being and the other transcendentals by a primary impression. Instead, "they are immediately known by the light of the agent intellect, but at the same time mediated *per species* abstracted from sensible things." [173] Again Avicenna takes 'one' as the principle of number, while Aquinas denies this. [144; 203; 214-5]

As with many other of the historical claims made in the book, Aertsen does not convince me. It is not that I disagree with his views necessarily. Rather, I do not see that he always has supported his claims adequately. For example, to return to the previous paragraph, the account of our knowledge of being that Aertsen attributes to Aquinas looks to me a lot like the one that Avicenna has. [181; 191-2] Again, Avicenna does discuss the relation of God (or: the necessary being) to unity, truth, and goodness elsewhere in his *Metaphysica* (VII.6). It also is not clear that for Avicenna 'necessary' is a divine attribute. To be sure, Aertsen distinguishes the transcendentals from the divine names and discusses their relationship. [373; 360-3] But it is not clear whether or not Aquinas has just appropriated and renamed a doctrine of Avicenna who has long discussions of how the quiddities in the mind include unity and plurality but have their basis in quiddities in themselves. I do not find Aertsen offering much help in settling such issues. More generally, without an extensive investigation of such as Albert the Great, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Averroes, to name a few, it is hard to assess the novelty in Aquinas' discussions of the transcendentals.

The bulk of the book consists in methodically presenting Aquinas' texts on each of the transcendentals in turn. Aertsen presents texts bearing on each transcendental and their interrelations from Aquinas' *Opera*. Generally he paraphrases the arguments and doctrines. Occasionally Aertsen discusses applications of the theory of the transcendentals, e.g., to the Trinity. [224; 376; 413] On account of this style and organization, the book returns to the same topic several times.

Aertsen defends his interpretations against others in the secondary literature. For instance, he argues against Kremer's and De Vries' readings of Aquinas' *esse commune* [388-90], McNerny's view of Thomist analogy [399], Honnefelder's interpretation of Aquinas' conception of 'transcendental' [472], and Geiger's interpretation of Aquinas on abstraction [129]. His most significant claim is that he denies, against many, including Gilson and Eco, that Aquinas takes beauty to be a transcendental. [335-6] Aertsen shows, convincingly, that beauty is not a transcendental, but is implicit in the transcendentals true and good. [344-6; 359] Aertsen confines himself mostly to the neo-scholastic secondary literature: He does not deal with those like Peter Geach or Hermann Weidemann—not to mention more radical critiques of Aquinas' whole enterprise. Overall, Aertsen defends Aquinas' view as correct and as philosophically significant against all comers, with a few minor hesitations. [E.g., 230]

Certain features of Aquinas' theory of transcendentals, Aertsen claims, have original and philosophical significance. For example, Aquinas has an account of truth different from his contemporaries. [243] Truth has two modes of being: an ontological one, *in re*, and a logical one, *in intellectu*. Strictly, truth concerns to the logical relation of a subject to predicate, while this relation is caused by the ontological relations of things in the world. [248-9] This logical truth then falls outside of metaphysics. [252] Locating truth in the human

mind rather than in the cosmos makes Aquinas' thought "anthropocentric" instead of the classical "cosmocentric". [257-8] We start from the world as it appears to us and then try to get at reality. Aquinas however differs from modern phenomenologists like Kant in that he thinks that, because the mind becomes identical to the real form of the real object thought, we can have knowledge of reality. Being, as pure act, is prior to thought. [200; 268] Moreover, Aertsen says that Aquinas, unlike Heidegger, locates truth primarily in the intellect [265], although he does recognize truth outside of the mind [250]. Aquinas' views on transcendentals thus become historically important in the development of modern thought.

However, Aertsen clearly wants to do more than to show the historical importance of Aquinas' doctrines on transcendentals. In an excellent Introduction, Aertsen reviews briefly the modern historiography on medieval philosophy. He locates three main views; 1) the Christian philosophy of Gilson [8] 2) the linguistic turn to the work in medieval logic of those like Kretzmann [12] 3) the emphasis on intellectual and mystical life by those like De Libera [14-5]. However, he charges that all three approaches either limit the study of medieval philosophy to what is familiar to modern ears, or ignore important areas of medieval philosophical activity. In contrast, Aertsen seeks to restore both the distinctive character and the philosophical integrity to the medieval period by concentrating on the transcendentals, "the conditions for all thought and the basis of all philosophical reflection." [20] Aertsen wishes to restore medieval texts to modern philosophizing. He stresses Aquinas' connection of being to Heidegger's *Dasein*. [105; 264] I can see Aertsen's point: Aquinas has an anthropocentric epistemology while still defending an objective realism.

However Aertsen does not do much to defend this view. To be sure, the book is a solid treatment of Aquinas' doctrines on the transcendentals. But I do not find it to transcend that particular topic nor the particular texts, as Aertsen hopes.

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ALLAN BÄCK

Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood, and Mechthild Dreyer (eds.), *John Duns Scotus; Metaphysics and Ethics*. Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln 1996 ix + 608 p. ISBN 90-04-10357-0 (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 53)

I am grateful for this large collection of essays on the philosophy of John Duns Scotus. Despite his importance in medieval philosophy, as well as in philosophy in general, modern scholars have relatively neglected studying his work. [2-9] In comparison to Aquinas we have not done much. I find this ironic, given Scotus' dominance in medieval theology from his death to the Renaissance, his great influence on modern philosophy, not to mention on Peirce and Heidegger, and the revival of haecceities today. As Honnefelder notes, the Thomist dominance in current neo-scholasticism comes from mostly non-philosophical, historical considerations. [4] But Scotus, it seems, had the greatest influence upon the modern period. [31-2]

Scotus has a motley reputation. As the editors write, he is 'of reality the rarest-veined unraveler'. On the other hand, those of the Renaissance so hated the Subtle Scot and his endless distinctions that they bequeathed to us the word 'dunce'. Accordingly, I see that those discussing Scotus not only have the usual task of explicating the text and making clear its historical and philosophical significance but also have to explain why the theory of Scotus is not silly. In general the essays do succeed at the usual task. However, sometimes in accurately reporting the terminology of Scotus, they make me at least lose track of the philosophical significance of the questions debated.

The essays deal with a variety of topics, mostly from metaphysics and ethics, but also with logic, as with Jakob Schneider's essay on the sophism 'Caesar is Caesar'. The main

topics include modality, haecceity, univocity, the infinite being, and practical reason. These topics do not cover all of Scotus' interests, nor even all his main ones like angels, the Trinity, and the formal distinction. Instead, they represent modern interests and the particular inclinations of the writers.

The book is well produced with a few exceptions. [28.24; 128; 182; 183 n. 39] Given the state of Scotus scholarship, I would have found it useful to have a common bibliography at the end, as the notes have quite extensive citations.

The first section deals with historical issues. Allan Wolter discusses the complexities of dating Scotus' works, and argues that the new Vatican edition of the *Ordinatio* probably does not represent Scotus' final views. [40; 57] Stephen Dumont deals with the relation of Scotus to such contemporary supporters of Henry of Ghent as William of Ware and Richard Conington. [71] M. Draeger claims that Scotus, via the *Theoremata*, had a direct influence on the rise of the deductive axiomatic structure in nineteenth-century science. [88] Gordon Wilson analyzes the influence of Henry of Ghent on Scotus' theory of relations. [123-4]

The next section concerns modality. Simo Knuuttila holds that Scotus has a new view of modalities as possible worlds, as opposed to the one Hintikka attributes to Aristotle, where what is possible is what is the case sometimes, while what is necessary is what is the case always. [130] On this new view, what is possible need not occur ever. In this way, God remains free to choose what to create, or not to create at all. Knuuttila claims that these logically possible worlds are independent of God's will. [140] Normore and Boler disagree and take the position that for Scotus the possible supervenes on the actual, in particular, on the actual power of the divine will. [160-1; 167] Still, Normore admits that non-repugnance, sc., logical consistency, is independent of God's will in a sense. [162] Marrone sides with Knuuttila [178], but claims that Scotus' views change, while also having different stages. [186] Neil Lewis observes that Grosseteste had a theory of modality like Scotus', where modality is reduced to divine power. [223] However Scotus grants the modalities a bit more independence. [224]

S. Sousedik follows the later history of the theory of modality. Scotists like Poncius and Mastrius and their followers—like Leibniz! [198]—tied possibility to divine power, perhaps to avoid Wycliff's doctrines. [201] In contrast, the seventeenth-century Thomists took possible being as independent of divine will. [194] However, Knuuttila claims that Scotus does not accept the view that God decides what is logically possible, as, he says, Descartes does, nor that possibilities are dependent on the divine intellect, as, he says, Aquinas and Leibniz do. [134] In opposition, Normore says that Suarez sides with Scotus and Descartes against him, with Ockham. [172] So, at this point, although it is settled that Scotus influenced the seventeenth century rationalists greatly, it is not settled just in what that influence consisted.

Another section of essays deals with the problem of individuation and Scotus' doctrine of haecceity. Rega Wood considers the relation of Scotus to earlier figures, principally Rufus but also Kilwardby, Henry of Ghent, and Avicenna. [256; 271] Using his past work on the theory of individuation, Jorge Gracia analyzes Scotus' theory and finds Scotus' distinction between individuality and the individuating entity significant as well as being a possible answer to Suarez' criticisms. [234; 248] Woosuk Park criticizes and emends Gracia's views so as to point the way to a new theory of individuation. [279; 288]

Another section contains seven papers on the univocity of being in Scotus. Boulnois argues that Scotus has a consistent position on the univocity of being, but that his position evolved along with his theory of analogy. [293; 314] M. Burger sees a similar progression in Scotus' conception of person. [323] S. Brown contrasts Scotus with Aureol and Henry of Ghent on there being a fundamental being *in quid*, applicable to all items. [331] Kobusch finds in Scotus an ambivalence on how 'being' is univocal: taken transcendentially, on the level of the quiddity *in re*, 'being' names what is common to all items in all the categories; taken supertranscendentally, on the level of the quiddity in itself, 'being'

signifies what is available for coming into existence. In the former sense, 'being' applies only to actual beings; in the latter, to all possible beings. In a similar vein, Beckmann points out that Scotus has a use of 'relation' different from Aristotle's: 'relation' no longer signifies a category, but becomes a transcendental term applying to all possible being, and so is fundamental to the determinations and formal distinctions of being. [371; 376] Kobusch claims that later Scotists differed on how to take being in Scotus [357; 362], and sees the same split among contemporary commentators on Scotus. [362-5] Those who take the former approach take Scotus to be following Avicenna; those who take the latter take him to reject Avicenna and be a precursor to Heidegger. [cf. 305-6]

Surprisingly, despite elaborate presentations on Henry of Ghent and Latin medieval writers, the authors of this volume do not discuss Avicenna much. So I find it hard to assess which group of commentators is right here. Honnfelder notes that Scotus criticized his contemporaries for embracing a version of the 'augustinisme avicennant'. [11] but he too recognizes the importance of Avicenna for Scotus' thought. [30] Judging by the citations of later medievals, like Ockham and Burleigh, so did Scotus' successors. Even if some interpretations of Avicenna do not fit Scotus' theory, still it does not follow that the hypothesis of the 'augustinisme avicennant,' made famous by É. Gilson, becomes completely discredited. Scotus may have found many of his doctrines in Avicenna. For instance, Avicenna has the doctrine of haecceity, which some find original to Scotus. [30] Again, Sondag distinguishes the quiddity in itself from the quiddity *in intellectu* without working out the reference to Avicenna. [395 n. 2] Also, Ghisalberti claims that Scotus has a new theory of modality, of non-repugnance, as opposed to the Aristotelian (à la Hintikka) statistical conception. [420; 425] But Avicenna has the same notion. Likewise O'Connor discusses Scotus' proof that there cannot be more than one necessary being without mentioning Avicenna's elaborate argument. [437] But then he focuses more on how to formulate Scotus' arguments so as to make them palatable to modern analytic philosophers of religion. Again, Schönberger, discussing Scotus' rejection of the adequacy of negative theology, claims that Scotus makes the novel move of no longer discussing names but concepts. [490] He worries about whether Scotus takes 'infinite' as a negative name. [486] But, once more, these issues arise in Avicenna's *Metaphysica*. De Boni has a more comprehensive view when he claims that Scotus departs from his medieval contemporaries in holding that the unity of God can be proved on philosophical grounds, somewhat as Avicenna did. [467] However, he says, Scotus departs from Avicenna in requiring the existence of secondary causes for this claim to be established apart from revelation. Once again, Avicenna's metaphysics needs looking at.

The last section concerns ethical issues in Scotus. Marilyn McCord Adams compares Scotus and Ockham on the unity of the virtues: in what sense and to what degree can someone have one moral virtue without having the others? She finds it surprising that Scotus allows them more independence than Ockham does: Scotus takes a more Aristotelian model of simplicity and Ockham a more Platonist model, she claims. I find her discussion excellent, but wonder at her surprise: for one who champions formal distinctions like Scotus would tend to allow more independence, even for necessarily coextensive properties or moral dispositions, than a nominalist like Ockham. Likewise, Inciarte, for instance, finds Scotus more akin to Plato's theory of ethics—no surprise, given his Augustinian heritage. [524] Inciarte also sees Scotus departing from the Aristotelian view in holding that prudence [i.e., practical wisdom] is not a moral virtue but at best something required for the expert level of moral excellence. [532-3] Ingham agrees that Scotus has a view of prudence different from his predecessors. She sees him moving away from the Stoic-Patristic view, and moving towards a view of practical wisdom more like (in my view) Aristotle's original conception of *phronesis*. [553] Ingham holds that for Scotus prudence deals with a self-reflexive moral choice [557], sometimes about means, but other times, about ends as well. [565; 569] However, Scotus insists that prudence by itself does not generate choice and so cannot guarantee avoidance of moral error and sin, because of the absolute freedom of the will to choose any alternative, or to refrain from choosing. [562-4; 570]

I gather that here Scotus is less optimistic than Aristotle, given the doctrines of Original Sin and Grace, although Ingham does not discuss these. In contrast, Möhle offers a more active role for practical wisdom in Scotus. In the later works, Möhle claims, Scotus allows practical knowledge to be a cause of the will and to become established as a practical science. [577] From its standpoint of absolute freedom, where the standard of right reason enforces logical consistency, the will chooses, independently of natural laws and personal happiness. [579; 588] Consequently Scotus is moving away from a virtue ethic concerned with achieving personal happiness, to an ethic much more like Kant's. [581; 587] Still, Scotus and Kant differ in that Scotus ties this viewpoint to divine revelation and objective, transcendent moral objects, whereas Kant does not. [587; 594] Möhle and the others certainly make the case that Kant might have had Scotus as a worthy predecessor, although they fail to address the issue of the actual historical connection.

A recurrent theme in these essays concerns how influential Scotus was during the modern period. We see his influence stretching from Suarez through Descartes, Leibniz and Kant, up to those like Peirce and Heidegger. Like Kant, Scotus divorces prudence from moral excellence, and morality from personal fulfillment and natural necessity. Descartes echoes Scotus and the Augustinian tradition when speaking of 'right reason' and 'the light of reason'. [528; 542] Honnefelder is right to say that Scotus' influence has not been recognized sufficiently, and much needs to be done to appreciate his worth. This volume helps in this endeavor by raising many interesting avenues of inquiry into the importance of Scotus as a great philosopher, one whose influence on the modern period has been relatively neglected. Its papers are generally of high quality. By and large, though, this is a book for specialists, and will not by itself make Scotus' influence clear to a more general audience.

Kutztown

ALLAN BÄCK

L'enseignement des disciplines à la Faculté des arts (Paris et Oxford, XIII^e-XV^e siècles), eds. Olga Weijers, Louis Holtz. Brepols, Turnhout and Paris 1997, *Studia Artistarum* 4, 562 pp. ISBN 2-503-50571-6

The history of universities and schools has recently been the subject of growing scholarly attention. The present volume consists of the proceedings of a congress held in Paris at the Institut de France in May 1995, organized by Olga Weijers and Louis Holtz, under the auspices of the *Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique*. These veterans of the historiography of medieval universities chose the topic of the Faculty of Arts from the thirteenth to the fifteenth century because the position and influence of this faculty, its relation to the other faculties, and its methods of instruction have so far been relatively under-researched. The volume's twenty-eight articles (twenty-one in French, six in English, one in Italian) are divided into seven sections (labelled inexplicably with six roman numerals): the institutional framework; the *trivium*; the *quadrivium*; the new Aristotle; methods of instruction; the relations of the arts to theology and philosophy; and the influence of the Parisian model. Each section is introduced by a general lecture on the *status questionis*, after which various scholars present their current research in shorter contributions. Each section concludes with a roundtable discussion. The title promises to give equal attention to Paris and Oxford, but someone with a specific interest in English universities will be disappointed; more than three quarters of the research presented focuses on Paris, suggesting that Oxford was added as an afterthought. Still, by looking mainly at the Parisian model, with excursions to Oxford, important conclusions can be drawn for the place of the Arts Faculty within the framework of medieval education.

Vergier's introduction on the institutional framework of the Arts Faculty in both Paris

and Oxford raises important issues, although he admits that there are more questions than the sources can answer. What were the differences between Paris and Oxford? How did the Arts faculty fit into the federative body of the entire university? Who exactly were these arts students who made up circa eighty percent of the student population? Verger concludes that most of them were less young than generally has been supposed (17-20 years), and most either finished with a B.A. or dropped out before that. (This would suggest that some of the changes in the student body often associated with the Renaissance were actually less pronounced than previously thought.) Students who seriously wanted to advance to, say, theology, often found their preparation not in the Arts Faculty, but in local mendicant *studia*. The roundtable discussion that concludes this section underlines the need for more prosopographical research, and the contributions of Lusignan (on Parisian colleges) and Courtenay (presenting the data of the University *computus* of 1329/30) show that this type of research can indeed offer interesting perspectives.

Closely connected to the institutional framework is the question of the methods of instruction: what actually went on in the classroom? Weijers gives a largely biographical introduction to the *status questionis* in this field, and concludes that despite a growing interest (modestly, she does not mention that much of this growing interest is due to her own scholarly activities), more research remains to be done. Not only is there a large discrepancy between our interest in methods of instruction and the availability of source materials, as is pointed out in the roundtable discussion, but another problem is the great diversity from one place to the next. Can research results for Paris simply be extrapolated to other institutions? (This intriguing question is addressed by Buzzetti in the last section of this volume, on the influence of the "Parisian model".) The basic methods of instruction were the lecture (treated in an interesting contribution by Maierù on the terminology of the *lectiones ordinaria*, *extra-ordinaria*, and *cursorie*) and the disputation (which not only provided the basic argumentation method, but also eventually gave the masters new research materials, as Weijers shows in her contribution). For those who wonder how actual instruction was eventually recorded in texts, Hamesse's contribution discusses the technique of *reporatio*. In the same section, Lafleur makes a convincing case for a closer examination of "textes didascaliques", descriptions of the student curriculum, as a distinctive genre.

The curriculum in the arts faculty is traditionally described as the *trivium* and the *quadrivium*. But to what extent did this distinction reflect a pedagogical reality? Ebbesen and Rosier launch a frontal attack on the idea that the Aristotelian model of the seven liberal arts reflected in any way the reality of teaching in the Arts Faculty; already in the twelfth century, they argue, it was nothing but a theoretical construct. In their view the *trivium* was a myth. Students entering the Arts Faculty were already versed in basic grammar. Grammar in the Arts Faculty was not a basic linguistic skill, but closely linked with logic, giving rise to speculative grammar, and ultimately, a sophisticated way of thinking and argumentation. In the same section, in an argument that is at times so subtle it seems to contradict itself, Braakhuis examines more closely the constitutional setting of the *logica modernorum*, concluding that its main texts were intended for preparatory teaching. To what degree rhetoric was part of the Arts education remains subject to debate. Common opinion seems to agree that the *artes epistolandi* and *artes predicandi* were not a university genre, but this view is challenged by Ward, who argues that despite its minor place in the curriculum, universities did play a central role in the dissemination of rhetorical theory.

If the concept of the *trivium* must be challenged, what about the *quadrivium*? Regrettably, the contributions in this section of the volume are hardly representative of the entire *quadrivium*. Beaujouan nicely outlines the field, and concludes that the curriculum was fundamentally transformed by the influx of Arabo-Latin translations of scientific texts at the end of the twelfth century, but the contributions following this general introduction are somewhat unevenly distributed. There is one on astronomy (Lejbowicz) and two on music (Maître and Vellekoop). Mathematics seems an especially grave omission here.

The next section (with contributions by Cova, De Rijk, and Luscombe) suggests that the Arts curriculum may have been defined less by the division into seven arts than by a particular body of texts. As Lohr shows, by 1255 the *Novus Aristoteles*, Aristotle's works on ethics and natural philosophy, newly available in translations from the Arabic, had become the basic texts in the Parisian arts faculty. The influence of the Arabic tradition was considerable, since most of Aristotle's texts were interpreted through Averroes's commentaries and compendia. Despite the enormous progress the new Aristotle represented in natural science and psychology, the incompatibility of Averroan Aristotelianism and some basic points of Christian doctrine would lead to heated controversies, and eventually to the condemnation of certain Aristotelian doctrines in 1277.

"Philosophy" in the medieval university was both more and less than Aristotelianism. In another section entitled "Philosophie et théologie," De Libera points out that while both the Arts and the Theology Faculty were unmistakably philosophical in content and method, neither fully deserves the label. Theologians remained critical of the philosophical concepts the Arts curriculum offered. As Bataillon argues, theologians made free use of philosophical notions, but still considered philosophy the handmaiden of theology, perhaps because they were on the defensive, outnumbered by the masters in the Arts Faculty.

Volumes of conference proceedings tend to carry broad and ambitious titles, while offering a bundle of disparate data rather than a synthetic point of view. The present volume is no exception. If this dense and learned compilation suggests any single conclusion, it is that this field merits more attention and detailed study, especially in prosopographical research and in the editing of newly found texts. For those whose interest is less specialized, Hilde de Ridder-Symoens's more synthetic *History of the University in Europe* may offer a better read; *L'enseignement des disciplines* surely merits a place as a indispensable supplement to it.

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The De Rijk-Files

Internet address:

http://www.leidenuniv.nl/philosophy/text/RIJK_BOS.HTM

Database of medieval Latin Texts on logic and semantics in medieval manuscripts, founded on the card files of Professor em. L.M. de Rijk.

During his entire career Professor L.M. de Rijk has compiled notes on medieval manuscripts containing logical texts. From 1953 onwards he visited a great number of libraries in Europe, he studied many microfilms, and analysed numerous catalogues. He took down shelfmarks, folio numbers, titles of tracts, author names, names of the author commented on, incipits, explicits, colophon, year or centuries. He recorded these data on filing cards and made use of them for many of his books and articles.

This personal filing system, if accessible, would be of great value for all students of the field. On the initiative of Dr. Olga Weyers (Constantijn Huygens Institute) and Dr. E.P. Bos (Leiden University) funds were made available to appoint Drs. Corinna Vermeulen to format the database, in collaboration with Dr. Bos, so that it now can be used as a repertory of medieval latin texts on logic and semantics in medieval manuscripts (medieval in both cases meaning written between 500 and 1500). The *ars vetus* and *ars nova* themselves (including texts with interlinear or marginal glosses and *De sex principiis*) are left out. The database contains commentaries on the *ars vetus* and *nova*, texts belonging to the *logica moderna*, and other texts on logic, such as tracts *De artibus liberalibus* or just pages of notes. Manuals belong to the *Logica moderna* are split up into tracts, commentaries on the *ars vetus* or *nova* into commentaries on the separate works (but not further into commentaries on book I, book II etc.). As a rule texts from manuscripts after 1500 are not included; but this rule is not applied too strictly, because the manuscript might turn out to be medieval after all. Codicological and palaeographical aspects are noted only when relevant for the history of the text (for instance provenance and colophon are included, but format and material are omitted).

In many records, a large part of the fields is still empty; often because the codex simply does not contain a colophon, the provenance is unknown and the fields «umbrella title» and «author comm.» are not relevant, but just as often because the necessary information is not in the files. The data have been supplemented where possible from the available catalogues (covering of course only part of the libraries).

Supplements of the most important information (for instance folio numbers, incipit) have been made from microfilms accessible, but as the number of these microfilms increases, more information is forthcoming.

From the character of the database as the electronic version of a personal filing system follows that it is incomplete. Users are cordially invited to send their own personal files in addition to these presented here in order to correct and improve the database. These corrections and improvements will be incorporated in the database together with our own supplements.

Thanks are due to the Constantijn Huygens Institute for Text-Editions and Intellectual History (Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences), The Electronic Text Centre Leiden and the Department of Philosophy (Leiden University) for additional grants, which made it possible for Mrs. Corinna Vermeulen to correct and format the database, and for study of some libraries in Northern Italy by E.P. Bos.

Users are invited to send corrections and additions to:

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